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Abstract of T h e s i s .
Some historians have depicted industrial welfare as of 
small significance in the development of British industrial 
relations. This thesis contains case-studies of many firms
and industries which illustrate the prevalence of company 
welfare provision between 1846-1939 and its usefulness to 
employers as a labour strategy. While there have been works 
on specific welfare schemes, this is a monographic study of 
industrial welfare enabling comparisons to be made between 
very different industries. The thesis also identifies the 
formative influences upon the organisation of company
provision over a broad time span.
Highly capitalised industries needed to invest more in
the stability and reliability of their workforces than other 
trades. Moreover, market control enabled companies to 
exercise a greater degree of forward planning in the
management of production, capital and men. As natural 
monopolies and the first large-scale enterprises, railways
were innovators in industrial management and in the provision
of industrial welfare. In more competitive trades, the
passing of small firm and ex gratia paternalism and its 
replacement by more systematic welfare schemes usually 
followed the formation of large, corporate firms from the 
1890s onwards. Changes in the organisation of industrial
welfare tended to follow the establishment of the managerial
bureaucracies and structures suited to the large company.
The thesis argues that profitsharing can only be 
understood as an element of industrial welfare provision. It
shows that, rather than welfare being mainly concerned with 
factory conditions, employers were more interested in the 
questions of income maintenance, sick pay and old age
pe n s i o n s .
Consequently, employers lobbied Parliament to prevent 
their industrial welfare schemes from being made redundant by 
social legislation. By influencing the final form of
government proposals, they ensured until the Second World War
that company provision was able to continue as part of state
welfare schemes.
Industrial Relations and Welfare Capitalism 
in Britain, 1846-19 39 .
Chapter 1
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Industrial Relations, the Company, 
and Welfare.
(i) Introduction: industrial relations 
and welfare capitalism
(ii) Collective Bargaining and Scientific 
Management
(iii) Paternalism, Industrial Welfare and 
the Company
(iv) Industrial Welfare as a Labour Strategy
(v) Markets and Case-studies.
p. 8
The Railways, M o n o p o l y , and Labour 
M a n a g e m e n t . p . 53
(i ) Introduction
(ii) The Railways and Corporate Management
(iii) Internal Labour Markets and Industrial 
Welfare
(iv) The Railways and Industrial 
Welfare, 1846-1914
(a) Introduction
(b) Origins
(c) Employers Liability and Actuarial 
Valuation
(d) Collective Bargaining and National 
Insurance
(e) Summary
(V ) Rationalisation and Industrial Welfare, 
1914-1939 
(vi) Conclusion.
Industry and Labour in the Metropolitan
Gas Industry. p . 106
(i) Introduction
(ii) Municipal Regulation and 
Rationalisation
(iii) Work Discipline and Industrial Welfare
(iv) The Extension of Industrial Welfare
(V ) Conclusion.
The Development o f the Large-scale Enterprise
and Company-based Industrial Relations
Policies in the Iron and Steel Industry. p . 152
(i) Introduction
(ii) Economic Development, Corporate 
Management and Welfare Policy
(iii) Industrial Welfare and the Steel 
Industry, 1870-1914:
(a) Company Practice
(b) Social Welfare Legislation
(c) Summary
(iv) World War One and State Intervention
(V ) The Corporate Company and Industrial
Wei far e (I ):the Tariff and Profitability 
(V ) The Corporate Company and Industrial 
Welfare (II): 1918-1930
(v) The Corporate Economy and Industrial 
Welfare(III), 1930-1939 :
(a) The United Steel Companies
(b) Dorman-Long
(c ) Richard Thomas and Company
(d) Stewart and Lloyds
(V ) The Corporate Economy and Industrial 
Welfare(IV): Summary
(vi) Conclusion.
Chapter 5 System a t 1c 
Welfare in
Ma nagement and Industrial
the C h emi c als Indus t r y .
(i) Introduction 
(i i ) Unilever
(iii) Imperial Chemicals Industries
(i v ) C o n c l u s i o n .
p. 226
Chapter 6: The Labour Q u estion in______
(i) Introduction
(ii) Brewery Paternalism
(iii) Conclusion.
the Breweries p. 269
Chapter 7: The Place of Industrial W e lfare in
British In d u s t r y .
( i ) Introduction
(ii) Textiles
(iii) Coalmining
(iv) ShipbuiId ing
(V ) The Engineering Industry
(vi) The Materials Users
(vii) The Electrical Goods Industry
(viii) The Motor Car Industry
(ix) Food and Tobacco
(X ) The Boot and Shoe Industry
(x i ) C o n c l u s i o n .
p. 290
Chapter 8: The Labour Copartnership Association and
the Industrial Welfare S o c i e t y . p . 384
(i ) Introduct ion
(ii) Labour Copartnership Association
(iii) Industrial Welfare Society
(iv) C o n c l u s i o n .
Chapter 9; Industry and Social R e f o r m .
(iii)
p. 413
( iv )
( V )
(vi)
(vii)
Introduction
Employers' Liability, 1880-1906
The Shop Clubs Act 1902, and the Liberal
Welfare Reforms, 1908-11
The Whitley Council Scheme and the
National Industrial Alliance
Housing and Education
The Unemployment Insurance Act
1920 and the Pensions Act 1925
Co n c l u s i o n .
E pilogue . p . 483
* * * * *
T a b l e s .
T a b 1e I :
Table II:
Table 11 :
Table IV: 
Table V:
Railwaymen's Friendly Socities and Savings 
Banks, 1833-1930. p . 91
Average Weekly Wages of Manual Workers on
an Industry by Industry Basis, 1886-1930. p . 485
Employment Statistics of Industrial
Manual Workers, 1871-1931. p . 486
Company Personnel Organisation (1952). p . 487
Average Per Company Cost of State and Industrial
Welfare Services in Britain in 1954
(based on the experience of Bakelite Ltd). p . 488
Biblioqraphy
Primary Sources. 
Secondary Sources.
p. 489 
p. 495
* * * *
P r e f a c e .
I am thankful to a number of institutions which allowed me 
to research their archives and which freely offered their 
time and help. These are: the British Steel Corporation's 
Record Offices, Unilever PLC, Imperial Chemicals Industries 
PLC, the Brewers' Society, the Industrial Participation 
Association, and the Industrial Society. I am, of course, 
also indebted to public institutions, like the Public Record 
Office, the Greater London Record Office, the Westminister 
Record Office, the British Library, the University of London 
Library, and the British Library of Political and Economic 
S c i e n c e .
The renamed Economic and Social Research Council should also 
be acknowledged for its role as a financer of research, and 
for, in particular, funding the undertaking of this thesis.
Lastly and above all, the knowledgeable and persevering 
supervision I received from Dr John Turner, now at Royal 
Holloway and Bedford New College, receives my special 
g r a t i t u d e .
Chapter 1 .
Industria l Relations, the Company, and Welfare.
( i ). Introduction :_____industrial relations and welfare
capitali s m .
This thesis assesses the place of industrial welfare in 
British labour management from 1846-1939. It concentrates on 
the role of the company and its internal organisation rather 
than upon the growth of trades unionism, collective 
bargaining, and battles over wages and hours. Businessmen 
use ma ny techniques to restrain industrial conflict, from 
supervisory control, the deskilling of work, and collective 
bargaining, to reliance on slack in the labour market. But 
the importance of welfare in industrial relations has more 
often been overlooked, with the exception of the pioneering 
research of Joseph Melling into specific welfare schemes.^ 
This thesis aims to present a monographic study of 
industrial welfare over the m c i e t y  years before the Second 
World War.
There are few works about the development of British 
management practice, and the existence of industrial welfare 
poses questions about the nature of firms and their labour 
policies. The behaviour of companies and employers cannot be 
understood with reference only to the market theories of 
neo-classical economists, which depict employers and workers 
as "rational" agents seeking maximum reward for minimum 
1. Cf. Melling in the Bibliography.
effort.^ According to such theories, employers and workers 
would have bargained with each other as equals in the 
market-place to determine the division between profits and 
wages. Employers were merely profit-maximisers, refusing to 
produce beyond the point where factor costs became greater 
than the revenue from each subsequent article produced. 
Competition forced employers to hire and fire workers as the 
fluctuations in market forces dictated. It is no coincidence 
that the theories of neo-classical economics were evolved 
during the 19th Century, when the British economy was 
characterised by small competitive firms and notorious trade 
c y c l e s .
Men, of course, were never simply materialistic
rationalists, and competition between companies rarely
reflected the explanatory models of economic text-books.
Because businessmen had greater resources and owned the
capital, the bargaining relationship was in reality an
unequal one. Industrial relations, therefore, were often a
matter of power and cl ass-conf1ict and a cause of social
divisions, rather than some objective mechanism between
employers and workers to secure economic efficiency. As
human institutions, companies required pragmatic solutions
to cope with the "social" context of industrial production.
In addition, the "economic" context of highly
competitive markets, which had so influenced industrial
relations, altered. From the 1890s onwards, mergers between
1. Cf. W.S.devons T h e  Theory of Political Economy
(I87I); A.Marshall Principles of Economics (1890).
Cf. also P.L.Williams The Emergence of the Theory
of the Firm: from Adam Smith to Alfred Marshall
(1978 ) .
companies created a growing number of large and
oligopolistic concerns.^ A.D.Chandler has outlined the
growth patterns of the "modern" corporation. He argues that
employers had strategies other than profit-maximisation
through the market mechanism. Large companies run by
managerial bureaucracies aimed to replace markets with the
planning of production from the raw material to the
distribution stage. Such a company structure was designed to
secure supplies or product-markets, and to improve the speed
2
and cost of processing and selling goods. The implications 
of these industrial developments for micro-economic theory 
have been more fully worked out by O.E.Williamson and other 
economists. Their work undermines neo-classical assumptions 
about profit-maximisation as the single motive of companies. 
Managers, having different interests to shareholders, often 
put sales-maximisation before the search for profits.^
H.F.Gospel, C.R.Littler and others have pointed out 
that larger company structures had implications for labour 
management. They link developments in business organisation
1. L.Hannah The Rise of the Corporate Economy (1979).
2. Cf. A.D.Chandler Strategy and Structure (1973);
The Visible Hand (1977).
3. Cf. under W.J.Baumol, R.M.Cyert & J.G.March, 
J .K .G a l b r a i t h , L.Hannah & J.A.Kay, R.Marris, 
R.Marris & A.Wood, O.E.Williamson in the 
Bibliography. Challenges to theories of perfect 
competition began in the 1930s with works like
E .H .Chamber 1 in The Theory of Monopolistic
Competition (1933); & J.Robinson The Economics of 
Imperfect Competition ( 19 3 3 ) .
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with deskilling and the growth of internal labour markets.
By replacing manual skills, machinery and production-line
technology cheapened labour, made it more easily
replaceable, and allowed managers to assume the actual
organisation and planning of work. Such policies were made
famous by the "scientific management" theories of
F.W.Taylor.^ Furthermore, oligipolistic companies which
enjoyed greater market stability were in a position to
undertake long-term planning. Labour could, therefore, be
employed on an equally long-term basis, and a core of
permanently-employed workers could be offered job-security
and a career and benefits structure within the company.
Workers could also be employed directly. While employers had
traditionally left labour management to foremen or
sub-contractors, managers began to take over responsibility
for hiring, firing, work-organisation, and industrial
discipline. The sub-contracting of work to a leading-hand
had been common in steel manufacture and coal-mining,
although it had never had a place in an industry like the
railways with their large managerial bureaucracies.
Sub-contracting remained prominent in British industry until
2
the Second World War.
As company structures so influenced industrial 
relations, an examination of the connection between 
commercial considerations, business organisation, and
industrial welfare is a central part of this thesis. It 
recognises that the form and purpose of welfare schemes were
1. Cf. s.(ii) below.
2. H.F.Gospel & C.R.Littler Managerial Strategies and
Industrial Relations (1983), esp. p p . 1-24,171-196.
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influenced by many factors like traditions of early 
paternalism, the siting of companies and their labour-supply 
problems, the type of labour employed, the demands of
work-discipline, union organisation, and the extent of 
capitalisation and internal labour markets. The greatest 
influence, however, was the nature of a company or an 
industry's market. The history of industrial welfare in
natural monopolies like railways is markedly different from 
that of competitive trades like iron and steel production. 
But the increasing control of competitive markets through 
corporate structures enabled those companies engaged in them 
to adopt to some degree the internal labour markets and 
welfare practices of railways.
This work seeks to establish industrial welfare as an 
important aspect of the employment relationship for the 
larger part of the British workforce. Salaried staff, who 
enjoyed job-security and formed the earliest internal labour 
markets, undoubtedly received sick pay and pension benefits. 
As managers, their loyalty was essential to the running of
the firm, and, with the creation of large managerial 
bureaucracies from the turn of the century, companies needed 
to increase their investment in their staff. But the 
experiences of salaried workers were not typical of 
employees generally, and their particular circumstances make 
the extensive welfare services provided for them worthy of a 
separate study. Moreover, the existence of perquisites for 
salaried workers is not a contentious issue, whereas the 
applicability and importance of welfare schemes for manual
12
British workers is.^
The thesis does not cover every aspect of industrial
relations during this period. Nor does it assume that its
subject matter can be considered as more important than
questions of collective bargaining or deskilling. It is a
history of the industrial relations of welfare capitalism. 
The term welfare capitalism is not meant to imply freedom 
from economic exploitation. Unregulated markets were
widespread enough to cause misery and poverty, but many
employers, at least in practice, recognised that the
wage-contract or the labour market transaction of popular 
economic theory was an inadequate means of managing,
organising or fully utilising a workforce. Workers in 
sickness, infirmity, and old age required
income-maintenance. This factor was, before the
establishment of a Welfare State, an overriding 
consideration of the real labour market. Because companies 
were human institutions, many companies realised the value 
of meeting the needs of their workforces, upon which 
efficient production depended. Industrial welfare was 
clearly more a question of business organisation than one
of philanthropy or social justice.
Before outlining the history of industrial welfare from
1846 to 1939, it will be necessary, in section (ii), to
discuss industrial relations in general, including the
issues of scientific management and collective bargaining.
1. Cf. comments in Gospel and Littler (1983),
pp.16-7; & C.R.Littler The Development of the
Labour Process in Capitalist Societies ( 19 8 2 ) ,
pp . 90-2,198-9.
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Section (iii) will review the origins of welfare provision 
in British industry, and explain how developments in 
managerial strategies and structures influenced the nature 
and organisation of company provision. Section (iv) will 
look at the underlying purpose of industrial welfare as a 
labour strategy for employers. The last section will explain 
the framework of the thesis.
14
(ii). Collective Bargaining and Scientific Management.
Employers were able to adopt a number of labour
strategies, including, in addition to welfare, collective
bargaining and scientific management.^ The rise of trades
unionism led employers into negotiations, for collective
bargaining was often preferable to conflict. Furthermore,
the economy in this period was largely dependent upon the
skills and labour of its workers and not upon machinery and
technology. Craftsmen exercised a degree of unilateral
self-regulation in the organisation of work, sometimes
through the system of sub-contracting. Limited managerial
direction gave skilled workers a strong negotiating
position. The scope for autonomous work-regulation and its
2
influence on industrial relations has been exaggerated, but 
employers did make collective bargaining agreements in order 
to increase their control over the pace, price and 
organisation of work. Trade cycles were also an important 
influence. A fall in economic activity exacerbated questions 
of wages and hours, and employers willingly negotiated if 
the result was an agreed cut in wage rates.^ Union leaders 
could sometimes ensure the acceptance of joint agreements 
despite rank and file objections, and, for employers, 
industrial discipline was, consequently, easier to enforce.
1. Cf. J.Turner "Man and Braverman: British
Industrial Relations", History (1985), pp.236-242, 
which is a useful review article on industrial 
relations literature.
2. Cf. R.Price Masters, Unions, and Men (1980).
3. Cf. K.Burgess The Origins of British Industrial
Relations: the 19th Century Experience (19 7 5) .
15
Unions, in return, won the advantage of official recognition 
as the representative organisations of their members. 
Collective bargaining provided workers with some say in the 
determination of pay and conditions, instead of leaving such 
issues to the arbitrary decisions of individual managers and 
f o r e m e n .^
Employers associations and collective bargaining dealt
in most cases with the primary questions of wages and hours,
but these two issues were only a part of the vexed problem
of employment relations. National and regional bargains
before 1939 in iron and steel, cotton-spinning, and
coalmining were basically sI iding-scaIe arrangements in
which wages fluctuated with the market price of the product.
Collective bargaining merely made the market determination
2
of wages and hours more acceptable to workers. The 1898 
Terms of Settlement in the engineering industry, on the 
other hand, accepted the right of management to determine 
the manning, operation, and pace of machinery. It also
sought to remove any limitation on the numbers of 
apprentices in the hope of cheapening the supply of skilled 
labour.^ But Jonathan Zeitlin has pointed out that even the 
powerful Engineering Employers Federation failed at the 
factory-floor to gain the full exercise of managerial
prerogative for its members. The importance of labour skills 
to production could not be replaced by signed agreement.
1. A.Flanders "Collective Bargaining: A Theoretical
Analysis", British J 1 . o f Industrial Relations
( 1968 ) , pp . 1-26.
2. Cf. R.Currie Industrial Politics (1979).
3. Cf. E.L.Wigham The Power to Manage (1973), pp.
54-73.
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Such a transition required investment in new machinery, and 
the small firms of the engineering industry did not have the 
resources to undertake large-scale mass production. 
Competitive rivalries, moreover, would have made such 
investment unprofitable. It was company and industrial 
structures and not collective bargaining which limited the 
possibilities for internal management.^ The 1898 Settlement, 
in any case, allowed individual companies the flexibility of 
workplace bargaining over wage-rates, piecework, and 
o v e r t i m e .^
Where employers associations existed, the independence 
and sovereignty of the company was not necessarily 
undermined. The British iron and steel, textile, coalmining, 
shipbuilding, engineering, and motor car industries were 
examples of failures of cooperation amongst employers.^ This 
situation was reflected in the chemicals trade before 1914. 
Iron and steel was particularly notable for its regional 
collective bargaining machinery from the 1860s onwards. But 
steel companies often undermined their regional associations 
by bidding up the wages fixed by agreement, if it was in 
their short-term interests.^ Furthermore, companies like the 
railways required a complex set of rules governing the 
relations between workers, supervisors, and managers just to 
operate. The devolving of reponsibilities over labour
1. J.Zeitlin "The Labour Strategies of British 
Engineering Employers, 1890-1922" in Gospel & 
Littler (1983), pp.25-54.
2. Wigham (1973), p.59.
3. Cf. C h . 4, & C h . 7, s s . (i i ),(iii),(iv),(viii).
4. J.C.Carr & W.Tapi in History of the British Steel
Industry (1962), pp . 73-4,145-6,149-150.
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matters to conciliation boards was, therefore, opposed by
the companies as a hindrance to the smooth running of their
large enterprises. The railway industry fought against the
prospect of trades union interference and joint
negotiations. The conciliation boards established in 1907
were forced upon the railways by the Liberal government, and
in any case instituted bargaining only at a company level.^
It is hard to discern a trend towards national
collective bargaining before the Great War. The Whitley
Report in 1916-17 recognised the deficiencies of the pre-War
2
industrial relations system. Employers associations were 
often poorly supported, limited in their aims, and split by 
the divergent interests within them. War-time interest in 
joint negotiation waned with the power of the trades union 
movement during the 1920s, and the patchy framework of 
collective bargaining was continued. It was within companies 
that important developments took place.^ The commercial and 
managerial decisions of industrial giants like I.C.I. and 
Unilever,^ or even of companies like United Steel and 
Stewart and Lloyds^ proved more important than those of 
their respective associations.
Henry Braverman has outlined the restructuring of work
1. Cf. C h . 2, s s .{i ),(i i ),(i i i ),(iv ) (d).
2. Cf. C h . 9, s . ( i v ) .
3. W.R.Garside "Management and Men: Aspects of
British Industrial Relations in the Inter-War
Period" in B.Supple Essays in Business History
(1977), p p . 244-267; & Hannah (1979), p p . 27-40, 
90-122.
4. Cf. C h . 5.
5. Cf. C h . 4, s.(v)(III) .
18
in the 20th Century as an explanation of the way employers 
determined the nature of industrial relations within 
companies. Manual skills were replaced with the furthest 
division of labour, and broken up into many repetitive 
processes. Workers became unskilled and easily replaceable. 
These trends in production were aided by developments in 
mass-production technology, and managerial supervision 
replaced labour's control over the organisation of work. 
Braverman's study begins with an analysis of F.W.Taylor, who 
published his Principles of Scientific Management in 1913.^ 
Taylor argued that scientific management required the 
manager's organisational skills to be coupled with the 
brute-force of the worker and preferably one with the 
"mentality of an ox". The underlying assumption of Taylorism 
was that workers were both lazy and stupid. Inefficient, 
"rule-of-thumb" techniques could be replaced by scientific 
ones, and labour had to be shown how high wages depended 
upon low labour costs and increased output. The manager 
could analyse any task, and calculate the most economical 
methods of work. Then, the "unit efficiency", equal to what 
the "best" man could produce in a given time, could be 
calculated. Bonuses would be paid for output over the 
stipulated amount.
The scientific measurement of unit output would ensure 
that the task was within human capacity, and measured 
rest-periods would enable output to be sustained over a long 
period. Production could be increased by the breaking up of 
work into repetitive, easily learnt tasks, and the manager
1. H.Braverman L abor and Monopoly Capital (19 74).
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was then responsible for ensuring coordination between the
segmented operations of each worker. Moreover, "It is only
through enforced standardisation of methods, enforced
adoption of the best implements of working conditions, and
enforced cooperation that this faster work can be assured.
And the duty of enforcing the adoption of standards and of
enforcing this cooperation rests with management alone".
Taylor assumed that high wages would make managerial
authoritarianism acceptable, and provide a solution to class
conflict and industrial relations problems.^
Braverman's study, however, is not a detailed
2
historical analysis of Taylorism. There were several 
reasons why Taylor's principles could not be applied in
British industry. In 1913, Edward Cadbury, a leading partner 
in the famous Quaker chocolate firm, replied to Taylor's 
book. He acknowledged that any employer was concerned about
the scientific organisation of labour and machinery on the
factory floor. Consequently, the flow of work from one 
department to another had to be planned centrally. But he 
criticised Taylor for ignoring the human costs of 
production. Cadbury argued that trades unions would resist 
any system which speeded up work and that individual men
could not be reduced to living tools. Industrial disputes, 
moreover, were not merely a fight for higher wages and 
shorter hours, but stemmed also from "an increasing 
knowledge on the part of the workman of his lack of control
1. F.W.Taylor The Principles of Scientific Management 
(1913), p p . 9-12,26,32-9,83,92,143.
2. Cf. S.Wood (ed.) The Degradation of Work; Skill, 
Deskilling, and the Labour Process (1982); Littler 
( 1982 ) .
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of the conditions of his own life". In practice, workers had
to be consulted by management and feel that their
personalities and labour were of worth. Cadbury Brothers had
Suggestions Committees elected by workers and staff.
Part-time education for teenage employees was training for
life and citizenship as well as for the rigours of
industrial discipline. Cadburys saw the efficiency and
welfare of a worker as inseparable. Full efficiency required
the workers' cooperation and loyalty, and, therefore,
demonstrable proof of their mutual interests with employers.
Housing, sick pay and pensions were provided as part of a
just employment policy at Cadburys.^
Yet Taylor had been a manager and did not deprecate
"semi-philanthropic and paternal aids". For "This kind of
so-called welfare work all tends to improve and elevate the
workman and make life better worth living. Viewed from the
managers' standpoint they are valuable aids in making more
intelligent and better workmen, and in promoting kindly
2
feeling among the men for their employers". At other times, 
Taylor ridiculed welfare work.^ But Urwick and Brech, in 
tracing the acceptance of scientific management in British
1. E.Cadbury "Scientific Management in Industry: the 
Case against Scientific Management" (1913), 
p p . 1-3,5-7 in A.D.Chandler Management Thought in 
Britain (1979). The Guild Socialist, G.D.H.Cole, 
however, doubted if the minima of control given to 
workers at Cadburys would assuage labour demands 
(pp.36-7). Cf. Ch . 7, s.(ix).
2. F.W.Taylor Shop Management (1911), p p . 58,118-9, 
199-120.
3. D.Nelson & S.Campbell "Taylorism versus Welfare
Work in American Industry: H.L.Gantt and the
Bancrofts", Am.H.R. ( 1972 ), p . 5. Taylor's remarks 
are quoted by his biographer, F.B.Copley, in 1915.
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industry from 1895-1915, placed great importance on the
"human" aspects of management. They had changed attitudes
and so eased the introduction of scientific techniques.^
Just as the engineering industry's capital structure
and segmented markets prevented the introduction of
2
scientific management techniques, British motor car 
producers rejected the Taylorism supposedly popularised by
Henry Ford in Detroit. They relied upon a mixture of
industrial welfare and bonuses. Like Cadburys, they sought
cooperation rather than authoritarianism.^ Indeed, Fords
itself introduced profitsharing in 1914 and began organising 
clubs and social events after the Great War. One
contemporary commentator linked the development of the
American corporation with the introduction of welfare 
schemes. General Motors, quoted by Chandler as the principal 
founder of corporate management techniques, was an 
enthusiastic supporter of industrial welfare, and had
introduced by 1929 stock ownership, sickness and accident 
insurance, a savings plan, and sports and recreational 
facilities.^ J.D.Mooney, Vice-President of General Motors, 
in 1937 believed that the channels of information from the 
bottom to the top were as important as the chains of
command. They were the only way of instilling a common
1. L.Urwick & E.F.L.Brech The Making of Scientific 
M a n agement, Vol.II (1949), p p . 102,193-4.
2. Cf. above.
3. W.Lewchuck "Fordism and British Motor Car 
Employers 1896-1932" in Gospel and Littler (1983),
p p . 82-110.
4. R.W.Dunn Labor and Automobiles (1929), p p . 148-9, 
151-6,158-9.
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purpose. Mooney argued that the problems of human relations
in industry were more urgent than those of efficiency in
production. The dilemma between the individual worker and
the group or the company were solvable by guarantees of
social security for workers. Continuity of employment,
however, was dependent upon the stable economic conditions
which the corporate company could provide. Mooney was
critical of state social security because it did not enable
workers to identify with their place of work.^ If Fords'
welfare schemes were ungenerous, this was a product of its
lack of internal managerial development rather than the
success of Taylorism. The personal and autocratic style of
Henry Ford contributed to the rapid decline of his firm's
2
profits and market share during the Inter-War years.
Littler has demonstrated that the influence of 
Taylorism in Britain was significantly diminished by trades 
union resistance, and the continuation of traditional, more 
pragmatic management.^ Employers adjusted theory to the 
practicalities of industrial life, and Taylorism emerged as 
only one of many strands of scientific management. Another
1. J.D.Mooney "The Principles of Organisation" (1937)
in L.H.Gulick & L.P.Urwick Papers o n  the Science
of Administration (1969, 1st edn. 1937), p p . 93-8.
C f . C h . 9, e s p . s . (i ) .
2. Chandler ( 1973), pp. 114-161 ,372-3 . Cf. C h . 7,
s .(viii).
3. Littler (1982), pp.80-96. This criticism applies
also to the system introduced by the Bedaux
company in the 1930s. As management consultants, 
they sought to determine a "fair" unit of work 
within a set time, and to pay workers by results.
The Bedaux system had only limited success in 
"new", expanding industries like food processing, 
chemicals, and electrical engineering, and was 
resisted by management and unions (pp.99-140).
23
^factor" psychology, was prominent in Britain because the 
demands of war-production interested government in the 
problems of industrial fatigue. Both manpower and armaments 
were in short supply. Long working hours, however, brought 
diminishing productivity and resulted in greater 
absenteeism, bad time-keeping and reduced effort. The Health 
of Munitions Workers Committee of 1915-17 was appointed to 
investigate the problem. Improvements in workshop conditions 
were introduced in controlled establishments and munitions 
factories with the object of increasing productivity.^
The growth in the size of munitions factories caused 
"the numerous problems of labour efficiency and the personal 
welfare of the employees". One large employer submitted 
evidence to the Health of Munitions Workers Committee 
acknowledging that increasing factory size involved " 'duties 
beyond those realised through the medium of the wage
o f f i c e  '" The firm had, therefore, adopted "'an
organised system of what is called social or welfare work". 
It aimed to humanize shop-floor conditions and "keep alive 
those right relationships which are the basis of a 
well-ordered and harmonious community'". Another employer 
told the Committee that welfare work " 'must not be regarded 
as something outside the ordinary factory management or
extraneous to it, but as a vital and integral part of the
whole discipline and right organisation of the business, in 
which the economic results justified the trouble and
1. Cf. N.Whiteside "Industrial Welfare and Labour 
Regulation in Britain at the Time of the First 
World War", I.R.S.H. (1980) p p . 307-331.
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original outlay'".^ The Committee believed that the best
could be obtained from the "human machine" by the
application of an "industrial scientific management" which
2
accounted for the health and contentment of workers. Hours 
were gradually decreased during the War till the eight hour 
day became the norm.^ Canteens were founded at places of 
work to provide hot, nourishing food. Lighting and heating 
were improved. Cloakrooms and lavatories were built, and the 
Ministry of Munitions undertook to provide armaments workers
4
with decent housing.
The Industrial Fatigue Research Board was founded in 
1918 as a direct successor to the Health of Munitions 
Workers Committee. It formed links with the National 
Institute of Industrial Psychology, established in 1921, 
which in the Inter-War period came under the direction and 
influence of the management theorist C.S.Myers. His writings 
and name became associated with "human factor" industrial 
psychology, which gradually came to concentrate on boredom  
and work-disaffaction rather than on physical fatigue. 
Myerism, like the welfare movement of the First World War, 
sought to increase unit output with a more empirical and 
broader approach than Taylor's single method. Yet it is hard 
to discern the practical benefits of "human factor"
1. PP 1914-16 (C.B151) xl 985. Report on Industrial 
Canteens, Memo. n o . 8.
2. PP 1916 (C.8213) xxxiii 449. Memo. n o . 7; Memo. no.10
3. Cf. PP 1914-16 (C.8133) xix 289. Health of 
Munitions Workers Committee.
4. Ministry of Munitions History of Ministry of
M u n i t i o n s , Vol.V (1919), p p . 44-56.
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research.^ Although it encouraged interest in shop-floor
conditions or in what was termed "internal" industrial
welfare, the working environment of most British workers
remained poor. Factories established by "new" industries in
the Midlands and South, and which, on their building,
incorporated welfare amenities into their structure were not 
2
typical. Questions of "external" industrial welfare, like 
pensions, sick-pay, or even sports and social clubs, did not 
concern Myerism. Yet it was "external" welfare which formed 
the basis of company provision, and it is, therefore, the 
major subject of this thesis. Myers admitted that industrial 
relations could be improved by state or employer support for 
workers during unemployment, ill-health, and old age, and by 
co-partnership or worker-involvement in management. But
"external" welfare was not part of the National Institute's
• I- 3 r emit.
The influence of the "Hawthorne experiment" and the 
works of Elton Mayo, although widely discussed in management 
literature, seem even less significant in practice. The 
Western Electric Company of Chicago undertook from 1924-1935 
the investigation of industrial behaviour at its Hawthorne 
Works. Its main conclusion was that individual output could 
be improved by the transfer of workers between jobs, or by
1. M.Rose Industrial Behaviour:______ Theoretical
Development since Taylor (1982), p p . 65-100. Cf.
C.S.Myers Industrial Psychology in Great Britain 
(1924) in particular.
2. H.Jones "Employers' Welfare Schemes and Industrial 
Relations in Inter-War Britain", Bus.Hist. (1983), 
pp.61-75.
3. Cf. C.S.Myers Business Rationalisation (19 32), 
p . 52. C f . C h . 8, s.(iv).
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any change which would relieve the monotony of factory
employment. Moreover, a worker's contentment at work was
connected with the companionship he gained while there.
Output often depended upon a semi-conscious assumption by
the workers about the maintenance of a level which would
protect their interests as a group. They would seek to avoid
the continual speeding up of production. Mayo argued that
management had to adapt these social instincts by
integrating them with loyalty to the company as a whole.
A.Carey has shown how the Hawthorne experiments produced few
results or conclusions of worth.^ Employers did not
reorganise work-systems and plant-layout to account for
2
"social sentiments" and individual requirements. "External" 
industrial welfare was a useful alternative because it did 
not need to interfere with the process of production itself.
Collective bargaining and scientific management were 
important aspects of industrial relations during this 
period. Emphasis upon collective bargaining, however, 
ignores the role of the company in determining the nature of 
labour markets and the employment relationship, while 
scientific management's focus upon the "labour process" 
separates production from the economic and social context 
within which industry operates. Capital and managerial 
structures influenced investment decisions over the
1. A.Carey "The Hawthorne Studies: A Radical
Criticism", American Sociological Review (1967), 
p p . 403-16.
2. Rose (1982), p p . 103-124,168-172. Cf. also E.Mayo 
Human Problems o f Industrial Civilisation (1946); 
L.F.Urwick The Life and Work of Elton Mayo (n.d.).
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introduction of flow-process technology, and, therefore, 
affected the way labour was organised. Managers recognised 
Taylorism's solutions to industrial strife as simplistic, 
and unions resisted the "speeding up" of work. Companies had 
to cope with the "human factor" in industry. Welfare was a 
means of fulfilling those human needs not met by the cash 
nexus. Furthermore, the growth in the size of firms enabled 
employers to exercise some control over the movements of the 
market, and increased the possibilities for labour 
management. The next two sections, consequently, will 
analyse the origins and purpose of industrial welfare, and 
its relation to the role and structure of the company.
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(ill). Paternalism, Industrial Welfare, and the C o m p a n y .
Labour is a commodity which is bought and sold, and, in 
that sense, the employment-relationship is a market 
transaction. Because the division between profits and wages 
inevitably produces conflict between employers and workers, 
industrial relations are predominately a p o w e r-relationship. 
Although market factors like the demand for labour affected 
the bargaining power which either side could exercise, 
trades unions relied upon solidarity and organisation to 
protect the living standards of their members. Employers 
also had an extensive influence over the form and nature of 
industrial relations, and the industrial discipline they 
exercised was dependent upon a conscious system of internal 
management and supervision. But cooperation was as essential 
as discipline in overcoming the workers' resistance to 
managerial direction.
While competition between companies was approved by 
neo-classical micro-economics, competition between employers 
and workers within the firm was illegitimate because 
industrial production required cooperation. Employers needed 
to emphasise the "unitary" ideal of the company. They 
attempted to win the loyalty of those they employed by 
offering certain wage or welfare benefits. The insecurity 
caused by the threat of old age and sickness was an 
important cause of strikes and work-disaffection. Benefits 
provided income beyond that of the market transaction which 
exchanged labour for cash. P r ofitsharing, pensions and sick 
pay mollified and justified an employment relationship in 
which the place of the worker was subordinate. They imbued a
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degree of loyalty to the firm. Moreover, company provision 
directly improved labour efficiency by increasing the labour 
supply and retaining the skills and experience of workers.
Because expenditure on industrial welfare is additional 
to wages, it is sometimes classified as a "fringe benefit". 
Reid and Robertson distinguish between expenditure which is 
a "payment to an employee" and expenditure which is a "cost 
to an employer". The first category would include basic 
wages, overtime, legally-entitled holiday-pay, bonuses, and 
"supplementary remuneration". Cash payments are a deserved 
return for work undertaken, and would be seen by workers in 
this light. Discretionary "costs to employers" are 
undertaken on behalf of employees, and involve contributions 
to pension and welfare funds, various services, and 
voluntarily-given holiday pay. While the cost and worth of 
wages can be quantified, the value of welfare to the 
employee is not so easily assessed. The effects of the 
goodwill engendered by welfare on efficiency and production 
is an immeasurable quantity. Welfare copes with the "human 
relations" aspects of business as well as the objectives of 
"economic man" and income-maintenance. Company provision 
helps mould a labour force more suited to the requirements 
of production.^
1. G.L.Reid & D .J .Robertson Fringe Benefits, Labour
Costs and Social Security (1965), p p . 15-16,18,
20-25,39-45. Reid and Robertson analyse company 
surveys which assessed the extent and purpose of 
industrial welfare provision in the 20 years or so 
after the Second World War. Expenditure not 
directly related to the needs of production was 
seen as "an investment in the labour force", and 
the principal aim was to reduce 1abour-turnover. 
Occupational pensions induced a sense of security, 
facilitated the retirement of the old and the 
inefficient, and boosted morale and (cont.)
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Welfare services existed from the very founding of
British industry in the cotton mills of Lancashire. Within
the typically small factory of the 18th and 19th Centuries,
the role of a single employer or family was crucial in all
aspects of the business. Company provision, consequently,
was notably paternalistic. By 1830, the cotton industry had
many notable examples of paternalism.^ In part, such
paternalism had its roots in the traditions of landed
society, and in the relations between aristocrats and gentry
2
with their labourers and tenants. Industrialists assumed
the role of another propertied estate. Employer and
landowner, as local dignitaries, gained respect and standing
by holding entertainments and displaying generosity.^ But,
from the outset, industrial paternalism met the particular
demands of factory-production. Greater firm size,
mechanisation, and the sub-division of labour necessitated
the imposition of industrial discipline, but also increased
the need for rest-periods and maintaining the health and
reliability of workers. Nonconformist employers, in
particular, attempted to instill the utilitarian values of
hard work, temperance, and self-enlightenment. They sought
to undermine the social values of 1anded-society and the
productivity. Medical treatment and sick pay 
helped men to return to health and, therefore,
minimised the disruption to output.
1. A .J .Robertson "Robert Owen, Cotton Spinner; New
Lanark, 1800-1825" in Robert Owen, prophet of the 
poor (1971), pp.149-53,
2. Cf. F.D.Roberts The Paternalism of Early Victorian 
Britain (1979).
3. S.Pollard "The Factory Village in the Industrial 
Revolution", E.H.R. (1964), p p . 513-531.
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Tory "old regime". The paternalism of the "socialist" Robert 
Owen at the New Lanark cotton mill merely typified an 
autocratic management which linked greater efficiency with 
the good treatment of workers.^
Patrick Joyce has described the nature of industrial 
relations in the Lancashire cotton industry principally 
after 1850. He outlines the close relationship between 
industry, society, culture, and politics. Within the factory 
village or local community, the patronage of an employer and 
his family was extensive and pervaded social and religious 
life. As the heads of their community, they had to 
demonstrate its cohesiveness. Their influence extended to 
the voting behaviour of their employees. Deference was both 
an economic necessity of life for workers and a cultural 
phenomenon. Paternalism and patriarchialism were evident in 
family-life, in society at large, and in religious teaching. 
Within the factory itself, men became spinners while women 
undertook less skilled tasks. The em ployment-relationship, 
of course, produced cl ass-conf1ict as well as deference, but 
the success of factory-production depended upon an unwritten 
agreement of cooperation between employers and workers. But
1. Robertson in Pollard & Salt (1971), p p . 145-165;
E.P.Thompson The Making of the English Working 
Class (1968), p p . 857-886. Cf. also N.McKendrick 
"Joseph Wedgwood and Factory Discipline", H.J.
(1961), p p . 30-55; S.Pollard The Genesis o f  Modern
M anagement (1965), p p . 213-225; E.P.Thompson "Time,
Work Discipline and Industrial Capitalism", P ast & 
Present (1967), p p . 56-97. N.Abercombie & S.Hill 
"Paternalism and patronage". Brit. J 1 . of 
Sociology (1977), p p . 413-429 is a useful 
discussion of the difference between paternalism 
and patronage.
2. P.Joyce Work, Society and Politics (1983), passim.
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whatever its cultural or social perspectives, paternalism 
in practical and material terms dealt with the provision of 
housing, social amenities, old age pensions, and sick pay.
Although the ideology of self-help and individualism in 
the 19th and early 20th Centuries might have been a factor 
militating against the actual provision of industrial 
welfare, in practice the employers' need to meet the 
requirements of his labour force was probably a greater 
influence. Employers, in any case, generally recognised the 
value of welfare services which promoted independence. 
Contributory shop clubs were a tribute to notions of 
self-help and providence. Employers often began to support 
such societies after they had been spontaneously formed and 
funded by the men because company support made these clubs 
financially viable. Employers were keen to involve workers 
in their running as compensation for their lack of control 
over investment and production matters. It was a more 
effective strategy for colliery owners to provide financial 
assistance to miners' mutual provident societies than to 
organise the collection and payment of benefits themselves.^
Paternalism was symptomatic of a direct and personal
relationship between employer and employee, and was unsuited
to large companies and professionalised management. Joyce,
therefore, contends that in Lancashire the personal
relationship between cotton employer and worker was
2
superseded by the large combines of the 1890s. But,
1 . C f . Ch . 7, s.(iii).
2. Joyce (1980), p p . 331-44.
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although the sociological and cultural aspects of
paternalism may have declined with the small communities in
which it thrived, welfare continued, and, indeed, expanded
under the new joint stock companies.^ The Quaker chocolate
employer, B.Seebohm Rowntree was still convinced that in
1905 " Probably much more beneficial influence upon the
character of the working classes may be exercised through
the medium of their places of employment than is at present
exercised by the churches'". The usefulness of industrial
2
welfare to employers remained. Yet even paternalism was 
common in many industries until the early 1900s, and 
continued throughout the 20th Century in trades like 
brewing, wool and worsted, pottery, and footwear whose 
production continued to be small scale.^
Ex g ratia benefits were the only means available to 
most 19th Century employers for the provision of welfare.
H.I.Dutton and J.E.King have questioned the commitment of 
the Lancashire cotton magnates to paternalism. They doubt 
their ability to pay and sustain benefits when trade cycles 
restricted the availability of profits for welfare 
spending.* The very structure of small firms, often 
over-competing for limited markets, did damage profitability 
and employment levels. Strong international competition, in
I. Cf. C h . 4, esp. s.(iii); C h . 5; Ch.7,
ss.(ii)-(v),(vii)-(ix).
2. B.Meakin Model Factories and Villages: Ideal
Conditions of Labour and Housing (1905), p . 33.
3. Cf. C h . 6; Ch.7, s s .(i i ),(v i ),(x ).
4. H.I.Dutton & J.E.King "The limits of paternalism: 
the cotton tyrants of North Lancashire, 1835-54",
Soc.Hist. (1982), pp . 59-74.
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particular, exacerbated the harshness of the wage - c o n t r a c t .
These circumstances were also true of other staples like
coalmining, engineering, shipbuilding, and iron and steel 
production. But ex g ratia benefits, though useful in the 
management of labour, did not commit an employer to 
expensive, long-term outlays, and payments could be adjusted 
according to revenue. Paternalism had an important influence 
on 19th Century industrial relations, even if its extent was 
constrained by market considerations. A welfare policy with 
set contributions and guaranteed benefits required the
managerial and organisational resources which most Victorian 
family firms did not possess.
A central theme of this thesis, however, is to show 
that monopolies like the railways, which did not face 
competition and enjoyed more constant revenues, had 
well-developed welfare policies throughout this period.
Railway companies required a large managerial bureaucracy in 
order to administer their complex operations and large 
workforces. They needed an extensive internal labour market, 
and a high labour turnover was an expensive problem. Welfare 
services protected their investment in the training and 
disciplining of their workforce. Railways, therefore, had 
both the means and the need to systemise welfare provision 
by removing the ex gratia element. The administration of 
their contributory mutual provident societies did not rely 
upon the a^ hoc discretion of employers and managers.
Moreover, the fact that the corporate structures of the
1. Cf. C h . 2, especially s s .(i ),(i i ),(i i i ).
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railways were imitated by other industries at the turn of
the century is another crucial subject of this thesis.
Cooperation and mergers rationalised competition and made
extreme fluctuations in supply and demand less likely. The
managers of large companies could plan production from the
raw material to the distribution stage, and were able to
balance the required amounts of raw materials, labour and
capital with their more secure markets.^ The operations of
company bureaucracies gradually replaced the market
mechanism as a means of economic exchange, and the corporate
company, consequently, required an industrial relations
2
strategy in addition to the wage-relationship.
From the outset of a merger, considerable investment 
was required to ensure that management resources were
adequate for their increased role.^ The loyalty of salaried 
workers was assured by perquisites, stable wages, benefits, 
and job-security. Industrial welfare for staff was
undoubtedly extensive, and foremen, often responsible for 
employing, organising, and sacking workers, could be equally 
protected. Yet, obtaining the co-operation of the workforce 
in the process of rationalisation from 1900 has been 
overlooked despite the contributory and systematic welfare 
schemes which were founded as a consequence. h 
reorganisation of management brought reforms in the
1. Hannah (1979), passim. By 1907, the largest 100
firms in Great Britain controlled 15% of 
manufacturing net output; by 1939, 23% (p.180).
2. Cf. C h . 2, ss . (i) ,(ii),(i i i ) ; & C h . 4, ss.(i),(ii)
for a further discussion of this point.
3. Cf. E.T.Penrose The Theory of the Firm (1972),
p a s s i m .
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administration of welfare. Developments in company provision
were linked, therefore, to changes in managerial structure.
The Federation of British Industry noted the benefits of
coordinated production and marketing, and their potential
for maintaining fair conditions of employment,^
The growth of professional management was linked to
arguments favouring a more ethical form of business
organisation. Oliver Sheldon, who worked as a manager at
Rowntrees, believed that the replacement of employers by
managers would be mirrored by the supersession of the
profit-motive as the principal business incentive. Men would
become more service and community-minded, and the
application of "social ethics" by the new managers would
prevent labour disputes. The value of a worker's worth had
to be recognised. Management had to return to individuals
their contributions to their company and community.
"Industrial management is thereby presented with the
opportunity of making the factory rather than the class the
basis of association". The change in the nature of
management had led to the shedding of the belief that
"cooperation can be secured (merely) on the basis of
(paying) w a g e s  ". Giving guarantees of minimum living
standards and adequate social security was ethically
correct. Human relations and the search for industrial peace
were moral questions, and could not be reduced to scientific
calculation.^ Industrial conflict, therefore, was seen as
1 . FBI Report of th e Committee on the Organisation of 
Industry (1935).
2. 0 . Sheldon The Philosophy of Management (1965, 1st
edn. 1923), p. 13 , 20 , 27-28 , 78-9 ,150-151 , 166-7 , 178 ,
196.
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resulting from arbitrary management and was an abnormality 
rather than an integral element of the
employment-relationship.
By the Inter-War period, scientific management did not
imply the harsh practices of F.W.Taylor but proper account
of the "human factor". Professional management realised that
successful and efficient production depended upon
cooperation between management and workers, and the
establishment of mutual goals.^ Rationalisation and
scientific management complemented each other, and were
answers to socialism. In 1927, Industrial Peace stated that
rationalisation, "in its widest significance, is identical
with scientific management". Rationalisation dealt with the
relationship between producers, while scientific management
stood "for a particular method of organising the productive
processes in an establishment, and particularly a method of
2
dealing with the human factor in production". Sheldon 
believed that the addition of rationalisation to the "first" 
industrial revolution and the adding of the "human element" 
to the "mechanical revolution" would together produce 
unconceived levels of wealth.^
1. Industrial Welfare, Oct 1925, pp.336-8. Industrial 
Welfare was published by the Industrial Welfare 
Society. Cf. Ch . 8, s.(iii).
2. Industrial Peace, July 1927, pp . 133-6. Industrial 
Peace was published by the British Commonwealth 
Union. Cf. J.Turner "The British Commonwealth 
Union and the General Election of 1918", E.H_._R_^  
(1978), p p . 528-551; & Businessmen and Politics 
(1984), pp.15-6,45-8.
3. Industrial Welfare, June 1923, pp.149-151.
(iv). Indus trla I W e lfare as a Labour Strategy .
Oligopoly increased the stability of markets and
enabled companies to exercise greater "discretionary 
behaviour" in the administration and organisation of their 
companies. Company objectives could be decided more by 
internal bargaining within the firm instead of leaving 
events to the verdict of the market. Corporate companies, 
therefore, had greater scope for planning in labour 
management. But the balance of personal, administrative, or 
group pressures places limits upon management's 
"discretionary behaviour", and such pressures include the
workers ability to hinder production or to strike. 
Employers are in a position to minimise class conflict and 
have to limit the effects of work-disaffection. The 
presentation of the rising managerial class as a neutral and
adjudicating factor in the battle between capital and
labour, however, was belied by the consequences of "human 
factor" and industrial welfare policies. Systematic company 
provision was a means of protecting and harnessing a labour 
force .
A major objective of labour policy was to remove 
workers' "fears" about sickness, injury, old age, and 
unemployment.^ Employers realised that their workers' 
perception of their company influenced industrial relations. 
Sir William Lever of Lever Brothers acknowledged that the 
deficiencies of the wage-contract were often the root of 
working-class grievances: "I feel that three great ghosts
are haunting each one of us. It is astonishing how each of
1. L.Urwick Personnel Management in Relation to
Fac t ory O rganisation (19 43), p p . 8-9,15-6,25-6,
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us lives in fear, in fear of unemployment, the fear of
sickness, and the fear of death, and the way it will leave 
our widows and dependants". Lever also provided for his 
workers old age. Despite the existence of state social 
security, he considered labour's "fears" as the proper 
object of an employers' concern.^
The administration and funding of sick pay and pensions
were, in addition, an avenue for employer-employee
cooperation. Managers and employers legitimised their
control over questions of production and investment by
granting the labour force some say in welfare provision.
Workers, as human beings, sought at their place of work
intangible objects, like companionship, a sense of purpose,
and a voice in the managerial hierarchy above them. The
innate expressions of human psychology did not cease to
exist in an industrial context, required the administrative
means to cope with them, and could not be countered by faith
in the rationale of marginal labour economics alone. As
Industrial Peace put it in 1917: "The first thing is to find
a means of giving effect to the demand of Labour for some
share in the control of Industry. That does not necessarily
mean control of the high politics of manufacture, but it
does emphatically mean some control of the conditions of
2
workshop life". A Federation of British Industries 
memorandum in 1919 recognised industry to be "an autocratic 
system". Unions, consequently, demanded either the 
nationalisation of industry or workers' control. The first
1. W.Lever Copartnership: Laying the Three Ghosts;
Unemployment, Sickness, Death ( 19 2 2) .
2. Industrial P e a c e , November 1917, p.20.
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was condemned by the F.B.I. as giving power only to
bureaucrats. The second demand was dismissed if it meant
self-governing work-shops. The Federation argued that they
suffered from a lack of discipline and business expertise.
Participation "in the control of working conditions",
however, was acceptable.^ Works councils provided labour
with a forum for voicing grievances, and often undertook the
administration of welfare schemes. C .H .N o r t h c o t t , another
writer on management from the Rowntree factory, in 1933 said
that welfare matters were the "definite limits" of joint
decision-making "in the experience of many firms in the 
2
c o u n t r y " .
Elections to positions of responsibility in industrial 
provident societies encouraged the participation of their 
members, and helped reduce any sense of a deferential 
relationship.^ Profitsharing, by giving workers a stake in 
their firms, similarly improved the "status" of an employee, 
and the committees which ran such schemes were often a means 
of employer-employee consultation and cooperation.
Copartnership, or the election of worker-directors by
profitsharers, further embodied the promotion of joint
interests and at the highest level in a company. Many
1. FBI Archive, MSS/200/F/l/2/2, The Control of
Industry, Memo. to all members of
"Nationalisation" Committee, 30 June 1919.
2. C.H.Northcott "Principles and Practices of
Industrial Relations" in Factory Organisation 
( 1933 ), p p . 112-150 .
3. Given the involvement of workers in the
administration of benefits, the small number of 
welfare workers employed in British industry 
throughout this period cannot be taken as 
indicative of the interest of employers in company 
provision ( Cf. Littler (1982), p . 198-9).
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employers recognised that the dividends from profitsharing
and copartnership schemes were an insufficient means of
winning the loyalty of their workers since they formed only
a minor part of their incomes. The sharing of profits was
generally only one element of a company's benefit system.
Profitsharing committees often assumed the role of works
councils and likewise undertook the administration of many
forms of company provision.^
Labour policies had administrative consequences which
had to be determined within the firm. Works councils could
be established to give workers a say in the running of their
companies. Alternatively, when sickness became a constant
problem and men were slow to return to work, sick benefit
clubs could be founded. The solutions adopted depended on
the sophistication of managerial planning and operation. An
internal labour market, in particular, was an example of the
exercise of "discretionary behaviour" in labour management,
because it was segregated from the workings of the labour
2
market as a whole. The internal labour market was the 
minimum number of workers required by a company to sustain a 
level of output which would meet the demands of its more 
secure markets. Oligopolistic companies, therefore, could 
maintain large "core" workforces. Trained and experienced in 
often firm-specific skills, "core" workers were 
differentiated by management from the "pool" of residual, 
non-permanent workers and treated accordingly. They were a
1. Cf. passim, esp. C h . 8, ss.(i),(ii).
2 . Cf. P.Doeringer and M.J.Piore Internal Labour 
Markets and Manpower Analysis (1971), which is the 
classic text on internal labour markets.
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lost or devalued investment if 1abour-turnover or 
work-disaffection were at high levels. Disruptions to 
production were particularly expensive for more 
capital-intensive companies. They were more likely to retain 
workers in even unprofitable production so long as the
interest and charges on capital could be redeemed. Large, 
corporate companies pledging themselves to massive capital 
investment sought to safeguard expected rates of return by 
planning the numbers and stability of their workforces on 
whose cooperation the full and efficient use of new plant 
could depend.
Like the job-security and "status" bestowed by internal 
labour markets, systematic welfare schemes provided workers 
with rights, namely to benefits. Indeed, the economic
security offered by benefits was often contingent upon being 
accepted as a permanent employee. The less extensive welfare 
services typical of the small firm or unsystematic
management, on the other hand, were usually favours, not 
rights, and could be withdrawn at any time. They were a 
minor investment in sporting and social clubs, unsystematic 
sick clubs in receipt of a voluntary subvention, or ex 
gratia pensions. Company sports and social clubs burgeoned 
in the years just after the Great War. They were seen as 
expressing and encouraging a team spirit, and instilled the 
mutual purpose essential to coordinated production.^ The 
impact of introducing sports and social facilities would 
undoubtedly have been greater in a time of lower wages, 
fewer leisure facilities, and the beginnings of cinema,
1. Works Management, Dec 1919, pp.103-4. Cf also
Sheldon (1925), p.196.
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radio, and television.^ Many industries, like steel and
coalmining, were also more geographically isolated than
others and required social amenities.
Yet, ex gratia welfare contained no commitment to any
individual employee, the cost of a football club, for
example, being general. The use of sports facilities would
be open to any of the men who happened to be employed at the
works. Profitsharing, and contributory old-age pensions and
sick pay, however, dealt with personal requirements,
contributions, and benefits. Foremen were often the first to
be offered the opportunity to contribute to pension schemes,
because of their important supervisory role and the security
of their employment. Standing-men were then considered, and
the extension of internal labour markets led to schemes
incorporating a major part of a more settled workforce. The
scale of the administrative task this necessitated, as well
as the need to account for large sums of money, required the
systemisation of company welfare policies. Bureaucratic
rules and guidelines normally implied per capita
contributory schemes and set benefits, although some
companies, whose markets were less stable or whose
management was less developed, favoured non-contributory
schemes funded by company trusts and with set and limited
subventions from employers or company stock. They,
nevertheless, paid guaranteed benefits. Pension provision,
in particular, was improved by systemisation, since a large
number of contributors was needed in order to pool the
actuarial risks involved. Moreover, its very cost encouraged
1. A.G.P.Elliot "Company Welfare Benefits" in Reid 
and Robertson (1965), p p . 300-309.
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contributory schemes, and stability and confidence were 
essential to such a long-term investment.
In addition to proving the "unitary" ideal of the
company and to providing some measure of "workers'
democracy", welfare schemes often had specific aims.
Increasing the labour supply, and protecting the health of
the worker were common objectives. Pensions especially were
connected with the reduction of labour turnover. The head of
Ford's in 1913 reckoned that every new worker cost $38 to
train and that the teaching of the required manual skills
amounted to $2 million a year. Car production at Ford's was
a flow-process necessitating large amounts of capital, and
the cooperation of experienced workers helped maintain the
rhythym of output.^ With differing plant-layouts,
combinations of machinery, and products, many skills could
become firm-specific. Steel companies which in the 1930s
invested in flow-process technology sought to protect the
skills of the men which operated the new plant. Reliable and
2
trusted workers became of greater value. Any worker, 
considering leaving a firm, had to decide whether the loss 
of benefits and particularly pension rights were greater 
than the gains from new employment.
Furthermore, the value of company welfare before 1939, 
ranging from death grants, sick benefits, holidays with pay, 
pension payments, to hot running water in the lavatories 
when few enjoyed such luxuries at home, would have had a 
psychological effect that is hard for a generation
1. Gospel & Littler (1983), p . 177.
2. Cf. C h . 4, esp. ss.(i),(ii).
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accustomed to state-provision guaranteeing freedom from the
worst poverty to appreciate. Workers, supported by an era of
Keynesianism, world free trade, and a time eventually
benefiting materially from large-scale production, have
gained a spending power that leaves them less reliant on the
perceived munificence of their employers. Littler, however,
has argued that industrial welfare schemes in Britain were
stunted by social legislation.^ Yet, governments before the
Beveridge Report of 1942 did not seek to establish a
universal social safety-net, nor even to provide sustenance.
They wanted to encourage private thrift, and state and
industrial schemes were seen as viable alternatives.
Employers had the reason and the resources to provide income
maintenance during infirmity, adequate housing, and social
amenities. They were, consequently, given the opportunity to
organise basic or supplementary industrial provident
societies within the terms of statutory schemes. The
management theorist, G.H.Miles, said that a sound strategy
was to "cater for some need rather than attempt to compete
2
with opportunities already in existence". Employers 
influenced the passing of social legislation, and, through 
their commitment to company provision, found state schemes
more acceptable. A significant reason for the growing
support for welfare in this period can be attributed to 
changes in the structure of companies and the economy. The 
thesis, therefore, raises questions about the nature 
and purpose of state as well as industrial
1. Gospel & Littler (1983), p . 185.
2. G.H.Miles in Chandler (1979), pp . 27-30.
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w e l f a r e .^
If company provision was an important element in
industrial relations during this period, the activities of
Quaker businessmen must be seen as typical rather than
unusual. In putting their religious beliefs into practice at
their factories, industrial welfare has been depicted, at
least during the 1890s and early 1900s, as their particular
2
accomplishment. The ojectives of Quakers like Seebohm
Rowntree were not markedly opposed to others in many 
different types of industry. Rowntree held that scientific 
management's "improvement of industrial processes and 
administration" was integral to a strategy of rising wages. 
But management had to win the confidence of workers as well 
as retain managerial authority. Rowntree believed that 
industrial strife was caused by the existence of
"unacceptable" methods of work-organisation. Minimum welfare 
legislation and collective bargaining with unions both had a 
role, but the voluntary actions of companies produced 
important "psychological effects". The self-management of 
provident societies was seen by Rowntree as combatting 
"ca'canny" and enabling the easy "introduction of
labour-saving machinery and improved administration". 
Rowntree did not believe that workers were uninterested in 
the major problems of industry, but in general wanted 
"something more intimately associated with their daily 
lives". He was convinced that works committees enabled
1. Cf. C h . 9.
2. C f . Littler (1982), pp . 90-1; J.Child British
Management Thought: A Critical Analysis ( 19 69 ) ,
pp . 35-7 ; M.M.Niven Personnel Management, 1913-63 
( 1967) , p p . 18-36.
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"fair-minded and thoughtful workers" to realise that someone 
had to be "in supreme control". But it was possible to make 
"an arrangement under which working conditions are mutually 
agreed upon...." Even this most limited area of industrial 
control at Rowntrees was restricted by managerial veto.^ The 
welfare policies of Quaker employers may have had a 
religious motive, but, as employers, managerial and business 
considerations were normally determinate. Moreover, many 
Nonconformist employers, including Congregational ists and 
Unitarians, held similar views about their Christian duty to 
their workers.
As labour was resistant to industrial requirements,
welfare services were provided where the wage-contract had
failed to achieve employers' objectives. Company provision
was not a peripheral labour strategy and its importance in
Britain has been underestimated. Paternal and systematic
welfare had the same objectives, and differences in the
market, managerial, or capital structure merely moulded the
levels of company provision which were desirable or
possible. Firstly, industrial welfare attempts to mollify
the class-conflict inherent in the employment-relationship.
A tangible demonstration of the "unitary" ideal of the firm
is a prophylactic against strikes, work-disaffection, and
resistance to managerial direction. Secondly, many employers
believed that a large part of industrial unrest originated
from a lack of economic security. They were, therefore,
1. B.S.Rowntree Industrial Unrest; a Way Out (1922), 
pp.3 -1 3 ,15-17,22-6,30-5,37-9,56-60. C f . also PRO 
BT55/2, Memo, on views of B.S.Rowntree to Balfour 
C o m m i t t e e .
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willing to organise or finance pensions, sick pay, and 
accident compensation. Thirdly, the existence of company 
provision enabled employers to cooperate with workers in one 
area of industrial life, while leaving managerial 
prerogative over production matters intact. The wish of 
employees to extend their freedom of choice at work was 
canalised into works and profitsharing committees, the 
election of co-partnership directors, and balloting for the 
appointment of organisers of provident funds and sports 
clubs. Labour was, therefore, given a participatory role. 
Fourthly, industrial welfare augmented a policy of internal 
labour markets. Systematic or contributory welfare, as
opposed to ex g r atia benefits, bestowed rights through 
membership of a pre-determined scheme, and reduced the high 
costs of retraining due to labour turnover.
The most important unit in an industrial economy is the 
company itself. Industrial welfare was a strategy organised 
on a company basis and its extent and potential was 
dependent on general developments in managerial structure.^ 
It was the timing and influence of managerial 
reorganisation,- rather than simply increases in company
size,- which largely influenced changes in the
1. Cf. C h . 2, ss.(i) ,(ii)f(iii); C h . 4, ss.(i),(ii);
C h . 7, s s .(i ),(x i ).
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comprehensiveness and organisation of company provision. 
Indeed, it would be surprising if changes in the structure 
of industry and management had not affected internal labour 
m a n a g e m e n t .
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(V ). Markets and Case-studies.
Industrial welfare policies in Britain changed over 
time and varied from industry to industry. But these 
variations are explicable. In the following chapters, 
therefore, the role of industrial welfare in each industry 
will be analysed separately. There was, for example, a very 
clear difference between public utilities and competitive 
concerns in their approach to labour management. While 
strong competition exacerbated the harshness of the wage 
contract, monopolies were able to provide stability of 
e m p l o y m e n t .
Chapter 2 concentrates on the railway industry. 
Railways were the first corporate companies, whose 
operations required an extensive internal labour market 
supported by a sophisticated system of welfare benefits. 
Chapter 3 further investigates the purpose of industrial 
welfare in another natural monopoly, the gas industry.
Chapter 4 is concerned with the "old” staple industry 
of iron and steel making. The economic difficulties which 
British steel production faced during the 20th Century can 
be attributed to its failure to rationalise, but the mergers 
that did occur undoubtedly influenced company provision in 
the industry. The large companies established in the 
Inter-War period, especially in the expanding tinplate and 
tube sectors, were able to systemise their welfare 
provision. Chapter 5 looks at a competitive trade which 
expanded in the 20th Century. The chemical industry reached 
a high degree of company rationalisation, and its welfare 
provision was, consequently, extensive. While major
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developments in management and welfare occurred in the 
monopolistic railway and gas industries during the 19th 
Century, crucial developments in steel and chemicals 
happened in the 1920s and 1930s.
Chapter 6 analyses brewing, an industry which remained 
composed of small-scale family firms. Its welfare continued 
to be notably paternalistic. Chapter 7 further extends the 
themes of the previous chapters by looking at other 
industries, although in less detail. It also compares the 
welfare provision of different trades.
Chapter 8 investigates the purpose and achievements of 
organisations which specialised in the promotion of welfare 
schemes. Chapter 9 looks at the links between state and 
industrial welfare.
Chapters 2 and 4 on the railway and steel industries 
are central to this thesis, and much theoretical material 
illustrating the connection between company size, managerial 
structure, and industrial welfare are contained in them. The 
subject-matter presented in other chapters depends upon 
arguments developed in them. The concluding section of 
Chapter 7 should be consulted for the comparisons it makes 
between industries.
52
Chapter 2 .
T he Railways, Monopoly, and Labour Man agement.
i . Introduction.
By having to tackle the problems of large-scale 
organisation from their founding, railway companies had 
developed by 1850 the corporate management structures which 
few other industries had adopted even by 1900. While the 
family firm or partnership remained the norm in other 
sectors, special Acts of Parliament permitted joint-stock 
railway companies to be formed, because the scale of their 
initial investment was beyond the financial means of 
individuals. By 1875, the capital raised by railway 
companies amounted to £630 million, a sum which greatly 
outstripped investment in other industries, and the industry 
employed 275,000 people or 3% of the male labour force. By 
1913, fixed capital exceeded £1330 million and employees 
numbered 643,000. In 1847, fifteen companies controlled 61% 
of the industry's capital, and, by 1870, the figure was 80%. 
After 1921, the whole network was owned by four giant 
c o n c e r n s .^
In addition to granting the right to found joint stock 
companies. Parliament needed to regulate the compulsory 
purchase of land and the laying of track. Regulation was a 
barrier to free enterprise, but competition was also 
naturally hindered by the capital costs of building
I. T.R.Gourvish Railways and the British Economy
1830-1914 (1980), p . 9.
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permanent way and constructing rolling-stock. Intense 
commercial rivalry prevented an adequate return on 
investment. Moreover, monopoly increased after construction. 
The efficient working and scheduling of railways and the 
routing of "through" traffic necessitated inter-company 
cooperation and alliances.
As monopolies in control of large numbers of men and
materials, railways found contemporary business practices
inadequate. The industry, therefore, had an important
influence upon the development of corporate administration,
labour management and industrial welfare. Quaker employers,
like Cadburys and Rowntrees, are normally viewed as
innovators in systematic labour policies and industrial
welfare,^ while, in fact, the railways were the first
practitioners of corporate labour management. The railway
amalgamations of the Victorian era were the model for the
combinations formed in other industries during the late
1890s and the Inter-War period, and the managerial lessons
learnt by railways were also adopted by others. The
organisation of an efficent flow of traffic over a
geographically-dispersed enterprise like a railway was
impossible without a sytematic managerial structure, while
few other businesses in the I9th Century needed full-time
managers or a well-defined administration. Chandler argues
that market circumstances induced companies to adopt the
internal management structures which could best exploit the
2
business opportunities presented to them. The market
1. Cf. Ch.l, s.(iv); Ch.7, s.(x).
2. Chandler (1973), p p . 15-16.
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circumstances of monopoly, therefore, determined the 
organisation, planning and coordination of railway traffic. 
Monopoly guaranteed rates of return and the fullest 
utilisation of expensive capital. Lack of competition 
provided secure employment and established large internal 
labour markets. Railways funded industrial welfare in order 
to gain the loyalty of this permanent workforce.
Labour management in the industry depended upon a 
rigorous system of discipline. The safe and orderly working 
of the railways relied upon workers fulfilling the duties 
allotted to them. As employees in a public service, 
railwaymen were seen by their employers as company 
"servants" rather than as "workers". Yet, railway managers 
were aware that efficient service was as dependent on 
incentives as on discipline. Paternalistic benefits given on 
a p e r s o n a l , ex gratia basis were unsuited to companies the 
size of railways. The systemisation of railway management 
was coupled with the adoption of conscious, company-wide 
labour policies. The industry became notable for its 
friendly societies with their benefits and contributions set 
according to predetermined rules.
Section (ii) of this chapter analyses the development 
of railway management, and section (iii) explores its 
connections with internal labour markets and welfare. 
Section (iv) outlines the history of welfare provision from 
1846-1914, and section (v) explores the effects of 
rationalisation during the Inter-War period upon industrial 
w e l f a r e .
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(ii). The Railways and Corporate M an a g e m e n t .
The railways, as highly-capitalised natural monopolies, 
were regulated and partly created by government. Parliament 
had to authorise compulsory 1and-purchase for the 
construction of lines across the country, and, by preventing 
the random laying of permanent way, it limited the number of 
possible competitors. Before the reform of company law in 
the late 1860s, the formation of joint-stock concerns was 
sanctioned by private Acts of Parliament. The state, 
moreover, had to draw up and enforce railway safety 
standards. Yet even the operational requirements of railways 
tended towards monopoly. Companies cooperated over "through" 
traffic because of the diseconomies of unloading passenger 
and freight trains on to different lines. In 1842, the 
Railway Clearing House was established to plan "through" 
routes, and it divided revenues amongst companies according 
to its own standard classification of goods and rates.^ But 
it was the securing of sufficient returns from railway 
investment which made competition damaging and profitless. 
While the industry expanded rapidly in the thirty years 
after 1830 as a result of speculative investment, 
over-capitalisation increasingly became the object of 
criticism within companies and the subject of public debate. 
The pooling of traffic between railways replaced policies of 
competitive pricing and services.
Despite gradual rationalisation throughout the 19th 
Century, notable examples of rivalry did continue. The 
significance of such "disatrous" railway construction in
I. Cf. P.S.Bagwell The Railway Clearing House in the
British Economy, 1842-1922 (1968).
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relation to total investment has been disputed.^ But
monopoly was strong enough to be responsible for the
industry's relative disregard of c o st-control. Pricing was
not related to operating expenses. Companies remained
over-capitalised and ignored factor-saving technological
innovation. A sharp rise in costs in the early 1870s drove
the industry's operating ratio (working costs as a
percentage of gross revenue) up to fifty. The ratio
stabilised from 1873-1890, but, during the 1890s, the
2
aggregate figure was sixty. It is estimated that the 
average quantity of goods and passengers carried per train 
on the London and North Western Railway was the same in 1900 
as 1880. The load carried per train in this period was 68.6 
tons while the Pennsylvania railroad pulled an average 
486.6. Eight or ten ton trucks were standard in Britain till 
1914, and twenty ton trucks, even by the 1930s, amounted to 
only 3% of the total stock of mineral wagons. The average 
load of a ten ton truck was 2.83 tons. Labour costs were 
also uncontrolled. Aldcroft, by using admittedly "crude" 
calculations of total railway traffic divided by the numbers 
employed, estimates that over the period 1860-61 to 1879-80 
labour productivity rose by about 1.59% per annum, but 
declined from 1880-81 to 1909-10 to a virtual standstill
1. T.R.Gourvish "The Performance of British Railway 
Management after I860: the Railways of Watkins and 
Forbes", Bus.Hist (1978), p p . 186-200.
2. R.J.Irving "The Profitability and Performance of 
British Railways, I870-I914", Econ.H.R. (1978),
p p .186-200.
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yearly average of 0.17%.^
Aldcroft attributes these failings to managerial
shortcomings, while Irving favours the view that
Parliamentary hostility to monopoly before 1914 hindered the
pruning of uneconomic lines. Gourvish, on the other hand,
challenges the view of managerial failure. He quotes the
London and North Western and the North Eastern Railways as
exemplars of advanced management, although neither collected
information for assessing unit costs and labour 
2
productivity. Moreover, changes in the organisation of 
railways were undoubtedly important managerial developments 
and had a direct influence upon industrial welfare policies.
In the railway industry, large amounts of men, money, 
and materials were concentrated into a single business unit. 
Problems of geography and distance had to be solved, and 
activities as diverse as work-shops, terminals, stations, 
warehouses, office buildings, telegraph lines, and signals 
had to be coordinated. Unlike a canal, a railway ran and 
maintained its own equipment and transport. The speed of 
rail travel, the maintenance of schedules, and the 
enforcement of safety-procedures necessitated direct control 
over rolling-stock. Managers, furthermore, had to respond 
daily to changes in the demand and type of traffic. 
Depreciation had to be financed and construction undertaken 
according to estimates determined by the collection and 
collating of regular data. Rates, costs, and wages had to be
1. D.H.Aldcroft "The Efficiency and Enterprise of 
British Railways, I870-I9I4", in Studies in 
British Transport History, I87Q-I970 (19 7 4).
2. Gourvish (1978), p p . 186-200.
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set at levels which provided reasonable returns.
The complexities of running a railway required a 
well-defined administrative structure. The lines of 
authority amongst the large numbers of full-time managers 
which railways employed had to be p r e-determined. 
Responsibilty had to be allocated between the central 
office, departmental headquarters, and field units. Two 
innovations were central to the development of railway 
management. Firstly, because the general superintendant was 
unable to exercise operational control over a railway 
several hundred miles long, British companies began in the 
1850s to divide up lines into regions under the control of 
an autonomous divisional superintendant who managed and 
coordinated the movement of trains, and hired and fired line 
personnel. The very delegation of authority under this 
"divisional system" made hourly, daily and monthly 
statements essential. Hourly operational reports could 
inform managers of the position of trains and reasons for 
their delay. Daily reports were given by conductors, station 
agents, and engineers, and they could be consolidated into 
monthly assessments of the costs and profits from each 
locomotive, department, or division. Such information 
enabled the central office to set rates on a rational basis. 
Handicaps to "through" traffic could be located and "dead 
weight" on return trips reduced. Secondly, the 
"1ine-and-staff" system, by which divisional superintendants 
assumed direct authority over specialist managers like 
engineers or freight agents as well as line staff, was 
adopted by certain companies in the 1900s. Difficulties had
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arisen over the role of functional officers in the
divisions, because they had been responsible only to
headquarters managers like the chief engineer. Divisional
superintendants, therefore, had had little control over
constructional work on the permanent way. Local passenger
and freight agents had, within head office guidelines,
independently adjusted rates, and organised the loading of
trains. Coordination and communication between line or
traffic operations with their support departments were,
consequently, greatly hindered. The " 1ine-and-staff" system
placed line or operational officers and staff or functional
officers under a unified hierarchy of command. Functional
managers continued to set the standards and working
practices in their specialised areas, but they were made
answerable to the local superintendant.^
The "1ine-and-staff" system with its more powerful
divisions had to be complemented by a clear definition
between the responsibilities of the units and head office.
Otherwise, autonomous units within each railway might have
undertaken tasks more efficiently managed at the centre.
Railway managers at the divisional level concentrated on
operational tasks, while head office management dealt with
1. Chandler (1977), pp.79-97,102-4. Cf. also "The
Railroads: Pioneers in Modern Corporate
Management", B u s .H .R . (1965), p p . 16-40. There is 
room for confusion in the terminolgy used to 
explain managerial structures (cf. Chandler, for 
example). The "district" or "divisional" system on 
the railways more closely corresponds to the 
"departmental" system adopted by large 
corporations in other industries, in which middle 
managers were answerable for their specialised 
functions only to a central headquarters. The 
railway's "1 ine-and-staff system" resembles the 
creation of fully autonomous units under the 
"divisional system" in other trades.
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long-term investment policy. For reasons of economy, 
purchasing was also handled centrally. The separation of the 
financial and operating aspects, and the need for greater 
central coordination caused the reorganisation and 
enlargement of central offices. Separate accounting, 
treasury, secretarial, purchasing, and legal departments 
were established.^
Nonetheless, the first railways of thirty to fifty 
miles employed as few as fifty workers, and were 
administered by a superintendant who had a manager for each 
of the major functional tasks like transport or the 
maintenance of rolling-stock. But the scale of operations 
continued to increase, and the London and North Western 
Railway, formed in 1846 by the amalgamation of the London 
and Birmingham, Grand Junction, and Manchester and 
Birmingham Railways, was the first to adapt its management 
to cope with its large size. The new grouping owned 500 
miles of track, and, with £29 million in capital, it was 
Britain's largest company. In 1846-47, it controlled 23% of 
the industry's revenues from passenger traffic and 25% of 
the freight receipts.
Formed by Act of Parliament, the new company was 
statutorily committed to continue operating for five years 
as three separate units, but plans to deal with pending 
managerial problems were laid. In 1848, ad hoc 
sub-committees were established to deal with the increasing 
work-load. Three of these individually dealt with the
1. Chandler (1977 ), pp. 105-7, 120-9 ,145-7 ,175-6 .
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the running of each of the amalgamated companies, and they
reported to other sub-committees of the main Board like the
Audit or Finance Committee.^ In the same year, an
investigative committee was appointed "to produce a more
2simple, economical and efficient system of Management". 
Reports dealing with reductions in the number of depots, the 
rationalisation of staff duties, the use of company land, 
permanent way maintenance, locomotive power, foremen's 
wages, and coke supplies were issued.^ The First Report 
emphasised the need for more central control. It advised 
that a Chief Accountant, a Treasurer, and General 
Storekeeper answerable directly to the directors be 
appointed over the whole company. Another headquarters 
officer was employed to assess the profitability of actual 
and projected lines.^ The Second Report called for an 
estimate of the type and numbers of managerial staff which 
the new company would require, and, as part of a programme 
for building up a loyal and stable management, a staff 
superannuation fund was established and its solvency 
guaranteed by the L.N.W.R.^ The role of professional 
management, therefore, in the operation of railways was
T.R.Gourvish Mark Huish and the LNWR; a study of
management (1972), pp.109-11; "A British Business 
Elite; the Chief Executives of the Railway 
Industry, 1850-1922", Bus.H.R. (1973), p p . 289-316.
Rail 1008/93, 1st Report of LNWR Committee of 
Inquiry, 13 May 1848.
3. Gourvish (1972), p . 153.
4. Rail 1008/93, 1st Report, 13 May 1848.
5. Ibid, 2nd Report, 10 June 1848.
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clearly acknowledged. A Third Report dealt with the welfare
of all men below the rank of clerk.^
It was the London and North Western's adoption by 1848
of the district system for controlling the flow of traffic
which was its most marked development. An apparent trend
towards centralised control in I85I and the appointment of
chief officers disguised the fact that the regional
administration of traffic became increasingly autonomous.
The area sub-committees had been served by distinct
managerial units, and they were replaced in I85I by district
supervisors with full authority to control the movement of
trains. Specialist functions, however, continued to be
supervised from the centre. Other companies began adopting
2
the L.N.W.R. s divisional structure in the 1850s.
J.M.MacLean of the Caledonian Railway seems to assume 
that British railway companies had by 1883 established more 
adequate central offices with fully-staffed departments. 
Organisation and the increasing size of railway central 
offices replaced the more personal control of managers like 
Huish of the L.N.W.R.^ By the 1880s, the London and North
Western's headquarters oversaw the operations of ten
divisions. Every divisional superintendant had an assistant 
and several travelling inspectors, and was answerable to the 
chief general manager and the superintendant of the line
1. Ibid, 3rd Report, 15 July 1848. Cf. s.(iii) below.
2. Gourvish (1972 ), pp.105, 108-9 ,116 ,164-5 , 167 , 170 ;
M.R.Bonavia The Organisation of British Railways
(1971), p p . 13-15,18; Chandler (1977), p . 107.
3. J.L.MacLean The British Railway System: a
description of the Work Performed in the Principal 
Departments (18 83), pp.15,22,30,41,48-49,56,58.
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for the scheduling of traffic in his section. In six
important and larger regions, there were separate divisional
goods managers whose authority was parallel with the
division s superintendants. Responsibilities for traffic and
ancillary services were also divided at large stations.^
In 1902, the North Eastern Railway was the first to
unite the operating and commercial sides of the business.
Under the new system, the Line Superintendant became the
General Superintendant with extended authority over the
loading and unloading of trains, and over the maintenance of
stock. Divisional Superintendants were also given full
managerial authority within their sections. The North
Eastern's example was soon followed by the Great Northern 
2
Railway. The Lancashire and Yorkshire, and the Midland had 
adopted the "1ine-and-staff" system by the First World War.^ 
Only the London and North Eastern Railway of the four 
"Great" companies of the Inter-War period operated under a 
"1ine-and-staff" management. The L.N.E.R. held that local 
knowledge was essential if the company was to make the 
correct commercial decisions. Each area had different 
agricultural and industrial demands and the company wanted 
to adjust quickly to changes in local markets. There was 
little structural change in the Great Western Railway 
because, being so predominately based on the infrastructure
1. Sir G.Findlay The Working and Management of an 
English Railway (1889), p . 69.
2. Bonavia (1971), p p . 21-23,26.
3. D.R.Lamb Modern Railway Management (19 41), 
p p . 4,15-16.
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of the old G . W . R . , it was so little affected by
amalgamation. It continued with the less developed
divisional system.^ The London, Midland, and Scottish,
however, soon found its centralised structure too rigid and
spent some ten years in the period 1921-31 deciding upon a
2
new organisation. The company concluded by 1926 that the 
role of its General Manager was too extensive. In 1927, an 
Executive Committee was appointed with a President, and four 
Vice-Presidents in charge of either the traffic, 
engineering, commercial or financial departments.^ There was 
also a chief officer for labour and establishment. In 1931, 
Scotland, with its particular commercial and organisational 
needs, was the only section of the L.M.S. to be given full 
operational autonomy. By the 1930s, the L.M.S. and the 
Southern Railway had placed control over the maintenance of 
track, rolling-stock, and the marketing of traffic fully 
into the hands of divisional specialist officers, but they 
were responsible to the head-office and not to divisional 
superintendants.* The London, Midland, and Scottish, and 
Southern Railways, therefore, founded a hybrid system which 
combined the attributes of the divisional and 1 ine-and-staff 
structures.^
Most companies introduced a divisional system during
1. Ibid.
2. Lamb (1941), p p . 8,12-13,31.
3. Bonavia (1971), p p . 28-29,31.
4. Lamb (1941), p p . 2-4,5-6,13-14.
5. Bonavia (1971), p p . 29-30.
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the 19th Century, In the dozen years before the Great War, 
several British companies established a "1ine-and-staff" 
organisation. The experiences of the North Eastern and the 
Great Northern, which proved the most systematic in adapting 
the district organisation, were utilised by the London and 
North Eastern at the time of the industry's rationalisation 
in 1921. The new company was the only one to adopt the full 
" 1 ine-and-staff’• system. Developments in management,- at the 
L.N.W.R. in the 1840s, and at the N.E.R. in the early 
1900s,- had a direct influence upon labour and industrial 
welfare policies in these companies. Consideration of 
management in general led to detailed examination of labour 
requirements and the establishment of welfare policies 
better suited to the nature of railway employment.
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(iii) • Internal Labour Markets and Industrial W e l f a r e .
P .W .Kingsford in his review of railway labour in the
years 1835-1875 notes that the London and Birmingham
Railway, in providing churches and schools at local stations
and depots, drew upon the experiences of the Lancashire
cotton industry. When building company houses at Wolverton,
it followed the precedents of textile villages dominated by
paternalistic employers. Railway directors were "'like
ordinary millowners bound to do for their population that
which the millowners did'".^ At first, therefore, railway
welfare was ex gratia. Local shop clubs offered mutual
protection to its members and might occasionally receive
donations from the company. Faithful servants could be
granted pensions by the Board on the personal recommendation
of station or depot managers. It was a cumbersome,
2
inefficient system with no financial control or planning.
Welfare which was reliant upon the personal, 
discretionary largesse of an employer was as inappropriate 
for the growing size of railway operations as other forms of 
contemporary management. Moreover, the nature of railway 
employment, as well as the scale of operations, encouraged 
the systemisation of welfare. Monopolistic and 
capital-intensive companies required large "core" 
workforces, and railwaymen could look forward to a 
life-time's employment with their company. A secure market 
demand encouraged the establishment of a stable labour
1. P.W.Kingsford "Labour Relations on the Railways, 
1835-1875", Jl. of T.H. (1953-54), pp.65-81. Cf.
C h . 7, s.(ii).
2. Rail 1008/93, LNWR, 3rd Report, 15 June 1848.
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force, and gave companies the opportunity to introduce 
systematic, contributory welfare schemes with guaranteed 
rights. The reliabilty of railway workers added considerably 
to the operational efficiency of an industry dependent upon 
the detailed coordination of traffic and support services. 
Conscientious workers were an asset to an industry 
responsible for the safe carriage of passengers. As a public 
service, railways were particularly vulnerable to the 
affects of strikes, and, as highly capital-intensive 
enterprises, the financial costs of industrial action were 
equally daunting. Finally, the skills of footplatemen, 
guards, and signalmen took many years to acquire at a 
company's expense. For all these reasons, the men who worked 
on the permanent way were beneficiaries of railway welfare 
policy. While strong competitors, fluctuating trade, and the 
absence of a corporate structure limited the extent of 
industrial welfare in other industries, railways had the 
administrative means and the need to establish systematic 
company provision.
During its investigation into management in 1848, the 
London and North Western drew up a third report discussing 
labour policy. Adjustments in the methods of providing 
benefits were made because company-wide provident societies 
gave railways the ability to standardise benefits and to 
exercise a central control over welfare expenditure. Those 
below the rank of clerk were required to join superannuation 
funds. Those employed in the engineering workshops, where 
labour tended to be more mobile, could join voluntarily.
1. Ibid. C f . Ch.7, s . (v ) .
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The crucial difference was that engineers acquired their 
skills after a seven-year apprenticeship system which was 
controlled by the workers themselves. Labourers employed for 
constructional work were casual workers dismissed as soon as 
particular projects were completed. Railwaymen, however, 
were a "core" workforce.
Sir George Findlay, General Manager of the London and 
North Western Railway, in 1889 stressed the importance of 
internal labour markets to the organisation of labour in the 
industry. "The Company are very far from being unmindful of 
the material welfare of the men they employ, and indeed it 
is their constant study to maintain the most friendly and 
cordial relations with them, and to make them feel that 
their employers have a sincere interest in them and in their 
well-being at all times, apart from the mere buying and
selling of their l a bour " Mutual empathy was the "proper
relation between master and man". Workers who were given 
managerial responsibilities, such as inspectors and 
station-masters, were chosen from the lower ranks, and the 
"most scrupulous attention is paid to the training of signal 
men". The training-period varied according to the importance 
of the signal-post they were to occupy. The guards of 
passenger trains had responsibility for passengers safety 
and needed training. "All these men are subjected to a rigid 
examination before being appointed, and due regard is had, 
not only to their knowledge and experience, but to their 
general intelligence, capacity, and character". Even those 
employed in unskilled jobs like those of porter and shunter 
were offered security of employment because they were the
69
labour reserve for guards and signalmen.^ Enginemen and 
foremen, on the other hand, had an autonomous apprenticeship 
system, but the knowledge of engine drivers, guards, and 
signalmen was "both specialised and localised". The 
work-experiences of complicated signal systems upon 
different branch lines were varied. Men accustomed to the 
Westinghouse brake could not use ordinary hand-brakes. The 
specific, practical knowledge of railwaymen, therefore, was 
of great value to the company, and its loss an expense.
The particular labour demands of working on the 
permanent way were recognised by Felix Pole, General Manager 
of the Great Western Railway, in 1923: "In no walk of civil 
life is discipline of more importance than in railway 
service, and there is no more valuable asset a railway 
company can possess than a loyal, contented and 
well-disciplined staff." Management had to instill morale 
and loyalty as well as discipline. "Loyalty and efficiency 
go hand-in-hand, and, to secure these excellent attributes 
in any service, it is impossible to give too much 
consideration".^ Very strict discipline, however, would 
cause resentment, and "resentment is never conducive to good 
work". Suspending men for breaches of discipline was avoided
4
because experienced workers could not be easily replaced.
1. Findlay (1889), pp.72-75,82-83.
2. J .Mavor The Scottish Railway Strike 1891: A
History and a Criticism (1891), p p . 49-50.
3. F.Pole, Preface to K.J.Norman Browne The Browne 
and other Systems of Railway Discipline (19 23).
4. Browne (1923), pp.1,25.
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The special circumstances of monopoly created an 
unusual employment-relationship in the railway industry, and 
the demands of corporate management necessitated a positive 
labour policy. Railwaymen who worked on the permanent way 
formed a large internal labour market, and the retention of 
work-skills and the advantages of a stable workforce 
required a large investment in industrial welfare.
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(iv). Industrial Welfare and the Railways, 184 6 - 1 9 1 4 .
(a ) Introduction.
As a result of financial malpractices during the 1830s, 
Parliament required railway Acts defining a company's
articles of association to provide for adequate public 
accountability. The uses to which investors' money could be 
put were restricted, and the proper accounting of revenue 
was enforced.^ The right, therefore, of a company to donate 
to a welfare fund had to be sanctioned by legislation.
Friendly societies Igalised by Parliament had to be
properly constituted, with set contributions and rights to 
benefit. Nevertheless, railway provident associations
throughout their history were in general technically
insolvent and dependent upon company grants. Railways, whose 
cost control was lax, simply met the deficits of friendly 
societies. Faced, however, with an increasing financial 
burden, particularly from the cost of paying pensions, 
companies had at least to attempt subjecting their provident 
associations to actuarial considerations.
(b) O r i g i n s .
The London and Birmingham Railway's General Benefit
Society was established in 1839 to provide sick pay, death
assurance, and pensions in return for weekly or fortnightly 
2
contributions. Just as traffic operations could not be 
wholly united at the London and North Western at its
1. Cf. G.Alderman The Railway Interest (1979).
2. Rail 1008/10, L&BR, Board Minutes, 10 Oct 1839; 
Letter, 11 July 1860.
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founding in 1846, the welfare practices of the constituent 
companies were continued. Although a company-wide society 
was established under the ultimate control of a 
sub-committee of the Board, each operational district, 
corresponding to the old companies, had a separate committee 
in charge of administering the benefits. The L.N.W.R. 's 
third report on management in 1848 referred to the working 
of the friendly society. It was recognised that the harsh 
discipline, personally supervised by the chief officer, 
Huish, had drawbacks. Too many skilled or semi-skilled men 
were leaving the company's employ, and they were not easily 
replaced. Extensive bonuses and gratuities, it was believed, 
would encourage loyalty, but the policy of guaranteeing a 
railwayman 12/- sick pay per week was seen as too costly. An 
annual grant to its friendly society, according to its 
financial situation, would be made instead. The scale of 
sickness and pension allowances was revised, and membership 
was made a condition of employment in the new company. Money 
for the victims of accidents was allotted to departments. 
Huish was an intuitive rather than a systematic manager, and 
the Benefit Society was likewise an unsystematic if 
contributory club. No attempt was made to balance revenue 
and benefits. The L.N.W.R. also provided housing not only 
because it aided the transfer of labour throughout the 
company but because it bettered industrial relations, which 
was "seen as a vital factor in the maintenance of
operational efficiency".^
It was not until the 1870s that welfare policy was
1. Rail 1008/93, LNWR, 3rd Report, 15 June 1848;
Gourvish (1972), pp.61,95-7,113-4,153,155,174,264.
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further systemised at the L.N.W.R, The London and North 
Western Insurance Society was founded in 1871. It paid 
members death benefits and awards for permanent and
temporary disablement. In return for compulsory membership, 
the company agreed to pay "from time to time" a sum 
equalling five-sixths of total premiums. In 1874, the
railway donated £500 to establish the L.N.W. Provident and 
Pension Society. This scheme was also a condition of 
employment for all new workers, and cost the majority of 
members 2d a week in subscriptions. The company agreed to 
apply for statutory powers to donate £ 1 , 0 0 0 per annum, and 
changes in the Society's rules had to be confirmed by the 
Board. The scheme provided disablement pensions, additional 
death benefits, medical expenses, and sick pay at a rate of 
6 s per week for those normally earning 12s. The old age 
Pension Fund was begun in 1883 and guaranteed retirement at
65 years for the healthy and at 60 for the ill. Id a week
won the right to a 7s pension and 2d a week a 10s pension, 
while the company paid about £6,000 per annum in total. All 
three societies were managed by the same committee of three 
managerial appointees and twelve members elected from each 
of the managerial districts. To avoid the expensive and 
time-consuming process of gaining individual statutory 
permission to donate to each welfare scheme, the company 
decided to obtain the 1882 L.N.W.R. Act. This stipulated 
that, with the permission of three-fifths of shareholders, 
the directors could contribute to any cause which enhanced 
the welfare of employees. The old age Pension and Provident 
Funds were amalgamated in 1889, but the Insurance Society
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continued as a separate organisation catering for the
specific requirements of the 1880 Employers Liability Act.^
The Great Western Railway founded a Medical Fund
Society in 1847 to pay donations to some twenty hospitals
which treated their servants. By the 1890s, swimming and
Turkish baths, and free surgical appliances were available
to members. By 1901, the company provided dental services,
and a treatment centre for consumptives. The Provident
Society, established in 1880, covered sick pay and funeral
allowances.^ A Pension Society, founded in the same year,
paid pensions of between 10s and 14s according to the length 
4
of service. Modelling itself upon the coffee-houses
promoted by the L.N.W.R. at Crewe, a Temperance Union was
begun in 1883 and the G.W.R. Coffee Tavern Company was
established as a subsidiary of the railway. The Union
encouraged "healthy" activities like choir singing and
sports as alternatives to drinking, and interested itself in 
the "promotion of good will in all relations of the Staff 
and the Company".^ Social and sporting clubs in the railway
1. Findlay (1899), pp.77-81; Rail 1007/629.
2. Rail 1115/17, GWR Medical Fund Society, 
Half-Yearly Report for 31 Dec 1883 & 31 Dec 1895; 
Yearly Report for 1901.
3. Rail 1115/27, Report of GWR Provident Society,
1904 .
4. Rail 250/751.
5. Rail 1115/30, GWR Temperance Union, Annual Report
1912. By the 1920s, the Union was renamed the
Social and Educational Union. Cf. Ibid, 1922. As
late as 1950, as B.R.'s Western Region Staff
Association, it was considered "an integral part
of the social life" of the men. Cf. Ibid, 1950. On 
Crewe and paternalism, cf. W.H.Chaloner The Social
and Economic Development of Crewe, 1780-1923
(1950), pp.xix,45-51,146. Such provision, (cont.)
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industry promoted "esprit de corps", and railwaymen's
institutes providing board and meals were essential for
workers forced to travel many miles from home.
By the 1860s, the Great Northern Railway was concerned
about the high labour-turnover caused by the unavailability
of accomodation near places of work. More buildings at
isolated signal-boxes were particularly needed, and the
company began constructing houses at a cost of £120 each.^
In 1875, the Board hoped to minimise wage-increases on the
grounds that company cottages were themselves adequate
inducements to stay with the railway. Supply did not meet
demand, however. Rented accomodation, costing in London 6 / 6d
per week, was often beyond a railwayman's means, and 200
homes were required in the Traffic Department alone. In
1892, the company won the necessary Parliamentary authority
2
to advance house-buying loans at 4%.
As chairman of the South Eastern and the Manchester,
Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railways, Sir Edward Watkin was
principally responsible for welfare in these concerns. He
founded a savings bank at the S.E.R. in 1869 which sought to
however, was especially designed to attract 
skilled engineering labour to the workshops,- cf. 
also s.(iii). Swindon was developed by the G.W.R. 
as a model village in the 1850s with a Mechanics 
Institute and Medical Centre.
1. Rail 236/286, GNR, Memos, 13 May 1861, & 6 Sept
1861. On the destruction of urban working-class 
housing by railway building, cf. G . S.Jones Outcast 
London (1984), pp.161-4; H.J.Dyos "Railways and 
Housing in Victorian London", J l . of T.H. (1955), 
p p . 11-21,90-100, & "Some Social Costs of Railway 
Building in London",Jl. of T.H. (1957-8), 
p p . 23-31; J.R.Kellett Railways and Victorian 
Cities (1979), pp.324-336.
2. Rail 236/317, No.18, GNR, Memos, 17 July, 15 Nov 
1874; 11 May, 15 & 18 Nov, 14 Dec 1875.
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encourage personal thrift. As the Bank's guest-speaker in 
1881, the Bishop of London outlined Watkin's attitude to 
industrial relations as being "very wisely, in his own 
interests and in the care of the concerns which he 
represents and administers so effectively, to regard the 
well-being of those whom he employs".^ The M.S.L.R. 
established a Sick and Burial Fund in 1870. Membership of 
the Mutual Provident and Accident Society, on its founding 
in 1874, was compulsory. The right to benefit was 
restricted by the stern rules typical of 19th Century 
company friendly societies. The allowances of men found 
intoxicated while receiving sick pay were stopped. Members 
at each place of work were delegated to visit the recipients 
of benefits every week and to report cases of fraud.^
(c ) Employers Liability and Actuarial Valuation.
The 1880 Employers' Liability Act bestowed on workers 
the right to sue employers whose negligence was the cause of 
their accidents. Through its "contracting out" provisions, 
the legislation enabled workers to renounce their legal 
right to go to court in return for mutual insurance cover 
with their employers. Consequently, railway companies, which 
already offered their men extensive accident insurance, had 
to decide whether to continue with their schemes or to 
disband them in favour of workers resorting to litigation.
1. Rail 1115/47, SER Provident Savings Bank, Annual 
Report for 1881,1886,1890.
2. Rail 226/526, GCR Memo., 1908.
3 . Rail 226/372, Rules of GCR Mutual Provident and 
Accident Society, 1898.
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The G.E.R. 's Accident Allowance Fund altered its
constitution in 1880 to accord with the Act, and it enticed
its men to join by offering supplementary benefits.^ The
G.N.R. reviewed its allowances in 1888 from the "commercial
aspect", and noted that the L.N.W.R., Midland and G.E.R. all
had accident and provident societies to which they had
contributed £23,236, £9,000, and £4,472 respectively in the
previous year. The Great Northern did not contribute to
accident or sick funds but the company's practice was to pay
the difference between full pay and benefits received from
the workers' independent friendly society. The company paid
£1,379 in provident benefits and £2,543 in retirement
payments in 1887. It estimated that establishing a fund
2
would be more costly than its present system. The L.N.W.R., 
however, did contract out of the Act by founding a
compulsory scheme. Unlike Employers Liability, compensation 
at the company did not depend on proving the responsibility 
of the employer in any individual case. Litigation between 
employer and worker was seen as too detrimental to
industrial relations.^
Employers formed accident societies for two principal 
reasons. They disliked the prospects of litigation, and they 
wanted the levels of compensation to be limited by mutual 
agreement. The 1880 Act, therefore, encouraged company 
provision, but the 1897 Workmen's Compensation Act, by 
out a p r e —determined scale of automatic benefits for
1. Rail 390/338, GER Accident Fund, Memo., 16 March 
1923 .
2. Rail 236/362, Letter, 9 April 1888.
3. Findlay (1889), pp.77-80.
accidents at work, removed the employers' two reasons for
contracting out . Nevertheless, the Great Central Railway,
previously the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire,
reviewed the benefits it paid. It noted, firstly, that
Workmen s Compensation did not cover the loss of earnings in
the first two weeks of convalescence. Secondly, pensions
would not be available for bereaved widows and orphans. The
directors decided to continue the level of benefits it
provided, which included widows' pensions and payments
during the first weeks of recuperation from accidents. The
company agreed to meet 1 0 % of all its benefit society's
funds, if provident contributions rose by Id to 8 d a week,
2
and if members paid Id extra for accident insurance. The 
G.E.R. also founded a friendly society under the 1897 Act.^ 
Although the N.E.R. decided that it would simply pay 
compensation claims made under the legislation, it concluded 
that a fund should be established specifically to cover the
two weeks remitted by the law.^ The North British Railway
held that the additional costs of the Act demanded an 
increase in members contributions, but instead agreed to 
giving a 1 0 % donation because "this concession would have a 
very salutory and far reaching effect with the men, and be 
highly appreciated".^ The L.N.W. Insurance Society was wound 
1 . Cf. Ch . 9, s.(ii).
2. Rail 226/372, GCR, Circular to members of Mutual 
Provident and Accident Society.
3. Rail 390/338, GER Accident Fund Scheme, Memo., 16 
March 1923.
4. Herapath's Railway Journal, 3 June 1898.
5. Rail 226/372, GCR Memorandum, 21 Sept 1898.
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up, although a voluntary fund without company support was 
established by the men themselves. Special provision was 
made, however, for the early weeks of lost earnings.
The revision of welfare schemes was not instigated by 
the passing of social legislation only. The M.S.L.R. had 
contributed to its Mutual Provident and Accident 
Associations £1,300 every year since 1882. It was 
acknowledged by the company that the Association's 
credibility in the eyes of the men depended on the company 
guaranteeing its liabilities. Action was needed, because a 
report in 1894 showed the societies to have a defecit of
£29,538. The company, therefore, felt obliged to underwrite 
all sickness allowances for men over 70, and to carry the
societies' pension burden "as a matter of good feeling". In 
return, a one penny increase in contributions was sought, 
but this condition was abandoned because it introduced "a
disturbing element in the ranks".^
The revision of welfare benefits was sometimes halted 
by the opposition of trades unions. The Amalgamated Society 
of Railway Servants believed that company societies
threatened their own welfare funds and discouraged men from
striking. The North Eastern Railway first drew up plans for
a contributory pension scheme in 1884. In that year, the 
company agreed to give 3d per week for each man in service 
to provide a maximum pension of 10s. But, because the
A.S.R.S. was well organised on the N.E.R., the company was 
unable to establish such a contributory fund for more than
1. Rail 226/372, Memo. on deficiency of Mutual 
Provident Society, 14 April 1894.
80
twenty years. Although the North Eastern obtained the right
under its 1889 Act to compel membership of a pension scheme,
protests organised by the union ensured the clause was never
effected. The men seemed to prefer non-contributory
allowances even if they were discretionary and financially 
2
inadequate.
The N.E.R. re-investigated its various funds in 1893. 
The company spent nearly £5,000 a year on welfare benefits, 
a sum greater than any other company with the exception of 
the L.N.W.R. The directors wished to avoid resentment which 
changes in the paying and giving of benefits might cause, 
and the scope for action was consequently limited. It was 
impossible to cease pension allowances altogether, for it 
was in the nature of railway work that the older and least 
efficient men had to be retired. Workers had to be reliable 
and fit, and good eyesight was a particular requirement. The 
singular advantage of discretionary grants, the right to 
alter or end payments at will, had been whittled away by 
increasing costs and the fact that railway employers paid 
benefits to all workers as a matter of course. Moreover, 
discretionary pensions, being below adequate sustenance, did 
not secure the employment of a "superior" class of workmen. 
A contributory scheme providing payments of 5s at 65 years 
of age was the only "proper solution of the pension 
question". By contributing themselves, the interest of
1. Rail 527/230, Memo., 10 Aug 1906. On the A.S.R.S. 
and the N.E.R., cf. P.S.Gupta "Railway Trade 
Unionism in Great Britain, c . 1880-1900", E c o n .H.R. 
(1966), pp.124-153.
2. Rail 527/1161, Letter to Secretary of NER, 8 March 
1889; Letter, 11 March 1889.
3. In 1893 , the NER's gross revenue was £7 , 183 , 463 ; 
net revenue £3,071,976: cf. R.J.Irving The North
Eastern R a ilway Company, 1870-1914 :__^ __economic
history (1976), p.285.
______________________
workers in a friendly society was enhanced, and
se If-management and committee elections encouraged
The N.E.R, s housing policy was also 
circumscribed by the need to maintain good industrial
relations. By 1902, the N.E.R. had built 4,606 cottages,
and, although the return on rents did not equal the interest 
due on the original investment, it was decided that
increases "would create much discontent, and probably the
effect in creating dissatisfaction amongst the men would do 
harm out of all proportion to the extra revenue available".^ 
Detailed memoranda on welfare were drawn up at the
N.E.R. in the early 1900s, at a time when the company was 
considering all aspects of management. In 1903, it was
reported that a "large number of North Eastern
employees...." wanted to found a pension fund, but first 
wished "to ascertain how far the company would be prepared
to give financial support " Delegates elected at
fifty-six mass meetings were asked to formulate an 
appropriate scheme. The North Eastern realised that the 
fund's success depended on its backing. The railway believed 
that, in terms of labour management, the influence of
discretionary grants upon the men was "very much lessened by 
the fact that they are not assured". Any scheme would have 
to be approved by the company, and no alterations in its 
rules which affected its financial basis could be made 
without the directors consent. A regular lump sum to a fund 
0 y0 j-y y 0 ar would, it was estimated, cost less than the
paying of discretionary grants. A new scheme, therefore, was
1. Rail 527/31, NER, Memo, for Board, 4 Dec 1902.
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devised after fresh Parliamentary powers had been obtained 
in 1905, and, "In order to avert threatened opposition, it 
was agreed that any fund formed under the Act should be 
registered under the Friendly Societies Act, 1896" which
forbade compulsory membership.^
Railway welfare was also resisted in Parliament when
statutory permission for the founding of schemes was sought.
Sir Charles Dilke, the Radical-Liberal, for example, spoke
against the involvement of the Great Eastern in the personal
affairs of its workers. In 1897, the company wanted to
2
establish a Savings Bank. Railway News disagreed with
Dilke: ".... a certain amount of philanthropy is quite
compatible with the soundest principles of business. To
encourage thrift, to give the rank and file of the staff a
stake in the concern, to attach them permanently and
devotedly to their service, are objects for the sake of
which hard-headed directors and managers have found it worth
while to sacrifice a few thousands a year in net revenue".^
In support of such aims, the London, Brighton and South
Coast Railway in 1899 successfully petitioned for an Act of
Parliament to revise the rules of its Pension Society. It
wanted to transfer the members of the old scheme, without
consulting its members, to a new fund, and impose tight
4
financial control upon it.
1. Rail 527/230, Board Memo, on Proposed Servants'
Pension Fund, 29 Jan 1903; M e m o . , 10 Aug 1906.
2 . Railway N e w s , 27 Feb 1897, p . 365.
3. Ibid, 6 March 1897, p . 389.
4. PP 1899 (C.9203) xxxiii 871. Report to the Home
Department on Shop Clubs, Q s . 3629-30.
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Despite the reorganisation and revaluation of friendly 
societies by many companies, a Board of Trade Report on 
Railway Superannuation Funds in 1910 concluded that most 
societies continued to produce a yearly deficit. The
governing bodies of these funds had "apparently failed in 
the earlier stages properly to appreciate what the liability 
undertaken in respect of pensions would likely to amount
to". The Report, in addition, concluded that even the
membership of voluntary schemes tended to be universal
because of the special inducements they offered. General 
Secretary of the A.S.R.S., Richard Bell, was aware of the 
importance of company friendly societies to railwaymen, when 
he admitted he came "into touch with them more or less every 
day in some case or other".^
(d ) Coliective Bargaining and National Insurance.
By 1907, Lloyd George had forced the railways to accept 
a nationwide conciliation scheme. The 1894 Railway and Canal 
Traffic Act, which had frozen rates in an effort to curb 
monopolistic pricing, had encouraged companies to squeeze 
wages, with the effect that membership of the A.S.R.S. had 
grown dramatically. To avoid the prospect of a country-wide 
railway strike in 1907, Lloyd George threatened to enforce a 
system of conciliation boards unless they were appointed 
voluntarily by the companies. He also held out the carrot 
rates revision. A hierarchy of conciliation boards at 
local, sectional, and central level were established in all 
companies, but agreement was reached only after an assurance
P P  1910 (C.5349) Ivii 35, pp.30,32; PP 1911
(C.5484) xxix-Pt.I 687, Q s .3548,3593.
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that unions would remain unrecognised and that their 
officials would not sit on the boards.^ The industry had 
conceded three points. The privilege of railwaymen to
Petition directors about their grievances became a right, 
^i^i-cial rather than a^ hoc procedures for complaint were 
established, and, where Sectional and Central Boards failed 
to find agreement, outside arbitrators could be called in. 
The scheme lasted seven years during which time 
dissatisfaction with its working led to a national strike in 
1911. Rates were not revised until 1913.^
In negotiations on the conciliation boards, the 
companies argued that the scale of welfare provision was
reason enough for low wage increases. The leverage given by 
the boards to a more strident labour force worried the Great 
Eastern. In 1908, the company issued a circular on the
conciliation scheme to its servants stating that it gave 
£28,500 to provident societies every year. In addition, the 
railway granted allowances to those retired men who had been 
too old to join pension societies when hired. The General 
Manager, J.F.S.Gooday, set wages against free travel passes, 
paid holidays, savings banks, cheap cottages, free uniforms, 
"and other privileges". He asked the men "to seriously 
consider whether you will break off the friendly relations 
which have hitherto existed between the staff and the Board, 
a [1(3 introduce conditions which prevail where masters and men
Cf. P.J.Cain "Railway Combination and Government 
1900-1914", Econ.H.R. (1972), p p . 623-41.
2. Cf. G.Alderman "The Railway Companies and the 
Growth of Trades Unionism in the Late Nineteenth
and Early Twentieth Century", H .J ._ (1971),
p p . 129-51; P.S.Bagwell The Railwaymen; a history 
of'the N.U.R (1963), pp.275-7,284-5.
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each consider only their own interests, and under which 
directly a man is incapable of performing his full amount of 
work he is turned adrift without any consideration for his 
length of service, and without any provision for his old 
age".^ During conciliation procedures at the L.N.W.R. in 
1908, stress on the advantages of the Pension and Provident 
Fund helped reduce the level of the wages award.^ Richard 
Bell argued that his members contributed a substantial part 
of their income to welfare funds. His central point, 
however, was that it was in the nature of railway employment 
that the unfit had to be retired and that pensions, 
therefore, had to be provided. Employers were only 
fulfilling their responsibilities and in their own 
interests.^
While collective bargaining over wages and hours did 
not directly concern railway welfare policy, social 
legislation had the potential to affect its provision 
crucially. Yet, the passing of the Old Age Pensions Act 1908 
left the operations of company pension funds untouched. 
Railway News criticised the legislation on the basis that 
railway companies had drawn heavily on their own resources 
"to largely solve the old age pension problem many long 
years before the present Administration....", in addition to 
subscribing to sick and orphan funds.^ A G.C.R. memorandum
1. Railway N e w s , 23 May 1908, p . 912.
2. Rail 1007/629, LNWR Pension and Provident Society 
and the N.I. Act, April 1912, Appendix to a Memo.
3. Rail 1025/21, GWR Wages and Hours Arbitration, 10 
May 1909, p p . 19,32-4,72-3.
4. Railway N e w s , 8 Aug 1908, p . 278.
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in 1908 did conclude that it was impossible to pay for state 
and company pensions. But the railway continued to pay for 
those between 65 and 70 years who were not covered by the 
Act. Moreover, because a man needed a weekly income of 12/ld 
before the state pension of 5s was incrementally reduced, 
the G.C.R. ensured that its employees received a net sum of 
between 5s and 15s in accordance with its previous scale of 
benefits. Their awards were subject only to the provision 
that everyone should obtain the full state grant; "The 
Company have no doubt that this action on their part has 
been much appreciated".^
The railways had reason, however, to be troubled by the 
implications of the National Insurance Bill in 1911. The 
Railway Companies Association advised its members to 
establish, under the Act, Approved Societies, if for no 
other reason than to forestall the Amalgamated Society of 
Railway Servants forming their own. The G.C.R. doubted the 
worth of a voluntary Approved Society, because the absence 
of compulsion was considered to lessen membership and to 
limit its influence over workers. But the G.C.R. concluded 
that through an Approved Society the Board would "be able to 
exercise a useful pressure from time to time". They were 
certain that "The Company will control it...."^ The London, 
Brighton and South Coast Railway agreed to a voluntary fund 
but would "strive to maintain the house which is our own..."
1. Rail 226/531, GCR, Memo., 1908.
2. Cf. C h . 9, s .(iii).
3. Rail 226/530, GCR Board, subject no.28, NI Act, 26 
April 1912.
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from the interference of the state.^
Railway provident schemes had to be reconstituted to 
suit the requirements laid down by the Insurance 
Commissioners. The G.N.R, withdrew its annual donation to 
its Sick and Funeral Allowance Fund, because, under the Act, 
it had to pay weekly contributions for every member instead. 
But the company agreed to administer the Society free of 
charge, and members subscriptions were taken directly from 
w age - p a c k e t s . Incentives, additions to the minimum benefits 
laid down by the Act, encouraged the men to join the 
company's Statutory Fund. The N.E.R. paid benefits to 
workers under 16 years and above 70, who were not legally 
required to join the Health Insurance scheme.^ The Great 
Central also revised the rules of its sickness fund on the 
advice of an actuary and offered supplementary benefits.^ 
The L.N.W.R. enquired into the efficacy of its welfare 
policies and the costs of the new legislation. Its pension 
fund already showed a large deficit, a liability the company 
had accepted while their scheme was compulsory. It
questioned its commitment, however, on the grounds that the 
loyalty engendered by the Provident and Pension Association 
had failed to prevent a strike in 1911. Before the
provident section could become an Approved Society, the
1. Rail 1115/43, LBSCR, Report of Provident Society,
1913.
2. Rail 1115/4, GNR Sick and Funeral Allowance Fund, 
Accounts, 31 Dec 1912.
3. Rail 527/1098, NER, Conditions of Service in the 
Traffic Department, 1912.
4 . Rail 226/526, GCR and Joint Lines Friendly 
Societies, Statement of Accounts, 31 Dec 1911.
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Association s defecit had to recovered by either increased 
contributions or reduced benefits. The first measure was 
seen as beyond members means, the second as unfair to
long-standing members. The L.N.W.R., therefore, agreed to 
donate an extra £93,000, £82,000 of which was allotted to 
providing pensions. The remaining £11,000 allowed higher 
sick benefits to be paid, death allowances for husbands and 
wives, and retirement gratuities. These sums were additional 
to the £50,000 to be paid every year in employers'
contributions to the Approved Society. The chairman of the 
Company did not doubt that members of the Society would be 
"agreeably satisfied" with the new arrangements.^
(e ) S u m m a r y .
Friendly societies were an integral part of railway 
labour management during the years 1848-1914, because 
companies needed to create a loyal and stable workforce. 
Railway friendly societies were notable for being 
regularised and administered according to predetermined 
rules. Their existence depended upon the securing of 
pariiamenatary approval for the schemes, but the 
systemisation of welfare was also a managerial necessity. 
Each company had to involve its sizeable labour force in the 
membership of provident funds. Indeed, because company 
provision encouraged discipline and cooperation, many 
schemes were a condition of service. Extensive internal 
labour markets made the retention of skills through pension 
schemes and good conditions a useful instrument of
1. Rail 1007/629, LNWR Pension and Provident Society,
Minutes of Meeting, 7 May 1912.
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employment policy. Although many of the original friendly 
societies were not ex gratia and provided benefits for all, 
they were unsystematic in the sense they were not 
contributory and because income was rarely related to 
expenditure. From 1848 to 1914, the costs of welfare and 
especially pensions continued to grow. Increasingly, 
therefore, railway friendly societies became contributory. 
They remained, however, technically insolvent, and relied on 
the regular funds that railways as large, monopolistic 
companies could provide.
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Railwaymen s Friendly Societies and Savings Banks. 
Founded
1833 Stockton and Darlington Mutual Provident Society
1839 London and Birmingham Provident Society
1841 Birmingham and Gloucester Railway 
Friendly Institution
1842 London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway 
Provident Society
1846 London and North Western General Benefit Society
1847 Great Western Railway Mutual Accident Society
1850 Great Northern Railway Locomotive Sick Society
1851 Great Eastern Railway Provident Society
1852 North British Railway Provident Society
1853 Great Northern Railway Sick and Funeral
Allowance Fund
1857? L. & B.R. Savings Bank
1859 Midland Railway Friendly Society
1859? Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Insurance Society
1861 Midlands, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Savings Bank
1865 G.W.R. Enginemen and Footplatemen Mutual Accident, 
Sick and Superannuation Society
1866 Great Central Railway and Joint Lines 
Friendly Society
1868 South Eastern Railways Savings Bank
1871 L.N.W.R. Insurance Society
1874 G.C.R, and Joint Lines Accident and Pension 
Society
L.N.W.R. Provident Society
1875 G.N.R. Provident Society
1877 L.N.W.R. Servants Hospital Fund
1878 G.E.R. Accident Allowance Fund
1879 G.W.R. Provident Society
1880 G.W.R. Pension Society
1882 North Eastern Railway Benevolent Fund
1883 L.N.W.R. Pension Society
1885 G.W.R. Savings Bank
N.B.R. Provident Fund
1889 L.N.W.R. Provident and Pension Society
1890 G.E.R. Pension Fund
1893? South Western Railway Widows and Orphans
Benefit Society 
1893 N.E.R. Pension Society
1895 L.N.W.R. Savings Bank
G.E.R. Supplementary Pension Society 
Taff Vale Railway Savings Bank
1897 G.N.R. Savings Bank
1898 G.C.R. Provident and Accident Society
1899 L.B.S.C.R. Pension Society
1903 G.C.R. Pension Society 
G.W.R. Pension Society
1904 G.W.R. Mutual Accident Society
1907 N.E.R. Servants Pension Society
L. & Y.R. Pension Friendly Society
1908 Metropolitan Railway Pension Society
1 9 1 4 N,E.R. Servants' Death and Endowment Society
1 9 1 9 N.E.R. Cottage Homes and Benefit Fund
1923 London, Midland, Scottish Savings Bank
1930 L.M.S. Hospital Fund
Southern Railway Pension Society
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( V ). Rationalisation and Industrial Welfare, 1914-1939 .
Extensive changes occurred in the structure and 
management of the industry as a consequence of the Great War 
and the 1921 Railways Act. The demands of a war-time economy 
converted Parliament and businessmen in general to the 
advantages of combination. Greater efficiency was achieved 
by the Railway Executive Committee's central direction of 
the industry, "Through" traffic was streamlined, and 
goods-wagons were pooled and more fully filled. Coordination 
by the Coal Controller, for example, saved approximately 700 
million ton-miles per annum in coal freight.^
The unions' bargaining-power was increased by labour's 
shortage during the War, and the industry's wage-bill of £47 
million in 1913 expanded to €173m by 1921. Companies, 
moreover, continued to provide welfare benefits for men 
temporarily called to the colours. The Railway Executive 
Committee in 1914 decided that companies should supplement 
official payments to soldiers' dependants, and guarantee 
families a minimum of four-fifths of their customary income. 
This donation amounted to 7s plus Is for each of the first 
three children. The men called up in August 1914 were 
members of the Territorial railway regiments formed after 
Haldane's military reforms in 1907, and they were 
technically still company employees in the early months of 
the War. By the end of 1914, the families of employees 
joining the regular army received similar benefits, the aim 
being to encourage ex-railwaymen to rejoin their companies
1. Cf. Aldcroft in Aldcroft (ed.) (1974).
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when they were demobilised.^ The Great Central assisted all 
those whose husband or father was on active service and even 
continued to pay his contributions to company friendly
societies. These concessions cost the G.C.R. £3,033 in 1917. 
The N.E.R., therefore, appreciated the National Health
Insurance Act 1916 because it was "designed mainly to
strengthen the financial position of Societies, and to 
simplify their administration". Railway News recognised the 
good work of the Ministry of Munitions in promoting 
industrial welfare. The Boys Welfare Association was 
commended for its work with the 1,000 boys employed on the 
Midland Railway. It was a policy "conducing to better work 
contentment and loyalty, facilitating discipline without 
friction, and assisting favourable relations between 
employers and employees, during the most impressionable 
years of a boy's life". Welfare work developed "a spirit of
esprit de f i r m...... "^
With the state controlling the railways at the end of 
the War, the government had to decide upon the future 
structure of the industry. But the Coalition procrastinated 
in the face of union opposition to the industry returning to 
private hands. Railway News conceded in 1919 that the unions 
would have to be given a say in management.* The position of
1. Rail 226/596, Circular from REC, 19 Aug 1914.
2. Ibid, GCR, Letter from S.Fay, 26 Aug 1914; Rail 
1115/4, Report of NER Sick and Funeral Allowance
Fund, 31 Dec 1917.
3. Railway N e w s , 30 May 1919, pp . 895,899. Cf. Chapter 
8, s . (iii).
4. Ibid, 24 Oct 1919, pp.510,528; 31 Oct 1919, p . 566.
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the unions, however, was weakened by the Post-War Slump in
the 1920s, and they accepted, instead of nationalisation,
the conciliation machinery established by the 1921 Railways
Act. The employers still viewed the participation of workers
in management as an expropriation of their rights as
managers. Yet, the Railway Companies Association was
satisfied that all their recommendations for the
rationalisation of the industry were incorporated into the
1921 Act. Four regional, privately-owned groupings were
established and unnecessary competition was to be avoided.
The new concerns were left to reach their own decisions
about the practicalities of internal amalgamation and
streamlining, with the exception of the Great Western which
2
was based on the old company of the same name.
Managerial reconstruction required a review of labour
management policies, and the London and North Eastern
Railway investigated its welfare provision in 1924. The 1921
Act had left it in charge of the provident associations of
its constituent companies, which all varied in methods of
funding and in the payment of benefits. The contractual
obligations of each of these societies were regarded by
railwaymen as part of their conditions of employment. Their
benefit rights were, in addition, protected by the law laid
down in numerous railway Acts. Reconstituting the friendly
societies without inflicting losses of benefits on some
1. Bagwell (1963), pp. 377 - 3 7 9 ,382-3 ,397-8,404-11 ;
Railway N e w s , 24 Oct 1911, p.531.
9 H Ellis British Railway History, Vol.II (1959),
rh iii CT. PTj.Cain "Railway Combination and 
GoJe^n^ent, 1900-1914", Econ.HJR^ (1972),
pp . 623-641.
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portion of the workforce was impossible. The Railways Act, 
moreover, stated that customary practices were inviolate 
unless changed by mutual agreement. The systemising of 
welfare provision during the 1920s proved a complex process.
Mainly because of its parlous financial situation, the 
L.N.E.R. paid greatest attention to management and company 
structure in the hope of reducing costs. The railway adopted 
the working practices of its most efficient unit, the North 
Eastern. A detailed report on the payment of benefits was 
commissioned in 1924, for "Each of the constituent Companies 
took some steps to encourage what has come to be known as 
'Welfare Work', and several proposals for extending the 
movement have recently been made". Previous practices could 
not be continued, therefore, in an a^ hoc manner. The review 
selected twelve branches of welfare work as being of primary 
importance; railway institutes, reading rooms, and social 
clubs; lectures and debating societies; improvement classes; 
mess rooms and canteens; athletic clubs; rifle clubs; 
musical societies and brass bands; the Old Comrades 
Association; allotments; the friendly societies, including 
official company schemes and "unofficial" ones founded by 
the men themselves; savings banks; and the North East 
Cottage Homes and Benefit Fund.^ The committee reported the 
existence of 993 organisations, of which 42 received direct 
company support and 139 the free use of land or buildings.
In May 1923, the Board had placed all the different
1. M.R.Bonavia Railway Policies between— tlie— Wa r s
(1981), p.9. Cf. s.(ii).
2 , Rail 390/4 39, Memo, by Organisation Committee on
Welfare Work.
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savings bank into one amalgamated fund giving a single
interest rate of 4%, and it was agreed that all friendly
society payments were to be collected directly from wages.^
By June 1924, the L.N.E.R. decided to retain all the
railwaymen s institutes, although their free rent was ended.
Athletic clubs continued to receive assistance but began to
be charged for the use of grounds. Official company
organisations would be encouraged to coordinate sporting
activities throughout the company, in the manner of the
League of Riflemen which promoted and organised the sport of
shooting at the L.N.E.R. The Board, however, decided that
"Consideration of new Welfare Work should be postponed until
the Company is in calmer waters, and that the practice of
the constituent companies would be normally
2
c o n t i n u e d ....... " But the advantages of pooling actuarial
risks in a large pension fund were too financially
attractive to be overlooked. The N.E.R., G.N.R., and G.E.R. 
all had retirement funds, while the G.C.R., the Hull and 
Barnsley, and the Great North of Scotland granted ex gratia 
allowances. The aggregate cost in 1922 amounted to £207,180. 
Men were encouraged but could not be compelled to join 
associations organised on the basis of the North Eastern 
Railway's fund. It was self-managed and contributory, gave 
refunds at a generous rate, and the company held its assets 
at a fixed rate of interest.
1. Ibid, LNER, Report on Welfare Work, Feb 1924.
2. Ibid, Memo, to Directors, 20 June 1924.
3. Rail 390/311, LNER, Pension Arrangements, 1924 
R e p o r t .
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The L.N . E . R 's report in 1924 revealed its welfare 
philosophy. Firstly, it was in the employer's interests to 
have a "healthy, thrifty, contented, self-respecting and 
efficient staff , and labour as well as capital was an 
investment. Secondly, efficient workmen required adequate 
opportunities for education and recreation, healthy 
w o r k - c o n d i t i o n s , and decent housing. Thirdly, "many of these 
facilities are difficult for the staff to obtain by 
themselves, but can be readily provided by co-operation 
between the men, whose energy will carry out the schemes, 
and the employer, who is able to provide the necessary 
financial and technical assistance". Fourthly, welfare 
mollified class hatred. Fifthly, "this spirit of cooperation 
or esprit de corps will make it easier as time goes on to 
interest the staff in improving industrial efficiency..." 
The L.N.E.R. recognised the distinction between "external" 
and "internal" welfare. Because internal welfare dealt with 
the physical conditions of work in factories, railways were 
principally committed to providing institutes, savings 
banks, and friendly societies,- or external welfare. Such 
provision was a channel for shop-floor grievances; "It is 
important that the men should feel, especially in matters of 
external welfare, that the initiative is with them, and that 
the Company are not trying in any way to force schemes upon 
them". Welfare administration was democratic but subject to 
(the) necessary financial safeguards". External provision 
also tied even trade union activists to the company: "There
is a growing desire among the men to avail themselves of any 
help from the Company in carrying out the welfare schemes in
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which they are interested, and there is no doubt that an
active share in the management of such concerns give the
men s representatives, most of whom are leading men in the
Trades Unions, a more direct interest in the Company as an
organic whole , Although the National Union of Railwaymen's
Review described welfare as "capitalistic dope and
industrial soothing syrup", the L.N.E.R. believed it
promoted "a co-operative sense which, while impossible to
value in money", instilled loyalty.^ The Report suggested
that a full-time welfare officer be appointed to maximise
the advantages of company provision. He could establish
uniformity in the paying of benefits, and concentrate his
2
efforts on boys, who required pastoral guidance.
When the L.N.E.R. considered ending its financial 
support for the North Eastern Railway's Cottage Homes and 
Benefit Fund in 1926, the Fund pointed out its importance to 
the daily lives of workers. One member recounted how one of 
its local relief committees was applauded at an N.U.R. 
branch meeting for assisting a widow. Moreover, "The 
contributions by the Company have to a very large extent 
been one of the dynamoes by which the men have been able to 
carry their increased membership amongst the rank and file; 
the fact that the company were backing us up financially". 
Company concern for the "human factor" induced the interest 
of the men in their work. The railway s conciliation
Rail 390/439, LNER, Report on Welfare Work, Feb 
1924 .
2. Ibid, Welfare Committee Meeting, 30 July 1924.
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boards supported the Fund's case.^
The London, Midland, Scottish, as the largest railway, 
faced the greatest problems of rationalisation. The 
management attempted to enforce standardisation by applying 
the practices of the L.N.W.R., but the inter-company 
rivalries which resulted proved obstructive.^ The L.N.W.R. 
Hospital Fund was continued and allocated by the Board an 
additional £1,000 in 1922. In 1923, its benefits were
extended to the whole L.M.S. after the company had promised
to match 50% of the amount contributed by the men each week. 
By 1930, there were 946 branches of the Fund, covering 
240,000 members or 88% of the workforce. Between 1923-29, 
the Fund paid £565,590 to hospitals as well as donating to 
the costs of doctors' consultation fees and surgical and 
dental treatment.^ The L.M.S. established a welfare 
department in 1923, and divisional welfare officers were 
appointed under the direction of the Chief Officer for 
Labour and Establishment. The department built new 
recreational facilities like the Headstone Lane sports 
ground in 1924 for the use of wages staff at Euston. It 
organised annual company-wide sporting competitions, and 
suggestion and housing schemes. A company magazine, also 
founded in 1923, was designed to promote welfare provision. 
The L.M.S. was keen to point out the large sums it gave to
1. Ibid, LNER, Transcript of meeting of N.E. Area 
Board and Cottage Homes and Benefit Fund, 22 April
1926 .
2. Bonavia (1981), p.9
3. Rail 1007/555, LNWR Hospital Fund, Memo., 19 May
1930 .
4 . l m S The LMS Centenary (1938), pp.156-9.
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friendly societies, orphanages, hospital treatment,
convalescent homes, dental and optical assistance, lectures
and continuation classes, canteens, mess-rooms, railwaymen's
institutes, libraries, and social and sports facilities.^
The L.M.S. claimed not to believe that industrial
disputes were a result of the worker's greed for wages, but
due to "the absence of a proper understanding between the
parties concerned, those in a position of authority in the
industrial world frequently lacking either the opportunity
or the inclination to exercise personal sympathy and
interest in their helpers or co-workers...." The point was
to give railwayman an appreciation of the difficulties of
2
management in a company the size of the L.M.S. As W.J.Blake
of the L.M.S. stated: "  the necessary link between the
men who find wages and those who depend on those wages for 
their existence was to be found in the right conception and 
application of the principles and practice of industrial 
w e l f a r e . ..
The Great Western Railway was from its founding in 1922 
a unified company,* and the company's friendly society 
continued to function as before the War.^ Public Utility
1. Rail 1115/49, Leaflet on LMS Hospital Fund, 1930;
Rail 1007/555, Memo., LMS, 19 May 1930; LMS
Railway Magazine, Dec 1923, pp.43-4,68; Jan 1924, 
p p . 100-1 , 107-9 ; May 1924 , pp. 232,275-6,429-30 ; Oct 
1924, pp.429-30; Nov 1924, pp.466-7; Dec 1924, 
p p .74-5,108,110-1,135,482,498-500.
2. Ibid, March 1925, p.108.
3. U n i t y , Dec 1925, p . 119.
4. Bonavia (1981), p.9.
5. Rail 1115/23, cf. accounts for 1925.
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Societies were founded in the early 1920s,^ as a result of 
the 1918 Housing Act. They provided subsidies for the 
construction of industrial housing, because, with the 
rationalisation of lines, labour had to be transferred.^ The 
Southern Railway by 1922 was likewise able to adopt a
unitary corporate structure.^ In 1930, the company obtained 
Parliamentary authority to amalgamate pension provision. 
Section 6 of the L.B.S.C.R. (Pensions) Act 1899 had firstly
to be repealed, and the Southern had to guarantee the
solvency of the new fund.*
Although the difficulties of rationalisation both 
necessitated and hindered the streamlining of welfare 
benefits, action had to be taken to comply with the 1925 
Widows, Orphans, and Old Age Pensions Act. The G.W.R.
Pension Fund, for example, from 1904 did not receive a
direct company contribution but the railway did supplement 
the fund's pensions. A man with forty years service could 
have his 5s contributory pension doubled, and the company 
paid 60% of the total cost of retirement benefits. The 
G.W.R. were confident that the 1925 Act would not
substantially alter the details of their pension provision. 
Yet, those who joined the fund in 1926 would when retired 
receive company allowances worth 25% less than those who had 
joined prior to the legislation. The cut, however, was only 
equal to the cost of the Great Western's contributions to
1. Rail 250/244 & 1115/14.
2. Rail 425/4, LMS, G.P.Committee, 26 Oct 1923; 
memo., 5 Dec 1923.
3. Bonavia (1981), p.9.
4. Rail 1115/64, SR, Memo., 1930.
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the new state pension scheme. Although the Widows and 
Orphans' Benevolent Fund was wound up, the company promised 
to pay any benefits due to present members. Any widows 
unable to obtain state allowances after 1925 were also 
promised financial help.^ Because the L.N.E.R. was to 
contribute some £125,000 per annum under the legislation, 
donations to voluntary pension funds were proportionately 
reduced. Ex gratia allowances, paid on certain constituent 
parts of the railway, were continued. The objective, as 
before the 1925 Act, was to guarantee a pension income from 
both the state and the company of between 5s and 15s. But 
lump-sum gratuities to widows and orphans, which cost the 
company £5,300 a year, were ended, as these categories were 
covered by the new Act. The railway had reduced pension 
allowances when their recipients reached 70 years of age and
became eligible to the state grant of 5s a week under the
1908 Act. Mortality had ensured that payments to over-70s 
amounted to only £8,500 per annum. As the 1925 Act
introduced pensions at 65, the company believed that, with
the majority of its pensioners in their sixties, it could 
save large sums. The company sought revisions to the G.N.R. 
Pension Fund, the G.N.R. Supplemental Pension Fund, the
N.B.R. Insurance Society, and the G.E.R. Sick and Orphan 
Society. They would cut its costs by an estimated £63,000 
per annum. The fact, however, that higher state pensions of 
lOs became payable at 65 was not justification under the
1921 Railways Act for altering customary benefits, and the
1. Rail 250/751, GWR, Pension Society.
2. Rail 390/546, Memos., Dec 1925, 5 & 8 Jan 1926.
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L.N.E.R. 's friendly societies invoked its protection in 
1926. The company believed it could win its case in court 
but preferred an amicable solution. It was mutually agreed 
to continue supplementing pensions by 50% for the seven 
years following retirement.^
The rationalisation of the industry by the Railways Act 
1921, because it protected previous practices, delayed 
managerial reorganisation. Required to maintain the welfare 
benefits of all those in receipt of them, the companies were 
not successful in streamlining welfare organisation, and 
many of the friendly societies established by the pre-l92l 
companies survived even the nationalisation of the industry 
in 1947.
1. Rail 390/439.
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(vi). Conc l u s i o n .
Railway companies as the first businesses to tackle the 
managerial complexities of large-scale organisation were 
equally innovators in labour managment and industrial 
welfare. The better managed railways, moreover, were 
undoubtedly the more systematic in the provision of welfare. 
The largest company by the mid-l9th Century, the London and 
North Western, introduced extensive company provision as an 
element of company re-organisation after 1846. Following 
reports, the North Eastern Railway in the early 1900s 
established a Iine-and-staff management and restructured its 
welfare organisation. The L.N.E.R. during the Inter-War 
period was the most systematic in corporate and labour 
management, and investigated the implications of each.
The scale of the railways' investment in welfare was 
possible because of secure profits and was necessitated by 
the creation of large internal labour markets. Stable work 
forces were, however, rare in British industry. Some trades 
continued throughout this period to rely on casual, 
unskilled labour^ while others gradually founded more 
capital-intensive concerns and the corporate structures they 
required. The systemising of welfare in these industries, 
therefore, is more closely linked to developments in their 
general management. Railways had to organise their labour 
forces systematically from their founding. By the 20th 
Century, other industries began to adopt the scale and 
type of provision originally utilised by the first
I. Cf. Ch . 7, s . ( i ) .
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large-scale businesses.^
The extent and scale of provident provision in the
railway industry was indicative of the value placed upon the
semi-skilled workforce employed on the permanent way. This
made the railway industry active as an employers ' group in
the drawing up of social legislation, and its Parliamentary
2
experience as a lobby-group proved invaluable.
1. Cf. esp. C h . 4; also. C h . 6.
2. Cf. C h . 9.
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Chapter 3.
Industry and Labour in the Metropolitan Gas Industry.
(i ). Introduction.
Both the railways and the gas industry were
capital-intensive, naturally-monopolistic joint-stock
utilities. Over-capitalised and often inefficient, gas 
companies came to depend upon monopolistic pricing. They
were, therefore, increasingly regulated by government
throughout the 19th Century. London, due to its size and
importance, was the object of the bulk of gas legislation. 
Being so little researched, the gas industry deserves 
investigation, and articles on the subject have so far 
focussed on the development of regulatory legislation and 
its political implications.^ But controlling legislation had 
a direct influence upon the profitability, management and 
commercial strategy of the companies. In the late 1860s, the 
Metropolitan gas concerns embarked upon a policy of 
amalgamation, rationalisation, and new investment. Returns 
to scale could be secured only by efficiently planning the 
distribution network over a large enough area. Avoiding the 
duplication of services reduced high capital costs.
The passing of controls over monopolistic pricing 
induced gas employers to refuse increases in labour costs, 
which could no longer just be passed on to the consumer. Gas
I. Cf. Bibliography.
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legislation was similar in effect, therefore, to the Railway 
and Canal Traffic Act of 1894 because both helped provoke
industrial strife. The complexity of managing gas companies 
was not as great as railway operations which had to be
closely coordinated according to a pre-determined schedule
and carried out despite the communication problems on a 
national, rather than a local or city-wide, scale. Yet, gas 
companies were too large to be administered by one man and 
were too capital-intensive to be owned by one family.
Gas employers needed to impose a strict regime:
work-discipline was linked to capitalisation and new
machinery, to the need to keep it continually operative, 
and, consequently, to the establishment of joint-stock
companies. Managerial authority was exercised strictly in 
the industry because of the workers' ability to halt an 
essential supply. Gas employers failed, however, to 
establish a large and reliable internal labour market 
because its trade was affected by the seasonal demand for 
light. It was necessary, nonetheless, to build up a "core" 
workforce, consisting principally of stokers who formed the 
majority of gas workers. Despite the investment required in 
retorts, gas-holders, and mains, the industry depended upon 
the physical effort of men to stoke the coal. The industry 
could not wholly rely on ex gratia paternalism, although
much welfare provision in London did remain discretionary 
until the 1870s. But gas employers continued even then to 
respond inadequately to the increase in the size of firms 
and the building of larger works during that decade. Their 
general attitude continued to be that workers were servants
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who should simply respect the social status of employers.
Welfare in the gas industry was only gradually systemised as 
a response to serious labour strife in 1889, and
copartnership was instrumental in that process of 
systemisation.
Section (ii) in this chapter outlines the development 
of gas legislation and its influence upon rationalisation 
and investment in new, larger works. Section (iii) analyses
the effect of these changes upon labour relations and
industrial welfare in the years before the First World War, 
when the basis of gas company labour policies was largely 
determined. Section (iv) looks at welfare provision in the 
years 1914 to 1939.
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(ii). Municipal Regulation, Rationalisation,
and Capital Development.
The Gas Light and Coke Company was the first enterprise
to manufacture gas at a central works and to distribute it
through pipes. Requiring a large capital-outlay, the company
successfully applied to Parliament in 1810 to be
incorporated as a joint-stock enterprise. In 1812, the
G.L.C.C. was granted a statutory charter bestowing the right
to lay underground pipes within the area of the City of
London, Westminister, and Southwark. The company could
operate, consequently, without the consent of local
authorities. It became known as the Chartered, although
other companies in subsequent years were designated trading
areas.^ Competition, however, was possible, as non-statutory
companies could operate with the permission of local
authorities. Moreover, the trading-areas of statutory
2
companies often overlapped. Private gas companies, rather 
than municipal concerns, flourished in London, partly 
because the Metropolis was ony(iitted from the terms of the 
1835 Municipal Corporations Act. No local authority was 
large enough to own a gas company until the Metropolis 
Management Act 1855 established the Metropolitan Board of
W o r k s .
The necessary civic regulation of road-works increased 
monopolistic tendencies. High capital-entry also limited 
competition in the gas industry. Companies which cooperated
1. Cf. C.Singer et. ajl. , A History of Technology 
(1954-78), Vol.IV, ch.9.
2. J.Reeson Acts Relating to the Supply of Gas and
Water by Companies and Local Authorities (1902), 
p p . 115-21.
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to avoid the duplication of mains secured greater returns on
their investment,^ Over-capitalised companies facing low
returns restricted trading to mutually-agreed districts.
Collusion encouraged the government regulation of prices and
dividends, which by the 1840s were recognised as 
2
exorbitant. Competition finally ended south of the Thames 
by 1853 and in north London by 1857.^ The London vestries 
were convinced that high prices, low illuminating power, and 
weak gas-pressure were all attributable to the policy of 
"districting". The Metropolis's 1861 Sale of Gas Act 
sanctioned the principle of monopolisitic trading areas,* 
"in order to economise Capital and avoid the too frequent 
opening of the public streets". But inspectors were 
appointed to investigate company accounts every three years 
to ensure that any dividends paid were justifiable, and 
maximum prices were set for particular qualities of gas.^ 
Yet, the Honorary Secretary to London's "united vestries" 
believed the Bill had been emasculated. Municipalities were 
the only bulwark "against the giant joint-stock interest 
which is gradually absorbing all other interests in the
House of Commons " A clause seeking to link
dividends with price along a siiding-scale had been
1. D.A.Chatterton "State Control of the Public Utilities 
in the Nineteenth Century; the London Gas Industry", 
Bus.Hist. (1972), p p . 168-78.
2. PP 1867 (C.18-I) Iviii 497, Letter N o . 24.
3. PP 1867 (C.520) xii 1, p . 3.
4. GLCC The History of the G.L.C.C. (1912), pp.38-42.
5. PP 1860 (C.78) iii 485, p . 501; PP 1875 (C.281) xii
1, Q s . 4568-5590.
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a b a n d o n e d .^
The price of London's gas remained high, and its 
quality inferior. The Corporation of London, therefore,
published a Bill in 1856 seeking to municipalise the gas
interests within its boundaries.^ The G.L.C.C. and the
Imperial company, in parlous financial circumstances,
responded by introducing Bills proposing their purchase by 
the Metropolitan Board of Works, but Parliament would not 
countenance the municipalisation of established companies.^ 
Instead, the City of London's Gas Act 1868 appointed 
commissioners to judge whether dividends were a result of 
"due care and management". A Board of Gas Referees would 
decide on the maximum impurities to be allowed in various 
gas supplies.* Moreover, the G.L.C.C., City, and Great 
Central companies had to submit within a year proposals for 
amalgamation which would reduce expenditure and reposition 
gas-works in less populous areas. Otherwise three "impartial 
persons" would rule on the issue.^ In the meantime, gas 
companies on the South Bank met the President of the Board 
of Trade and voluntarily agreed to amalgamations.^ The 
provisions of the legislation were extended to the 
G.L.C.C. 's trading area outside the City of London by
1. PP 1867 (C.520) xii I, Letter regarding I860 Act.
2. PP 1867 (C.18-I) Iviii 565, Letter N o . 24; PP 1867 
(C.520) xii 1, p . 3; PP 1875 (C.281) xii 1,
Q s . 19-23.
3. Hansard, 13 May 1875, 5th s e r . , vol.224,
c o l s .611-6.
4. PP 1867 (C.520) xii 1, p . 3.
5. PP 1867-68 (C.49) cxv 459.
6. Hansard, 13 May 1875, vol.224, cols.619-621.
Ill
another Act in 1868, and to the South Metropolitan and
Imperial in 1869. The companies had to accept political
pressures for the rationalisation of London's gas supplies,
and they preferred agreement to compulsion. The G.L.C.C.
absorbed the two other City companies in 1870, and an Act in
1871 conferred upon the company powers to amalgamate with
adjacent concerns if the terms of the 1868 Act were extended
to them. This Act and similar legislation for the South
Metropolitan in 1876 was eventually to place the supply of
London's gas in the hands of two companies.^ They would
gradually achieve uniformity in the price, illuminating
2
power, and purity of supply on either side of the Thames.
Between 1879-1885, the S.M.G.C. amalgamated with three
3
companies, while, in the years 1870-76, the G.L.C.C.
effected seven amalgamations, and four more were achieved by 
1914.4
The G.L.C.C. 's acceptance of amalagamations derived
from the new commercial strategy of its secretary, 
J.O.Phillips.^ The Gas Light and Coke Company Act of 1868 
also provided for the erection of the world's largest
gasworks at Barking, where the company could construct port 
facilities on the bank of the Thames. It was intended to 
supply a new and bigger company, and the G.L.C.C., moreover,
1. Chatterton (1972), pp.168-78; PP 1899 (C.294) x
19, note 50.
2. Journal of Gas Lighting, 14 Feb 1871, p . 105; 28 
Feb 1871, p p . 144-5..
3. South Metropolitan Gas Company Co-partnership 
A l m a n a c k , 1909.
4. GLCC (1912), p . 99.
5. B/NTG/2117.
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could reduce its costs by not having to tranport coal 
inland. An efficient, well-located works supplying a larger 
trading area increased the ratio between sales and 
capital-expenditure. Moreover, demand was exceeding the 
potential of the company's three old works. The G.L.C.C. 's 
financial position was saved by these developments.^ The 
company realised that, by building Beckton, it would be well 
placed to take over those companies with which it had to
4
amalgamate. An Act in 1870 specifically gave the G.L.C.C.
the right to supply adjacent companies in bulk.^
Construction work at Beckton began in 1868, and gas was
first produced there in 1870.^ As part of its expansionist
policy on the South Bank, the South Metropolitan built new
works at East Greenwich. The dual policy of centralised
manufacture and amalgamations in London reduced leakages,
and by 1875 had made the buying of coal cheaper by 4s a 
7
t o n .
The Metropolitan Board of Works, however, argued that
price rises always followed amalgamations because
0
investments like Beckton had to be paid for. In 1873, the 
Board complained that it was impossible for gas
1. PP 1875 (C.281) xii I, Q s . 300-11.
2. PP 1899 (C.294) iv 19, Evidence of G.Livesey.
3. B/NTG/2084, evidence of Beck to Commons, 1867.
4. B/NTG/2085, note 64.
5. Reeson (1902), p p . 513-6.
6. GLCC (1912), p . 79.
7. PP 1875 (C.281) xii I, Qs. 6639-6688 ,6791-2 .
8. Ibid, Qs.216-20.
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commissioners to assess "due care and management" because 
the phrase was too vague and impractical. Though unable by 
law to pay shareholders above a 10% dividend, companies had 
just resorted to issuing new stock to existing 
shareholders. In 1876, a bill for the amalgamation of the 
G.L.C.C. with the Imperial and Independent was accepted on 
condition that the new company agreed to the public auction 
of new shares and the automatic adjustment of prices with 
dividends along a sliding scale. Similar arrangements were 
introduced into the S.M.G.C. Act 1876.^
Rationalisation during the period 1869-84 required 
companies to adjust internal management structures. The gas 
companies were too large to be run by a single man or 
family, and capital demands were so large that directors 
were appointed to represent the interests of shareholders. 
Courts of Directors met regularly to discuss operational 
matters, but they relied heavily upon the advice of station 
engineers and chief administrators. Head-off ices collected 
revenue, purchased raw materials, and overlooked the 
processing and sale of by-products. Station engineers were 
in day-to-day charge of works, manufacture, mains, 
pipe-laying, distribution, and labour matters. The 19th 
Century gas industry, with production and distribution 
matters separated from commercial decisions, had a basic
1. PP 1899 (C.294) X 19, Board of Trade Returns, 25 
July 1876.
2. Chatterton (1972), p p . 168-78.
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departmental structure.^
The growth of gas outlets increased the size of 
operations. Home-lighting expanded in the 1880s with the 
introduction of the Welsbach mantle. Pre-payment meters were 
installed in the 1890s for working-class homes, and cooking, 
water and space heating appliances began to be sold. The 
G.L.C.C, s "Horseferry" cooker was the first mass-produced 
and standardised gas-cooker. District offices were abandoned 
for showrooms in shopping centres in the 1890s, and this
advancement in sales administration required greater
2
managerial and financial resources. At the S.M.G.C., there 
was an increase in the number of chief officers at head 
office before and during the Great War. While operational 
management remained mainly under the control of 
s tation-engineers, the methods of working in specialist 
functions were determined by certain chief officers.^
Milne-Watson, who became Governor of the Chartered in 
1918, believed in large-scale organisation. He wanted the 
gas industry to cooperate on a national basis, particularly 
in the processing and marketing of by-products like benzole, 
tar, creosote, fertilisers, sulphate of ammonia, and 
hydrocholric acid. Milne-Watson was instrumental in founding 
the British Commercial Gas Association in 1912 and the 
National Gas Council in 1916 in order to fight off the 
threat from electricity. He was determined, moreover, to 
preserve labour relations during any transformation in the
1. S.Everard The History of the Gas Light and Coke
Company (1949), p . 279.
2. Ibid, pp.277-8.
3. B/S.Met.G./lll/l7/l, 17 May 1916.
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scale of industrial organisation by extending welfare 
sche m e s .^
In the 1920s, the G.L.C.C. 's area extended from 134 to 
265 square miles, which Milne-Watson saw as a practical 
organisational limit. In 1934, A . E .Sylvester was employed to 
oversee financial policy and to increase the number of 
appliances and outlets for gas. Sylvester added a Budget 
Audit Department to the Rental, Gas Sales, Stores, Stove, 
and Meter departments. He saw "departmentalism" as 
inappropriate to the new size of the business. The concept 
of "territorial" as opposed to "departmental" organisation 
was adopted. All the company's activities at the new 
divisional level were made the responsibility of a single 
management officer who had the help of a number of technical 
officers. Each divisional headquarters controlled the 
sub-offices and showrooms. The delivery work of the Stove 
and Meter department and the despatch of fitters became 
divisional responsibilities. This decision brought the 
better of coordination of customer services. Trunk mains 
continued to be overseen by the chief Distributing Engineer, 
but local mains were laid and repaired by the divisions. The 
G.L.C.C. became a decentralised, divisional company during 
the 1930s, although the new structure was not completely 
established till 1941.^
Gas legislation transformed an unregulated monopoly 
into a regulated one, but the Acts of the 1860s were a
1. Everard (1949), p p . 311-313.
2. Ibid, p p . 333,349-351.
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compromise of benefit to the companies as well as to 
consumers in the Metropolis. Controls avoided the need for 
municipalisation, while legislation encouraged the formation 
of private monopolies. Regulation directly affected the 
scale and management of gas production, but the commercial 
strategies of the companies overlooked labour requirements. 
Such a paradox can be partly attributed to the timing of 
rationalisation being partly imposed from outside companies 
rather than developing internally. Without a labour and 
welfare strategy suited to the changes which took place, 
industrial relations worsened. Only the industrial disputes 
of 1889 convinced gas companies of the need to undertake the 
systemisation of welfare, a change which determined the 
nature of its labour management in the Pre-War and Inter-War 
p e r i o d s .
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(iii) . Work-discipline and Industrial Welfare, 1860-1914 .
Despite extensive capital commitments, gas companies 
introduced few mechanised techniques in the 19th Century. 
Loading the retorts depended upon physical effort and the 
necessary cooperation of the stokers. A labour policy of 
work-discipline and industrial welfare aimed to maintain 
security of supply in an essential public service. But 
companies responded to the regulating of prices and 
dividends by increasing work-loads, and the centralisation 
of production increased the workers' ability to combine. The 
threat of strikes in 1889 forced employers to concede an 
eight-hour day. As a tactic for regaining managerial control 
over the retort-house, the employers introduced systematic 
welfare schemes to replace ex gratia benefits. Moreover, the 
expansion of outlets during the 1890s helped reduce seasonal 
fluctuations in demand, and internal labour markets were 
e x p a n d e d .^
Fully-fledged gas-stokers were semi-skilled workers 
enjoying permanent employment and high wages, and they, 
consequently, led disputes in the industry. Other hands were 
generally hired as casual workers in the Winter. If their 
services were not required in the Summer, stokers were given 
alternative employment on repair or building work. They were 
offered "allowances, sick payment, and superannuation, and
I. F .A.Popplewell in S.Webb & A.Freeman Seasonal 
Trades (1912), p p . 184-5 notes that the difference 
in the numbers employed in the industry between 
the busiest and slackest weeks declined from 53.4% 
in 1885 to 20.4% in 1906.
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in some places holidays with full pay". Stokers learnt their 
trade in approximately a month, but becoming a 
"fully-fledged stoker" was marked by a celebration at the
works.^ New men were "Unused for the most part, to work in
organised gangs, in which every unit depends upon the
other". They were "unaccustomed to the clockwork regularity 
essential to good stoking" which "required incessant 
supervision, accentuated by the elimination of hopeless
wasters". Then, to complete training, " ......all that is
required is to gradually 'speed up' the g a n g s ......" One of
the reasons for paying benefits was to encourage trained 
work-teams broken up for the Summer to return in Winter. 
Even experienced temporary workers in London were sometimes 
found employment in trades with seasonally high demands in 
the Summer,- as local bricklayers' mates or dockers,- and 
asked to return to the gas-works in the Winter. But the 
continuance of casual and temporary labour hindered the 
systemisation of company provision in the industry.^
Until 1830 , the G.L.C.C. 's Court of Directors 
personally dealt with workmen as an "old-fashioned 
landowner" treated his servants. Four weeks' sick-pay and 
allowances during the whole period of convalescence from 
industrial accidents were paid. Widows' grants of £5 or £10, 
according to the deceased's status or length of service, 
were awarded, and annual beanfeasts were held. Because the
1. Journal of Gas Lighting, 17 Sept 1889, pp . 541-2;
W.Thorne My Life's Battles (1925), p . 36.
2. Journal of Gas Lighting, 21 Jan 1890, p . 105.
3. Ibid, 14 Aug 1888, pp.286-7.
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company had so increased in size, the Court dispensed with
ex gratia sick-pay in 1830, and established a provident fund
to which the company donated £20 per annum and money for the
services of a surgeon. Weekly contributions of 4d or 6d
secured benefits of lOs or 12s a week for six months. Old
age and widows pensions remained at the discretion of the
Court s Pension and Allowance Committee, but in practice
they accepted the advice of the station engineers who
actually managed the men. A workers' pension scheme was
suggested but turned down in 1843.^ Pensions, however, were
accepted as essential and expected in an industry where only
2
the fittest could be retained in employment. Discretionary 
payments allowed the company to exercise sanctions. 
Applicants for pensions in 1877 were refused for joining a 
strike five years earlier.^ A church, school, and library 
were also provided at Beckton. Following the amalgamations 
of the 1870s, the sick funds were reconstituted in order to 
promote a single corporate identity. For, by 1872, three 
provident societies existed. The Indoor Society catered for 
waged employees at the gas-works of the old Imperial 
company, the Outdoor Society for the Imperial's fitters and 
mains-layers, and the Workmen's Society founded by the 
G.L.C.C. in 1830 paid benefits to the Chartered's employees. 
The last fund being insolvent, its members were transferred 
to the Indoor and Outdoor societies.* A Sick and Burial Fund
1. B/NTG/2021-2051; B/GLCC/38/l, 6 May 1887; Everard 
( 1949 ) , p p . 116,121.
2. PP 1899 (C.294) x 19, Q s . 2475-78.
3. B/GLCC/38/l, 20 May 1887.
4. Everard (1949), pp.207,240,266-7.
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was founded at the South Metropolitan in the 1842, and a
pension scheme in 1855.^ The S.M.G.C. also provided
Christmas gifts, and one week's paid holiday after a year's
employment or two week's paid holiday after two years at the
company. But all those granted holidays had to go to the
country or the seaside in order to counter the debilitating
2
affects of retort-house work.
Both labour and capital had to be planned during the 
rationalisation of the industry in the 1870s. The S.M.G.C. 
built workers' houses when its works were relocated.^ The 
G.L.C.C. constructed homes at Beckton, otherwise "the 
operations of the Company could not be carried on 
advantageously on such a s i t e " . A surplus workforce had to
4
be nearby to cope with emergencies like foggy weather. The 
houses were let to workers from 1872 "subject to the 
Enquiries to be made by the Superintendant... as to their 
character being satisfactory".^
Labour disputes were rare in the industry, but not 
unknown. Strikers had been instantly dismissed at the 
Chartered as early as 1834.^ It was the harshness of work 
rather than wages which proved the major cause of labour 
problems. Stoking was an arduous trade carried out in 
intense heat and smoke. Twelve hour days were normal, and,
1. PP 1899 (C.294) X 19, Q.3482.
2. Thorne (1925), p . 51.
3. C.Carpenter Industrial Copartnership ( 1927 ), p . 51.
4. PP 1899 (C.294) x 19, 0.3040.
5. B/GLCC/147.
6. Everard (1949), p . 123.
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to enable the changover of shifts on Sunday, men had to work
twenty-four hours. Thorne, the gas-workers ' leader, recounts
how it took three to four days "to feel normal again" from
such long stretches of "inhuman labour". Foremen were
employed to check meters and instruct teams lagging in
output to increase their efforts.^ In 1867, delegations from
four G.L.C.C. works requested that the working-day be cut
2
from 12 to 8 hours, but the directors would not accept such 
a rise in labour costs.^ When wage increases were agreed by 
the Metropolitan companies in 1871 as a result of reported 
labour agitation, many companies axed their annual and 
monthly holidays. No "increase in the working expenses per
1,000 feet of gas sold" occurred because "you may pay higher 
wages and get more work".* After further agitation in 1872, 
the directors of the G.L.C.C., nonetheless, granted 
additional wage increases. The station engineers had advised 
them on the damage a strike would cause. But shorter hours 
and a six day week were refused, and an unsuccessful strike 
at the company, led by the men at Beckton, followed. 
Strikers were sacked and those living in company houses were 
evicted.^ Parts of London were in darkness for six hours, 
ten weeks passed before production levels were restored, and 
£30,000 in profits were lost. All the companies met to make
1. Thorne (1925), pp.37-38.
2. B/GLCC/29/2, I & 25 Oct 1867.
3. Everard (1947), p.165.
4. B/GLCC/29/2, n.l2.
5. PP 1899 (C.294) x 19, A p p x . no.15.
6. Everard (1949 ), pp. 209 ,244 ; Journal____of Ga^
L i g h t i n q , 12 Feb 1895, p.303; B/GLCC/147.
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preparations against future workers' combinations. One
works superintendant, aware of losses in productivity,
wanted to re-employ the strikers, but the directors refused
out of principle. The new men were asked to sign weekly
contracts of employment. By having to give seven days'
notice before leaving their work, the gasworkers effectively
renounced sudden strikes and their chief bargaining counter.
The strike leaders were prosecuted.^
Gas employers objected to labour unions, although the
secretaries of the Metropolitan gas concerns met regularly
to agree on wage-levels. They wanted to avoid the
possibility of companies outbidding each other. When the men
at the G.L.C.C. in 1865 had requested a wage of 3/6d a day,
representative delegations of the "two classes" of men from
the retort-house and the yard were summoned to the Court and
2
informed of its decision. Workers could petition for an 
increase in wages but the directors' decision was 
n o n - n egotiable. Attempts to form a union in 1872, 1884 and
1885 failed.^ The strike in 1872 was denounced because the 
tie of master and man, forged by "patriarchial care", had 
been broken.* Employers were entitled to respect from their 
employees because of "the position in which they are 
placed".^ The Journal of Gas Lighting concluded in 1889 that
1. B/GLCC/22/2, 5,6,13, & 20 Sept 1872; Journal _gf
Gas L i g h t i n g , 17 Dec 1872, p p . 1027-8,1031-33.
2. B/GLCC/29/2, Court Minutes, 15 & 26 Sept 1865.
3. Thorne (1925), p.61.
4. Journal of Gas Lighting, 17 Dec 1872, p.988.
5. Ibid, 14 Feb 1879, p . 49.
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it was an attribute of the status of an employer that he 
could dismiss his workers without giving reasons. Only 
salaried staff had contracts setting out conditions for the 
termination of employment.^ Gasworkers were expected to show 
the same discipline and loyalty required of other national 
services like the Army and Navy. But the object of 
management was to " bind them to your house by the stomach 
(rather) than by the legs'".^ The total authority of 
employers to hire and fire, a labour surplus, high wages, 
and sickness and pension schemes were all designed to 
produce a well-disciplined and cooperative workforce.
When the National Union of Gas and General Labourers 
was formed on the 23rd April 1889 in order to secure 
reductions in the hours of labour, stokers had been 
complaining of overwork for nearly a quarter of a century.^ 
London's gas employers were surprised by the union's 
solidarity,* and so, by May, agreed to an 8 hour day. The 
number of retorts to be loaded per shift was reduced from 76 
to 72 on the further insistence of the men. George Livesey 
of the South Metropolitan, however, made these concessions 
to gain time for the enlisting of black-leg labour.^ Unlike
1. Ibid, I Oct 1889, pp.633-4.
2. Ibid, 17 June 1890, p . 1115.
3. Ibid, 16 April 1889, p.707.
4. Thorne (1925), pp . 35-37,51-52,64,66.
5. Cf. J.Melling "Industrial Strife and Business
Welfare Philosophy; the Case of the South
Metropolitan Gas Company from the 1880s to the 
War", Bus.Hist. (1979), pp.163-179; E.Hobsbawm
"British Gas Workers, 1873-1914" in Labouring ^
(1964); R.A.Church "Profit-Sharing and Labour 
Relations in the Nineteenth Century", I.R.S 
(1971), pp.2-16.
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other employers, he would not agree to a closed shop, and,
on the 5th September, a strike was called at the S.M.G.C.
Strikers were immediately sacked, Livesey publicly declared
that the union had no right to interfere with management,
but the G.L.C.C. opposed a calling of the joint committee of
Metropolitan gas directors to discuss the issue. Indeed, the
G.L.C.C. s Court gave the station engineers full power to
discuss "Labour management" with the union "for the
maintenance of order and work". The union was best organised
at the G.L.C.C., although it remained unrecognised by the
company.^ Blacklegs at the S.M.G.C. did not obtain an
"ordinary system of working" till January 1890. The strike,
which cost the company £250,000, did not end till the 4th
February 1890, and full gas pressure was not restored till
2
the 13th. By June, the London gas companies had begun to 
impose monthly contracts of work as an anti-strike tactic.
Men at the G.L.C.C. were reputed to "down tools" 2-3 times a 
week. The company also began to build up coal stocks, and 
applied to the government for assistance. Troops at Chatham
were made ready to replace any strikers at Beckton.
The Journal of Gas Lighting remarked during the strike 
that there was "a stir in the minds of gas directors" about 
new machinery.^ Water gas, the inclined retort, stoking
1. B/GLCC/38/1, 20 Sept 1889; Thorne (1925)
p. 106-109 .
2. S.M.G.C. C o partnership Almanack (1909); Carpenter
( 1927 ), p . 23; Journal of__ Gas Lighting, 21 Jan
1890, pp.99-100.
3. Journal of Gas_lAghting, 3 June 1889, p . 1019; 17
j{rnTT889 , p.1115; 24 June 1890 , pp.1164-5; 7 Oct 
1890, pp.735-6,746.
4. J o u r n a l  of Gas Lighting, 22 Oct 1889, p . 589.
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machinery, automatic loading, and vertical retorts were
installed in the 1890s and early 1900s.^ By 1908, numbers in
the retort-house had fallen by 50%. New machinery lessened
the employers' dependence upon the stokers' work-skills at
the point of danger'. The companies, therefore, gradually
reduced their vulnerability to organised strikes. By 1910, 2
or 3 men could achieve the output which had once required 12
workers. But Livesey at the South Metropolitan also founded
in October 1889 "a special system of Profit-sharing" as a
means of averting strikes. Workers already received at the
S.M.G.C. weekly bonuses if their shift produced above a
standard output. By offering workers the right to a division
of the profits, however, the new scheme changed the
constitution of the company, and a permissory Act of
Parliament had first to be obtained. The proclaimed aim was
to win the loyalty of the workers by making them feel they
4
were co-owners of the company.
Livesey believed that the absence of a firm bond 
between employers and men was ultimately responsible for the 
dispute in 1889. He,- at least avowedly,- preferred
copartnership labour to new machinery as a means of
countering industrial strife.^ Profitsharing was suited to
1. Ibid, 4 March 1890, p.377; Copartners Magazine,
March 1911, pp.36-7; PP 1899 (C.294 ) x 19,
Qs. 1744-49 , 1873-76 . Cf. C . E .Brackenbury Modern
Methods of Saving Labour in Gasworks (19 00); 
Popplewell in Webb & Freeman (1912), pp.176-7.
2. Journal of Gas Lighting, 23 June 1908, p p . 791-3.
3. Popplewell in Webb & Freeman (1912), p.178.
4 . PP 1912-13 (C.6496) xliii 853, Report on
Profitsharing and Labour Copartnership.
5. Journal of Gas Lighting, 23 June 1908, p p . 791-3.
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the gas industry. It marked, firstly, the end of 
discretionary paternalism as the "old social habits and 
personal relationships of the workers underwent a radical 
change due to the growth in the size of companies. Welfare 
could be placed on a more orderly footing. Secondly, it was 
an extension of the sliding-scale arrangements introduced, 
for one, at the S.M.G.C, in 1876 for the benefit of 
consumers. Higher dividends were paid only if prices were 
reduced. Workers bonuses likewise would be paid when 
dividends increased, prices fell, and productivity improved. 
The 1889 scheme set a bonus of 1% of annual wages for every 
Id reduction below the price of 2/8d charged for 1,000 cubic 
feet of gas. The price in 1899 was 2/3d. Workers' capital 
could not be withdrawn for five years and was deposited with 
the company at 4%. To become profitsharers, the more 
permanent men had to sign on for twelve months, and 
effectively renounced participation in sudden strikes. 
Temporary employees committed themselves for three months. 
Workers were not only enticed by the bonuses, but by the 
offer of security of employment.
The Profitsharing Committee, established in 1889, 
consisted half of employers nominees and half of elected 
workers. Labour relations and industrial welfare were 
institutionalised and taken from the sole control of the
station engineers. The Committee administered the various
provident funds, and discussed work-conditions and pay.
Managerial autocracy was tempered by a degree of
Sifjp
127
consultation, although the directors retained an ultimate
veto. A worker could take any grievance to the Profitsharing
Committee, which appointed a Safety Committee in 1892. It
was recognised that the cooperation of the workforce was
integral to the enforcement of safety-procedures and the
reduction of accidents. A jury of twelve workers adjudicated
on the causes of accidents and granted compensation
payments. After the passing of the 1897 Workmen's
Compensation Act, an Accident Fund was established which
2
enabled the company to contract out of the legislation. As 
well as overseeing the accident provision, the Profitsharing 
Committee administered the Superannuation Fund.^ In 1898, 
prof itsharing at the S.M.G.C. added some 7-8% or 5d to 7d a
day to wages, and the South Metropolitan produced gas 1/-
per ton of coal cheaper than the average. S.M.G.C. men did
not work to union rules, and ignored stipulations about the
numbers of charges to be made per shift. The efficiency and 
energy of South Metropolitan workers were generally
4
recognised and attributed to the profitsharing scheme, 
which became copartnership in 1898 with the election of two 
w o r k e r —directors. A Copartnership Committee was formed in 
1899. The staff obtained the right to elect a director only
in later years.^
1. Carpenter (1927), pp.46-7; PP 1912 (C.6496) xllii
853, p p . 51-2.
2. Industrial Welfare, Aug 1922, pp. 305-8. Cf. Ch.9, 
s.(ii).
3. PP 1912 (C.6496) xliii 853, p p . 51-2.
4. PP 1899 (C.294) x 19, Q s .1060-64,1734-47.
5. Carpenter (1927), p p . 3 - 7 ,16-17,51-54.
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Makins, governor of the G.L.C.C., objected to the 
"hybrid species of Director" because to him the interests of 
employer and worker were inherently opposed. Managerial 
authority had to be total if industry was to be efficiently 
run. Even if common aims could be identified, Makins 
believed the social barrier to be insuperable,^ Management 
was responsible for profits and losses, and the worker had 
only to offer faithful service.^ The characters of the two 
chairmen were contrasted. Livesey was the "the prophet, the 
projector, the pioneer", Makins' approach was conservative. 
Politically, Livesey was a Liberal and Radical 
Nonconformist, Makins a Tory. Livesey believed that Makins' 
views were representative of gas employers and unsuited to 
the modern gas industry. Before 1889, employers were 
"regarded as the fathers of their workpeople" and labour 
relations could be conducted informally. Trade unionism had
challenged the institution of mastership and divided the
loyalties of workers. Only "the argument of the pocket" was 
left with which to win back the allegiance of the labour 
force.^ Workmen would no longer accept being treated as 
deferential servants. The chief question was how "to give 
i;0 5 ponsibi 1 ity to everyone in society,— without changing 
their status".^ Livesey's answer was to assist workers in 
becoming "property-owners" with a stake in the business that 
employed them. With greater responsibilities, they would be
1. Journal of Gas Lighting, 26 Feb 1895, p.427.
2. Ibid, 14 Jan 1890, pp.57-58.
3. Ibid, 12 March 1895, pp.5 2 7 -8 ,541-2.
4. Ibid, 26 Feb 1895, p.415.
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better workers and citizens. In 1906, Livesey adopted the 
language of reform to decry the "serious inequalities of 
wealth which abound in the existing social system". But only 
copartnership could "distribute wealth in the most efficient 
manner . While the working-class had failed themselves by 
their lack of providence, employers were culpable by not 
helping them to become property-owners.^
Yet, the G.L.C.C. founded a non-contributory pension 
fund in 1895 for regular employees. It was modelled upon a 
scheme at the Great Eastern Railway where Makins, the
G.L.C.C. Governor, was a director. It was "a kind of set-off 
to Mr Livesey's profitsharing scheme" because "it will have 
the same effect" in "that the men will like the service of 
the company better". The Secretary, Field, believed that 
"every advantage you can give to the men somehow or other 
reflects itself upon the company's working". He denied that 
the G.L.C.C. was dominated by the Gasworkers Union because 
it refused to meet its representatives, but union strength 
there was probably a factor in the G.L.C.C. s deciding
against the introduction of profitsharing in 1889. Great 
reliance was still placed on the fact workers could voice
any grievances to the station engineers. A worker was
compulsorily retired at 65, and received a pension of a 
third of his wages of 35s a week after 25 years service, if 
he had "a good record as a workman". The inadequacies of the
1. Carpenter (1927), pp.2-7,101.
2. Journal of Gas Lighting, 6 Nov 1906, p.375.
3. PP 1899 (C.294) x 19, Q s .2456-89,3807-44. Costing
£25,000 a year, the scheme added one third of a
to the price of 1,000 cubic feet of gas. Cf. C h . 2.
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Provident Fund continued to be covered by the company, and 
various sports and social clubs were founded at Beckton in 
the 1890s, It was admitted that the motive behind the 
company s greater interest in welfare since the labour 
strife of 1889 was to offset the gradual enforcement of 
stricter discipline.^
By 1900, 4 companies other than the South Metropolitan
offered profitsharing contracts. In 1908-9, 19 gas concerns
introduced profitsharing or copartnership schemes. 8 more
followed this example between 1910-12. By 1913, gas
companies accounted for 33 of the 133 profitsharing schemes
2
listed by the 1912 Royal Commission. Although the gas 
industry was particularly suited to profitsharing, there is 
no clear reason for its sudden expansion within 4 years. 
Livesey had certainly publicised profitsharing in 1907 by 
promoting it as a solution to the railway dispute, and gas 
employers were partly responding to spreading industrial
strife in Britain before 1914. Strikes occurred in
provincial gas companies throughout 1912-13 over the 
questions of minimum wages and maximum hours. Many 
companies concluded that their existing pension and 
provident clubs were insufficient to meet the new situation. 
Whereas "sick, pension, and other funds had not cured
disaffection amongst the workers", profitsharing bonuses
1. Everard (1949), p.280.
2. Carpenter (1927), Appx; PP 1912 (C.6496) xliii
853 .
3. Journal of Gas Lighting., 1912 & 1913, passim.
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had the advantage of being paid presently and constantly.^
The Journal of Gas Lighting, moreover, believed that
the Liberal government elected in 1905 was committed to
"class" legislation. The General Workers and Gas Labourers
Union was still campaigning for an eight hour day, when the
Liberals passed the "socialistic" 1908 Mines (Eight Hours)
Act. It not only increased the price of gas, but set a
precedent for other industries. Gas companies also feared
the municipalisation of public utilities. Spreading the
ownership of gas concerns made them less vulnerable to
2
compulsory purchase.
Another reason for the spread of profitsharing and
copartnership amongst gas companies was that, unlike
railways, they had not generally sought the statutory 
authority to provide industrial welfare, despite being 
regulated monopolies. Those companies which had altered 
their articles of association to undertake profitsharing and 
copartnership schemes were in this sense exceptional, and 
the legality of other aspects of welfare in the industry was 
questionable. Some concerns, therefore, began to seek 
specific statutory permission for benefit funds. The 
Brighton and Hove Gas Company was granted its Benefit Funds 
Act in 1912. The legislation was seen as systemising the 
free pensions which had been available at the company for 
forty years: "The Act of 1912 was designed to give
parliamentary sanction and authority to this procedure in
1. Ibid, 9 Feb 1909, p . 153.
2. Ibid, 25 Dec 1906, p . 865; 28 Jan 1908, p p . 217-8,
223; 31 March 1908, pp.217-8.
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definite form and on a prescribed scale, without which it
failed to afford adequate assurance to the worker or
encouragement for its extended adoption by other
undertakings". The aim was to establish "rights" and replace
discretionary benefits. Six other gas companies applied for
similar legislation in the same year.^ Though in reality
there was little fear of Parliament halting welfare
benefits, other gas employers responded by introducing
profitsharing schemes which financed and systemised their
provident payments.
At the G.L.C.C., the succession of Makins by Woodal as
Governor in 1908 was significant. Woodal had a more
progressive, intelligent outlook to labour relations, and
introduced copartnership in three other concerns where he 
2
was a director. Woodal was determined to rescue the company 
from the "impertubable conservatism of the old Board". He 
was critical of the "Manchester School" view that cheap 
production depended upon cheap labour. Trade unions had 
rightly opposed exploitation but Woodal's ideal was "that 
every industry and every firm shall be united in the pursuit 
of its own corporate welfare". The rights of humanity as 
well as capital had to be protected, particularly within the 
anonymity of a large joint-stock enterprise.^ Autocratic 
management was anachronistic. By 1912, Corbett Woodal's
1. Ibid, 7 May 1912, p. 348 , 379 ; 13 Jan 1914, p . 101.
2. Ibid, 15 Dec 1908, p . 914. Woodal was chairman of 
the Tottenham and Edmonton Gas Company, and a 
director of the Bournemouth and Croydon companies.
3. Copartners' M a g a z i n e , May 1911, Supplement;
Address by GLCC Governor to the Labour 
Copartnership Association.
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chief success was declared to be the statesman-like "way in
which he has humanised the whole corporate life of the vast
century-old institution .Woodal established a
complaints procedure which the men could use without fear of 
2
victimisation. Correspondents to the G.L.C.C.'s
house-magazine felt indebted to the company for its welfare 
benefits. One of them who attended the Chartered's centenary 
outing in 1912 to Crystal Palace commented how "It was nice 
to see the employees and their engineers so united
together".^
Although the G.L.C.C.'s pension scheme was central to 
its industrial relations policy, the company had not
calculated its costs. Faced with increasing losses by 1908, 
the G.L.C.C. cut the price of gas. Economies were
implemented,^ and it was hoped to replace the expense of 
guaranteed pensions with copartnership. Copartnership was 
established at the G.L.C.C. on the 9th October 1909.^ 
Employees received a half per cent bonus for a Id fall in 
the price of gas. £5 had to be accumulated before half of 
all bonuses above that figure could be withdrawn, and the 
remainder had to be invested in company stock. The scheme 
applied to regular employees and winter hands if they agreed 
"to work well and faithfully". Temporary workers were given 
their bonus on the 30th June if they promised to return the
1. Ibid, Aug 1912, p . 114.
2. Ibid, June 1911, p . 82-83.
3. Ibid, Aug 1912, p . 136.
4. Journal of Gas Light i n g , 11 Feb 1908, p . 337.
5. B/GLCC/48/2, 9 Oct 1909.
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following winter and left half of their bonus on deposit
with the company. A copartnership committee of 18 members
appointed by the directors and 18 elected by copartners with
5 years' service was charged with administering the scheme.^
Social and educational life at Beckton was extended by the
Copartnership Committee with the provision of a rifle club,
2
boy scout units, and football, cricket, and swimming teams.
The G.L.C.C. was, in addition, concerned that the 1908 
Old Age Pensions Act would undermine company retirement 
allowances. It was, consequently, encouraged to follow the 
South Metropolitan's lead in copartnership. "Of the public 
measures the Government propose to introduce", stated the 
Journal of Gas L i g h t i n g , "gas administrators will naturally, 
as large employers of labour follow intently the one which 
proposes to make better provision for old a g e " .  ^ Employers
4
were affected as providers of company welfare. The 
questions of relieving old age poverty and copartnership 
were viewed as a single question on the grounds that retired 
workers who possessed capital would not require pensions.^ 
The 1908 Act was opposed as the possible first instalment of 
a larger policy which could stifle the industrial pension 
and benefit funds which united employers and employees.^
1. C o p a r t nership, Feb 19 09, p . 18; Journal of Gas
L i g h t i n g , 19 Jan 1909, p . 519.
2. Copartners' Magazine, July 1912, p . 102; Jan 1911, 
p . 15.
3. Journal of Gas Lighting, 4 Feb 1908, p . 49.
4. Ibid, 10 Sept 1907, p.679; 9 June 1908, p . 618.
5. Ibid, 18 Feb 1908, p.223.
6. Ibid, 12 May 1908, p . 345; 11 Aug 1908, p . 298.
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While the companies at first intimated that they could not
afford the burden of state and industrial pensions, they
never seriously considered the abandonment of private
provision.^ Nor did legislation seriously weaken the
effectiveness of old age allowances. The G.L.C.C. merely
reduced their pensions by 5/- a week to ensure that workers
in retirement received the state pension and an aggregate,
2
average allowance of 13s. In a attempt to reduce costs, the 
General Manager of the Chartered and the Copartnership 
Committee on the 15th March 1910 proposed replacing 
discretionary pensions by a contributory system. The
suggestion was declined by the Board because of the possible 
resentment from the men who would have to begin making 
payments. The company, therefore, failed to tackle the 
problem which the increasing cost of generous, ex gratia 
pensions presented. Indeed, the maximum allowance was
increased in December 1910.^
When the National Insurance Bill 1911 was enacted, the 
Governor of the Chartered presided at a meeting of the 
provident societies. They agreed unanimously to contract 
out.^ The two societies were amalgamated and the rules were 
revised to accord with the Act. A Supplementary Society was 
also founded and was supported by a Id donation per member
1. B/GLCC/44/1, 31 July 1908.
2. Ibid, 6 Nov 1908.
3. B/GLCC/45/1, 4 Nov 1910; 30 Dec 1910.
4. Ibid, 28 July 1911. Cf. C h . 9, s.(iii)
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from the Court.^ Members petitioned for widows and orphans
benefits to continue. The company accepted the proposal once
beneficiaries agreed to contribute Id per fortnight to the
2
Supplementary Society. A committee of management and twelve 
sub-committees were appointed. They tackled the detailed 
tasks of administering medical and sanatorium benefits, 
stamping medical cards, and appointing doctors to the 
Society's panel. Woodal gave his wholehearted support to the 
Act, calling it a "blessing and Godsend to the poor and
sick".^ The secretary of the old Outdoor Society assumed
that role for the new Approved Society, while his
4
counterpart in the Indoor Society became Treasurer. A 
committee representing all grades of employees at the
S.M.G.C. agreed that the existing Sick Fund could not be 
made an Approved Society and established the Employees 
(1912) Fund in its place.^ The Copartnership Committee was 
empowered to act on behalf of workmen in Approved Society 
matters.^ The Sick and Burial Fund was continued by the 
company to pay supplementary benefits.^
Good wages and welfare payments encouraged faithful 
service amongst stokers. Company provision remained largely
1. Ibid, 8 & 22 March 1912.
2. Ibid, 14 June 1912.
3. Co-Partners M a g a z i n e , May 1914, pp.66-8.
4. Ibid, June 1914, p p . 81-2.
5. B/GLCC/45/1, 4 Feb 1912; 29 May 1912.
6. Ibid, 28 Aug 1912.
7. Ibid, 8 Oct 1912.
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discretionary until the 1890s due to the industry's reliance
on casual labour. Welfare did, however, contribute before
that decade to the establishment of a "core" labour-force.
It was the permanent stokers who were the main beneficiaries
of company welfare policies, because their role and numbers
in the retort-house made them crucial to the maintenance of
gas supplies. The expansion of the Metropolitan gas industry
in the 1870s was not matched by a corresponding investment
in new machinery. Companies became increasingly vulnerable
to strikes by stokers whose physical efforts alone sustained
an expanding industry's output. Labour management and the
granting of welfare benefits remained autocratic and often
ad h o c . Livesey's response to the 1889 strike was ruthlessly
to smash the union at the S.M.G.C. and to adopt at least the
vestiges of worker-participation in place of managerial
autocracy. Machinery was also installed throughout the
industry as a means of weakening the workers' control over
production. Company provision was increased at the South
Metropolitan and the G.L.C.C. after the strike, and set
benefits began to be given as a right. Moreover, the decline
in the use of casual labour in the 1890s furthered the
systemisation of welfare and its extension to Winter
workers. The industry's twin strategy of introducing new
technology and extending welfare provision after 1889
undoubtedly undermined the National Union of Gasworkers. In
1891, it was 60,000 strong; by 1908, it members numbered
32,318.^ Yet, the effectiveness of profitsharing and
1. Ibid, p p . 160-1. There were 80,000 workers in the 
industry by 1907. 18,000 were reported to be
involved in profitsharing and copartnership 
schemes. Cf. pp . 156,158-9.
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copartnership as an anti-strike tactic is difficult to 
measure. Strikes, in any case, had been and continued to be 
rare in the gas industry, due to a mixture of extensive 
welfare benefits for a "core" workforce, good wages, and 
strict work-discipline. But profitsharing and copartnership 
were a means of improving the stability of employment, of 
establishing representative institutions within the company, 
and of systemising all forms of company provision. They 
increased the workers' economic security. The lack of 
employment rights and labour's inability to influence and 
negotiate work conditions, pay, and hours undoubtedly 
contributed to industrial strife in general during this 
period.^ Whereas profitsharing and copartnership assumed 
only a small importance in most industries, market 
circumstances enabled them to become a major influence in 
the administration of industrial welfare in the gas 
industry.
1. cf .  J.E.Cronin Industrial Conflict in Modern 
Britain (1979), pp.93-96.
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(iV ). The Extension of Welfare Provision, 1914-1939 .
In August 1914, the Gas Light and Coke Company
established a fund to provide for the dependants of
employees sent as territorials in the London Rangers to
France. Full compensation was paid for any loss of wages
while on active service.^ By September, the Copartnership
Committee founded the "G.L.C.C. War Distress Fund". It was
financed by a subscription of one quarter of all
2copartnership bonuses. The South Metropolitan received over 
a thousand letters during the War from men at the front. 
Many expressed hope of returning to the company. One soldier 
commented: "I feel confident that all Copartners on Active
Service appreciate all that is being done for our families 
whilst we are away, and look forward to a great re-union 
when hostilities cease".^
The War, however, threatened the gas industry's 
copartnership agreements. As war-conditions increased the 
price of gas, dividends which were paid according to a 
sliding-scale were squeezed, and some companies ceased to
4
pay profitsharing bonuses. The government, moreover, 
assumed the right to fix wages. Gas workers received the 
substantial advances of other munitions workers despite the 
industry's decreasing profitability. By 1918, gas employers 
were seeking to resume total control over the determination
1. B/GLCC/46/1, 5 & 6 Aug 1914.
2. Ibid, 4 Sept 1914.
3. NCEO Archive, MSS/200/B/3/2/C140, Pt.l:
C.Carpenter Copartnership______ of______ the______ South
Metropolitan Gas Company (1922), p . 17-21.
4. Journal of Gas Lighting, 28 Aug 1917, p p . 364-5.
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of wage-rates,^ but the government preferred to establish a 
Joint Industrial Council. Membership of the gas workers 
union had increased, and stoppages, which involved the 
G.L.C.C., occurred in September 1918 over the employment of 
non-union workers.^ The demand for labour during the War had 
enhanced union bargaining power, and the state, which had 
assumed direct control of the economy, had to accept 
responsibility for industrial relations. It was hoped that 
Whitley's Joint Councils would reduce industrial strife by 
ensuring workers had negotiating rights. Moreover,
collective bargaining and official company recognition 
strenghthened the unions as representative organisations. 
Unions would be placed in a better position to prevent 
unofficial strikes. Whitley Councils were intended not only 
to improve the "organisation" of industrial relations but 
also to encourage union membership. Carpenter of the
S.M.G.C., consequently, argued for the founding of an 
independent federation of gas concerns, which would 
institute bargaining with workers outside any state system 
of councils.* Other gas employers, and most notably 
Milne-Watson of the G .L.C.C., accepted the general "tendency 
towards collective action", which state control of the
war-economy had necessitated.^
1. Ibid, 12 Feb 1918, pp.283-4.
2. On the Whitley Joint Industrial Councils, cf.
R.Charles The Development of Industrial Relations
in Britain, 1911-1939 (1973); also. C h . 9, s.(iv).
3. Journal of Gas Lighting, 17 & 2 4 Sept 1918,
p p . 52 4,567.
4. Ibid, 26 Feb 1918, p. 384 ; 2 April 1918, p . 13.
5. Ibid, 30 April 1920, p . 182.
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The Whitley Council was appointed in 1919, and wage
negotiations between employers and workers began in October
1921. Awards were automatically made according to a sliding
scale based on a cost-of-living index.^ But employers
continued to rely on company provision instead of collective
bargaining, and this reliance influenced the final form of
the joint councils in the industry. The Whitley structure
consisted of one central and many regional and works 
2
committees. The regional committees were appointed to draw 
up the constitution of their respective works committees. 
They generally failed to do so, because the employers 
opposed the possible interference of unions in management at 
the level of the shop-floor.^ The works committees formed in 
London during 1919 were established by the companies as an
4
extension of copartnership. They were chaired by the 
station engineers,^ and their function was advisory only. 
The introduction of these committees, indeed, was designed 
to pre-empt and forestall the proposed state system of 
Whitley councils. They were meant to improve efficiency by 
utilising the experience of workers, who in turn would be
1. Cf. PRO LAB2/458/IR173/1925, Gas JIG, 21 March, 2
Dec 1925; Report of Chief Conciliation Officer
(London and S.E.), 9 Jan 1925; & Memo, from C.C.O. 
(S.Wales & S.W.), 27 Nov 1925.
2. Cf. T.Williamson "Trade Unionism and Negotiating 
Machinery in the Gas Industry" in F.E.Gannett &
B.F.Catherwood (eds) Industrial and Labour
Relations in Great Britain (19 3 9).
3. LAB/2/458/IR139/3/1921, Gas JIC, Memo., 9 July
1921.
4. Ibid, Position re. Works Committees, 23 Sept 1921.
5. Industrial Welfare, Jan 1931, p p . 44-5.
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educated about the problems of management.^ Carpenter 
founded independent works committees at the S.M.G.C. and its 
subsidiary, the South Surburban. They were effectively 
works branches of the central Copartnership Committee, which 
made it clear that it did "not recognise the claim of any 
other body or organisation to interfere with this 
Committee s powers or decisions" about conditions of 
employment at the company.^ Carpenter preferred industrial 
welfare because he believed Whitley to be merely two 
adversaries facing each other. By 1922, he pointed out. 
South Metropolitan workers owned £500,000 in capital. Both 
union and non-union employees signed copartnership 
agreements, although they limited a man's freeom to strike.* 
Even sports promoted a "feeling of part-ownership" because 
they demonstrated the employer's concern for his worker's 
social life and not just for his worktime activities. 
Consequently, sports grounds were more effective, in terms 
of labour relations, if they were sited some distance from 
the works.^
At a Copartnership Committee meeting at the G.L.C.C. in 
July 1919, both employers and employees recognised that 
copartnership, pensions, and double holiday-pay promoted 
mutual understanding. Although copartnership bridged the gap 
between capital and labour, it was held that works
1. Journal of Gas L i g h t i n g , 15 Dec 1920, p . 628.
2. Ibid, 25 Feb 1919, p . 376; 4 March 1919, p . 438.
3. Ibid, 18 Aug 1920, p . 354.
4. Carpenter (1927), pp . 18,21-2,100,104.
5. Journal of Gas Lighting, 9 Dec 1925, pp . 644-5.
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committees would increase cooperation. The Deputy Governor
in July 1919 hoped "that the Works Committees might take the
place of the Whitley Council and all the difficulties of
the Company could then be worked out round that table, and
it would be very gratifying for the Governor to be able to
meet the various demands as they arose instead of referring
them to arbitration or Government Departments".^ Works
committees were established at every plant. They were
appointed to make representations to works management, and
through the central Copartnership Committee to the
directors. Suggestions on works-methods were particularly 
2
encouraged. Yet Copartnership Committee meetings in this 
period were dominated by the Governor, Milne-Watson. The 
numbers voting in copartnership elections, the commissioning 
of Milne-Watson's portrait, or the sending of 
congratulations to the winners of awards were typical of its 
discussions,^ Milne-Watson attributed the industry's good 
industrial relations to the existence and the expansion 
since 1918 of welfare.* It was claimed that supplies were 
retained throughout the General Strike of 1926 because of 
the good feeling engendered by company provision.^ If, as 
Milne-Watson said in 1928, "Copartnership is the vehicle by 
which (the "family spirit" in industry) can be reached", its
1. Copartners' M a g a z i n e , July 1919, p. 84.
2. LAB2/458/IR139/3/1921, Extract from Gas W o r l d , 11 
June 19 21,
3. Copartners' M a g a z i n e , passim.
4. PRO LAB2/458/IR173/1925, Gas JIC, Note. Cf. Williamson 
in Gannett & Catherwood (eds.) (1939)..
5. Journal of Gas Lighting, 5 & 19 May 19 26,
p p . 266,335-6.
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concrete embodiment was the pension funds, benefit schemes, 
distress funds, and the sports associations gathered around 
the copartnership scheme itself. They gave workers "an 
opportunity of taking part in the activities of the Company" 
without actually interfering in management. Welfare benefits 
built up that degree of worker loyalty which was essential 
to any large-scale company.^
The G.L.C.C. paid great attention to company provision 
in the 1920s. A central catering department took charge of 
canteens organised at each station and office. New sports 
grounds and medical facilities were established.^ The 
company also attempted to protect workers from the affects 
of unemployment. Gas companies could be exempted from the 
Unemployment Insurance Act 1920 if they guaranteed jobs for
4
life, but this onerous condition was unacceptable. The
G.L.C.C. decided, nonetheless, that its Employees Insurance 
Society should make arrangements with the National
Federation of Employees' Approved Societies to establish a 
supplementary society under the Act. The Federation was
headed by Henry Lesser, who had previously administered the 
South Metropolitan's provident societies. Weekly 
subscriptions of 2d secured 7/6d in addition to state 
benefits for fifteen weeks of unemployment. 4s was available 
to men out of work for another ten weeks. All unemployment 
benefits, basic and supplementary, were received from
1. Ibid, Sept 1928, pp.335-40.
2. B/GLCC/50, 16 Jan 1920.
3. Copartners' Magazine, July 1921, p . 129; April 
1929, p . 99.
4. Journal of Gas Lighting, 15 Dec 1920, p p . 630-1.
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the society rather than from the employment exchange.^
An Employees Benefit Fund was established in 1920. It 
replaced the Employees Insurance Society which had provided 
additional benefits under the 1911 National Insurance Act. 
Due to inflation after the War, subscriptions and benefits 
had to be revised.^ The G.L.C.C. believed that the 
introduction of the Employees Benefit Fund was appreciated 
because the company "know how valuable is the feeling of 
security and independence which membership of such a Society 
can ensure". All workmen under 45 could join, and 
contributions, matched by the company, were set at 3d a 
week. Benefits included the payment of doctors' fees and 
medicines, and guaranteed sick allowances of 18s for 
thirteen weeks, 10s for a subsequent thirteen weeks, and 6s 
for the next twenty-six. Death benefits of £14 or £6 for 
members or wives and widows were also available, and widows' 
and orphans' allowances were provided. The company paid the 
Fund's administrative costs.*
In 1919, the company had spent some £23,000 on 
voluntary and non-voluntary pensions "because you get far
better work out of a man if he feels that you are going to 
treat him well when he goes".^ A contributory G.L-.C.C.
1. Copartners' M a g a z i n e , Jan 1921, p p . 3-4; June 1930, 
p p . 226-7; April 1930, p p . 134-5; B/GLCC/48/1, 22
Oct 1919.
2. Copartners' M a g a z i n e , April 1930, pp.134-5.
3. Ibid, March 1925, p . 69.
4. Ibid, Feb 1929, p . 39,64.
5 . PP 1919 (C.410) xxvii 299, Q s .4336-4454.
Departmental Committee on Old Age Pensions.
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(Non-Staff) Pension Fund was finally established in 1921.^
The 1,000 men who were already pensioners became its
responsibility, but the company continued to finance their
allowances. Contributions were set at Is a week, and the
company donated £50,000 to start the fund. Retirement was
set at 60 after 40 years' service, with employment before
2
1921 being taken into account. The company was concerned 
about the effect of the 1925 Pensions Act upon the Fund.^ 
The G.L.C.C. committed itself, therefore, to generous 
contributions, totalling £11-12,000 per annum, in order to 
induce workers to continue with the fund. The Court and the 
Copartnership Committee agreed that employees should pay 
full amounts to both company and state funds, and so receive
4
two pensions.
The S.M.G.C. 's Copartnership Committee continued to be 
"most valuable" in promoting the well-being of the workers. 
By 1925, it administered the accident fund, hospital 
treatment, a provident society, an unemployment insurance 
scheme, and a superannuation fund.^ The company had set up a 
supplementary fund under the 1920 Unemployment Insurance 
Act, and benefits were collected from the company's 
pay-office.^ Following the 1925 Pension Act, the S.M.G.C.
1. B/GLCC/48/1, 15 July 1921.
2. Copartners' M a g a z i n e , Dec 1922, pp . 236-237;
B/GLCC/48, 21 Nov 1919; 19 Nov 1920.
3. B/GLCC/50, 16 Oct 1925. Cf. C h . 9, s.(vi).
4. Copartners' Magazine, Jan 19 26, pp.13,16; 
B/GLCC/50, 13 Nov 1925.
5. PRO BT55/2, The Gas Industry.
6. B/SMetG/111/18/1, 13 Oct, 10 Nov 1920; Industrial 
Welfare, March 1923, p . 81.
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founded an Approved Society, called the Copartnership
Insurance Fund, at a cost of £3,000 per annum. Discretionary 
pensions for those not covered by the 1925 Act continued to 
be paid under the Employees (1912) Fund at the largesse of 
the Court.^ The Employees Widows and Orphans Fund, which 
received no contributions after the 1925 Act, was wound up 
in 1930, but money to help in needy cases could still be 
obtained from the Livesey Bequest. Copartnership rules were 
altered in 1929 to allow those joining the company "for 
periods of uncertain duration" to participate in the scheme. 
Such employees had to agree to remain "sober, honest, (and) 
industrious", and to perform all work allotted to them. Such 
agreements could be terminated with a week's notice.^
Savings bank, social, medical and sports club facilities
4
were all extended in the 1920s.
In 1931, Industrial Welfare believed that "No industry 
has done more for welfare than the gas industry", and 
praised the G.L.C.C. for its early realisation that
industrial success depended "on the keen co-operation of all 
who are in the company's service". Its employees by 1931 
held £850,000 in shares.^ Actuarial valuations of the
Approved Society in 1935 led to increases in benefits. 
Convalescent accomodation, medical and surgical appliances,
1. B/SMet/111/20/1, 24 March & 29 Dec 1926;
Industrial W e l f a r e , March 1927, p p . 75-8.
2. Ibid, 2 & 16 April 1930; 14 Sept 1932.
3. B/SMetG/111/21/1, 6 Jan 1929.
4. B/SMetG/111/18/1, 24 Dec 1918, 2 April 1919, 16
March 1921; B/SMetG/111/20/1, 24 March & 29 Dec
1926.
5. Industrial W e l f a r e , Jan 1931, p p . 44-5.
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and opthalmic treatment were also made available.^ Because
welfare at the G.L.C.C. was a "considered", all-embracing
policy, it was regretted in 1937 that there had been no
system of hospital benefits. Although 65% of its employees
subscibed to the Hospital Services Association or the
Hospital Saturday Fund, the company wanted to involve the
other 35%. A new scheme for convalescent homes, sanatoria,
surgical appliances, spectacles, ambulance services and
visiting nurses was initiated. Its rules were drawn up by a
sub-committee of the Copartnership Committee, and its
administrative costs were borne by the company. The scheme
was thought to round "off the work of the Company with
regard to welfare...." The G.L.C.C.'s Ramsgate Home was
placed under the control of the newly-constituted Employees
Benefit and Hospital Society.^ A new pension scheme in 1939
4
allowed over-55s to begin subscribing.
The basis of company provision was largely determined 
before 1914, and only extended during the Inter-War period. 
The early introduction of works committees forestalled 
government interference through Whitley Committees and 
merely continued the tradition of copartnership. Industrial 
welfare was highly systemised in the gas industry because it 
was composed of large companies and had a managerial 
structure which dealt with the complexities of its
1. Copartners' Magazine, Jan 1935, p.9; Aug 1937, 
p p . 458-9.
2. Ibid, Jan 1937, p p . 3,14-5,18-9.
3. Journal of Gas Lighting, 20 Oct 1937, p.210.
4. Copartners' Magazine, July 1938, p . 309.
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operations. Indeed, by 1937, the Chartered had 50,000 
employees, about one-fiftieth of the breadwinners in the 
Home Counties, Its welfare schemes, therefore, were 
calculated to affect 125,000 people.^ The need for loyal and 
efficient service in an essential supply service was 
reflected in the industry's commitment to company provision.
1. Ibid, Jan 1937, p . 3.
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(v). Conc l u s i o n .
The development of industrial welfare in the gas and
railway industries has parallels. Monopoly enabled them to
finance a variety of relatively generous schemes. Both
sought to maximise the returns on large-scale investments by
minimising work-disaffection, and transport and fuel
supplies were particularly vulnerable to strikes. Unlike
railways, however, even the world's largest gas company, the
G.L.C.C., did not require a divisional managerial structure
till the 1930s. But gas companies were large-scale
businesses by contemporary standards. It was primarily the
continuance of seasonal employment for some workers which
encouraged the retention of discretionary welfare in the
19th Century, despite the existence of some contributory
schemes. It was only as a result of the 1889 strike that
welfare was gradually systemised and eventually came to
match the size of gas companies and its departmental
management. The copartnership system finally adopted at the
South Metropolitan so effectively resisted trades unionism
and increased productive efficiency that it was generally
introduced throughout the industry by 1914. The S.M.G.C. was
regarded as more efficient and innovative than the G.L.C.C,
and Livesey directly attacked Makins ' competence.^ Worker
share-ownership, participation in management, more secure
employment, and increased welfare facilities provided an
answer to the industry's special vulnerability to strikes.
1. 1899 (C.294) X 19, p p . 285,331. From 1876-99, the
G.L.C.C. 's gas fell in price from 3/9d to 3/- per
1,000 cubic feet, while that of the S.M.G.C. 
decreased from 3/2d to 2/2d. The capital employed 
per 1,000 cubic feet fell respectively from 20/3d 
to 12/6d, and from 10/ld to 8/lOd.
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Chapter 4.
The Development of Large-scale Enterprise and Company-based 
Industrial Relations Policies in the Iron 
and Steel Industry.
{i ). Introduction.
When not merely an example of Quaker benevolence, 
welfare has been depicted as the province of "progressive", 
expanding giants like I.C.I. or Unilever.^ By implication, 
the more Northern-based staple trades like iron and steel 
were devoid of company-based policies which could maximise 
workers' efficiency. Yet, company records show that welfare
policies were important labour strategies in the iron and
steel industry.
2
It is true that the neo-classical labour market, which 
depicts the employment-relationship solely as an impersonal 
cash transaction, was epitomised by the steelworkers' 
job-insecurity and the continual adjustment of their wages 
in accordance with steel's selling-price. Indeed, iron and 
steel workers were often hired, not by employers, but 
through gangers and subcontractors. A reliance upon export 
markets induced the industry to be competitive and 
susceptible to trade cycles, but it was its atomised 
structure of small and medium-sized companies which made it 
vulnerable to overproduction. Unstable profits reduced the
1. Gospel in Gospel and Littler (1983), pp.16-17.
2. C f . Ch.l, s s .{i ),(ii ) .
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funds available for welfare expenditure, while a fluid
workforce undermined its necessity. But the mere payment of
wages could not solve all the labour-management problems
faced by steel employers. The history of industrial welfare
in the industry shows that employers were more acquainted
with industrial realities than economic theory, and had a
varied approach to the management of their workforces.
Moreover, the establishing of integrated enterprises in the
steel industry during the 1930s,- as a means of increasing
profits and rationalising competition,- was matched by a
corresponding devlopment in company-based labour strategies.
The history of industrial relations in the steel
industry has placed too much emphasis on collective
bargaining.^ It is a mistake to see the employers'
association rather than the company as the key unit
determining the structure of economic activity or industrial
relations. Iron and steel companies often agreed to wage
increases even if they undermined the rates set by regional 
2
associations. Steel employers,- like others,- were 
principally concerned with the operations of their own 
companies. Their vested interests and those of shareholders 
often prevented cooperative action in this atomised industry 
despite the benefits that rationalised competition could 
have achieved. Company-based labour management, therefore, 
was important to steel companies.
1. Carr & Taplin (1962), c h s .v i i ,x v i i ,x x v ,x x v i i ,x l i ;
J.Porter "The Iron Trade" in C.Wrigley The History 
of British Industrial Relations, 1875-1914 (19 82 ) , 
pp.253-265.
2. Carr & Taplin (1962), pp.73-4 ,145-6 ,149-50 ,
279-80,287-8.
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Section (ii) of this chapter analyses the relationship 
between the economic development of the steel industry in 
the years 1870-1914, the establishment of internal labour 
markets, and the practice and purpose of industrial welfare. 
Section (iii) investigates the type of welfare practicised 
before the Great War, while section (iv) assesses the 
changes induced by the War-period. Section (v) looks at the 
connections between capitalisation, the Tariff, and the 
systemisation of welfare in the steel industry.
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(ii). Economic Development, Corporate Management, and
W elfare P o l i c y .
Changes in the internal management of steel companies 
can only be explained if the need for integrated production 
and the broad difference between the structures of the heavy 
and light steel sectors are first understood. 
Mass-production steel works were established in Britain 
during the twenty years following the final development of 
the Bessemer-Siemens process in the 1860s. By 1900, however, 
plant was obsolescent compared to the large-scale, 
technically-integrated units established in Germany and the 
United States. Only one company in Britain but ten in 
Germany produced 30,000 tons of steel or more per annum. 
British rerolling continued as a separate trade. Blast 
furnaces were smaller, modernisation such as the 
introduction of mechanical handling or charging occurred at 
a slower rate, and output per head was consequently low. The 
world production of basic steel trebled by 1900, yet 
increased by only 50% in Great Britain. The phosphoric ores 
of the East Midlands were left unexploited. Although 
outdated by the mass-production of steel, wrought-iron 
remained a large part of British output until World War 
One.^ But British steel exports continued to expand until 
1914, and only Britain's share of the world export market 
declined. Foreign governments began to subsidise their home 
industries, and tariff barriers were put up. Traditional 
British markets like India and Brazil were gradually able to 
exploit their own iron ore resources, and Britain's early
1. T.H.Burnham & G.O.Hoskins Iron and Steel in
Britain 1870-1930 (1943), pp . 17-8,39-40,42-5.
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primacy had been in many respects fortuitous. These changes
in world markets were beyond the control of British
producers.^ Yet, by the 1920s, the British steel industry
experienced an absolute fall in output, caused principally
by the continued failure of the British steel industry to
invest in large-scale enterprise and its unwillingness to
reorganise the anarchy of its capital structure. There were
too many goods being produced for too few customers by an
unnecessary number of small companies, each unable to reap
the benefits of returns to scale. A Board of Trade report in
1918 had argued for the necessary reorganisation of the
industry into plants of over 300,000 tons capacity per 
2
annum. Large vertically-integrated concerns involved in 
flow-processes like steel-making could maintain the fullest 
utilisation of expensive capital. They could coordinate 
production to prevent bottle-necks at the various 
process-stages. More importantly, coordination made savings 
in the use of heat by rapidly moving iron and steel between 
each stage in production.
It has been argued by historians and not least by steel 
employers in the 1920s that the lack of investment was
1. S.Tolliday "Industry, Finance, and the State: An 
Analysis of the British Steel Industry in the 
inter-war years" (Camb. Ph.D., 1979), p p . 14-16. On 
the role of British entrepreneurship and the steel 
industry, cf. D.N.McCloskey Economic Maturity and 
Entrepreneurial Decline (1973); L.G.Sandberg & 
D.N.McCloskey "From Damnation to Redemption: 
Judgments on the Late Victorian Entrepreneur" in 
D.N.McCloskey (ed) Enterprise and Trade in 
Victorian Britain (1981); & L.G.Sandberg "The 
entrepreneur and technical change" in R.Floud &
D.N.McCloskey The E conomic History of Britain
since 1 7 0 0 , Vol.II (1981), p p . 99-120.
2. PP 1918 (C.9071) xiii 423, p . 20.
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caused by costly state welfare schemes and high wages.^ But
the vested interests of a fragmented industry proved
unwilling to rationalise on a scale adequate enough to make
new investment worthwhile. The National Federation of Iron
and Steel Employers, founded in 1918, favoured collective
ore-buying, selling and exports, but failed to implement any
of these policies because of district jealousies and
competitive rivalries. Historical circumstances had left the
British steel industry with obsolete but not worn-out
capital equipment. Marginal concerns could still accrue
returns for their fixed, capital costs, although their
overall profitability remained low. Shareholders were
unwilling to agree to plant closures and the downward
revaluation of their stock. The uncertainty of economic life
and the trade cycle proved too risky for employers to
consider investment in integrated production and the latest
technology. Although businessmen continued to believe that
recovery depended on an increase in exports, it is probable
that a stimulus to the domestic economy and the countering
2
of import penetration contained the answer.
Indeed, the growth of consumer markets between the Wars 
was able to establish thriving concerns in the production of 
tinplate, galvanised sheet, and tubes. Rearmament in the 
1930s rescued the heavy steel companies of the North East 
and Scotland. These factors and the 1932 Tariff meant that 
British steel producers, unlike their European rivals, were 
able in 1937 to surpass their 1929 output by 40%. Given
1. Burnham & Hoskins (1943), p p . 49,206-7.
2. Tolliday (1979), p . 31.
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expanding markets and higher profits, light steel producers, 
like Richard Thomas and Stewart and Lloyds, sought to 
concentrate production. From 1922 to 1939, Richard Thomas 
moved from holding 22% of tinplate production to 49%. By 
1932, Stewart and Lloyds made 72% of British tubes. They 
proved, therefore, more willing to establish the managerial 
structures familiar to large companies. But sheet, tinplate, 
wire and tubes composed only 28% of steel tonnage in 1920 
and 36% in 1937. Heavy steel producers remained 
unrationalised, and they used the opportunity of the 
additional demand created by the Tariff to sustain an 
outdated and atomised capital structure. Dorman-Long, 
Consett Iron and Steel Company, Colvilles, and other North 
Eastern and Scottish firms, consequently, remained less 
progressive with respect to management.^
Chandler has noted the link between market strategy and 
managerial structure. New corporate companies, created 
through amalgamations, supplanted the market mechanism by a 
managerial hierarchy which could coordinate production from 
the raw material to the distribution stage. Traditional 
economic theories assumed that output expanded to meet 
demand, and that only when demand was saturated would prices 
fall as firms began undercutting each other to increase 
their own output. Yet firms with a large market share could 
control supply, limit competition, and influence prices. 
Moreover, the market mechanism was not necessarily the best 
means to achieve the efficient allocation and utilisation of 
resources. Chandler's thesis is based on the proposition
1. Ibid, p p . 14-15,31,41.
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that far more economies result from the careful coordination
of production and distribution than from the increasing size
of the producing and distributing units.^ An economy of
small companies depended on the price-mechanism to transfer
goods between each process-stage. Levels of output and
employment relied upon the uncontrolled adjustments of the
market. Corporate companies, though rarely without
competitors, seek to replace the market mechanism with the
long-term planning of their own production.
Profit-maximisation, the single motive of the entrepreneur
in the hypothetical case of perfect competition, gives place
to oligopoly or sales-maximisation. Being less prone to
external economic factors, the managerial hierarchy within a
corporate company can exercise greater "discretionary 
2
behaviour". The rise of the corporate economy in the 20th 
Century affected the internal organisation and market 
strategies of many steel companies.
With the exception of railways, research into the rise 
of the corporate economy has, however, emphasised 
developments in the "new", expanding sectors.^ This factor 
is reflected in Chandler's description of the "ideal" or 
"advanced" managerial model, which consists of the 
large-scale, decentralised, multi-divisional enterprise. 
Such an organisation has a general office which oversees the 
whole company. The next level of the hierarchy, the 
division, handles one major line of products, or a set of
1. Chandler (1973), p . 13.
2. Cf. O.E.Williamson Markets and Hierarchies (1975).
3. Namely the motor car, chemical, tobacco, 
electrical, and distributive trades.
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services in a particular geographical area. Divisional 
executives are responsible for the financial success of 
their unit. The division itself has a central office and 
administers a number of departments, each of which is 
concerned with a major function like manufacturing, selling, 
accounting, or research. Each department has its own 
headquarters. Only the central office decides on strategic 
or entrepreneurial decisions about policy and procedures. It 
allocates the men, money, and materials on the basis of a 
long-term market strategy. Managerial decisions which are 
tactical and concerned with day-to-day operations are taken 
by the divisions and departments.^
But the multi-divisional enterprise was not suited to 
the market circumstances of the British steel industry. 
Companies which were involved in chemicals, food processing 
and electricals integrated horizontally with other concerns, 
and, therefore, gained control over many different but 
related products. They were, in addition, presented in this 
period with the technological opportunities for product 
differentiation, and there were advantages in pooling the 
high costs of research. Those companies competing for 
consumer markets often took over others in order to gain 
access to their distributive outlets. Obtaining 
returns-to-scale and planning the factors of production at 
each process-stage necessitated an adequately-large and 
stable market. In sum, the chemical, food processing, and 
electrical industries expanded their markets by introducing 
new products, taking over the production of other goods, or
1. Chandler (1973), pp.13-14.
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by increasing the area of sales. The manufacture of many 
varied products required separate factories and management. 
The selling of consumer goods required an independent sales 
network which could assess changing tastes, market and 
advertise effectively, and build up brand loyalty. Such a 
sales network, often spread over a large area, required 
regional administrative centres.^ Distinguishable products 
or regions, and separate manufacturing and distributive 
units moulded well into a structure of semi-autonomous 
d i v i s i o n s .
Williamson questions the idea that multi-divisional
organisation, rather than the multi-departmental, can be
accepted as the "modern" organisational structure.
Generally, the multi-divisional structure was founded upon
the economic growth which has occurred since 1945. Expansion
in the Inter-War years mostly increased the number of
company departments, and not the number of divisions. Within
the multi-departmental form, the general office directly
concerns itself with coordinating different departmental
tasks like production or distribution, and there are no
2
semi-autonomous divisions. The steel industry in the 1930s 
began to integrate vertically rather than horizontally. 
Management was centralised to improve the lines of command 
and communication. It was better coordination between each 
process-stage within a single, integrated works, and not the 
allocation of responsibility to company divisions, which 
produced savings like those to be gained in the use of
1. I b i d , p p . 2,9,11.
2. O.E.Williamson in A.D.Chandler & H.Daems (eds)
Managerial Hierarchies (1980), p . 187.
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heat. In a country the size of Britain, the full economies 
of integrated production could only be achieved if a single 
works produced for a national market, and so geographical 
dispersion within companies was inappropriate. There were no 
new steel products or markets. British steel companies made 
only a few capital goods for only one or several buyers who 
were industrial producers themselves, and a more centralised 
structure could easily deal with a few, large customers. A 
mutidivisional form would have coped better with a varied, 
changing mass market,- quite unlike that of steel companies.
Contacts with shipbuilding, engineering, railway, canning or
automobile companies were jealously protected by steel
companies. Consequently, the steel industry in certain 
regions became specialised. The steel companies of the North 
East, for example, concentrated on manufacturing ship-plates 
to meet the demand of the region's shipbuilding industry.
Steel company amalgamations from 1914 to 1939 
eventually encouraged the adoption of the corporate
management structure most appropriate to the circumstances
of the industry's markets. As well as the reform of 
managerial administration over production matters, it is not 
surprising that company-based industrial relations policies 
were also increasingly geared towards the needs of the 
corporate business. Labour requirements had to be met. 
Administrative consequences follow if, for example, sickness 
becomes a constant problem or if workers aspire to have a 
say in the running of the firm. Sick benefit clubs or works
1. Chandler (1973 ), p p . 44 ,326 ,334 .
2. Tolliday (1979), pp.35,42,382.
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councils could be established. Chandler and Williamson have 
emphasised the importance of company objectives being 
determined by a process of internal bargaining within the 
firm. By securing a degree of control over markets,
corporate and oligopolic structures, moreover, increased the 
"discretionary behaviour" of firms. But the balance of
personal, administrative or group pressures within a company 
restricts its scope of choices, and includes the workers' 
ability to hinder production or strike. Employers are in a 
position to minimise class-conf1i c t , and can limit the
workers' ability to combine or attempt to retain their
l oy a l t y .
Internal labour markets were an example of the exercise 
of "discretionary behaviour" or planning in the area of 
labour management. A "core" of permanently employed workers 
in a competitive industry could be sheltered as far as 
possible from fluctuations in trade. An internal labour 
market was also the minimum number of workers required to 
sustain a level of output which, in failing to make adequate 
profits, could help the redemption of capital charges. The 
larger the company and the greater the scale of capital 
investment, the greater was the need to secure labour and 
keep expensive investments fully utilised. Trained and 
experienced in often firm-specific skills, "core" workers 
were differentiated by the management from the "pool" of
residual, non-permanent workers and treated accordingly. 
They represented a lost investment if labour-turnover or 
work-disaffection were at high levels. Employers might 
maintain employment amongst "core" workers,- even when it
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was unprofitable to do so,- in order to retain their 
firm-specific skills and their proven loyalty.
Internal labour markets were expanded in the iron and 
steel industry due to the transformation from manual to mass 
production technology. New techniques established a category 
of semi-skilled machine operatives. It would be wrong, 
however, to contend that this period saw the final dilution 
of skill in the steel industry. A one-time steelworker and
writer on the industry in 1933 denied that Scientific
Management had substituted traditional reliance upon the 
experience and good judgment of workers.^ Semi-skilled 
workers substituted for skilled and unskilled alike, and, 
rather than producing an easily-replaceable
lumpenproletariat, the new technology made it more expensive 
in the aggregate to lose labour. Steel companies needed to 
pay for the six-month-long training of the new semi-skilled. 
They had to offer better wages and welfare benefits as 
insurance against their leaving once trained. The old
apprenticeship system had placed the responsibility for new 
recruits upon sub-contractors or leading-hands, who
controlled the allocation of all jobs according to a 
"seniority" system. By undertaking training as an overhead, 
management assumed direct control over job-allocation and
employment. Moreover, the semi-skilled, unlike the skilled,
1. H.Brearly Steel-Makers (1933), p p.vii,85. Steel 
production, indeed, remained an art rather than a 
science until the introduction of the LD-Oxgen and 
BOS processes in the 1960s.
2. H.Gintz "Effects of Technological Change on Labour 
in Selected Sections of the Iron and Steel 
Industries of Great Britain, the United States, 
and Germany, 1900-1939" (London Ph.D., 1954), 
Abstract, & pp.90-92,98.
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did not have the tradition of participating in craft-based 
friendly societies. Changes, therefore, in the nature of 
work and employment induced steel companies to reassess 
their welfare policies.
Two phases can be discerned in the history of 
industrial welfare in the steel industry from 1870 to 1939. 
Before the introduction of integrated production in certain 
steel sectors, company provision was based on a minor
investment in sporting and social clubs, unsystematic sick
clubs in receipt of a voluntary subvention, or on ex gratia 
pensions. Subsidised sports associations and social clubs 
became common practices in iron and steel and other 
companies during the Post-War boom. Employers tried to 
consolidate the larger workforces they had inherited as a 
result of amalgamations during the Great War. Recreation 
alleviated the boredom and arduous nature of work, and 
social amenities were necessary among those communities
which formed around the more isolated steel factories. 
Sports and social clubs, and ex gratia benefits were seen as 
expressing a team spirit and encouraging loyalty.^
With the increasing concentration of capital in the 
years around 1930, steel companies began to support joint 
contributory pension and sick-pay schemes which, by 
implication, demanded a commitment from and to individual 
employees. Old age pension, sick pay, and profitsharing
schemes, pledged to the automatic payment of benefits as a 
right of participation, were a large administrative task
1. A.G.P.Elliot "Company Welfare Benefits" in G.L.
Reid & D .J.Robertson Fringe Benefits, Labour
Costs, and Social Security (1965), p p . 300-9.
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requiring bureaucratic procedures and friendly society 
rules. The extension of internal labour markets led to 
companies underwriting the financing of benefits. Large 
corporate enterprises pledging themselves to massive capital 
investment sought to safeguard expected rates of return by 
planning the numbers and stability of their workforces on 
whose cooperation the full and efficient use of new plant 
would depend. Pensions helped reduce labour-turnover, and 
sick pay minimised the dissipating effects of illness upon 
efficiency and output.
Oligopoly and monopoly, or high profit margins provided 
either the labour market stability or the revenues necessary 
for systematic company provision. But the welfare practices 
of small steel companies absorbed into larger corporations 
by the 1920s had at first continued unaffected. Provision 
within constituent companies was often merely continued on 
an uncoordinated, works basis. Systemisation was undertaken 
because of the reorganisation of management rather than as a 
simple factor of company size.
Major expenditure on industrial welfare in the steel 
industry stemmed from changes in markets, capital 
organisation, production technology, and managerial 
organisation. Companies, particularly in the light steel 
sector, amalgamated to form large-scale, multi-departmental 
corporate enterprises to gain greater control over their 
markets. The producers of heavy steels generally continued 
with unreformed managerial structures and plant. But even 
the small companies which remained typical of the British
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Steel industry during this period had to deal with the 
recalcitrant problems of employed labour. Steel employers 
required industrial welfare as a means of instilling 
loyalty. Where housing was in shortage, or when state 
pensions and sick pay were unavailable or insufficient, 
employers often had little choice but to finance industrial 
welfare if the correct quantity and quality of labour was to 
be maintained.
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(iii) • Industrial Welfare in the Steel Indus t r y , 1870-1914 .
(a ) Company practice.
The development of collective bargaining from the 1860s
onwards confirmed that the replacement of smal1-workshops by
factories was ending the master-craftsman relationship.
Conciliation and arbitration boards were established after
the defeat of strikes, and wages were determined by a
siiding-scale linking renumeration to the moving price of
the product.^ J.S.Jeans of the Iron Trade Employers
Association supported collective bargaining in order to
contain organised labour, and its growing threat to capital
2
and profitability. Carr and Taplin view the "paternalistic" 
attitudes of iron and steel employers as workable in a 
period of non-unionised labour and as outmoded after the 
formation of conciliation boards.^ But industrial 
"paternalism" describes a firm owned by a single employer or 
family that might also dominate the social and political 
life of a factory community.^ It existed quite naturally 
among the large number of small and medium-sized businesses 
in the steel industry which survived into the 20th Century. 
Harry Brearley in 1933 tells how steelworkers were brought 
up to regard their employers "with awed respectfulness".^
1. Carr & Taplin (1962), pp.9-10,63-70,73,75,77,136, 
139,277.
2. J.S.Jeans Conciliation and Arbitration in Labour 
Disputes (1884), p p . 16,24.
3. Carr & Taplin (1962), p . 66.
4. Cf. Ch.l, ss.(i),(ii).
5. Brearley (1933), p . 82.
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Paternalism at the Coalbrookdale Iron Company is
associated with the Quaker convictions of the Darbys, yet
labour efficiency was a greater influence than philanthropy.
The Darbys and Coalbrookdale are famous for their role in
the Industrial Revolution. The first Abraham Darby was able
to overcome in 1709 some of the technical difficulties
involved in producing coke-smelted cast-iron. By 1776, the
company he had founded had several furnaces with a turnover
of more than £80,000 each and dominated the production of
iron in Britain.^ When Alfred and Abraham Darby inherited
the firm in 1830, they immediately instituted changes.
Abraham concerned himself largely with works management,
while Alfred concentrated upon labour relations. The control
of family groups over the organisation of work was broken
up, and "trustworthy and skilful foremen" were appointed in
their place. They were expected to make regular reports to
the company offices. Instead of employing and paying workers
through gangers, men were enrolled directly with the
company. The gang system was seen as inappropriate for a
firm of over 2,000 workers. Pool Hill Estate was purchased
in 1838 to provide cottages for the expanding labour force.
In 1840, Alfred Darby helped revise the rules of one work's
sick club in order to place it on a "sound financial basis".
It had been voluntarily founded by workers and had 200
members, but Alfred wanted to establish it as a company
fund. Its membership was extended to the whole labour force
and contributions were deducted directly from wages. Fines
1. Cf. S.Lilley "Technological Progress and the 
Industrial Revolution" in C.Cupolla (ed) The
Fontana Economic History of E u r o p e , Vol.Ill
( 1973) , pp. 197-205 .
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levied for bad work and breaches of company rules were
donated to the reconstituted fund, and Alfred also
contributed regularly on behalf of the company. The Club
soon accumulated a surplus, and was able to give a monthly
subscription to Alfred Darby's school. This was established
in 1846 for the workers' 700 children, who were compelled to
attend until the age of twelve. The company also provided a
Friends Meeting Place and rooms for the Literary and
Scientific Institution.^ It was because the sick club was a
vital institution to the workers that the company assumed
responsibility for its continuance. Industrial discipline
and welfare were the twin means adopted by the autocratic
2
Darbys to instill cooperation amongst their workforce.
The Carron Company in Scotland, on the other hand, 
deliberately maintained a tradition of "family employment". 
Trusted gangers employing their relatives and friends formed 
a reliable and local labour force. "The Company's own direct 
interest was particularly responsible for this stability, 
but in other fields the workers showed their own initiative, 
though they were helped by the Company. These were in the 
provision of schools (or of educational and social 
facilities generally), in the friendly society and in the 
cooperative store". Welfare was a mixture of direct company
1. A.Raistrick Dynasty of Iron Founders: the Darbys 
of Coalbrookdale (1953), pp.256,258-60,262-3;
A.Raistrick The Coalbrookdale Ironworks (1975),
p. 11. For another firm in the traditional 
iron-making areas of the 18th Century, cf.
L.T.C.Holt Waterloo Ironworks: A History of
Taskers of Andover, 1809-1968 , p p .109-111.
2. Cf. E.P.Thompson "Time, Work Discipline and
Industrial Capitalism", Past & Present (1977),
pp.56-97.
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involvement and encouragement of working-class self-help. 
The Carron Founders' Society, established in 1814, revised 
its rules in 1839. For subscriptions of 16/- in the first 
year and 12/- in following years, members were entitled to 
5/- a week sick pay for six months, 4/- for the next year, 
and 3/- subsequently. A funeral grant of €3 10/- to members 
or their widows was also paid. The employers gave the 
Society two shares in the Carron Company as its main source 
of income. Free coal and housing was also available to the 
w o r k f o r c e . ^
Until the middle of the 19th Century, it was possible
for the majority of iron and steel producers to know their
workers personally and to live "in their midst". Paternalism
meant establishing "a kind of 'family feeling'". The
authority of Wortley Ironworks' employers, for example, was
based on their personal standing amongst their workers in
2
the village of Wortley. Likewise, the ironmasters of 
Middlesb^rough, a city which was created by the iron 
industry of the mid-19th Century, dominated local politics. 
Henry Bolckow, John Vauglm, Isaac Wilson, Edgar Gilks, 
W.R.I.Hopkins, and Thomas Vaughn were all mayors and often 
members of Parliament for the borough. Henry Bolckow endowed 
Middlesbc^rough with schools, and built an infirmary in 1867 
primarily for the use of iron workers. Joseph Pease, in 
1870, paid for a school which could hold 600 pupils. The
1. R.H.Campbell Carron Company (1961), p p . 231-4. The 
provident fund was wound up in 1911 with the 
passing of the National Insurance Act.
2. C.R.Andrew The Story of the Wortley Ironworks
(1952), pp . 54-5. Cf. S.Pollard The Genesis of
Modern Management (1965), p . 235 on factory
villages in the iron and steel industry.
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rapid growth of the city in the 1860s caused a housing
shortage. Ironmasters in the surrounds of Middlesborough
established factory villages like New Marske, Lingdale,
Hulton, Lowcross, North Ormesby and Skinningrove. Bernard
Samuelson erected 500 cottages on the South Bank. These
villages were the recipients of employers' patronage.
Alexander Cochrane, for example, financed the construction
of a cottage hospital at North Ormesby.^ Dorman-Long laid a
recreation ground in 1888 for its workforce, and undertook
2
housebuilding by 1891. In 1911, the company gave £25 per 
annum to provide one quarter of the wages for a nurse at the 
Lydney works in South Wales.^ By 1912, the directors were 
discussing profitsharing as a means of retaining their 
workers' loyalty.^
Another North Eastern firm, the Consett Iron Company, 
drew up a report in 1871 noting the "great want" of cottage 
accomodation in the city. It concluded that the men could 
erect houses themselves, if suitable land was offered and 
the help of a building society secured.^ To support the 
local community, donations were given to churches and
1. B.J.D.Harrison "Ironmasters and Ironworkers" in
C.A.Hampstead (ed.) Cleveland Iron and Steel 
( 1979 ) , pp. 234-6,240 .
2. British Steel Corporation, 271/3/31, Directors' 
Minutes, 30 Aug 1888, 18 Feb 1891.
3. Ibid, 11 Jan 1911.
4. Ibid, 12 July 1912. On the lives of iron workers 
and their families, cf. F . Bell At the Works (1985,
1st edn. 1907), esp. pp.xvii,85-141. Lady Bell was 
the wife of Sir Hugh Bell of Bell Brothers, a 
leading Middlesborough ironmaster. On
Middlesborough, cf. also P.D.Stubley "The churches 
in the iron and steel industry in Middlesborough, 
1890-1914" (Durban M.A., 1979).
5. BSC 218/7, Directors' Minutes, 7 March 1871.
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chapels, schools, a hospital for sick children, and a band.^
When the Consett Company s articles of association were
revised in 1900, it was formally acknowledged that money
could be used to establish or support any institution which
could benefit employees, ex-employees, or their dependants.
Pensions and allowances were also permitted under the new
2
articles of association. In 1908, a Workmen's Club received 
company support, and rooms for reading and recreation were 
set aside at the works.^
The Coltness Iron Company likewise supported a wide 
variety of welfare services for its workers. From 1850
onwards, it made deductions from the men's wages for
house-rent, medical attendance, and payments to the friendly
4
society or savings bank. Smiths of Coventry and Lincoln 
built the village of Blairhall, and donated money to 
hospitals and convalescent homes which would receive their 
men. The company set up a savings association, and began
supporting a sick club which the workers had originally
financed themselves.^ At Archibald Kenrick and Sons of West 
Bromwich, membership of the Mutual Benefit Society for
funerals, incapacity, and long-term sickness was a condition 
of employment. Contributions were taken from wages, and a
1. Ibid, 1 Dec 1874; 29 Nov 1875; 31 March 1896.
Also, Consett/7/1753, 25 July 1900.
2. BSC 1066/13/9, General Meeting, 11 Aug 1900;
Extraordinary G.M., 1 Sept 1900.
3. Ibid, 7 April 1908; 7 July 1908.
4. J.L.Carvel The Coltness Iron Company (1948), 
pp . 57-8.
5. A.Muir 75 Years; A Record of Progress: Smith's 
Stamping Works (Coventry) Ltd; Smith-Clayton Forge 
Ltd (L incoln) (1958), p p . 39-41.
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committee of fifteen workers administered the funds. Rights 
to benefits were controlled by strict rules. Thirty visitors 
were elected at every annual general meeting to keep a 
constant check on all claimants. Recipients not at home 
before dusk were fined 5s and had their sick pay suspended. 
The company supervised the accounts, bore the expense of 
administration, and held the funds at 5% per annum. Kenricks 
underwrote the payment of benefits, and, in return, had the 
power of veto over any decision or change of rule made by 
the Society. Surplus funds were used for payments to 
hospitals and doctors, and for donations to a Benevolent 
Fund which helped in cases not covered by the Mutual 
S o c i e t y .^
The paternalistic traditions of small firms were most
clearly evident in the South Wales tinplate trade. In a
largely unmechanised process, the profitability of the mills
relied largely on the skill of its workers. It paid
employers, therefore, to keep local labour-pools intact,
even if works were run at a temporary loss and wages of 21
2
to 26s had to be met. Subcontracting labour through a 
ganger system did not hinder the development of company 
welfare policies. The comprehensiveness of welfare provision
1. BSC 29/12/2, Stewart and Lloyds, Rules of the
Mutual Benefit S ociety.... o f ..Kenrick & Sons
(1882). Cf. R.A.Church Kenricks in Hardware, A
Family Business (1969); & "Family and Failure:
Archibald Kenrick and Sons Ltd, 1900-1950" in
B.Supple Essays in British Business History
(1977 ) , p p . 103-124 .
2. W.E.Minchinton The British Tinplate Industry 
(1957), pp . 108-111. The Dowlais, Cyfartha, 
Aberdare, and Plymouth companies are quoted as 
keeping workers on "uneconomically" in PP 1867-8 
(C.3980-1) xxxix 1.
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in South Wales was said to be epitomised by the Dowlais 
Ironworks, which, by employing nearly 9,000 people, was one 
of the country s largest firms by the mid-19th Century. The 
trustee of the firm, G.T.Clark, said that the workforce was 
organised through fifty self-administered benefit societies. 
2d in contributions was compulsorily stopped from weekly 
wages. Rooms were provided free for friendly society 
meetings, and the company distributed the benefits which 
included sick allowances, funeral expenses, and accident 
cover. Another 2d was deducted to pay for schools and 
doctors, and a self-supporting medical fund began receiving 
company aid when it failed financially. Workers were 
encouraged to erect their own cottages, since Clark believed 
it was beneficial to management and workers if the men felt 
that their home-life was independent of the company. Houses 
were, however, built on company land with 99 year leases. 
Clark accepted that only by giving workers a "substantial 
voice" would grievances be effectively resolved. He claimed 
that all personal disputes at Dowlais were settled fairly by 
the heads of department whom every worker had the right to 
approach. The men could appoint representatives to voice 
general grievances, and informal negotiations bred a 
"family" atmosphere. Conciliation and arbitration boards 
were seen as unnecessary. The private ownership of a firm 
was preferred to shareholding, because it encouraged greater 
responsibility among board members and enhanced the standing 
of employers amongst the workers: the manager of a joint 
stock organisation "has not the power that a man who stands 
alone has, and that creates difficulty" when labour disputes
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had to be settled.^
By 1847, cottages and amenities like reading rooms had
been established at the Morfa works at Llanelly, the
Llwydarth works at Maesteg, and Players' at Clydach. Schools
are known to have existed at the Aberdulais, Maesteg, and
Margram works. In 1882, deductions for medical aid and
education were taken from the wages of rollerman at Gower's
2
Penclawdd works. The housing estate which developed in the 
vicinity of the Blaenavon Coal and Iron Company necessitated 
the active involvement of English general managers like John
Paton in the recreative and social activities of the
workpeople.^ The company had appointed a surgeon and a 
physician by the 1860s.^ The South Wales, Monmouthshire, and 
Gloucstershire Tinplate Workers, which itself had no
provident funds, acknowledged in 1892 that 90% of tinplate
1. PP 1867-8 (C.3980-1) xxxix 1, Qs.10,041-10,132.
The Dowlais Ironworks was later merged into the 
conglomerate Guest, Keen, and Nettlefords, which 
inherited in 1896 playing fields from the previous 
owners of its Smethwick works. Cf. Gwent R . O . ,
D. 409 . 25 , GKN Ltd An Outline History of this Group 
of Companies.... (1925). Re. Nettlefords, cf.
J.L.Garvin The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, Vol.I 
(1932), pp.65-66; & D.Judd Radical Joe; a Life of 
Joseph Chamberlain (1977), p . 22. Cf. also,
G.M.Young Stanley Baldwin (1952), p . 22; &
A.W.Baldwin My Father: the True Story (1956),
p p . 25-26,77. Like the Dowlais company, William 
Clay, manager of the Mersey Steel and Ironworks, 
promoted company-backed friendly societies and 
company bargaining procedures in the 1860s as an 
alternative to trades unionism. Cf. PP 1867-8 
(C.3980-1) xxxix 1, Q s . 11,141-11,290.
2. Minchinton (1957), p p . 111-113. The Melingriffith 
works' benefit club was founded in 1782, and the 
employment of generations of local labour there 
was seen as promoting cooperation and
work-discipline.
3. Gwent R.O., D . 751.356, Minute Book, 1846.
4. E.J.Davies The Blaenavon Story (1975), pp . 37,52.
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workers belonged to friendly societies. The union supported 
the introduction of state-funded retirement, because "....it 
is alleged that pensions derived from funds organised by and 
under the control of employers practically result in 
forfeiture of independence, since, as a rule, a probable 
claimant upon such a pension fund cannot change his
employment without loss".  ^ Richard Thomas' had by 1888 hired 
a recreation ground for the use of their employees, who 
needed leisure facilities amongst the homes they rented from 
the company.^ By 1912, Richard Thomas' helped workers 
purchase their homes with loans worth four-fifths the price
4
of a house.
Like the Dowlais Iron Company, the directors of tube 
manufacturers Lloyd and Lloyd of Birmingham accepted
petitions of grievances or requests from their men. In 1859, 
the workers asked for a "day's enjoyment out somewhere 
Similar to those given by other Tube manufacturers", with 
the expenses of the trip and wages being paid by the
company.^ In 1867, the men petitioned their employers to 
support a sick club, expressing their willingness to 
contribute to it through deductions from their wages. The 
company founded the Albion Tube Works Sick Society to cover 
illness, funeral expenses, and the death of members, wives,
1. Industrial W o r l d , 17 June 1892, p.7,
2. BSC 271/3/31, Directors' Minutes, 30 Aug 1888.
3. BSC 312/1/40, Rent Book, 1st entry on 30 June 
1902 .
4. BSC 271/3/31, Directors' Minutes, 13 Dec 1912.
5. BSC 39/12/1, Letter to Messrs Lloyd & Lloyd, 6
July 1859.
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or children. The company had, therefore, responded to the
expressed needs and anxieties of the workers themselves. The
Society fined its members 2d for not attending meetings.
After three days illness, workers had to obtain a medical
certificate to be entitled to six months' full sick pay.
Half-wages were given for the following twenty-six weeks.
Collections were held to help those recently widowed. Seven
members were elected to be in charge of the scheme, and they
were charged with regularly visiting the recipients of
benefits to prevent fraud. Beneficiaries had to be at home
before 9,00 p.m. during the Summer months and before 7.00
p.m. in the Winter. Scales of benefits were adjusted to
2
match the money available.
Stewart and Lloyds was formed by an amalgamation in 
1903 of Lloyd & Lloyd and the Clydesdale Tube Company. As 
the company proved successful competitors in an expanding 
market, it soon developed a policy of company provision in 
advance of most steel companies. Labour management within 
the new company was reorganised by the chairman, John Graham 
Stewart, and welfare became the concern of the new board of 
directors. "One of the first steps in Welfare Work was
inaugurated in 1908 .......  (A) handsome two-storied
building was erected for the use by the workers and people 
living in the village of Clydesdale, Mossend, and comprises 
a Billiard Room, Gymnasium, Baths, Reading and Reference
1. B.S.C., 29/12/2, Letter from workers, 1887.
2. Ibid, Rules of the Sick Society for the Workpeople
employed at Lloyd and Lloyd, Albion Tubes Works
(1888), established 1867.
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Rooms, Warehouses and Laundry".^ In 1913, the Board
discussed the introduction of a contributory pension scheme,
but eventually decided on the less systematic Employees
2
Benefit Fund. The Fund depended wholly on company 
subventions, and dispensed ex gratia benefits. But the very 
existence of a company fund for all workers was the first 
example of a single, centralised welfare policy at Stewart 
and Lloyds. It replaced the paying of benefits on a works 
basis and according to the traditional practices of the 
constituent companies. By May 1914, the Fund was bestowing 
sick-pay, pensions, and death grants to the dependants of 
members.^ It became an increasingly important institution at 
Stewart and Lloyds, and in many respects presaged those 
companies which placed industrial welfare on a more ordered
4
basis some twenty years later.
(b ) Social Welfare Legislation.
Because iron and steel employers were not committed to 
the levels of welfare expenditure undertaken by railway and 
gas employers, they were less affected by the implications 
of Employers Liability and National Insurance. Moreover, 
they had not built up the political connections of railway 
and gas concerns, and so had fewer opportunities with which 
to influence legislation. The general response of iron and 
steel employers in this period was to exaggerate the impact
1. BSC 39/7/3, Notes on the History of Stewart and 
Lloyds, 1919.
2. BSC 65/1/3, Minute Book, 27 May 1913.
3. Ibid, 20 May 1914.
4. C f . ss . (i v ) ,(v ) .
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of social reform on their competitiveness and on their 
ability to contribute to charitable donations, but to do 
little.
The interest of iron and steel employers in the
Employers Liability Bill 1880 was limited in comparison to
mining, railway, and shipping companies whose accident rates
were notably higher. While the industry was generally
inactive in response to the Bill, iron and steel employers
were included in a delegation which met Gladstone to discuss
the issue.^ Likewise, the Iron and Coal Trades Review
commented that, with regard to the Workmen's Compensation
Act 1897, "So far as the iron and steel trades are
concerned, it hardly seems to be probable that they will be
greatly affected by the Bill becoming law. No doubt there
will be a considerable increase of liability, but this can
be met, as most considerate and sensible employers already
meet it, by increased care guarding against the risk of 
2
accident". While the legislation was being passed, the 
Consett Iron Company had threatened to halt donations to the 
Consett Infirmary. Its support continued, however, and the 
company decided against asking the men to make mutual 
contributions as a means of defraying the extra costs under 
the Act. Contributions would have given the workers rights 
in the type of medical relief they received.^ The Abercarn 
Tinplate Company, faced with strikes in six mills, hoped to 
set up under the Act a contracting-out scheme "if desired by
1. Iron and Coal Trades R e v i e w , 13 Feb 1880, p . 180.
Cf. Ch.9, s.(ii) for greater detail.
2. Ibid, 28 May 1897, p.803.
3. BSC 218/7, Directors' Minutes, 18 Dec 1897.
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(the) workpeople".^ With the men in a militant mood, the 
company finally abandoned the idea and took out unilateral 
cover with an insurance company. Dorman-Long was similarly 
eager to found a mutual fund "with the workpeople should 
they want it".^ In 1898, the Managing-Director reported 
"that the Workmen not having been quite unanimous in 
accepting the scheme for Mutual Insurance against all 
accidents including the Workmen's Compensation Act,- the 
idea had been abandoned...."^ Employers' Liability was a 
cost borne by employers, and there was little incentive to 
join contributory funds unless sufficiently-attractive extra 
benefits were offered.
To the Iron and Coal Trades R e v i e w , the 1905 General 
Election was a moral victory for the Labour Party and for 
"socialist" ideas amongst Liberal M.P.s.^ Yet, because iron 
and steel employers did not administer contributory pension 
funds for their workers, little criticism was made of the 
1908 Pension Act. By affecting only those over 70 years and 
by providing only 5s a week, ex gratia allowances would 
still be needed. The response of the steel employers to the 
National Insurance Act was the automatic repense of a 
competitive industry towards social legislation. 
Bolckow-Vaughan threatened to end its donations to local
1. BSC 271/1/31, Directors' Minutes, 26 July 1897.
2. Ibid, 14 Feb 1898.
3. BSC 271/3/31, Directors' Minutes, 16 Feb 1898.
4. Ibid, 26 July 1898.
5. Ibid, 19 Jan 1906, pp.219-220,
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hospitals,^ but, given the need to provide for illness and
incapacity amongst its workforce, annual contributions
continued. The Consett Iron Company saw the Act as "a very
2
serious charge", and the Cargo Fleet Company estimated an 
additional expenditure of £200 per year on Unemployment 
Insurance and £1,200 on Health Insurance.^ Stewart and 
Lloyds, already planning to extend their welfare facilities, 
considered setting up an Approved Society under the 1911
4
Act. They were partly motivated by fear of the trades 
unions setting up their own Approved Society. Indeed, the 
trades unionist and Labour M.P., George Barnes, accused them 
of illegally pressuring workers not to join a union fund.^ 
The Consett Iron Company founded an Approved Society by 
1919. G
Criticism of social legislation, therefore, was 
uncoordinated. It was a situation typical of this atomised 
industry, which proved unable throughout its history to give 
expression to a collective view.
(c ). S u m m a r y .
Despite the pressures of competitive markets, steel 
companies were willing to finance welfare expenditure before 
1914. The scale of provision could not match the expenditure
1. BSC B-V/3/100, Reports & Accounts, 27 Sept 1911.
2. BSC 1066/13/9, General Meeting, 3 Aug 1912.
3. BSC 210(d)/20/l, Directors' Minutes, 30 June 1911.
4. BSC 65/1/3, Memo., 24 July 1912.
5. Hansard, 5th ser., vol.45, col.1308, 17 Dec 1912.
6. BSC 218/8/1755, Letter from Ministry of Health, 21
Oct 1919.
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of public utilities, which, consequently, proved more eager 
and able to lobby government on issues of social 
legislation. But the role of industrial welfare in the steel 
industry during this period is not without significance. Its 
very existence is illustrative of the fact that steel 
employers exercised discretion in the area of labour 
management. Their varied choices had different consequences. 
While the Coalbrookdale Iron Company in the 1830s founded a 
company sick fund in order further to undermine the ganger 
system, the Carron Company promoted welfare as a means of 
sustaining subcontracting. Sick societies were a common 
feature amongst steel companies. Industrial housing was 
necessary because of the geographical isolation of much 
steel production or the general lack of homes which workers 
could afford. Housing maintained the supply of labour, and, 
along with benefit societies and recreational facilities, 
helped the retention of workers for as long as companies 
required to employ them. Welfare remained on the whole ex 
g r a t i a , although there were contributory schemes, and 
Stewart and Lloyds had set up a company-wide and 
standardised fund to cover all its constituent works. It was 
a successful, expanding firm with a large market share, and 
it sought to retain workers through more systematic 
provision. This example was imitated by others like United 
Steels and Richard Thomas' in the 1930s.
183
(iv). World War One and State Intervention.
The First World War forced the government to undertake
the full management of the war economy. By 1916, the
Ministry of Munitions controlled supply, production, prices,
and wages in the steel industry. Centralised direction of
the economy encouraged governmental interest in the
efficiency of munitions workers. Reports stressed the need
for adequate lighting and heating, for hot food provided at
canteens, and for measured rest-periods.  ^ Dorman-Long, for
example, established canteens at their Llanelly, Abercarn,
Lydney, and Endlogan works in 1916, and their costs were
2
compensated by relief from Excess Profits Duty. The 
expansion of production to meet war needs also brought 
labour shortages. Company housing schemes were undertaken 
with the financial help of the state to attract new workers, 
and welfare benefits maintained contacts with ex-employees 
on active service in the expectation they would return to 
their place of work.
The Ministry of Munitions promoted the construction of 
industrial housing amongst companies involved in the 
production of weapons. The Clyde, Coventry, and Barrow were 
recognised as the most acute areas of housing scarcity. The 
Ministry aided Beardmores, Colvilles, and Stewart and Lloyds 
in the building of 350 homes for Glasgow steelworkers, and 
Colvilles later built another 250 at Gl e n g a r n o c k .  ^ Samuel 
Fox and Company constructed a village of 364 cottages near
1. Cf. PP 1914-16 (C.8133) xxix 289.
2. BSC 271/3/31, Directors' Minutes, 25 Aug 1916. Cf. 
Whiteside (1980), p p . 307-331.
3. Ministry of Munitions, Vol.V (1919), pp . 44-5,55-6.
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their Sheffield works with the stated purpose of attracting 
w o r k e r s .^
Further industrial housing was required to match the 
labour requirements of the Post-War boom. Government grants 
were chanelled into the Public Utility Societies established 
under the 1918 Housing Act. Richard Thomas' sponsored the 
Margram Cooperative Homes Limited to serve its Margram and 
Port Talbot works. This public utility society was 
constitutionally bound to provide small holdings and 
allotments, and to support educational and recreational 
activities.^ Thomas' also helped finance the Crymlyn Burrows 
Housing Society/*
The Consett Iron Company's housing scheme let houses on 
condition that strict rules, affixed in each home, were 
followed. Tenants were financially responsible for damages, 
and an official or workman could enter the home at any 
reasonable time to examine or repair the premises. Gardens, 
hedges, and fences had to be kept in good order. Moreover, 
the "Water closet and bath must be kept clean and used only 
for the purposes for which they are intended".^ Dorman-Long, 
which had tried to cope with the housing shortage at 
Middlesborough since the 1870s, had, in 1891, established a 
House Accomodation Fund to offer homes at cost-price. From
1. BSC 003/2/1, History of S.Fox & Co. Ltd (typed).
2. BSC 271/2/22, Rules of the Margram Cooperative
Homes Ltd (1919). Cf. Ch . 9, s.(v).
3. BSC 271/2/114, Crymlyn Burrows Housing Society 
Rules (1924 ) .
4. BSC Consett/7/1745, Memo., 4 March 1921.
5. Ibid, Consett Iron Company Regulations and
Conditions of Tenancy of Company's Houses.
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1917-21, the company invested much capital in the building
of Dormanstown, near Redcar, and its labour policy was
largely concentrated on providing for the pool of workers it
had created. The company took expert advice from the Welsh
Garden Cities Limited, which had built homes for Fox's of
Sheffield and the Birmingham rubber-manufacturers Dunlops,
and had experience in negotiating with government
departments. In 1917, the company agreed with the Ministry
of Health upon a 300-home scheme.^ Dormanstown became a
Public Utility Society in 1919, and a recreation ground,
athletic club, public hall, garden nursery, school, church,
and tennis club were built. A doctor was hired by
Dorman-Long for the benefit of the town's inhabitants. By
1920, the company had built a Club House, and bought cinema
2
equipment for use in the village hall. Aware of the fact 
that housing investment brought a poor return of between 
2-5%, Dorman-Long, nevertheless, was prepared to invest in 
Dormanstown because of the overriding need to increase the 
size of its workforce. With the coming of the slump in 1921, 
however, Dorman-Long was shedding labour.
Benefits had been paid during the War to the dependants 
of employees on active service in order to ensure that those 
workers, once demobilised, would return to their companies. 
Their labour skills were valued. Companies, furthermore, 
often met the differences between past and service pay. The 
Consett Iron Company started payments to the dependants of
1. BSC 271/3/31, Directors' Minutes, 18 Feb 1891; 
Letter from W.G.C. Ltd, 12 Feb 1917; 12 May 1917.
2. BSC 1066/21, Housing Committee Minutes, 9 Sept 
1919; 1 June 1920; 6 Oct 1920; 22 Nov 1920.
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employees with the colours in August 1914.^ Private Edward
Coxon thanked the company for the 12/- per week given to his
wife. The benefits were, he stated, a comfort to him in his
absence, especially in "these days of increased prices of
the means of subsistence". Dorman-Long in 1915 founded the
Employers' and Employees' Joint War Relief Fund.^
At the outbreak of War, Stewart and Lloyds decided to
grant 6/- each week to those wives of husbands who had
joined up and 1/- for each of their children under sixteen.
By September, 1,125 workers had volunteered to join the
armed forces, and they had 494 dependants costing the
company £223 per week. In calculating benefits, the
directors took account of the official separation allowance,
but guaranteed a minimum income. After the War had not ended
by Christmas, these allowances were made the responsibility
of the company's Employees Benefit Fund. The directors,
consequently, donated £10,000 to the society in 1915. By
1916, the fund was costing Stewart and Lloyds £20,000 per
annum. The company asked an investigative committee in 1918
to overlook its welfare policy. In May, the Board appointed
4
the committee to act as its advisors on welfare matters. 
The duties of the Employees Benefit Fund were expanded so 
that, by the end of the War, it operated as the Board's 
central welfare organisation. By 1922, the Fund still
1. BSC Consett/7/1746, Memo., 8 Feb 1915.
2. Ibid, Letter from Private Coxon, 24 March 1915.
3. BSC 271/3/31, Directors' Minutes, 22 Dec 1915.
4. BSC 65/1/3, Directors' Minutes, 21 Aug 1914; 23 
Sept 1914; 21 Oct 1914; 4 March 1915; 8 March
1916; 9 May 1918; 26 Jan 1922.
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required a company donation of £12,000, a sum which greatly 
exceeded the pre-War subvention.
The Parliamentary voice of iron and steel employers had 
been noticeably weak before the Great War. As a highly
competitive industry, it required a say in matters like 
import duties and social legislation because of their affect 
upon prices and costs. But the very intensity of competition 
militated against the creation of an effective employers' 
association. The National Federation of Iron and Steel
Manufacturers was established in 1918 only through the 
insistence of the government, which at the time was 
formulating plans of industrial reconstruction and needed 
the industry's cooperation. The N.F.I.S.M. objected to the 
Iron and Steel Trades Confederation's suggestion in 1919 
that unions be made responsible for collecting Workmen's
Compensation contributions and paying the benefits. The
Federation argued that, as accident compensation was paid by 
the employers, they should retain control over its 
administration. They opposed proposals to discuss accident 
prevention with the unions on the grounds it would 
constitute an interference with managerial control in the 
works. But the Federation supported the idea of "Committees 
of Employers and Workpeople" collecting joint contributions 
for supplementary accident benefits because the scheme would 
encourage class cooperation.^
1. BSC 802/6/5, Parliamentary Committee, 6 Nov 1919
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In 1918, proposals had been put forward for the 
reorganisation of industrial relations through Joint
Industrial Councils, The N.F.I.S.M. preferred to retain the 
industry s well-established system of collective
bargaining.^ Yet, two Joint Industrial Councils were 
eventually established, one in the Iron and Steel Wire
trade, the other in tinplate production. Sir Peter Rylands, 
one-time F.B.I. President, led the Iron and Steel Wire 
Manufacturers Association, which in 1919 proposed to 
introduce one week's holiday with full pay. The N.F.I.S.M. 
was concerned about setting a precedent for the whole steel 
industry, and persuaded the I.S.W.M.A. to abandon its
plans,^ In 1923, the Iron and Steel Wire J.I.C. objected to 
"the inclusion of workpeople's savings. Friendly Society, 
Joint Benefit and Superannuation Benefits for the purpose of 
calculating their Income as affecting the right to enjoy the
Old Age P e n s i o n  " from the state. Both the Steel Wire
employers and their union counterparts were eager to 
encourage voluntary initiatives in industrial cooperation
and welfare, and they opposed a Bill in 1923 proposing to
enforce the formation of J.I.C.s in unorganised industries.
Industrial relations were harmonious, and the Amalgamated 
Society of Wire Drawers nominated Rylands to continue as 
chairman in 1923 despite the fact it was their turn to head 
the Council. The J.I.C. opposed in 1924 the repeal of 
contracting out under the 1920 Unemployment Act. It drafted
1. BSC 802/6/35, CCWA, 22 Jan 1920.
2. For the Tinplate J.I.C., cf. s . {v ) (I I I ) ( c ) .
3. BSC 802/6/5, NFISM Parliamentary Committee, 6 Nov 
1919.
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a scheme, and felt its existence would have been justified 
if it had been able to administer unemployment benefits.^ 
The J.I.C. was, therefore, a supporter of the right to 
contract out under the 1925 Contributory Pensions Act.^
Paid holidays in the wire trade were finally introduced 
in 1938 following government legislation. The Iron and Steel 
Trades Employers Association, created in 1922 to coordinate 
the views of employers on industrial relations, agreed
with the various steel unions to provide seven days' holiday 
each year if a man had been employed at a company for the 
previous fifty weeks. The scheme proposed also to encourage 
cooperation between employers and workers at the level of 
the factory-floor. So, compulsory holiday funds were 
established at each works, and contributions of 1/- a week 
were deducted from wage packets. The money saved by each
worker would be handed over at the beginning of man's
h o l i d a y .^
The expansion of industrial housing and employee
benefit funds had been marked developments during the War,
and other company-based schemes were to expand during the 
1918-1921 boom. But the steel industry's Joint Industrial 
Councils were deprived of any role in collective bargaining.
1. PRO LAB2/1012/IR111/1924, ISWMA JIC, Annual Report 
1923-24; Memo., 18 Aug 1924, and Memo, from Chief 
Conciliation Office (NW Area), 9 July 1924; 
LAB2/2/1017/IR233/1923, Memo, by C.F.Walthers, 23 
July 1923.
2. Cf. Ch . 9, s.(vi).
3. ISTEA Agreement with regards to holidays (19 38), 
p . 5 and passim. Cf. also F . S t o n e s ^ h e — B^i^ish 
Ferrous Wire Industry, 1882-1962 (19 77),
p p . 87-9,96-7,184-5,291.
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Moreover, the abandonment of Reconctruction plans by the 
state undermined the very purpose of the National Federation 
of Iron and Steel Makers. Both the Federation and the 
J.I.C.s were able, however, to support the welfare schemes 
which developed at a company level.
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 ^^  ^ ' Zll®— Corporate Company and Industrial Welf are ( I ) ;
the Tariff and Profitability.
In 1918, the Scoby-Smith Report on the reorganisation 
of the iron and steel industry argued for the 
rationalisation of ownership, the reallocation of 
ore-rights, and the creation of a national export-selling 
organisation. The National Federation of Iron and Steel 
Manufacturers was founded in order to achieve these 
proposals. Yet steel companies were anxious to abandon 
rather than reimpose industrial controls, and they 
confidently expected the high levels of production and 
investment to be continued by the restoration of the 
market's invisible hand. By 1921, steel production had 
returned to a system of regional price and wage regulation. 
But the industry found itself overcapitalised, and unable to 
adapt to a shrinking market. As a highly capital-intensive 
process, steel production could not be easily reduced to 
cope with falling prices. Rationalisation and the 
construction of integrated works required an injection of 
capital which companies could not hope to raise nor, given 
the market situation, hope to repay. Neo-classical theorists 
assumed that companies would respond to slumps by improving 
efficiency, but, instead of ruining the least efficient and 
re invigorating the thrustful companies, the decline in 
profitability made the introduction of new technology 
impossible. By 1930, steel companies were beginning to 
accept the need to protect domestic markets. The questions
1. PP 1918 {C.9071) xiii 423.
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of profitability, import duties. Rationalisation, adequate 
demand, and the development of corporate companies were, 
therefore, inextricably interwoven.^
The N.F.I.S.M. had set up a Tariff Committee in 1927, 
but internal divisions prevented it taking a policy stance.^ 
By the late 1920s, heavy steels producers had accepted the 
need to rationalise behind a tariff wall. Yet, companies 
like Colvilles and G.K.N. were dependent upon foreign raw 
materials or semi-finished goods. Only after the Great Crash 
of 1929 was the Federation able to support the principle of 
import duties. With the cooperation of the industry, the 
National Government passed the Import Duties Act in 1932, 
and provided for the setting up of the Imports Duties 
Advisory Committee. It imposed a thirty-three and a third 
per cent duty on iron and steel imports for two years. The 
continuance of the tariff was conditional upon the
rationalisation of steel production. Promises of increased
efficiency were meant to answer criticisms about the danger 
of a protected market for domestic producers. The government 
had imposed duties only with the agreement of the industry 
itself. It was willing to legislate if a consensus amongst 
steel companies could be reached, despite the fact that 
steel's anarchic structure made such a condition nearly
impossible to achieve. Expanding companies like the United 
Steel Companies, Richard Thomas', and Stewart and Lloyds
supported rationalisation because they believed that the 
most efficient would benefit, while Dorman—L o n g , South
1. Andrews and Brunner (1954), pp.xii,67-8,
73-4,77,393.
2. I r o n and Coal Trades R e v i e w , Dec 1927, pp.179-80.
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Durham and Cargo Fleet, G.K.N. and Colvilles merely wished
to increase profitability and efficiency within the existing
structure of ownership. Seeking to conciliate all points of
view. Sir William Larke, President of the National
Federation, was unable to formulate a plan of reorganisation
in the two years for which tariffs had been temporarily
introduced. The British Iron and Steel Federation was
established in order to by-pass wranglings within the
N.F.I.S.M., but, although tariffs continued, no binding
agreements on prices, quotas, or rebates for reallocated
production were ever implemented. The B.I.S.F.'s
constitution only mentioned price maintenance, with the
result that, as demand fell, prices stayed up.^
Rationalisation within the industry, consequently, was
implemented by the companies themselves. Bolckow, Vaughn and
Dorman-Long had joined forces in 1929, and the Lancashire
2
Steel Company and Firth and Browns were formed in 1930. But 
major developments followed the passing of the 1932 Import 
Duties Act. Changes in managerial and capital structure, 
moreover, shaped the industrial relations policies of steel 
companies. This fact was recognised in a report drawn up by 
the Import Duties Advisory Committee in 1937, which 
acknowledged that the Tariff had made possible the building 
q £ new plant on old or greenfield sites. Rationalisation had 
involved the rapid mechanisation and concentration of
1. Carr & Taplin ( 1962), pp. 439 , 471-2 , 478 , 495-6 , 499 ; 
Tolliday (1979 ), pp.425-6,447-66 .
2. R.S.Sayers The Bank of England 1871-1141  (1976),
pp! 315-6 , 3 22 ; T.Firth & J.Brown Ltd 10^ Years— of_
Steel (1937 ) , p . 70.
194
production. Works were moved nearer to ore supplies, as the 
relative cost of transporting coal declined. The Report 
advised that, because of the shake-out of labour caused by 
the introduction of greater mechanisation, the industry 
should bear the costs of supplementary unemployment 
assistance, pensions, or compensation for loss of 
employment. Joint consultation was encouraged, as was the 
need for industrial housing.^
{V ) . The Corporate Company and Industrial Welfare (II): 
1918-1930.
Industrial welfare after 1918 showed a marked
continuity with pre-War company provision. The War, however,
did concentrate minds on the issue of industrial relations.
The Iron Coal Trades Review, therefore, portrayed the War as
having "swept away most of the old habits of mind, much of
the folly of unreasonable traditions, of high-handed
autocracy, of isolated dignity and exclusiveness". British
industry had undertaken research into the most scientific
means of production and labour management. By following a
more "human" approach, companies could instill good morale.
A specialist supervisor was useful for explaining welfare
proposals and avoiding misunderstandings. He or she improved
efficiency and saved lost hours by the immediate provision
of first aid or hospital attention, canteens, and
rocreational and educational facilities. The promotion of
2
sports encouraged good health.
1. PP 1937 (C.5507) xii 423.
2. Iron and Coal Trade R eview, 9 Dec 1921, p . 840. Cf. 
s.(ii).
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The Carron Company founded a Recreation Club in 1918.^ 
The Whitehead Iron and Steel Company, likewise, set up a 
Sports Club by 1923. In 1926, a Welfare Scheme was 
established to collect from workers a 2d levy to be used for 
various welfare projects. In 1936, the company streamlined 
its labour schemes by forming a single Sports Club and 
Institute. The interested participation of the men in its 
administration was encouraged by placing it under the 
direction of a Welfare Committee. Edgar Allen and Company 
began financing a Thrift Club and Benevolent Fund in 1918, 
and sought to reduce work-disaffection by the promotion of 
sports and social clubs. A Works Sports Club was established 
in 1920, and the Edgar Allen Works and Sports Magazine was 
run by a democratically-elected committee of workers and 
staff. The company was proud of the fact that seven of the 
1918/1919 Junior Football squad's fourteen members were 
still employed at the works in 1956. Limited joint 
consultation was allowed through a Works Council founded in
1919. Representatives were elected from each department. In
1920, a Safety Committee was introduced, and a profitsharing 
scheme, consisting of 20,000 £1 workers' shares offered at 
less than the market price, was instigated.^ McKechnie 
Brothers attributed their good industrial relations partly 
to "the attention given by the directors to the safety and 
welfare of employees". A general Mutual Benefit Society had 
existed since 1901, but provision was extended by the
1. Campbell (1961), p . 324.
2. Wise Group N e w s , May 1948, p p . 5-8.
3. Edgar Allen Magazine, Feb 1956, pp.55,58,260,267.
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establishment of a Sick and Dividend Club in 1925. The firm
granted holidays with pay from 1919 onwards, yet works
councils were not set up until 1939.^ Richard Johnson and
Nephew held a Victory Sports and Celebration festival in
September 1919. Wiredrawers contributed 2d a week to a
Sickness Fund, while ancillary workers donated Id. The Fund
also paid for hospital treatment. When the company went
public in 1926, a share Trust was created in order to pay
money into a reconstituted Benevolent Fund. In 1937, a
pension scheme was founded with a £10,000 gift from the 
2
co m p a n y ,
The Stanton Iron Company claimed a long tradition of 
industrial welfare when works committees were appointed in 
1919 to encourage employer-employee cooperation. For, 
"Workers, too, have a code of behaviour,- not imposed but 
agreed. They learn to work with the company".^ By 1925, the 
Staveley Coal and Iron Company owned 2,000 houses, and 
sports clubs were introduced to cap the community's Sunday 
school and cricket team, which had served the company since 
the 1870s. Team expenses and referees were paid. The 
Devonshire Works Mess Room had a Secretary, Treasurer, and 
stewards, organised a Benevolent and Convalescent Fund, and 
owned a convalescent home. The Warsop Main Medical Aid Fund 
paid doctors' bills, and the Staveley Works Sick Fund
1. -T n . M r K p r h n i e  The McKechnie Story (1965 ), 
pp.23-24. Contributory pensions were introduced by 
1946.
2. M.Seth-Smith Two Hundred Years of Richard Johnson 
and Nephew (1973), pp.1 1 9 ,121,124,145,193.
3. U n i t y , Jan 1929, p p . 312-3.
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granted sick pay and made donations to hospitals.^ There was
no central direction of welfare policy, as works managers
were left to administer provision according to local needs.
This was true also of Guest, Keen, and Nettlefords, whose
Smethwick Works, by 1925, had established its own Welfare
Department. It was responsible for supporting social clubs,
sports associations, holiday camps, a gymnasium, a works
canteen, surgeries, restrooms, and the provision of trained
nurses. The Castle Works at Newport organised an Institute
2
and Club with a billiard-room, library, and canteen.
The rapid growth of Colvilles during the First World 
War created the problem of maintaining good communications 
with its workforce. Originally, Colvilles had employed 
100-200 men at Motherwell, but expanded to include 1500-2000 
men throughout Lanarkshire, Ayrshire, and Stirlingshire. In 
1920, therefore, the company began publishing a house 
journal which could develop a corporate spirit. "It is... 
very easy for one to feel lost amidst such a huge 
organisation, and sometimes to wonder what the Company is 
really doing, or worse still, to have no interest in the 
Company or its affairs. There have also grown up within the 
Works many organisations, not only of a Trade or Union 
description, but likewise of a Social nature; yet the
1. BSC 39/90/3, Synopsis of Stavely Coal and Iron
Company Ltd and Subsidiary C o m p a n i e s , March 1925; 
Staveley Works Club, 31 Dec 1926; Barrow Hill 
Memorial Club, 31 Dec 1925; Ringwood Club, 30 June 
1929; Devonshire Works Mess Room, 31 Dec 1926; 
Warsop Main Medical Aid Fund, 31 Dec 1926; 
Staveley Works Sick and Accident Fund, 31 Dec 
1926. Cf. also Sunday School, General Fund; and 
Barrow Hill Works Fund, 1872.
2. Gwent R . O . , D . 409.25, GKN Ltd An Outline History 
of this Group of Companies.... (19 2 5).
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knowledge of these and the usefulness of them is limited to 
the actual members, for others know little if anything about 
them . The Magazine Committee was elected by each works 
department, and its journal's object was to prevent 
"unwarranted suspicions" becoming grievances. Works 
committees were founded for the same purpose. Colvilles 
hoped that a good "esprit de corps" would be further 
developed through the active participation of their men in 
sports and social clubs. Industrial unrest could be cured by 
welfare, because, rather than stemming from the activities 
of the lone agitator, or the selfish pursuit of large wages, 
its "real cause lies deeper, and will be found in the lack 
of sympathy, and personal interest shown by employers 
towards the rank-and-file of their workers". Furthermore, it 
was the "ever-increasing experience" of even low-paid 
workers and their firm-specific skills which made labour "a 
most important factor in industrial success". Young 
apprentices had to be instilled with the right attitude 
towards work and their employers, and welfare work was most 
effective on those of an impressionable age.^
The industrial welfare facilities which expanded during 
the Post-War boom found a permanent place in steel companies 
even during the depressed periods of the 1920s and the 
1930s. William Bain of Coatbridge had established the 
Lochrin Welfare Football Club in 1923. A sick pay scheme was 
instituted in 1926 and a Pension Fund in 1928, and both were
1. Colvilles Magazine, Jan 1920, p . 131; Aug 1920, 
p . 131.
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recorded as doing well "despite the depression In
1930, Marshall and Company founded a welfare scheme which 
charged elected works representatives with improving sports 
and social facilities. In the same year, a voluntary, 
self-supporting sick and accident fund at the Constructional 
Department was turned into the Company Welfare Fund. It 
began providing pensions in 1934. Moreover, it was in the 
years after the Great Crash that important developments in 
the welfare practices of large steel companies, like United 
Steel, Dorman-Long, Richard Thomas', and Stewart and Lloyds 
took place.
(V ). The Corporate Company and Industrial Welfare (III) :
(a ) the United Steel Companies.
The relationship between integrated manufacture, 
industrial structure, corporate management, internal labour 
markets, and industrial welfare is most clearly illustrated 
by the history of the United Steel Companies, established in 
1918 by the amalgamation of four concerns. Its founder, 
Henry Steel, was rightly convinced that the new company 
would exercise greater bargaining power in the securing of 
raw materials. While demand was high during the years
1918-21, the War had created raw material shortages which he 
hoped to overcome. Economies could be obtained from buying 
in greater bulk. A Central Board was appointed to handle 
the pooling of ore and coal between companies, but the full
1. W.Bain & Co. Ltd Lochrin's One Hundred Years: the 
Story of W i 1liam Bain and Co. Ltd of Coatbridge 
TT959), pTfO.
2. Marshall N e w s , Autumn Number, 19 30 , pp.9,90.
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advantages of coordinated production were not achieved
because management within the constituent companies
continued unchanged. Each company was responsible for its
own expenditure, and investment by the subsidiaries was
haphazard. Competition between the units was encouraged. A
report in 1921 stated the advantages of operating as a
single entity with a central staff and full-time chairman.
Losses could be reduced by concentrating certain steels in
those plants best suited to produce them. Capital, however,
was not restructured, and, by the mid-1920s, optimistic
investment in 1918-1921 had left United Steel
overcapitalised. When loans of over Elm had to be redeemed
in the financial year 1927-1928, United Steel found itself
unable to meet even the interest charges.^
In 1927, the Board appointed Robert Hilton as Managing
Director. He instigated the managerial reorganisation of
1928-1930, imposed central control over finance, and
provided for the better planning of production between
units. U.S.C.'s Head Office was moved from the headquarters
of Steel, Peech and Tozer, a constituent company, and given
its own building. The functions of administration, sales,
and purchasing were also centralised. Statistical and
accounting systems were unified, and a single store of
information and data was built up. Important business, like
capital expenditure, managerial appointments and financial
allocations, had to be authorised by the Central Board on
the recommendations of a Finance and General Purposes
1. Andrews & Brunner (1951), pp.119-121,123-4, 
R.Peddie The United Steel Companies L t d ,__1918-19^ 
(1969), p p . 13-15.
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Committee. The boards of the subsidiaries were also 
reformed, with those having no seat on the Central Board or 
without a responsibility in branch management, being
retired. As a consequence of the Depression, U.S.C. 's
capital in 1930 was written down by £9.75m to £11.5m. The 
production of railway materials, the largest element of 
United Steel s business, was concentrated at the Workington 
Iron and Steel Company with its acid Bessemer plant. Other 
heavy steel products were allocated to S.P.T. 's Ickles
Works, while Templeborough concerned itself with heavy
carbon-steel products. Samuel Fox's Stockbridge plant was to 
manufacture lighter goods, and special and alloy steels. The 
Cleveland collieries were closed, and redundant plant like 
some forges at Fox's and the tyre-mills at Workington were 
scrapped. There were difficulties, however, over the 
calculation of "depreciation rates" upon which government 
compensation for War-time losses were based. These problems 
and the vested interests of some shareholders in the 
subsidiaries halted the transfer of shares to the new single 
entity of United Steel. S.P.T. remained a separate company 
till 1931. The plants at Scunthorpe were not integrated into 
U.S.C. until 1946, while Samuel Fox remained legally 
independent into the 1950s. Due to the U.S.C. s financial 
situation, major capital development was forestalled until 
1933-1934, and peaked in 1937-1938 with the building of an 
integrated plant near to basic ore supplies at 
Appleby-Frodingham in Lincolnshire.
Yet, "The reconstruction of United Steel in 1928
1. Andrews & Brunner (1954), pp.119-20,156-8,
162-5,167-9,208,234.
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produced not only a reorganisation of its management and its 
production structure, but also the first ventures in those 
aspects of management which are additional to the primary 
activities of buying, manufacture and selling which have now 
come to be regarded as important and essential parts of 
management responsibilities. The most important of these
internal ventures were labour relations " ^  a  staff
pension scheme was begun in 1928, and indicated the 
company s new commitment to establishing a large managerial 
hierarchy. U.S.C, s policy towards its labour-force,
however, relied upon works councils. Workers' pensions were 
not introduced until 1935. The works councils were closely 
linked with managerial reorganisation in 1928-1930, while 
the pension scheme was connected with the capital
developments of 1934-38. Just as management was centralised 
and systemised, works councils were charged with operating 
on a uniform basis at plant and company level. They sought 
to imbue loyalty to U.S.C. by regularising the rights and 
conditions of workers on a company-wide basis. The councils, 
for example, took over the administration of the varied 
welfare schemes organised at once-independent works. They 
instilled a "tradition of mutual confidence", cooperation, 
good feeling, safety-consciousness, and two-way
communications between employer and employee. The provision 
of pensions, on the other hand, eased the shedding of old 
and inefficient workers when more mechanised techniques were 
being introduced. U.S.C. saw the replacement of labour as a 
permanent source of economy because machinery was less
1. Peddie (1969), pp.18-19,26.
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troublesome. There was also a greater need to reduce 
labour-turnover amongst men trained in the new techniques. 
Only welfare benefits like pensions could ensure loyalty, 
which was considered a prerequisite to "smoothness of 
operation in 'ancillary operations" like the charging of 
new m a c h i n e r y .^
Works councils, as well as managerial reorganisation, 
were introduced by Hilton, Safety First and Suggestions 
Committees were also appointed.^ Each plant had it own works 
council able to send members to a central representative 
body. Works councils provided workers with insight into the 
administration of the company. They allowed labour "to take 
their part in the management of welfare services and similar 
functions". The Appleby-Frodingham Works Council had forty 
members, and an Accident Prevention Committee, a Canteen 
Committee, a Sick and Dividing Club, a Coal Committee, and a 
Benevolent Society. It managed welfare buildings like the 
Athletics Club. Moreover, "The Council is kept regularly in 
touch with proposed developments of the Works, or changes in 
practice by the Works Manager, who regularly attends their 
meetings".^ The Council at Appleby-Frodingham superseded a 
joint sports committee established in 1922. It had deducted 
Id per week from pay-packets, although the wages of 
groundsmen were paid by the company. The enthusiasm for
1. Andrews & Brunner (1951), p . 355; BSC 888/14A/1,
U SCt 5 th Annual Week-end Conference of
Rgpr0 S0 ntatives o f Works Councils, 4—6 th Oct 1935 , 
pp.1,10-11,15,21.
2. Peddie (1969), p . 26.
3. G.R.Walshaw & C.A.J.Behrendt The H i s t o r y _ o f
-Frodingham (1950), pp.140-141.
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sports facilities was illustrated by the fact that, during a 
stoppage in 1921, workers had given up their time to lay 
pitches and carry out repairs.^ Indeed, one of the guiding 
principles behind changes in welfare practice was to put 
Social Organisation' completely under the control of the 
men. Although sports and recreation clubs relied upon 
U.S.C. s financial assistance, they were considered more 
effective if the initiative of members could be encouraged.^ 
The Workington Welfare Hall was registered as a company in 
1929 and its directors were elected by ballot.^ By 1935, 
every branch works council at U.S.C. had its benevolent sick
4
society. In the ten year period between 1938-48, United 
Steel spent £335,000 every year on welfare facilities.^
When the King in 1935 requested that on the occassion 
of his Silver Jubilee workers should be granted a day's 
holiday, U.S.C. instead decided to donate a day's wage bill 
to establishing a Convalescent and Holiday Home for
Appleby-Frodingham workers, and cottage homes for employees 
retiring from S.P.T., Fox's, and Workington.^ This decision, 
however, was reached after great argument within the
1. BSC 159/5/1, History of Appleby-Frodingham: _
O ut 1 ine (1950), pp.140-141.
2. BSC 159/1/7, Memo., 9 March 1938.
3. Ibid, Workington Welfare Hall^ Articles— of_
Association (1929).
4. BSC 888/14A/1, USC; 5th Annual Week-end Conference
of Representatives qf_Wqrks Councils, 4-6^h— Oct
1935, pp.1,10-11715,21; BSC 159/1/4, USC: Cottage 
Trusts, 1935-39, Memo., 3 Feb 1936.
5. Andrews & Brunner (1951), p . 318.
6. BSC 159/1/4, USC: Cottage Trusts, 1935-39, Poster
for Works.
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company. United Steel had calculated that paying the £10,000 
in wages was cheaper than losing a day's production. The 
directors were also opposed to dividing the £10,000 equally 
between the men, on the grounds that the money was 
consequently frittered. The cash grant was allocated to the 
works councils, who were to ballot the workers on the use to 
which the money should be put, although the Managing 
Director had the final say in the matter.^ The only question 
asked of the men was whether they wanted a convalescent home 
or retirement cottages. U.S.C. hoped for savings from not 
having to continue donating to private convalescent homes. 
But workers were discontented at not receiving a day's 
holiday.^ The opportunity of the Jubilee was used to extend 
industrial welfare policies. To the directors, a permanent 
insitution for the benefit of employees would help "display 
the corporate and family spirit" during the Jubliee.^
The provision of amenities and the temporary 
alleviation of sickness did not need the central planning 
and extensive financing of a pension scheme. The company, 
consequently, dithered in 1935 over the prospect of 
providing workers' pensions. The central Works Council, 
meeting in October that year, pressed for their introduction 
but their request was at first refused. Nevertheless, a 
1 . I b i d , M e mo., n.d.
2. Ibid, Memo., 1 May 1935.
3. Ibid, Memo., 21 May 1935.
4. Ibid, Letter to Cllr. Townsley, 4 May 1935.
nqp QQQ/iAa/1 iiqr; 5th Annual Week-end Conference of 
p^ r ^ . J n r a H v e e  Councils^_:4-6th Oct 1.9^ ,
p. 20.
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5.
deal with the Legal and General Assurance Company was soon 
signed and, by the end of 1935, 1,500 had joined the new 
pension scheme. By 1937, 90% of the workforce were
contributors, and membership was a condition of employment 
for workers joining the firm.^
{b ) Dorman-Long.
The steel companies of the North East coast, unwilling
to sacrifice their individual interests for the regional
industry as a whole, resisted the creation of large-scale
units of production. By continuing to invest heavily in
declining sectors like ship-plates and engineering after the
War, costly mistakes were made. Managerial practices,
interest groups within firms, rigidities of plant, and
financial burdens merely increased their reliance on these
declining sectors throughout the 1920s. Production
overlapped between and within North Eastern companies, and
bottlenecks at different process-stages continued. Although
by 1923 Dorman-Long had consolidated all the concerns it had
absorbed in recent years into a single company, little
restructuring of plant followed. The amalgamation of
Dorman-Long with Bolckow-Vaughn in 1929 led only to the
2
closing of the Carlton Ironworks. Dorman-Long remained
1. Journa 1 of Gas Lighting, 3 Feb 1937, p.263. The
Park Gate Iron and Steel company established a 
Pension Fund to commemorate the Silver Jubilee. It 
was administered by a sub-committee of its works 
council. Pensions were set at 3d for every year s 
service, and the company could revise or disband 
the scheme at will. Cf. BSC Consett/7/1753, Rules 
for the Park Gate Company Pension Fund (19 50).
2. Tolliday (1979 ), pp.65 ,71,74 ,81-84, 86-88 ,
125-6,132,140,152,160-1.
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backward in developing corporate management, internal labour 
markets, and sytematic welfare schemes.
As well as expanding company provision at Dormanstown, 
the company purchased a recreation ground at Llanelly in 
1919. The formation of "Welfare Committees" had been 
discussed in 1918, although a system of "works committees", 
acting as trustees for the sports and social clubs, was not 
actually appointed till 1928.^ Welfare, therefore, continued 
at first to be organised on a works basis and the practices 
of previous companies were continued. The Britannia and West 
March Ironworks, for example, levied Id a week for the 
services of a doctor. Another Id in deductions went to the 
North Riding Infirmary, where workers would be treated if 
they had obtained an admission ticket from the company.^
It seemed fairer in 1924 to extend the rights of the
Bell Brothers Workmen's Savings Fund to all Dorman-Long
employees than to abolish the institution altogether.^ 
Dorman-Long recognised, nonetheless, that the maintenance of 
previous welfare schemes created anomalies. Because the 
sports and social clubs had developed haphazardly, the Board 
in 1930 commissioned a report on all the associations "run 
mainly for the benefit of employees of the company.... 
Three boys' clubs, a sports club, two workmen s institutes,
1. BSC 271/3/31, Directors' Minutes, 17 Dec 1919.
2. Ibid, 25 Feb 1918.
3. BSC 1066/12/2, Memo., on Cleveland Works Social
and Athletic Club, 24 Nov 1941.
4. BSC 1107/11/1, Britannia and West March Ironworks
R u l e s , 4 May 1920.
5. B S C ( U K ) /SEC/3/102, Directors Minutes, 9 April 
1924 .
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and three workmen's clubs were investigated.^ A more
centralised direction of welfare facilities was recommended, 
but no action was taken until 1935. This was partly because 
of the drain of the depression on available resources, and 
partly because the direction of welfare policy could not be 
finalised while the company dithered over whether to grant
pension rights to all its employees or not.
In 19 20, Dorman-Long had established a contributory 
pensions scheme for "officers", a category which included 
staff and foremen. Members had to be under 55 years when 
they joined and had to agree to joint contributions.^ Its 
principal purpose was to ensure that managers and
supervisors did not join a union. The scheme was open only 
to those who were not members of labour organisations, and 
those unwilling to join had to submit a written explanation 
to the directors.^ The company, in addition, began making 
annual donations to a special fund, which could at the 
discretion of the directors help officers in circumstances 
not covered by the pension scheme.^ By 1922, "all those who
were paid upstanding wages and not by the day or hour" were
encouraged to join the contributory pension scheme, because, 
like officers, they were permanent employees.^ This special
1. BSC 1107/11/1, Memos., 2 April 1930; 28 Oct 1930;
6 Nov 1930; 1 Nov 1930; 8 Nov 1930.
2. BSC(UK)/SEC/3/1&2, 7 Sept 1920.
3. BSC 1100/6/1, Dorman-Long Pension Fund, Book of
Application Forms.
4. BSC(UK)/SEC/3/1&2, Directors' Minutes, 7 Sept 
1920 .
5. BSC 1066/13/1, Pension Committee Minutes, 1 Sept
1922 .
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fund was soon used for the benefit of even hourly-paid 
workers. The Board s Pension Committee generally accepted 
the recommendations of local managers that long-serving men, 
though not members of the pension scheme, should be granted 
ÊÜ S F ^ t ia allowances at 65 years. Awards were not given on 
any systematic basis. One labourer, for example, was granted 
5/- per week in 1922, while another at the Redcar furnaces
was awarded 10/-.^ A 78-year-old metal carrier at Samuelson 
and Company received 10/- for 39 years' service, while a 
labourer at Dorman-Long s Sheet Department received a 
similar amount after only ten years at the works.^ In 1923, 
the Pension Fund was responsible for 212 people at a cost of 
£8,711 for the year.^
The company estimated that the 1925 Old Age Pensions 
Act would cost it some £12,000 per annum, and the Board was 
determined to make savings in welfare provision to defray 
the extra costs.^ It reduced its contributions to the 
Pension Fund, and deducted £500 a year from the special fund 
also. After 1925, only staff members could join the Pension 
Fund. It was hoped that these measures would save a total of 
£5,000 per year.^ Yet, Dorman-Long felt obliged to honour 
the welfare commitments undertaken by Bolckow, Vaughn when 
it was bought out in 1929. The "ex-officials" of Bolckow, 
Vaughn had to be included in Dorman-Long's pension scheme,
1. Ibid, 18 Dec 1922 & 16 March 1923.
2. Ibid, 1 May 1923.
3. Ibid, 19 Oct 1923.
4. BSC CHM/SEC/1/1-3, 5 May 1925.
5. BSC 1066/13/1, Pension Committee Minutes, 27 Oct 
1925 .
210
but the discretionary "Workmen's Allowances amounting to
£2,087" were also confirmed. This decision, to be reviewed
annually, affected 160 men. Moreover, the Pensions Committee
at Dorman-Long had continued since 1925 to make
discretionary awards to workers. The perceived advantages of
cost-cutting had not surpassed the value of welfare in
industrial life. Every claim for benefit had to be
individually assessed, and this cumbersome procedure was
revised in 1931. It was decided that grants of 5/- would be
automatically awarded for fifty years' service, and that
they would be reduced to 2/6d when a beneficiary or his wife
became eligible for a state pension. All "border-line"
cases, however, would continue to be assessed by the
Committee on an individual basis.^
By 1934, Dorman-Long had established a Pensions Office
in order to wind up the Pension Fund and to provide all
pensions on an ex gratia basis and according to the 1931
guidelines. Dorman-Long's limited profitability and its
failure to construct an integrated works meant that it had a
small "core" of permanent workers. It had little reason,
therefore, to sustain a systematic pension scheme. With the
dissolution of the company pension fund, however, it was
thought necessary to place other welfare activities on a
2
uniform basis. Savings could also be made. Dorman-Long 
appointed a Welfare Office to streamline the wide variety of 
sports, social, and benevolent clubs. In 1935, all donations
1. BSC(UK)/SEC/3/1&2, Directors' Minutes, 7 Sept 
1920 .
2. BSC 1066/12/2, Letter from Pensions Office to 
Industrial Welfare Society, 17 Sept 1934.
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made by individual works to convalescent homes were
channelled into three institutions at Redcar, Dinsdale, and
Leeds. In the following year, the newly-appointed Welfare
Officer was instructed to found an Employees' Provident Fund
to incorporate the many benevolent societies at the various
works. The new society provided sick pay and hospital 
2
treatment. It was headed by a Workmen's Committee, although 
the Welfare Officer became the Honorary Secretary and 
Treasurer. Dorman-Long agreed to supplement the men's 
contributions of 4d a week by 10% of its total income. 
Membership of the Fund was made a condition of employment 
for all new recruits to the company.^ Each situation of 
hardship was reviewed independently, and Dorman-Long was not 
committed to maintaining its financial assistance which had 
been its chief objection to continuing the Pension Fund.^ An 
Employees' Sports Committee was founded in 1936 to organise 
activities on a company-wide basis. The Welfare Officer was 
given a central directing role because it was assumed that 
works managers had an apathetic attitude towards sports 
provision. Grants were given to promote sports associations^ 
and inter-company competitions between works. In cases like
1. Ibid, Welfare Donations, Memo., 5 Sept 1935.
2. BSC(UK)/SEC/3/1&2, Directors' Minutes, 17 Jan
1936; BSC 1066/12/2, Welfare Donations, Memo., 1
Aug 1936.
3. Ibid, 17 Nov 1936.
4. BSC 271/3/31, Directors' Minutes, 9 Feb 1939; 9
March 1939.
5 BSC 1066/13/1, Employees Sports Committee, 16 
March 1938; BSC 271/3/31, Directors' Minutes, 17 
Jan 1936; Letter from Welfare Officer to Cleveland 
Works Sports Club, 28 Oct 1937; Memo., 7 Sept
1939 .
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Cleveland where there was a limited number of sporting 
leagues, the intervention of the Welfare Officer was, 
therefore, crucial.^
As Dorman-Long failed to rationalise its plant, it did 
not establish the more extensive internal labour markets of 
other steel companies. But as demand expanded in the later 
1930s with the increase in government armament contracts, 
Dorman-Long systemised its sports clubs and non-contributory 
benevolent societies. Such provision instilled loyalty and 
helped alleviate work-disaffection. Unlike contributory 
pensions, it was not intended to reduce labour-turnover.
{c ) Richard Thomas and C ompany.
Whereas the United States tinplate industry largely 
concentrated upon the manufacture of autobody sheet, no 
single item dominated British output. Rolling, consequently, 
remained a separate trade to the production of tinplate bar. 
British producers were contracted to a number of suppliers, 
and rollers required the adaptability provided by 
small-scale machinery. The nature of the domestic market 
hindered the development of integrated tinplate works. A 
fragmented industrial structure caused overproduction, and 
many works were under-utilised. Richard Thomas' profits and 
prices throughout the 1920s were undercut by the 
comparatively low costs of entry into small-scale tinplate 
manufacture. Cheap imports added to economic instability. 
Only Baldwins, who obtained contracts to supply 
Anglo-Persian Petroleum and the Shell Transport and Trading
1. BSC 1066/12/2, Welfare Donations, Memo., 3 June
1939, Clevelands Works Sports Club.
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Company, wer.e able to build an integrated tinplate unit at 
Elba in the 1920s. Yet, as the selling price of tinplate bar 
increased after 1925, rollers were keen to develop permanent 
links with suppliers. Moreover, greater company size 
improved the purchasing power of tinplate producers. During 
the late 1920s, Richard Thomas' began buying out rivals and 
established a dominant position in the British tinplate 
industry. But, on the whole, its plant remained 
unrationalised. The scale of losses at Redbourn were so 
great that there was no prospect of paying dividends on 
Ordinary Shares at Richard Thomas' while production 
continued there on old lines. William Firth who gained 
control of the company from the Thomas family was convinced 
that Redbourn should be scrapped or developed into an
integrated basic Bessemer plant at a cost of €2.5 million. 
Only the greater market security provided by the imposition 
of import duties in 1932 allowed Thomas' to concentrate 
production as well as ownership. Under pressure from the
government, the company agreed to build the new plant at the
inland site of Ebbw Vale where unemployment was high. 
Relative costs favoured Redbourn with its proximity to 
Lincolnshire's basic ores. Ebbw Vale was designed to produce 
250,000 tons per annum of high grade steel. It was equipped 
with a large rolling mill, and had guarantees of orders from 
customers like Morris and Austin.^
Richard Thomas' had acquired the Redbourn works in
1906. By 1921, the Redbourn Village Society owned 238
1. Tolliday (1979 ), pp.164-181 ,183 , 191-7 , 200 ,211 ,218 , 
221. Cf. C h . 7, s.(viii).
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houses,^ There were official Sick Clubs and others 
spontaneously and independently organised by the men. All 
employees could join the main self-managed Sick Club. 
Benefits included sick-pay and death grants to widows, and 
administrative costs were covered by the company. The 
Workmen's Hospital Fund, founded in 1910, gave donations to 
the unemployed, to a Nursing Fund, an Aged and Poor Fund, 
and a convalescent h o m e .  ^ In 1925, welfare facilities were 
extended at Llanelly by the founding of a club with billiard 
rooms, a gymnasium, bowling greens, and tennis courts.^ The 
Abercarn Welfare Fund was established in 1931. Levies were 
set at 2d per week and they were intended to continue the 
traditional welfare services set out in the previous owners' 
articles of association.^ Drawn up in 1875, they stated that 
the employers should promote the welfare of workers through 
their support for clubs, provident societies, hospitals, and 
churc h e s .^
While Thomas' remained a conglomeration of small 
companies, industrial welfare was uncoordinated. One 
exception to leaving welfare in the control of individual
1. Ingot, May 1951, p . 3.
2. BSC 271/2/103, RTB Redbourn Works, Scunthorpe, 
Memo., 4 October 1945.
3. By 1940, Thomas' were contributing £50 to the
Hospital Fund with a total income of €360. The
Fund was the basis of the company's contributory
pension scheme founded in 1948.
4. BSC 312/1/8, Accounts, 19 30,1931,1932,1936,1940;
Abercarn Old Age Pension Fund, Accounts, 1948;
ACM, 21 Dec 1925, p p . 4,10-11.
5. BSC 312/1/1, Abercarn Welfare Fund, 5 Sept 1931.
6. BSC 312/3/4, Memo, of Association of the Abercarn 
Tinplate Company Limited (1895).
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works was the profitsharing scheme established in 1921. 7.5%
dividends were distributed. Industrial relations would be
improved, "as every Employee Shareholder in the Company had
an additional interest in helping to save the profits, and
the scheme also encourages better work and tends to the
advancement of the joint interests of the Company and its
employees". Close cooperation between employers and employed
was particularly necessary in the tinplate industry "for the
human element enters into that industry to an exceptional
degree". Small-scale tinplate manufacture was dependent upon
the skills and loyalty of its workforce. Richard Thomas'
claimed to have "recognised that fact". House-loans and a
Welfare Inspector "to look after the training of the boys"
were also envisaged as part of a comprehensive, company-wide
welfare policy.^
Richard Thomas' had founded an Officers and Staff
2
Pension Scheme by 1921, and it was the trade union side on 
the Tinplate Joint Industrial Council which in 1926 first 
argued for the introduction of workers' pensions. The 
I.S.T.C. repeated their proposals in 1929 and 1933, but the 
employers would not countenance the costs.^ Opinions within 
the industry were altered, however, once William Firth began 
in 1934 to give the idea his support. Firth was motivated by 
changes in the labour management requirements of the Ebbw
1. BSC 271/3/37, A . G . M . , 20 Dec 1921, p p . 2-3; AGM, 21 
Dec 1925, p p . 4,10-11.
2. Ibid, AGM, 20 Dec 1920; 271/2/6, Memo., on future 
of Staff Pension Scheme, 8 June 1939. The fund was 
insolvent by 1939. Benefits were reduced, and its 
business was transferred to an assurance company.
3. A.Pugh Men of Steel (1951), pp. 406 , 444 ,487 , 492 ,
498 .
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Vale works. Large-scale, rationalised production required a
more permanent workforce suited to the skills of the
continuous, integrated process which was replacing the old
"hand mills".^ Pensions would help ease out those least
adaptive and proficient in the new techniques. Firth offered
to give £25,000 of his own money to start the scheme if
other employers would match the sum. Firth was a member of
the Provisional Management Committee appointed by the 1935
annual meeting of the J.I.C. to draw up the rules of the
pension fund. Death benefits were also to be provided by the
scheme, which was completely private and did not rely on the
services of an insurance company. It was decided that
companies should contribute a levy of one and a quarter
pennies per box of steel ingot produced. A 2.5% levy on
wages would also be needed to accrue the £125,000 in
2
benefits expected to be paid in 1936. But negotiations over 
the scheme lasted three years. It was finally decided that 
works could join the scheme if 80% of their men had agreed 
by ballot to become members by the 24th September 19 37. 
Only John Player and Son, with a contributory fund of its 
own, was excluded from the operation of the scheme. Trades 
unions had complete control over the administration of the 
pensions, but rules could not be revised without the 
permission of every contributing employer. Benefits were
1. B.S.Keeling & A.E.G.Wright The Development of the
Modern British Steel Industry (1964), p p . 15-16.
2. BSC 271/2/50 , Rules of the Tinplate Trade
Superannuation Fund (1937); Memo., 30 Jan 1936; 
Letter from Welsh Plate and Sheet Manufacturers 
Association, 6 March 1936; Memo., 1 July 1936.
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made payable by July 1938.^
Firth circularised employers in 1937 urging their
agreement to the plans. He argued for the introduction of
pensions on a number of grounds apart from those of
humanity. Improvements in trading conditions over the next
few years would make labour restless. It was commercially
sound to retire men who were 65 and, consequently, the least
efficient. A lack of industrial provision would bring
increased state involvement. Administrative and financial
responsibility for the scheme lay with the unions. Moreover,
the payment of pension contributions was merely an accepted
and natural element of wage-costs. Firth also contended that
tinplate employers were fortunate in having moderate labour
leaders like Ernie Bevin. As advocates of pensions, their
2
authority had to be upheld. The unions, undoubtedly, helped 
gain the men's acceptance of the pension scheme. Resistance 
to the 2.5% levy on wages was illustrated by the 5,000 
tinplate workers who struck unofficially in April 1936. The 
Welsh Plate and Sheet Manufacturers Association was 
determined not to make concessions to rank and file dissent, 
and, with the cooperation of the union, contributions were 
first collected in 1937.^ The union also agreed to suspend 
retirement at 65 for the two years after 1938, because 
demand was expanding so fast that there was a shortage of
1. Ibid, Memo., 193 5; Explanatory Note on Main Points 
of the S cheme, by H.C.Thomas.
2. Ibid, Circular from Sir Wm. Firth, 4 May 1937.
3. Ibid, Extract from Western M a i l , 27 April 1936; 
Circular from W.P.S.M.A., 8 April 1936; Rules of 
the Tinplate Trades Superannuation Fund (19 3 7).
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skilled labour.^
By 1938, therefore, sports and social amenities, sick 
pay, medical treatment, and profitsharing were available at 
Richard Thomas , and, because of the restructuring of its 
capital and the expansion of an internal labour market, the 
company introduced old age pensions.
{d ) Stewart and L loyds.
Stewart and Lloyds revised both production and labour 
management in 1918: "The unification of management had to be 
considered owing to the various methods and systems which in 
each case were the result of many years experience...." at 
different works. Because Stewart and Lloyds was a large 
company dominating the manufacture, of steel tubes in 
Britain, it required a more central direction of 
decision-making and the systemisation of procedures. Its 
Employees Benefit Fund was given the role of unifying the 
organisation of welfare provision. It was supervised by the 
Board's Employees Benefit Committee, and paid ejc gratia sick 
pay, pensions, and death benefits. It was concluded, 
however, that all aspects of reorganisation would take years 
to achieve, and, indeed, production and management was not 
comprehensively rationalised until 1931. Stewart and Lloyds 
concluded that "a greater measure of consolidation of 
British Tube Tonnage" was needed to "ensure economy and to 
provide conditions of manufacture essential to large output
1 . Ibid, Circular from W.P.S. Manufacturers
Association, 5 May 1937.
2. BSC 39/7/3, Notes on the History of Stewart and 
Lloyds, 1919.
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as now used or being developed". Once the decision to
concentrate production at Corby was taken, it was clear that
Stewart and Lloyds would have to undertake a more rigorous
streamlining of management than had been previously
attempted. The size of the Board was cut, and
decision-making was finally moved to the centre: "The
reorganisation (is) to be designed to fit in with the Centre
Department situated in London".^ Some sub-committees to the
Board were wound up, and the details of the business were
transferred from many part-time directors to a small body of
professionals. A.G.Macdiarmid was appointed General Managing
Director and he and five Managing Directors formed an
2
executive committee. Sub-committees, like the Transfer
Committee, the Special Salaries Committee, and the Employees 
Benefit Committee, were considered useful and important
enough to be continued.
During the 1920s, local works remained responsible for 
organisations like the Clydesdale and Vulcan Welfare Clubs. 
It "entered deeply into the tissue of local life, providing 
recreation, religious instruction, choral singing, bowls, 
badminton, and billiards". The Vulcan Welfare Club owned a 
hut where dinners and dances were held, and had a Holiday
Fund and Safety First Committee. Carfin Hall, near
Clydesdale, catered for cricket, bowling, tennis and
football. In 1928, the Clydesdale works established a
Benevolent Fund to supplement the central Employees
Benevolent Fund. It replaced the old Works Friendly Society
1. BSC 65/1/3, 3 Feb 1931; 15 Dec 1931.
2. Ibid, 2 Feb 1932.
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which had included only skilled men as members. The new
society s constitution and rules were agreed by "accredited
representatives" of the Welfare Club and Works Friendly
Society, and the scheme covered sickness, accident and
death. 4d a week was deducted from wages to provide 12/- for
the first twelve weeks of sickness, 9/- for the next, and
then 5/- for an unstipulated period. Death benefit was set
at £6 and £3 for a deceased worker and wife respectively.^
The Stewart and Lloyds Employees' Trust Limited was
formed in 1923 to undertake any project for the benefit of
employees. 60,000 company shares secured a permanent source
of funds for general welfare projects. In 1924, 20,000 40/-
shares were freely distributed by the Trust to all employees
2
at Stewart and Lloyds. A share held for four years 
received an annual bonus of 1/-, and an extra l/6d was given 
to any shares held for five years or more. Stewart and 
Lloyds also agreed to compensate the men for any part of 
their dividends that were taxed. The company were careful in 
stating that wage-levels would be unaffected by the scheme, 
and employees were given the same rights as Ordinary 
shareholders. The Trust was prepared to advance loans to 
help workers and staff purchase further shares, and, in 
1924, Stewart and Lloyds lent the Trust £20,000 at 4% to 
purchase more shares from the company. By May 1924, 33,058
shares had been issued to workers.^
1. BSC 39/7/3, Clydesdale & Vulcan Welfare Club, 
Annual Report, 30 Sept 1928.
2. BSC 39/2/2, Memorandum and Articles of Association 
of Stewart and Lloyds Trust Ltd (1923); Letter 
from Secretary to Directors, 20 March 1924.
3. BSC 65/1/3, Directors' Minutes, 22 & 27 May 1924.
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When it was decided to develop the greenfield site of 
Corby, it was realised that "the problems of labour and 
trade union relations would be urgent and difficult". After 
some procrastination, it was finally decided that workers' 
trades unions would be recognised. But "every endeavour was 
to be made to settle a works difference locally at the works 
without reference to a neutral committee." Staff unions were 
never countenanced. The building of the plant and a 
community entailed a huge transfer of men and materials. The 
local authority had to assist in the construction of houses, 
and Stewart and Lloyds received local government subsidies 
for the building, by 1937, of 2,253 houses. The company 
provided shops, and, by 1938, a Welfare Hall and Sports 
Ground. Traditional practices were continued, for "It had 
always been the practice of the Company at its older works 
in Scotland and in England to encourage sports and communal 
activities of all kinds among its employees. It was realised 
from the start that assistance on an even more liberal scale 
might be given at Corby". The work of the trust established 
by J.G.Stewart at Clydesdale in 1908 was transferred to 
Corby. A Welfare Supervisor was appointed to oversee the 
various recreational associations, although detailed 
administration was left to the workers' committees. The 
Odeon (Corby) Limited was created in association with Odeon 
Cinemas and a picture-house was opened in 1936. A boys' 
club, gynasium, and swimming pool were particular needs 
fulfilled by the company.^
1 F.Scopes The Development of Corby Works (1968),
pp.110,112,114-5,117-8,129,130-1, 237; BSC 39/7/3, 
Clydesdale & Vulcan Welfare Club, Annual Report,
30 Sept 1928.
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(V ). The Corporate Company and Industrial Welfare (IV): 
S u m m a r y .
Despite amalgamations between steel companies during 
the Great War, the managerial sructure of the industry 
remained largely unchanged. As a consequence, sports 
associations, social clubs, and sick benefit societies, 
which increased markedly in the years after 1918, were 
independently organised at individual works. When the Tariff 
was implemented in 1932, steel companies in expanding 
sectors of the industry began to tackle the financial and 
productive inefficiencies of an anarchic capital structure. 
Corporate managements were founded to administer the large 
companies which were established, and labour management 
practices had to be revised. As management became more 
systematic and centralised at United Steel in 1928, 
industrial welfare provision was placed on a more unified 
basis by the appointment of a corporate system of works 
councils. Capital reorganisation at Richard Thomas' and 
United Steel in the 1930s increased their "core" of 
company-trained workers, and pension schemes were founded as 
a means of reducing labour turnover. Due to the early 
dominance of Stewart and Lloyds in the tubes trade, its 
Employees Benevolent Fund had been attempting to systemise 
company provision since the end of the Great War, and its 
finances were secured by the creation of a trust fund in 
1923. Pensions had been available at Stewart and Lloyds 
since 1913, and they remained throughout this period ex 
gratia for historical reasons. Dorman-Long, which 
rationalised neither plant nor management, continued with
223
the provision of unsystemised benefits
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(vi). Conclusion.
Industrial welfare was an important aspect of 
industrial relations in the iron and steel industry, and ex 
gratia benefits were suited to the circumstances of small 
and medium-sized companies. Competitive rivalries and low 
profitability hindered the establishment of internal labour 
markets and the systemisation of company provision,
particularly in the heavy steel sector. The development of
company structure and welfare in the industry was, 
therefore, pre-empted by the chemicals trade in the 1920s. 
But the evidence of this chapter does reveal a link between 
managerial restructuring and the systemisation of industrial 
welfare, and markedly so in the case of tinplate and tube 
concerns. However, the example of United Steel,- which was 
engaged in most types of steel production,- most clearly
illustrates the link between capital and managerial
organisation and welfare.
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Chapter 5.
Systematic Management and Industrial Welfare 
in the Chemicals Industry.
(i). Introduction.
The chemicals industry underwent extensive
rationalisation during this period, and two companies. 
I.e.I. and Unilever, came to dominate British chemical 
output. Moreover, they both became recognised exponents of 
all-embracing industrial welfare schemes. The expanding 
demand for chemical products in the 20th Century and a 
secure domestic market enabled the industry to exercise 
greater discretion over the funding and extent of company 
welfare. Provision was, therefore, greater than in the 
"old” , contracting staples like steel.^ Given the degree of 
attention paid to company organisation and management, it is 
not surprising that industrial relations and welfare in the 
chemicals industry was also highly systemised.
The chemicals trade was not truly a "new" industry, 
since the production of chemicals had been essential to many 
textile, glass, and paper making processes throughout the 
19th Century. Consequently, 20th Century chemical companies 
inherited traditions of small-firm Victorian paternalism. 
I.C.I.'s labour policy, for example, was originally based 
upon the paternalistic practices of Brunner, Mond, which 
together with Nobels, the British Dyestuffs Corporation, and
1. Cf. Ch.l; & Ch.4, s.(ii) for an analysis of 
welfare strategy and expenditure.
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the United Alkali Company formed I.C.I. in 1926.^
It had become clear by the 1920s that an atomised
British chemicals industry was competing unsuccessfully with
larger foreign companies reaping the benefits of return to
scale. The industry had been a major exporter to the United
States and the Continent in the 1870s, but, by 1913, Britain
accounted for only 11% of world chemical production. Until
the Great War, the British chemical industry hardly competed
in fine chemicals and dyestuffs. Therefore, the government
was compelled to encourage the formation of the British
Dyestuffs Corporation in 1918, and it held a major share
interest in the firm. The lessons of wartime led to a new
emphasis upon research and a determination to reorganise
company and capital structure. I.C.I. in 1926 controlled 40%
of Britain's chemical output, and was the country's largest
2
company in terms of capitalisation.
The careful co-ordination and long-term planning of 
production within a large firm brought efficiencies, avoided 
bottlenecks at various process-stages, and obviated the 
dangers of over-competition amongst many rivals. Research
1. This is not to say that other chemical companies 
had not adopted "progressive" labour policies.
Nobel Industries had developed welfare and safety 
measures in order "to cultivate a sympathetic 
understanding between the management and the 
workers". Cf. I.C.I. I.C.I. Ltd and its Founding
Companies; the History of Nobel's Explosives Co.
Ltd and Nobel Industries Ltd, 1871-1926 (19 38 ) ,
p . 94. Cf. also the British Cyanides Corporation in 
PP 1920 (C.544) xxxiii 765, and Whiffen and Sons
at the Greater London R.O.
2. W.J.Reader I.C . I . : A History (1970), Vol.I (1970), 
pp.249-327,451-466; W.J.Reader "I.C.I. and the 
State, 1926-45" in B.Supple Essays in British 
Business History (1977), pp . 227-243; A.E.Musson 
The Growth of British Industry (1978), p p . 216-221.
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and development, a costly item in the chemicals industry, 
could be pooled and centralised. The amalgamation in 1926 
brought together paint, dyestuffs, fertiliser, alkali, 
explosives, and metals interests, and the technological 
opportunities of the industry entailed further product 
differentiation. Unlike the case of steel, the company was 
involved in the organisation of many different products. 
This variety of processes and markets made the creation of 
semi-autonomous divisions or groups a practical 
administrative necessity.^ A company of the size of Imperial 
Chemicals Industries needed a managerial structure which 
could exercise sufficient central control while allowing 
adequate elasticity in the lower echelons. I.C.I. took its 
model from Nobel Industries, which in the early 1920s had 
experimented and found the right balance between the 
authority of top and middle management. From the outset, 
I.C.I. established a headquarters in control of purchasing, 
personnel, publicity, legal, taxation, and investment 
matters throughout the four constituent companies. A single 
system of accountancy was introduced, and research and 
development resources were amalgamated. Sufficient central 
authority allowed plant to be rationalised on the basis of 
reports about the viability of each works. The company also 
enjoyed greater buying power, a national sales network, and 
improved cash flow. I.C.I. tried to devolve responsibility 
to production units, but was probably too small in 1926 for 
effective divisions. I.C.I., however, grew internally and by 
acquisition, and the weaknesses of managing a highly 
1. Cf. Ch . 4, s.(ii).
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diversified enterprise from the centre were perceived. 
During 1928-1931, responsibility was devolved to eight 
boards in control of product divisions or groups. Each group 
controlled its own finance and capital investment but was 
accountable to the main board for its performance. It was by 
the 1930s, a rare example of the "modern" multidivisional, 
decentralised corporation. McGowan, who succeeded the first 
chairman Alfred Mond in 1930, insisted, however, on direct 
control over pricing policy. Therefore, the groups which 
were responsible for their own success or failure 
paradoxically had little say over the price-levels of their 
p roducts.^
It is because I.C.I. approached the question of 
management in a systematic and planned fashion that its 
labour policies are important to the history of industrial 
welfare. It adopted the paternalistic practices of Brunner, 
Mond, but altered them to suit its different size and 
structure. The reorganisation of welfare at I.C.I. was 
contemporaneous with the restructuring of management, and 
the organisation and comprehensiveness of the company's 
schemes were aspects of systematic management in general. 
I.C.I., therefore, provides an important test case.
The advantages of multidivisional enterprise applied 
even further to the more highly diversified soap-producers 
Lever Brothers, which joined with the Dutch Margarine Union 
in 1929 to form Unilever. British soap-making proved a 
vigorous, expanding industry by the 1890s, and, by exporting
1. Hannah (1979), pp.81-86.
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a quarter of its total output, it was the world's leader in
1913. Soap manufacture became an increasingly technological
enterprise involving diversfication into oil-making,
alkalis, rosin, perfumes, glycerine, and candles. Lever
Brothers, however, remained principally a soap concern in
control by 1921 of 158 associated and unintegrated
companies. Such a structure reflected the very personal
managerial style of its founder and sole Ordinary
shareholder, William Lever. His authority substituted for
formal organisation, and directors tended to act as
executors of Lever's instructions. Control over the
associated companies, like Gossages, Knights, and
Crosfields^, depended upon the extent of Lever's individual
stake in them. Yet, by 1924, Lever controlled some 90% of
British output.
But even Lever in the early 1920s had come to recognise
that his vast expanding conglomeration required managerial
restructuring. The parlous state of the company's finances,
attributed to the inability of one man singly to control so
large an organisation, made managerial reform inevitable.
1. The type of paternalistic provision made famous by 
Lever Brothers at Port Sunlight had parallels with 
Joseph Crosfield and Sons of Warrington. As 
important employers in the town, they saw 
themselves as natural leaders of their community, 
endowed Warrington, and patronised local building 
societies and charities. As Quakers, the 
Crosfields assumed from the 1860s a moral 
responsibility for their workers, but did not see 
welfare as philanthropy because it bound together 
employers and workers in mutual interest. From 
1922 onwards. Lever Brothers terminated 
Crosfield's welfare schmes and extended its 
Copartnership and Employee Benefit Fund to the 
company. Cf. A.E.Musson Enterprise in Soap and 
Chemicals: Joseph Crosfield and Sons Limited,
1815-1965 (1965), pp.149-56,316-9.
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Reorganisation was undertaken by Francis D'Arcy Cooper, who 
joined the Board in 1921. Because the central Policy Council 
had become too large by that date, a Special Committee was 
formed with sub-committees dealing with manufacturing, 
finance, and the West African raw material interests. The 
many companies were reorganised according to regions, but, 
in 1923, it was decided to group companies by product. As 
commercial rivalry between the three major producers. 
Levers, Crosfields, and Gossages, was especially intense in 
export markets, an Export Trade Board was set up as a means 
of joint consultation. But, even if Lever lost some of his 
direct influence, he remained firmly in charge till his 
death in 1925, continuing to believe that rivalry between 
the associated companies produced incentives and overall 
benefits.^
One element of the reorganisation of the early 1920s
was the greater autonomy given to Lever Brother's Port
Sunlight works. The prospect of a slump in 1920 led to a
call for greater efficiency and a reduction in manpower.
Lever had always taken a direct personal interest in the
works and its model village, but in 1922 the administrative
headquarters of the company was moved from Port Sunlight to
Blackfriars in London. Consequently, a General Works Manager 
2
was appointed. He was backed by a new Management Committee 
intended to create a "self-contained unit" at Port Sunlight. 
The irregular engagement and discharge of workers was
1. C.Wilson The History of Unilever, Vol.I (1954),
pp.213-5 ,244 ,246-7 , 269-71 ; B B 6 , "Rationalisation".
2. Ibid, p p . 266,272-3,276.
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stopped, quality supervision and stores control were 
reorganised, and cost accounting methods were revised. A 
Staff Officer was given charge of the new Service Department 
which took over control of welfare from Lever himself. Its 
duties were "all domestic matters connected with the Works 
and Villa g e " .^
The professionalisation of management did not finally
occur until the chairmanship of D'Arcy Cooper, who succeeded
2
Lever on his death in 1925. Cooper increasingly delegated 
day-to-day affairs so that he could concentrate on long-term 
or strategical issues. Administration was increasingly 
transferred and centralised at London. A Technical Committee 
was appointed to report on the pooling of reasearch, and it 
set out prospects for profitable developments in new 
products. Cooperation in advertising amongst the associated 
companies was crucial because it was a major item of 
expenditure in the soap trade. An Advertising Committee 
ensured that all advertising revenues were determined by the 
central board. An Investigation Committee undertook market 
research. Further committees were established to deal with 
laundry soap, toilet soap, exports, overseas interests. Port 
Sunlight, finance, legal matters, the West African 
companies, and the Bromborough margarine factory.^
1. BB6, "Lever,- Management and Labour",
"Reorganisation at Port Sunlight, 1921-22"; "Port 
Sunlight Local Board".
2. Cf. C.Wilson "Management and Policy in the
large-scale enterprise: Lever Brothers and
Unilever, 1918-1938" in Supple (1977), p p . 124-140.
3. Wilson, Vol.I (1954), pp.296,299-300,302. Cf. also 
BB6, "Reorganisation of Top Management, 1925"; 
"Report of Technical Commission, 1925"; 
"Beginnings of Market Research, 1926".
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The commercial advantages of soap and margarine
producers cooperating rather than competing over the
securing of oils underlay the decision to amalgamate with
the Dutch Margerine Union in 1929. Moreover, the rapid
demand for margarine from the 1900s onwards had forced the
British and Dutch firms into rivalry for retailing outlets.
Under Unilever, they were grouped together into Allied
Suppliers. Dealing in a mass consumer market, Unilever
required an extensive and separate sales and marketing
organisation. Efficient stock control and adequate
"through-put" from the raw material state to the finished
product allowed the company to guage supply with demand.^
Unilever, like its predecessors, was engaged in the
production of numerous goods, wholesaling, transport, and
2
retailing,- but on a far greater scale. Cooper soon
established himself as Unilever's chief executive. His main 
objective was to found a single, unified company. In 1931, 
London became Unilever's headquarters, and voting on the 
board according to groups representative of the two old 
companies was ended. Capital expenditure was controlled 
centrally, and Cooper was able to close works and
rationalise plant throughout the 1930s. Salaries and 
accounting were standardised. The problem was recognised to 
be the establishment of sufficient degrees of headquarters 
control and freedom of action in middle management. 
Divisional responsibility was shared according to product 
and geography, a decision which reflected the organisational
1. Wilson, Vol.II (1954), p p . 263,269,307-316.
2. Mathias in Supple (1977), p p . 141-162.
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problems of a worldwide chemicals, soap and foods group.^
This hybrid organisation, however, undoubtedly obfuscated
the division of managerial responsibility within the 
2c o m p a n y .
Just as Lever had controlled commercial management 
personally, the extensive welfare expenditure of Lever 
Brothers was based upon the trusts and benefices he 
established. Funded from his private fortune, company 
provision was non-contributory, and in many
respects paternalistic. His efforts, moreover, were 
concentrated upon the Lever Brother works at Port Sunlight, 
and management and welfare in the associated companies was 
largely unaffected by their takeover by Lever. Contributory 
schemes bestowing rights to benefits for the company as a 
whole were introduced by the more professionalised 
management of D'Arcy Cooper. Industrial relations became 
more clearly a question of company organisation rather than 
personal philanthropy.
1. Reckitt and Colmans, formed in 1937 by the 
amalgamation of two concerns, was another
example of a large company engaged in chemicals 
and food. Reckitts principally produced polishes 
and cleaning agents, and Colmans was originally a 
mustard company. They were both extensively 
involved in building factory villages, education 
classes, sick clubs, sporting facilities, pension 
funds, medical services, profitsharing and works 
councils. Cf. B.N.Reckitt The History of Reckitt 
and Sons Limited (1951), p p . i x ,33-4 , 39-40 , 52-3 , 
59-63,76-7,91; & J. & J.Colman The First Fifty 
Years of the Carrow Works Council, 1918-68 (19 68 ) , 
passim; W.Ashworth "British Industrial Villages in 
the 19th Century", E c o n .H . R . (1950-51),
p p . 378-387.
2. Wilson, Vol.II (1954), p p . 307-11,381; Channon 
(1973), p p . 172-3.
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Welfare and labour policies in the chemical and soap
industries have been investigated in Charles Wilson's
history of Unilever and in the biography of I.C.I. by
William Reader.^ There is, however, justification for
specifically studying industrial relations in these giant
concerns, especially as the standard works contain gaps in
their accounts of industrial welfare. Outlining the
development of company provision was not their chief 
2
objective. Neither can adequately explain the purpose of
company provision without tracing its link with managerial 
structure and the possibilities it provided for the 
extension and systemising of welfare. I.C.I.'s reputation as 
a well-managed enterprise makes its inclusion in this thesis 
important. As Britain's largest company by 1930 in terms of 
capitalisation, Unilever and the means by which it coped
with the labour management problems that its very size 
created are of natural interest.
1. Wilson, Vols.I & II (1954); Reader, Vols.I & II 
(1970, 1975).
2, Wilson overlooks the development of pension and 
sick pay schemes before 1914, and, during the 
period of the 1930s, he concentrates on staff 
welfare policy. Several works deal with welfare at 
Brunner-Mond but not in a comprehensive fashion, 
and the descriptions of the development of its 
welfare practices need to be drawn together.
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(ii). Imperial Chemicals Industry.
I.C.I.'s welfare policy was crucially influenced by 
Brunner, Mond, a firm established in 1873 by John Brunner 
and Ludwig Mond. It was Brunner, however, who gradually 
assumed the running of the company. He was its chairman till 
one year before his death in 1919, and he was succeeded for 
the seven years prior to the formation of I.C.I. by his son, 
Roscoe. As a Unitarian, John Brunner believed that employers 
were given by God custody of their w o r k e r s ' moral and 
material well-being. He, therefore, opposed social 
legislation which interfered with company welfare provision, 
and so placed the state as an intermediary between employer 
and worker. Brunner was prepared to negotiate with local 
unions but believed that collective bargaining for industry 
as a whole was a threat to his personal standing with his 
men. ^
Brunner, Mond built houses in the village of Northwich 
in Cheshire near to its Winnington Works. Fines and instant 
dismissals were slowly replaced by a more sophisticated 
labour policy which established a settled community of 
workers. Northwich became a company village, and Brunner was
elected the M.P. for the area in 1885. Both Brunner and
Ludwig Mond mingled socially with their workforce, and 
Brunner was president of the Workers Sick Club at the
Winnington factory. The fund was administered by an elected
committee, and contributions of 4d a week were deducted from 
the men's wages. The company paid the doctors' fees and
1. Reader, Vol.I (1970), p . 233; S.Koss Sir John
Brunner: Radical Plutocrat (1970), pp.x,1-2,4,23,
2 4-5,3 3-8,40-4,4 6-7,144,152-4.
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medicine bills, kept the Club's accounts, and held its funds 
with interest. The company school, built in 1886, furnished 
a well disciplined and settled labour-pool. A Workmen's Club 
was established at Northwich in 1877, and provided a number 
of indoor games, a library, reading room, and sports ground. 
The tee-total Brunner forbade the sale of alcohol at the 
Club. Workers were first granted a week's paid holiday in
1884 on condition they missed, unless for reasons of
sickness, no more than ten days' work during the previous
y e a r .
In 1897, sick pay was increased to 10s a week. Brunner 
supported the Workmen's Compensation Act of that year, but 
stressed how his company had paid accident compensation
since 1881 without considering who was at fault. The
goodwill imbued was held to be incalculable, and men had to 
attend the works surgery for the slightest abrasion because 
prevention reduced any "consequent suffering to the men and 
cost to the firm". All compensation was paid by Brunner,
Mond itself, which refused to buy a policy with an insurance
company. By assuming direct responsibility for accidents at 
the factory, the company hoped to increase the workers'
loyalty. Pensions were introduced in 1899, and Brunner 
decided that no-one over 30 years would be employed. All 
pensioners, therefore, required a record of long service. 
Recipients of these allowances, which were a personal
benefaction, were placed upon the Mond Pension List. Because 
of the Shops Clubs Act 1902, which stipulated rules and 
rights to benefit under contributory schemes, the company
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took over the Workers ' Sick Club and began paying benefits
without contributions. Double holiday pay was provided from
1902 onwards. In 1911, an Approved Society was created under
the National Insurance Act, and benefits supplementary to
the legislation were provided. The company agreed in 1913 to
guarantee sick pay for the first 26 weeks of the National
Insurance scheme, when participants were accumulating
contributions and were not entitled to state benefits.^
A General Works Council was appointed in July 1918, and
works committees chaired by the local works manager were
2
founded a month later. In 1920, the works committees at 
Middlewich and Sandbach suggested that a copartnership 
scheme be founded. The directors opposed the idea because of 
the fall in trade and profits, but two directors and members 
of the Brunner family were willing to sell 10,000 shares to 
set up a Stock Purchase Scheme. Although the numbers who 
could be placed upon the Mond Pension List were limited, 
when two men retiring in 1920 were clearly deserving of a 
pension, the list was merely extended.^ The works
1. Koss (1970), pp.X,1-2,4,23-5,34-8,40-4,46-7,
144,152-6; H a n s a r d , 29 Nov 1906, vol.164,
cols.1037-9; Chemical Trade R e v i e w , 16 May 1908, 
p. 459 ; B.Didsbury "Cheshire Saltworkers" in 
R.Samuel (ed.) Miners, Quarrymen, and Saltworkers
(1977), p p . 182-7; J.Goodman The Mond Legacy
(1982), p . 33; 8/4A, General Works Council Minutes, 
29 Oct 1920; 9 Feb 1921. Cf.9, s.(iii).
2. I.C.I. Works Council Scheme; Fiftieth Meeting of
Central Council (1960), p p . 3-7; I.C.I. Memorandum 
on Labour Relations (1961), p . 14.
3. 8/4A, General Works Council Minutes, 29 Oct 1920.
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committees supervised various provident societies like the 
Benevolent Fund. At the Winnington works in 1920, the Fund 
paid out nearly £152 in sick and death benefits. An annual 
company donation matched the total contributions of the men 
over the previous twelve months.^ Although Brunner, Mond 
already contributed to hospitals on behalf of their workers, 
each works committee in 1921 was placed in charge of a 
branch of the new Hospital Fund. An extra Id a week towards 
provident contributions paid for its benefits.
Labour policy at I.C.I. was based upon personal 
contact, improving the status of workers, increased 
financial and job security, consultation, and copartnership. 
Sir Alfred Mond, who took charge of Brunner, Mond in 1925, 
was directly responsible for labour matters, and Lloyd 
Roberts, I.C.I.'s first Chief Labour Officer and the 
architect of its welfare policy, had been employed at 
Brunner, Mond since 1916. Lloyd Robert's Labour Department 
was given the remit of initiating schemes and systemising 
the welfare provision already established by the four 
constituent companies. I.C.I.'s sucess was seen to depend 
upon good labour relations, as well as rationalisation, 
capital development, management selection, and research. The 
company's labour policy, revealed on the 7th October 1927, 
was designed to dispel the notion "that the trend towards 
great amalgamations will widen the gap between employers and 
workers". The central aim was to win men's loyalty by 
providing security and status, and these advantages were
1. Ibid, 9 Feb 1921; Works Benevolent F u n d .
2. Ibid, 22 Oct 1921.
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seen as having the potential to undermine trades union and
"class loyalties". Cooperation between managers and workers
was essential to a modern enterprise. For Mond, a successful
labour policy entailed predicting the demands of labour and
granting them before they were sought.^ He believed that
I.C.I. as a large employer could set an example in
industrial relations for the rest of British industry. Mond,
indeed, held the view that "large and well-organised
concerns" should handle all state health and unemployment 
2
b e n e f i t s .
Security was to be given through the staff grade system 
and status by a share ownership scheme. They were both 
introduced in 1928. The grading scheme was intended to 
establish an internal labour market. Brunner, Mond had been 
able to secure continuity of labour by drawing on 
generations of workers from its company village. At I.C.I., 
all hourly workers with five years' service were promoted to 
a permanent status with weekly wages. All staff grade 
workers were entitled to one month's dismissal notice, full 
payment for bank holidays, and, for six months in any one 
year, full sick pay less state benefits. For, "It stands to 
reason that a man who doesn't have to worry what is to 
become of his wife and children if he should be ill is freer 
to devote himself to his work". Such promotion was totally 
at the discretion of the directors, and a worker was judged 
upon keenness, team spirit, skill at work, economy in the
1. Cf. H.R.Northrup Boulwarism (1964); General 
Electric of America's labour policy encapsulated 
this principle.
2. Industrial W e l f a r e , Oct 1927, pp . 317-9; Reader,
Vol.II (1975), pp.11,57,60-1,63-4,137.
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use of materials, general tidiness at his job, time-keeping, 
and length of service. Permanent workers also had the right 
to purchase I.C.I. Ordinary shares at 2/6d below the mean 
market price. But, because share prices were depressed 
during the early 1930s, profitsharing was abandoned in 
19 34.^ Long Service Awards of watches and medals, which had 
been awarded at Brunner, Mond, were continued by I.C.I. 
Alfred Mond saw the subsidised I.C.I Magazine founded in 
1928 as a tangible symbol of harmonious industrial 
cooperation.^
Contact and communication were to be established 
through the works councils founded in 1929. They promoted a 
spirit of cooperation, increased contentment and efficiency, 
and gave employees greater responsibility for working 
conditions.^ I.C.I. wanted to disprove the notion it was "a 
soulless organisation which reduces its workers to the level 
of easily replaceable machines". The works council scheme 
sought to establish "scrupulous fair and open methods" of
5
management and consultation. Equal numbers of managers and 
elected workers sat on the monthly works councils. A General 
Works Council represented the Group and a Central Works 
Council consisted of delegates from the Groups. All of them
1 . Reader, Vol.II (1975), p p . 62-4; ICI Magaz i n e , May 
1928, pp.511-12; I.C.I. Memorandum on Labour 
Relations (1961), p . 31. I.C.I., however, renewed 
profitsharing in 1954.
2. ICI Magazine, May 1928, p . 413.
3. Ibid, Jan 1928, p p . 3,8-10.
4. Ibid, Feb 1929, p p . 125-6.
5. I.C.I. Imperial Chemicals Industries: A Short 
Account of the Activities of the Company (1929), 
p p . 30-1.
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were purely consultative bodies, dealing with safety, sport, 
recreation, and health and welfare matters. They had no 
right to information, and the decisions of local managers 
and directors were final.^ The inuagural meeting of the 
Central Works Council was attended by 840 people. The good 
reception they received from I.C.I. was indicative of the 
importance attached to their position as councillors.
I.C.I. gave £50,000 to set up the Directors Benevolence 
Fund under the control of the Central Works Council. Its 
purpose was to supplement existing schemes and to fill gaps 
in company provision. The Fund, the I.C.I. Bravery Awards, 
and the Safety Committees all date from the beginning of the 
works council scheme.^ It was clear from the first meeting 
of the Central Council that the works committees had a 
specific and essential role in the provision of welfare. 
They were designed "to take over a number of activities 
which already exist in some works in connection with 
benevolent funds and other funds of that character". A 
hierarchy of councils could provide the administrative 
machinery needed to operate any systematic company-wide 
welfare scheme. Moreover, gaining the active participation 
of works' council representatives in their administration 
reduced fears,- particularly amongst independent shop
4
clubs,- about company control and patronage.
1. Reader, Vol.II (1975), p.61.
2. I.C.I. Works Council Scheme; Fiftieth Meeting of 
Central Council (1960), pp.2-7.
3. I.C.I. The Works Council Scheme (1960), p . 7.
4. Minutes of the Central Works Council, 18 April 
1929; 20 Nov 1929; 20 Nov 1930.
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Although the membership of benevolent and hospital 
funds was encouraged, a wide discrepancy in provision at
I.C.I. remained. In 1929, an investigation located three
types of funds; hospital schemes and benevolent funds,- each 
with set contributions,- and yearly sick clubs where income 
varied according to necessity and the surplus was divided 
every Christmas. At one factory, a works council proposed to 
replace whip-rounds for cases of hardship with a 
"'rationalised' benevolent scheme". Slate or "money" clubs 
with no financial reserves offered little guarantee of 
security in times of need. I.C.I. agreed to aid these clubs 
with subventions. The works councils avoided conflict with 
the organisers of existing, voluntary funds, which they were 
elected to help, by seeking to co-opt them on to their 
committees. They could offer the assistance of the 
Directors' Benefit Fund and the support of the company. 
Apart from the Alkali Group, where a "comprehensive" fund 
had already been established, most societies still had 
limited membership and inadequate benefits. While some 
workers paid Id or 2d a week, others at smaller works gave 
Is. Offering the company's help for provident organisations 
on a works basis was an inadequate solution. A larger fund
and better management could secure greater benefits for
smaller contributions.^
The I.C.I. Workers' Friendly Society, therefore, was 
inaugurated on the 1st January 1930 as a company-wide fund. 
A central society could guarantee sick pay on a uniform and 
fair basis. It instilled a sense of identity and loyalty to
1. ICI Magaz i n e , July 1929 , p . 4; Sept 1929 , pp. 240-2 ;
Oct 1929, p p . 356-8.
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I.C.I., and membership was a condition of employment for
actuarial reasons.^ The company had to provide £50,000 to
start the Society. Its trustees and General Management
Committee were elected, but it was administered through the
works council system. I.C.I. agreed to give Id a week to
every member. Men contributed 3d a week and women 2d in
return for respectively 10s and 7/6d sick pay for thirteen
weeks. Benefits for a subsequent three months were set at
5/- for both sexes, after which time workers could apply to
the Directors' Benevolent Fund. Death grants of £10 for a
male worker and £7 for his wife, and £7 10s for a female
worker were also offered. Hospital provision was the
responsibilty of works committees, which could add Id to
general contributions for the extra insurance cover. Local
works committees could recommend workers to the Society for
2
discretionary pensions. The Friendly Society became 
insolvent by 1931. Its dissolution was proposed in favour of 
funds for each group within I.C.I., which would bear its own 
actuarial risks. In a ballot of members, the idea was 
defeated. Lloyd Roberts wrote that it was "a matter of
congratulation that members have strongly upheld the 
principle that every I.C.I. man shall receive the same 
treatment as another, no matter where he works..." 
Contributions, however, were increased to 4d for men and 3d
1. I.C.I., Minutes of Central Works Committee, 20 May
1930 .
2. I.C.I., Minutes of the Central Works Council, 18
April 1929, 20 Nov 1929, 20 Nov 1930; ICI
Magazine, Dec 1929, p p . 566-577; May 1930,
p p . 487-8; 135/33A, Memo., 6 Sept 1932, & Rules of
I.e. (Workers) Friendly Society (Revised 1933).
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for women.^ Works councils continued to encourage voluntary
funds like the Dillingham Life Benefit Society. It was
self-supporting and provided benefits supplementary to the
compulsory funds, although the company paid the
2
administrative costs.
The I.C.I. Sports Association was formed in 1930 with 
Sir Alfred Mond as chairman. Just as provident provision was 
centralised, the Association was founded to coordinate works 
sports activities throughout the company.^ Clubs were
largely independent associations with elected committees, 
although their facilities were usually either provided or
4
funded by the local works. The new Association was an
affiliated organisation, and did not directly interfere in 
the administration of any sporting organisation.^ Indeed, 
Group Labour Managers stressed the value of leaving clubs to 
rely on the enthusiasm and interest of their members.^ But, 
because sports competitions were "not organised in 
accordance with any defined Company policy", I.C.I. was 
divided into six geographical areas within which annual 
inter-area competitions in fifteen sports would take place. 
National competitions would also be held, and the whole
1. I.C.I. Magaz i n e , Dec 1931, pp.552-3; 135/33A, 
Memo, from Labour Department, 12 Aug 19 35.
2. 5 3/6/6, Rules of Dillingham Life Benefit Soc i e t y ; 
First Annual Report for year ending 31 July 1936.
3. I.C.I. Magaz i n e , April 1929, p . 378.
4. Ibid, Jan 1928, p p . 21-33; 87/33A, Circular, 16 Jan 
1928; W19/4A, Letter to L.Roberts, 13 Nov 1935.
5. W19/4A, Handbook: ICI Sports Association.
6. Ibid, Memo, to Lord Melchett, 20 May 1931.
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scheme cost £4,800 per annum.^ The Association was
discontinued in 1932, partly for reasons of cost, but mostly
because it seemed anomalous to be dismissing workers while
paying the expenses of sports teams to travel around the
country. Reports from labour managers in Scotland, the North
West, and North East, however, stated that the Association
had encouraged participation, and that their areas would be
devoid of sports facilities but for its existence. It had
established a bond between management and workers,
encapsulating "the I.C.I. spirit". National competitions, in
particular, had increased interest and membership. 25% of
the employees of Muntz's Metal Company, or 100 people,
2
participated in some sport. By 1933, therefore, £650 was 
made available to the Labour Department to encourage
3
competitions between neighbouring works.
To provide pensions, a Workers' Voluntary Fund was set 
up in 1930, which the company administered free of cost. But 
ex gratia pensions and gratuities were paid by I.C.I. 
according to a fixed table of benefits. The central Labour 
Department established a Pensions and Assistance Funds unit 
to process applications. After being employed for 15 years, 
a worker received as a gratuity two weeks' wages for each 
year of service. A pension of 10s a week for a male worker 
and 7s for a woman were provided for service of between 15 
and 24 years. 12/6d and 9/6d per week were available 
respectively for employment of between 25 and 34 years. 15s
1. W19/4A/1B, Memo., 16 Dec 1946.
2. W19/4A, Report on ICI Sports Association, May
1931.
3. W19/4A/1B, Memo., 16 Dec 1946.
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and 12s were paid to workers with 35 years' service, and £1 
and 15s for over 40 years. The whole scheme cost £100,000 a 
year.^ Gratuities were also available for workers certified 
by the Medical Department as too unwell to continue in work. 
By 1930, lump-sum payments were made an instrument of plant 
rationalisation, as older workers were replaced with either 
fitter and younger men or new machinery. Gratuities varied 
according to works and Groups, but the Welfare Department in
1930 came to view them as too costly. General guidelines,
therefore, were drawn up, which generally reduced the levels
of the awards. Where a works was closed, gratuities had
often been paid to all those with five years' service. The
qualification period was increased to ten years. Where
greater efficiency was sought and an ill or incapacitated
worker was to be retired, he needed 20 years' employment to
be entitled to a benefit. If, however, a worker was between
60 and 64 years, he needed half that period of service.
I.C.I. justified these changes on the grounds that all
2
gratuities were discretionary.
A typical central works council agenda consisted by
1931 of the Savings Bank, the Workers' Friendly Society, 
hospital and convalescent treatment, the Directors' 
Benevolence Grants, sports and recreation, as well as safety 
procedures, time lost through sickness, improved
1. I.C.I. Magazine, Dec 1929, pp.568-9,579-80;
Reader, Vol.II (1975), p p . 68-69; 18/33A, Memo., 10 
May 1933.
2. 10/4A, Memo., to Hon. Henry Mond, 28 Jan 1930;
Letter to Hon. H.Mond, 27 Jan 1930; Circular 
cancelling Circular 93: Payments to Redundant
Workers; Payments to Discharged Workers, Central 
Labour Department, 14 April 1930; 18/33A, Memo.,
10 May 1933.
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work-methods, "and everything appertaining to the welfare of
the employee",^ Works councils provided the administrative
means to organise a whole spectrum of welfare provision on
an ordered, company-wide basis. It matched the
rationalisation of production and management. As Lloyd
Roberts commented in 1930: "Whatever steps our commercial
and technical experts may devise for the restoration and
maintenance of our trade, their efforts will be to a large
extent stultified in the absence of rationalised relations
between the human factors in production". He did not wish to
2
apologise for using the word "rationalised". By 1931, 
welfare expenditure at I.C.I. equalled 8.33% of the wages 
bill. A report concluded that "It has been the aim of the 
Central Labour Department throughout to lay a greater stress 
on the attainment by the workers of a sense of status and 
security rather than on a mere rate of wages, and it is 
believed that I.C.I. workers now fairly generally accept 
this v iew".^
In 1934, £1,000 was allocated to the establishment of
works dental clinics. The Labour Department believed that 
neglected teeth and oral sepsis were a major cause of 
illness through gastritis, ulcers, and even "mental 
disturbance". Treatment took place in the company's time. By
4
1937, I.C.I. hired the services of six dentists. The
1. I .C.I. Ma g a z i n e , March 1931, pp.209-11.
2. 8/4A, Talk given by R.Lloyd Roberts, Chief Labour
Officer of I.C.I., at I.W.S. Conference, 7 Sept 
1930 .
3. Reader, Vol.II (1975) pp.67-8; 155/33A, Memos, to 
Chief Labour Officer, 22, 27 & 28 Feb 1933.
4. 78/33A, Memo., 2 March 1934.
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company still calculated, however, that it lost from 1936-37
3.5m working hours through 5,000 individual cases of
sickness among 46,000 workers. A male worker lost an average
8.2 days per year and a woman 11.3, while the figure for
staff was 12.1 days. Sickness was viewed as "disorganisation
and loss of efficiency to the Company", and work-conditions
and medical treatment were considered an important element
of business management.^ I.C.I. employed 5 full-time and 30
part-time medical officers. 15 more were paid according to
their hours of attendance. There were also 19 full-time
nurses, 19 full-time and 57 part-time ambulance room
2
attendants, and 705 first-aid attendants.
From 1936-37, I.C.I. paid £3,000 in ex gratia pensions. 
By 1937, 71% of all employees had been pensioned, and the
company decided to establish a contributory and compulsory 
scheme to pay supplements to the 1925 Old Age Pensions Act.
I.C.I. agreed to donate a sum worth 3% of the gross weekly 
wages bill to the fund. Moreover, the company compensated 
the society for all employment before 1937 when it could 
have received no contributions, including that at I.C.I.'s 
antecedent companies. Full pensions, therefore, could be 
paid upon the society's founding. A cash lump sum was given 
to the relatives of any members who died before receiving 
their pension. The contributory scheme replaced all old age.
1. 29/33A, Memo., 29 Dec 1938. L.Johnman "The Largest
Manufacturing Companies of 1935", B u s .H i s t . 
(1986), p p . 239 gives a figure of 49,706 ICI 
employees for 1935.
2. Ibid, Sickness Investigation, 21-6-37; ICI Medical 
_ Serv i c e .   _
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retirement, and out-of-work gratuities,^
Brunner, Mond had provided industrial housing, sick 
pay, medical treatment, social and recreational facilities, 
pensions, holiday pay, works committees, and profitsharing, 
It was a comprehensive, but paternalistic, welfare policy. 
I.e.I., however, adopted a policy of institutionalised 
welfare, and established semi-independent friendly societies 
which administered schemes according to set rules and 
pre-determined benefits. Favoured with the advantages of 
oligopoly, I.C.I. established a large internal labour 
market, and the Staff Grade Scheme was a means of appointing 
permanent workers. Only these workers,- defined by the 
company as those who could be expected to stay with the 
company till retiring age,- were compelled to join welfare 
schemes. Temporary workers only became members of the 
Workers' Friendly Society and on a voluntary basis. The 
works councils were an institution for the centralised 
administration of every aspect of industrial welfare. The 
Labour Department, however, formed policy and had the final 
authority. Yet, the contributory element of the Workers' 
Friendly Society made sick pay a right. Even the Labour 
Department's table of ex gratia pensions and gratuities was 
viewed in 1933 as only a half-way house to a prospective
1. I.C.I. Magazine, June 1928, p p . 507-8; Dec 1929, 
pp. 568-9, 579-80 ; 53/6/6, Letter to Pensions and 
Assistance Funds Department, 26 Aug 1937; 11/33A,
Memo, from Labour Department, 1 May 19 36.
2. 44/33A, Memo., on Casual Labour, 27 Feb 1934; 
Memo., 13 Feb 193 4; Memo., from General Labour 
Manager, Ayrshire, 20 March 1934; Memo., from 
Central Labour Department, 31 Jan 1934.
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contributory pensions society.^ Knowing the full costs of 
systematic pension provision, however, I.C.I. did not 
introduce such a scheme until 1937.
In sum, I.C.I. adopted Brunner, Mond's traditions in
2
labour management. But they did not remain wholly intact. 
Paternalism was unsuited to the size and structure of
I.C.I., and as much attention was paid to reorganising 
welfare as management and research. Capital and management 
were rationalised between 1928-31, and welfare was generally 
standardised throughout the new corporate company 
simultaneously. Pensions were the only exception, but their 
necessity was recognised during this period and plans were 
made for their introduction. The contributory pension fund 
was finally founded after redundant labour, which would have 
been eligible to improved benefits, had been shed in the 
early 1930s.
1. 18/33A, Memo., 10 May 1933. Cf. Reader, Vol.II
(1975), p.68.
2. Cf. Reader, Vol.II (1975), p . 60, where a contrary 
opinion is stated.
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(ill). Unilever.
William Lever s labour policy was based principally
upon gaining the cooperation of his workers, which he aimed
to achieve by promoting the "unitary ideal" of the company
and by maintaining a degree of economic security for them.
Lever drew from his Congregationalist beliefs when he argued
that industrialists had a moral responsibility for their
workers. Employers were "trustees" of their firms, although
benevolence and unrealistic generosity would ruin a company.
Welfare was part of business organisation and had to be paid
for through higher productivity. To meet his moral and
business commitments. Lever was an advocate of "prosperity
sharing", which he defined as the spending of profits by
employers on the workers' behalf. Lever believed that
workers would merely fritter any bonuses paid to them
directly. Better housing and social amenities were presented
as a means of distributing profits on a "fair" basis.
Consequently, Lever's welfare schemes often appeared
paternalistic and sometimes autocratic.^
The model village of Port Sunlight, begun in 1888, was
2
central to Lever's scheme of "prosperity sharing". Port
1. Wilson, Vol.I (1954 ), pp.142-7 ,293-6 ; Progress,
Oct 1902, p p . 101-2.
2. Cf. Prices of Bromborough The History of Prices of 
Bromborough, 1854-1954 (1954), pp . 6,34-5,37; &
Alan Watson Price's Village (1966), p p . 46-7. 
Prices' model village was built during the 1850s, 
and its example was Lever's inspiration for the
construction of Port Sunlight. It was served by
community and medical facilities, and numerous 
provident societies. The Wilson brothers, the 
founders of welfare at the firm, had once been 
employed at New Lanark where Robert Owen had 
gained fame as an enlightened manager. Lever 
bought Prices out in 1919.
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Sunlight was intended to provide workers with the
opportunities to enjoy life. Workers who endured long
stretches of labour and bad housing had little reason to
give an employer faithful service. Good home conditions and
social amenities were meant to "Socialise and Christianise"
business relations and revive the "close family brotherhood"
of the Victorian small firm. The management at Port Sunlight
was convinced that their esprit de corps was unsurpassed by
any other firm.^
The Village Council was established in 1896, and had a
number of sub-committees to run the social and sporting
facilities, schools, shop and sick society. Education was
available for all children at Port Sunlight. The Council was
elected but its role was purely advisory and it depended
2
upon the company to finance its ventures. At the factory 
itself, employees could only submit recommendations through 
a suggestions box. The Works Committees, founded in 1899, 
consisted of managers and foremen only.^ By 1901, the 
Village Council was promoting at least fifteen sporting,
4
social, educational and religious associations, and they 
all enjoyed the free use of company lands and
1. Unilever, Internal Memorandum, Evolution of 
Working Conditions at Port Sunlight; Progr e s s , 
Sept 1902, p . 323; A.G.M., 6 March 1902. However, 
as Port Sunlight consisted of tied cottages, 
management also had a powerful means of deterring 
labour unrest.
2. Port Sunlight M o n t h l y , Jan 1896, p p . 1,32; Feb 
1896 , p . 34; March 1896 , p.66; April 1896 , p . 98.
3. Unilever, Evolution of Working Conditions at Port 
Sunlight.
4. There were 24 by 1911.
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buildings. By 1905, the 3,000 inhabitants of Port Sunlight 
were served by a park, allotments, church, two schools, a 
public hall, a restuarant, gymnasium, open-air 
swimming-pool, numerous sports grounds and club-houses, an 
inn, theatre, concert hall, library and a cooperative store. 
There were some 600 houses which had cost £350,000 to build. 
The average rent, taken directly from wage-packets, was 6s a 
week for homes considered to be worth 10/6d.
In 1905, Lever Brothers formed a Holiday Club to be run 
by an elected committee of employees. Members who had been 
employed for the previous year were eligible to one week's 
paid holiday. Contributions were stopped from wages and 
amounted to one hour's pay per week, to which the company 
added 4%. Long Service Awards of gold watches were 
introduced in the same year for workers with fifteen years' 
service. The Employees Benefit Fund was, however, the 
largest welfare measure introduced in 1905. It was managed 
by four trustees appointed by the company and by four 
elected employees. The Fund was wholly financed by Lever 
Brothers, and it provided sick pay, accident compensation, 
and pensions for employees and widows. Pensions were given 
to men of 65 years with 15 years' service. Women were
1. Port Sunlight M onthly, June 1896, pp.161-2;
Progress, 1899-90, p.viii; 1901, p.viii; Sept 
1902, pp.321-2; Dec 1902, p . 468.
2. Wilson, Vol.I (1954 ) pp.144-6 ,147 ,149 ; B.Meakin
Model Factory__and Villages; Ideal Conditions of
Labour and Housing (1905), p p . 426-33.
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granted a pension at 60.^ By 1907, the Employees Benefit
Fund supported eighteen pensioners, and the benefits were
revised "to make (the Fund) thoroughly s o u n d " . Pensions
would be given after 20 years service, and the amount paid
was reduced. The Fund had an income of €5,801 in that year.
£5,200 of this sum was donated directly by the company and
the rest came from its investment of £15,000 in Lever
preference shares. Its expenditure, however, amounted to
2
only £785. A Cottage Hospital was opened at Port Sunlight 
in 1907.3
Two years later, Lever introduced profitsharing. The 
payment of cash bonuses contravened the principles of 
"prosperity sharing". The company, however, was becoming 
larger and as a welfare policy Port Sunlight could not be 
repeated. Lever had to find another means of winning the
loyalty of workers outside the village, and called
Copartnership "The New Relationship". He hoped profitsharing
would increase efficiency and counter work-disaffection. 
Copartnership Certificates entitled workers to dividends but 
not to shares, and every copartner in return had to sign a 
contract agreeing not to waste time nor materials. Three 
members were elected to a Copartnership Committee from each 
of the four "classes" of directors, managers and foremen,
1. Unilever, Internal Memorandum, Evolution of 
Working Conditions at Port Sunlight. The amount 
paid was set at one eightieth of the sum earnt by 
an individual in his or her last twelve months 
multiplied by the number of years' service.
2. Progress, April 1908, p . 56? A.G.M., 8 March 1907.
The Employees Benefit Fund's assets stood at 
£37,505 in 1911.
3. Unilever, Internal Memorandum, Evolution of 
Working Conditions at Port Sunlight.
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salesmen, and general staff. After the 5% annual dividends 
had been paid to shareholders, the remaining profits would 
be divided equally between the Ordinary shareholders and 
copartners, and £100,000 was distributed to employees in the 
first issue. By accumulating certificates in each year, a 
worker could finally add 5% to his annual wages.^ All 
certificates could be withdrawn by Lever at any time and the 
record of every worker was assessed before being invited to 
be a copartner. Strikers would immediately loose their 
copartnership rights. It was because the productivity and 
reliability of every potential copartner was assessed that 
Lever felt able to call his new scheme "prosperity sharing". 
Profitsharing would, he claimed, have paid bonuses to good 
and bad workers alike. Not finding the capital, the 
copartner "must admit the logic of the control and 
management of the business resting in the hands of those who
represent the capital, namely, the Board of Directors".
2
Copartnership reinforced the right of management. Lever did 
not believe, therefore, that copartnership would abolish the 
wages-system or interest on capital. Copartnership obtained 
the "more equal distribution of wealth", but, if it failed 
to increase output, improve quality, reduce waste, and 
prevent strikes, "it is perfectly obvious that 
Co-partnership is absolutely useless as an implement of
Wilson, Vol.I (1954), pp.151-8? W.P.Jolly Lord 
Leverhulme (1976), pp.90,92? Unilever, Internal
Memorandum, E volution of Working Conditions at
Port S u n l i g h t ? Progress, July 1909, p . 76? Oct
1909, p p . 109-110.
A.G.M., 10 March 1911.
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production". In 1915, Lever criticised the British chemical
industry for a failure of organisation. The human factor was
an integral part of business organisation, and
copartnership, by lessening the need for day-to-day
supervision, enabled management to attend to the long-term
2
prospects of their company.
Between 1917-23, Lever introduced compulsory education 
for all Port Sunlight employees between 14 and 16 at the 
company's Staff Training College. A recreation ground, a 
holiday camp, a dental surgery, maternity home, and an 
opthalmic clinic were built. A Recreations Association was 
formed as a federation for the existing clubs.^
Rationalisation and changes in management influenced the 
administration of industrial welfare. The Service
Department, which increasingly took over the control of 
welfare at Port Sunlight from Lever, was founded in January 
1922. Its remit was to develop the human element at the 
factory, improve a worker's home life, and increase labour 
efficiency. It was responsible for all aspects of welfare at 
the works and the village, including the Health Insurance 
Approved Society. It expanded company provision, and 
established a "core" labour force. For, in 1922, its first 
and particular duty was to reduce the large numbers of 
temporary workers employed since the beginning of the War. 
The Department was charged with dismissing these
1. W.Lever Copartnership and Efficiency (1912).
2. CP COP 24, W.Lever Copartnership in the Chemical 
Industries (1915) .
3. Unilever Evolution of Working Conditions at Port
Sunlight.
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"undesirables" and forming "a minimum permanent and reliable
staff, the main object of which is reduction in costly
labour turnover". Indeed, labour stability was the
"foundation of successful finance". Recruits were asked to
register with the Service Department and casual labour was
stopped from queuing at the factory gates. Grading and the
distinction between permanent and casual employees were
essential to an internal labour market. A monthly assessment
of each individual was made by foremen and managers on
personal characteristics like reliability, punctuality, and
co-operation. The results were recorded by the Department,
where workers could gain access to their grading cards. The
employee's status and chances of promotion depended upon the
results of this assessment. Despite strong opposition from
unions and workers, grading eventually gained acceptance,
and employees could make appeals about their assessment to a
Workers' Representatives Committee.^ Lever Brothers
recognised that labour mobility and casual employment
limited the possibilities of industrial welfare: it was
2
unprofitable to invest in temporary workers.
Industrial disputes had been caused at Lever's by 
redundancies and short-time during the Post-War Slump. In 
September 1922, a Works Advisory Committee, elected by
1. Unilever, Evolution of Working Conditions at Port
Sunlight ; B B 6 , "Reorganisation at Port Sunlight, 
1921-22"; P r o g r e s s , Sept 1922, p p . 147-8,153-4; 
LBL/1, Lever Brothers Employees Handbook (1923), 
pp.24,29-34,42,45-55.
2. Progress, Sept 1922, pp . 165,172-5.
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copartners, was established by the Service Department as a 
means of evaluating shop-floor opinion. But Lever also 
offered to guarantee certain workers security of employment 
or income.^ Permanent employees were allowed to join the new 
Life Assurance and Unemployment scheme. An internal labour 
market could be built upon the perception that "There is a 
legitimate aspiration on the part of all workers to have a 
monetary interest in the industry in addition to wages. They 
are seeking greater security of tenure.." In addition, 
there was "fear of unemployment, fear of sickness, and the 
fear of death, the way it will leave our widows and 
dependants".^ These were the "Three Ghosts" which Lever saw 
as haunting workers, and which his welfare policy aimed to 
lay. Every copartner was given a free life assurance policy, 
its benefits varying with individual grades and 
responsibilities. Lever Brothers, however, could change the 
terms of the policy at will. A sum would be paid to the 
dependants of all participants when deceased. Moreover, if 
they found themselves on short-time or without employment, 
they were assured of a sum which together with state 
benefits would pay half a worker's standard weekly wages. A 
copartner who was sick for seven days would receive the same 
rates, although his or her situation would be reassessed
1. Ibid, p p . 221-3.
2. Unilever, Evolution of Working Conditions at Port 
S u n l i g h t .
3. W.Lever Copartnership; Laying the Three Ghosts:
Unemployment, Sickness, Death ( 1922 ). Cf. Ch.l,
s .(iii ) .
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every four weeks. Temporary workers could be dismissed at 
the end of the day, while permanent employees were entitled 
to one week s notice.^ Unemployment pay tackled the first 
great fear, sick pay the second, and life assurance the 
third, and pensions under the Employees Benefit Fund catered 
for the fear of old age.
The dependence of welfare at Lever Brothers upon the 
personal philanthropy of its owner was illustrated by 
Lever s decease in 1925. His will made provision for the 
continuation and creation of independent trusts in control 
of preference shares with which to fund welfare benefits.^ 
But Cooper wanted to make welfare provision an integral part 
of the company's organisation. He claimed that the position 
of the Employees Benefit Fund was insecure because it relied 
upon 8% Preferred Shares which, after Ordinary stock, would 
be first to suffer any economic set-back. The company would 
not guarantee benefits over which it had no control. Lever
Brothers were advised by lawyers that they were entitled to
the accumulated assets of the Employees Benefit Fund but the 
company wanted to avoid an acrimonious legal battle with the 
trustees.^ An equitable compromise was agreed. It was 
accepted that the trustees had a legal right to the funds 
and would continue to administer them. The assets reverted,
1. Unilever, Evolution of Working Conditions at Port 
Sunlight.
2. Unilever Employees Handbook (1937).
3. Progress, Sept 1922, pp . 156-7.
4. Lever Brothers, Directors' Minutes, 8 July 1925.
5. Ibid, 13 Jan 1926.
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nevertheless, to the company.^ With control over the
company s welfare schemes. Lever Brothers could begin to
standardise company provision. By 1927, Group Life Assurance 
was extended to all associated companies except Gossages and 
Watsons which had their own schemes.^
In 1928, the control of the company over welfare
payments was illustrated by its refusal to give Long Service 
Awards to those workers at Crosfields who had joined the 
General Strike two years previously, while one-time strikers 
at Gossages and Cooks were awarded theirs. Walter Citrine of 
the T.U.C. appealed on behalf of the men at Crosfields. 
Cooper intervened because he did not believe the men should 
be penalised forever. They had already forfeited their 
copartnership certificates, and had lost benefit rights
under the Life Assurance and Employees Benefit schemes.
Lever Brothers agreed to let the matter be decided by a
1. Directors' Minutes, 24 Feb 1926.
2. Ibid, 3 Feb 1926; 10 Feb 1926; 25 Aug 1927. In
19 28, the sickness and unemployment scheme was 
extended. All employees were guaranteed not to 
lose more than four and half hours' wages in any 
week if they were placed on short-time. Those 
unemployed for a whole week received 
three-quarters wages less four and half hours' pay 
for a period of twelve weeks. Those with fifteen 
years' service obtained full wages less the four 
and half hours' deduction if out of work for a 
week, and those on sick pay enjoyed the same
conditions. In 1936, a standard week was
introduced. The company agreed to pay the 
difference between that standard and the hours 
worked (minus any state benefits received) . All 
those without work for a full week would have 
their unemployment benefit supplemented to ensure 
no loss of income. Sick pay was available on the 
same basis for thirteen weeks in every year. Full 
pay was also given to the victims of industrial 
accidents. Cf. Unilever, Internal Memorandum,
Evolution of Working Conditions at Port S u n l i g h t ;
& Employees Handbook (1937).
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ballot at Crosfields amongst those who had not struck.^
Lever himself had been the driving force behind
copartnership, and it was abandoned on the formation of
Unilever, But, generally, welfare after the amalgamation was
placed upon a systematic and contributory basis. Benefits,
consequently, became rights. Wilson sees the introduction of
contributory schemes as a reflection of the leading role
being assumed by professional managers at the expense of
owner-employers. Paternalism was anachronistic, and
employees in more democratic times were in position to
assume direct responisibility for their own sick pay and
2
pensions. A company-wide staff pension scheme, however, was 
for Unilever an investment in its managerial resources. The 
management of a large, highly-diversified enterprise 
required an increased administrative structure, and a
shortage of managerial skills would have placed limits upon 
economic growth. Pension schemes helped in the retention of 
staff, and a contributory system was the only secure means 
of financing adequate benefits.^ A staff Union 
Superannuation Fund was formed in 1931. It replaced the 
Employees Benefit Fund at Lever Brothers for all salaried 
employees, and was a condition of employment for all new 
recruits.* Employees with past service, not having made 
contributions during that period, might have been excluded 
from an adequate pension. But Unilever agreed to donate
1. Directors' Minutes, 25 Oct 1928.
2. Wilson, Vol.II (1954), p . 384.
3. Ibid, p p . 382-4.
4. Unilever, Evolution of Working Conditions at Port 
S u n l i g h t .
262
£1,100,000 to the Superannuation Fund in place of
b a c k - p ayments, and the company continued to donate some
£100,000 a year. Far from the scheme being independent,
therefore, Unilever ensured it was an integral part of its
staff management.^ A Pensions Officer was appointed to
2
administer the Fund.
In 1929, it was realised that the consolidation of the 
new company coupled with an economic downturn would lead to 
the closing of works.^ Out-of-work payments and pensions, 
therefore, became important for a company that wished to 
retain its reputation for fair dealing.* Ex gratia pensions 
for workers were increased in 1932. It was considered an 
expense of rationalisation, but the cost would be, said
5
Cooper, "counterbalanced by (the) corresponding savings". 
Unilever was supporting a variety of pension schemes by that 
date, costing the company, in addition to the Union 
Superannuation Fund, about £450,000 per annum. This sum 
equalled an extra 10s a ton on the price of soap and 
margarine. The expense of paying ex gratia pensions on a 
large scale was burdensome, but it was acknowledged that 
savings would not be made for ten years while the funds in 
any contributory scheme accumulated.^ Nonetheless, the 
Pensions Officer was asked to draw up a contributory scheme
1. Directors' Minutes, 1 Jan 1931.
2. Ibid, 3 Sept 1931.
3. BB6, "Closing of Factories", 1929.
4. Directors' Minutes, 17 Sept 1931; 10 Dec 1931.
5. Ibid, 28 Jan 1932.
6. Ibid, 5 May 1932.
263
for all workers. He calculated that a contributory pensions 
scheme would cost Unilever £1,000 a week.^ Moreover, 
Unilever wanted to place pension provision "upon a uniform 
basis..." throughout the company. The opportunity was taken 
to streamline the funding of all provident provision 
throughout the new international company. An all-embracing 
Union Provident Fund was founded to oversee all forms of 
industrial welfare for workers, and its trustees were 
appointed by the Board. Membership of the Fund was a 
condition of employment. Within the British half of 
Unilever, Approved Society and Pensions sections were set 
up. The differing levels of state benefits between countries 
necessitated such a division of administration.^ With regard 
to pensions, the Fund was "a common-sense solution of one of 
the most difficult problems facing large-scale industries 
to-day, and maintains the tradition in regard to industrial 
relationships which has characterised the firm's policy in 
the past".* Contributions to the Fund were set at Is a week 
to which the company added 2s to each individual account but 
Unilever reserved the right to alter its donation at will. 
Workers retired at 60 years, or earlier if there was a valid
1. Ibid, 6 Oct 1932.
2. Ibid, 13 Oct 1932; 8 Dec 1932.
3. Ibid, 15 June 1933; CPPS, Rules of Union Provident
Fund ( 1932) .
4. P r o g r e s s , Jan 1933, p p . 21-2. Progressive welfare 
policies were, in fact, a tradition of the 
industry, which included associated companies like 
Crosfields, Watsons, Thomas', Pears, Knights, and 
Prices, as well as Lever Brothers. Cf. CP 14, Note
on History of Industrial Policy in Lever Brothers'
B u s i n e s s .
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reason like illness.^
In 1935, Unilever established a branch of the Hospital 
Services Association. Workers at Levers and at associated 
companies like Planters Foods, the Bromborough Margarine 
Works, Brooke and Company, and the road transport firm
S.P.D. were allowed to join, A Management Committee decided 
on the level of contributions in return for benefits of 7s a 
day to cover hospital fees, allowances for operations, 
consultants bills, convalescent treatment, ambulance 
services, nursing treatment, and surgical appliances.
Wilson argues that welfare policy under Lever was based 
upon Port Sunlight and copartnership, and that pensions and 
sick pay were introduced by Unilever.^ In fact, pensions and 
sick pay had been provided directly by the company in the 
1890s. After 1905, they were paid through the Employees 
Benefit Fund. Welfare under Lever remained paternalistic and 
ex g r a t i a , and was dependent upon productivity and 
profitability. Company provision contributed to efficiency, 
and was an important arm of any business. It helped 
companies to cope with the "human factor". After its
formation in 1929, Unilever's management and structure 
needed to be reorganised. Contemporaneously, welfare 
provision for workers became based upon contributions,
actuarial calculations, and rights to benefits. Wilson, 
however, overlooks the workers' Union Provident Fund. The
1. CPPS 9, Rules o f Union Provident Fund (1932).
2. WH4, (Jan 1935 ) .
3. Wilson, Vol.II (1954), pp.382-3.
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bureaucratie procedures for collecting and recording 
individual contributions involved greater attention to 
detail than merely drawing from a company fund to pay ex 
gratia benefits. The systemisation of welfare was possible 
because of the central managerial organisation established 
under Cooper. An internal labour market, pensions and other 
benefits were an investment by a corporate company in its 
workforce. It reflected the exercise of greater planning 
over the whole production process.
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(i V ). Conclus i o n .
I.C.I. and Unilever emerged as amongst Britain's
largest companies, worth by 1930 £77m and £132m
respectively. Both employed over 50,000 people. I.C.I. is
distinguished by its attention to management, and, through
its Labour Department, it could administer a planned and
unitary welfare policy. Unilever's benefits were
comparatively less systemised and unified across its many
concerns. Memoranda drawn up by I.C.I.'s Lloyd Roberts in
1931 imply that its welfare was an anti-union strategy, and
a way of cheapening wages and labour. Unions, however,
accounted for only 30-40% of I.C.I. 's workforce when welfare
schemes were initiated in 1928, and, during the Great
Depression, their postion weakened. Lloyd Roberts was
probably justifying welfare expenditure to McGowan, who
assumed control in 1931 and who was less convinced of the
value of company provision than his predecessor. In
practice, I.C.I. 's welfare benefits were their own
justification.^ They did, however, produce a contented
workforce, and I.C.I., like Brunner, Mond before it,
remained free of major industrial disputes. Lever's dislike
of unions was well known, and, during a dispute in 1911,
strikers' copartnership certificates were removed. But
Lever's labour relations policy was comprehensive and
calculated, and was not, as some claimed, merely an
2
advertising ploy for soap. Unilever, like I.C.I., replaced 
paternalistic methods with the systemisation of welfare.
1. Reader, Vol.II (1975), p p . 57-8,65-70, 119-20,299,
2. Wilson, Vol.l (1954 ), pp. 144-56, 275-7 ; Vol.II, 
p p . 382-4.
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Chapter 6 .
The Labour Question in the Breweries.
{i ). Introduction.
Industrial welfare provided brewing employers with a 
formidable means of managing their labour force. The 
industry remained composed of small, family firms, and 
company provision was notably paternalistic. In 1936, over 
77% of brewing companies had less than Elm in capital, 
although some large firms had emerged.^ Welfare encouraged 
the personal links between employers and employees which 
small-scale production made possible. Gratuities could be 
bestowed on an individual and ex, gratia basis, and their 
effectiveness depended upon the standing and reputation of 
the brewing dynasties within their firms.
Paternalism, of course, was not unique to brewing. 
Within the small business characteristic of the Victorian 
economy, gratuities commonly won the deference employers 
needed for the exercise of authority over their workers. 
Because work-discipline was easier to maintain amongst 
established and settled communities, small factory owners 
and family partnerships were willing to finance housing, 
social amenities, and sick clubs. Generations of workers 
grew up in the expectation of working with their parents. Ex 
gratia welfare was illustrative of a very personal style
1. K.H.Hawkins & C.L.Pass The Brewing Industry
(1979), p . 49. There were 4,482 breweries in 1910?
2,889 in 1920; 1,418 in 1930; and 885 in 1939.
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of management, and changes in the size and structure of 
companies undermined paternalism. Brewing was one of the 
earliest examples of capitalist production, and firms had 
been established in all large industrial centres by 1800 in 
response to the creation of urban markets.^ Yet, there was 
little innovation in production methods throughout this 
period, and amalgamations could not have brought returns to 
scale. Corporate management was not, therefore, introduced 
into the brewing industry, and brewing provides an 
interesting case-study of a trade proud to retain its
paternalistic practices and a tradition of "family 
employment". Its history has parallels with the wool and 
worsted, footwear, and pottery trades.^
Dominated by the brewing industry, towns like 
Burton-on-Trent and Tadcaster in Yorkshire became epitomes 
of industrial paternalism. Even London breweries were able 
to establish self-contained communities like those at
Pimlico and Mile End Road. Special factors increased the 
opportunities for industrial welfare in the industry. The 
lack of foreign competition made employment and company 
provision secure and permanent features within brewing 
firms. The fact that labour constituted a small proportion 
of total costs further enabled brewers to retain men during 
a slack period. Pensions or annuity payments, and half-wages
1. Hawkins & Pass (1979), p p . 14-20. Cf. also
P.Mathias The Brewing Industry in England,
1700-1830 ( 1958) .
2. Channon (1973), p p . 92,94,96,99. Corporate
enterprises were not formed in the brewing 
industry till the late 1950s.
3. Cf. Ch.7, s s .(ii),(v i ) ,(x).
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during sickness were common features of brewery employment.^
The families which remained in control of brewing
companies were a significant feature in the industry. Yet,
between 1886 and 1900, brewing firms converted into joint
stock companies. 260 breweries went public, and £185 million
in shares were issued. Brewers accounted in 1905 for eleven
of the United Kingdom's largest fifty companies in terms of
market capitalisation, and, by 1930, the figure was still as 
2
high as eight. A number of firms in London and Burton had 
become leaders within the industry. London brewers had 
expanded by the early 1800s to meet the size of the 
capital's market, while the laying of the railways presented 
new opportunities to brewers like those in Burton. They were 
able to sell their beer, with its distinctive flavour, to 
urban markets and it soon won widespread popularity. 
Advertising was, consequently, particularly important to the 
Burton producers, and they were the first to introduce 
trade-marks. Commercial brewers continued to replace local 
and domestic producers throughout the 19th Century because 
their products were of a better quality. But an expanding 
demand and a free and open licensing policy continued to 
allow new brewers to enter the market. Restrictive licensing 
was reintroduced in 1869, and the 1870s marked the beginning 
of a fall in the demand for beer which continued throughout 
the 1900s and the Inter-War period. The need to secure
1. D.M.Knox "The Development of the London Brewing 
Industry" (Oxf. B.Litt., 1956), pp.123-4,134-5,
Labour costs were about 12.5% of total costs 
during 1920-1930. Cf. J.Baxter "The Organisation 
of the Brewing Industry" (Ph.D., 1945),
p p . 311,359.
2. Hannah (1979), p p . 102-3,187-92.
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outlets against the affects of a shrinking demand and 
increasingly restrictive licencing forced brewing firms to 
buy public houses. Smaller breweries were often bought out 
merely because of the value attached to their tied premises. 
Investment in public houses increased from £30 million to 
over £200 million in the thirty years after 1870. By 1900, 
only 10% of public houses were independent. Perhaps 
three-quarters of the industry's capital consisted of 
licensed premises during this period. Capital was floated in 
order to buy property, not to finance the rationalisation of 
beer production, and there was no incentive to make 
management more professionalised. Indeed, most of the 
capital raised on the stock exchange was in the form of 
debenture or loan shares, and the brewing families retained 
ownership as well as managerial control.^
The continuance of the small, privately-owned, family 
firm shaped labour policies. Ex gratia welfare proved an 
adequate means of managing brewing workers. While other 
employers introduced collective bargaining to cope with the 
rise of trades unionism, brewers opposed the appointment of 
workers' intermediaries. Labour relations were never 
discussed by the brewers' trade associations, and a 
workforce fragmented by the low concentration of firms had a 
weak bargaining position. Settling labour problems within 
the firm increased the influence of employers and their 
discretionary benefits over the attitudes and actions of 
their workers.
1. Hawkins & Pass (1979), pp.20-22,25,27-8,34-5, 
37-9,40-2,44,50.
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(ii). Brewery Paternalism.
Paternalistic, and ex gratia welfare was well
established in the brewing industry by the middle of the
19th Century, and remained unaffected by the creation of
joint stock companies in the 1880s and 1890s. The system of
patronage and deference was only threatened during the years
1913-1914, when newly-formed brewery unions challenged the
employers authority. But, despite increasing unionisation
after 1914, traditional welfare practices were continued and
extended. They helped produce a labour force which remained
at work even during the General Strike of 1926.
Guinesses, the noted producers of stout, became the
United Kingdom's largest brewers under the stewardship of
Benjamin Lee Guiness in 1835-1858. He introduced death
benefits and discretionary pensions of between 2s and 6s per
week. Medical attendance and free medicine were available.
Hospital and convalescent home bills were met. Housing was
built to accomodate workers, and excursions were held.^
Mitchell and Butlers of Birmingham began a non-contributory
pension and gratuity fund in 1869. Men were eligible if they
were 60 years old and had been employed for 20 years. A
sports ground was laid in 1879, and later a recreation club
was founded. Mitchell and Butlers promoted the company fire
brigade, established in 1882, because "it is worthwhile from
the employers' point of view to do whatever he can to make
2
his employees proud of the Company". When Boakes began to 
pay bonuses to their men in 1886, it took the opportunity to
1. P.Lynch & J.E.Vaizey Guiness's Brewery in the 
Irish Economy, 1859-1876 (1960), pp.232-238.
2. U n i t y , Jan 1931, pp.199-202.
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invite staff and workers to a luncheon. Employees returned a
vote of thanks. The traditional excursion was also organised
on their behalf. John Smiths of Tadcaster was "the centre
of industry in the town". By the 1890s, the firm had some
200 "steady, decent, trustworthy men". The proprietors,
Henry and Frank Riley-Smith wanted an efficient workforce,
and were particularly anxious, ironically, to encourage
sobriety. "The firm have fully recognised their
responsibility, and felt it their task to promote their
employees general good, and consequently, in this brewery,
2only one common interest exists between masters and men".
By 1893, Burton had 31 breweries employing 8,000
workers. It was a brewing town, often electing a brewer as 
its Member of Parliament.^ An excursion organised jointly 
between Messrs Salt & Company, Beard Brothers, Eversheds, 
Bell & Company, Hill & Son, and Nunnelly & Company was held 
in 1886.* Nearly all the 60 men and foremen at the Abbey 
Brewery were members of a self-supporting sick fund, and
they had formed cricket and football clubs.^ But it was Bass
and Allsopp which dominated the Burton brewing industry. 
Michael Thomas Bass built a vicarage, chapel, Sunday school, 
and workmen's institute there. As M.P. for Derby for 33 
years, he endowed the city with a public library and baths, 
and a recreation-ground costing £3,000. A church, schools,
1. Brewers' J ournal, 15 Sept 1886, p . 346.
2. A.Barnard Noted Breweries of Great Britain and
I r e l a n d , Vol.Ill (1889-91), p p . 36-7,46.
3. Brewers ' Journal, 15 July 1892 , p . 291.
4. Ibid, 15 June 1886, p . 152.
5. Barnard, Vol.l (1889-91), pp.330,340.
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and a literary institute with library, reading room, and
billiard room were constructed at his estate of Rangemore,
which later became the country seat of his son. Lord Burton.
It was believed that, during his life, Bass spent some
£200,000 on such patronage,^ Samuel Allsopp & Sons is known
to have constructed workmen's houses and provided mess rooms 
2
at its works.
The other large brewers were to be found in London, 
where Barclay, Perkins & Whitbreads were the major producers 
of the 19th Century,^ By the 1890s, the firm employed at 
Southwark 700 workers "for whose comfort, health, and 
recreation they have attended to liberally in every way". A 
cricket ground was laid at Dulwich, and special arrangements 
were made with local railways to provide employees with 
cheap transport to work. A scripture reader and a surgeon 
were paid to attend at the brewery, and a benefit club 
provided sick pay.* Whitbreads was credited with spending 
large amounts on employees' welfare. Annual beanfeasts were 
held in the 1870s. By the 1890s, the firm began providing 
free medical attendance and half wages for men who were 
sick. The scheme replaced the contributory sickness and 
burial fund founded in 1866. Annuities, pensions, cricket
1. Ibid, pp.46-7,49,60; B r e w e r s ' J o u r n a l , 15 Sept
1870, p . 200. By 1891, Bass had the largest ale and 
bitter brewery in the world, covering 145 acres.
2. Ibid, p . 127.
3. However, London firms like Ind Coope in 1856; 
Charrington in 1872; Mann, Crossman, & Paulin in 
1872; and Truman, Hanbury & Buxton in 1873 opened 
Burton breweries.
4. Barnard, Vol.l (1889-91), p . 272.
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and games clubs, sports equipment, a kitchen and cafe were 
also available. The "family tradition" in Whitbread 
involved not only the active interest of the brewers in the 
welfare of workers, but also the long-service given to the 
company by individuals and their families.^
The authoritarianism which was often an element of
paternalism was demonstrated by the Quaker Sampson Hanbury 
of Truman, Hanbury & Buxton. In the 1830s, he decided to
employ a teacher and compelled his workers to learn to read 
and write on pain of dimissal. Welfare provision was the 
direct concern of members of the firm's four controlling 
families. Pensions were at first bestowed directly by the 
partners upon retired men and injured workers if they could 
not be found alternative employment. The Black Eagle Benefit 
Club was established in 1841, however, to take over the
awarding of benefits. In the 1890s, "Many social functions
took place at the brewery, for the employees did not commute 
and the firm became the pivot of their existence. The men 
looked to the company to provide their entertainment and 
security; it was their local club, for hours were long and 
they lived nearby". A Workmen's Hall, adjoining the head 
brewer's residence, contained a library and reading room, a 
mess room fitted with cooking apparatus, and an allowance 
room where the workers could obtain their free beer. Edward 
North Buxton became chairman in 189 7, "and a special place 
is reserved for him in the long memories of East Enders
1. Knox (1956), p . 135.
2. B.Hill Whitbread's Brewery (1947), p p . 36-7.
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for whom he did so m u c h " .^
Charringtons at Mile End did much "for the comfort and
well-being of all the employees". The firm had a
"well-organised" Sick Fund and a Convalescent Fund, allowing
"masters and men (to) unite in (their) management, the
partners taking office with the men". Charringtons
constructed "a long row of very excellent cottages, occupied
by workmen, selected from the ranks for good service and
good conduct", and brewers and heads of department also 
2
lived on site. The partners of another Mile End firm, Mann, 
Crossman, & Paulin, resided near the brewery too. 
Beanfeasts, excursions, and Christmas gifts were common 
occurrences, and, after becoming a joint stock concern in 
1901, the company continued to boast of the way "personal 
and family associations" had been retained.^
Weekly pensions at Watneys of Pimlico were given to 
most loyal and long-serving workers or their widows, while 
others might receive gratuities. Granted at the discretion 
of partners or directors, their amounts varied. James 
Withers, a drayman, could have expected a pension of 15s a 
week for 27 years' service. He was only awarded I2s, for at 
one time "disposing of beer in the town" where he was making 
deliveries. A widow of another drayman received a £10 
gratuity on the grounds that, although her deceased husband
1. Truman, Hanbury, & Buxton Trumans the Brewers 
(1966), pp. 22 ,25 ,33-4, 38-9 ,44-6 ,52; Brewers ' 
J o u r n a l , 15 March 1872, p . 567; Barnard, Vol.I 
(1889-91), pp.216,225. By 1891, the company 
employed 150 men.
2. Barnard, Vol.I (1889-91), p . 304.
3. H.Jones Albion Brewery, 1808-1958 (1959), p.73.
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had been "fairly stupid" and had six offences against his 
name, he had become "fairly good" after receiving a warning 
from a partner. Awards were given for accidents and deaths 
at work. Sick pay at Watneys, however, was granted through 
the contributory, ex gratia Brewery Sick Club to which the 
firm gave subventions.^
Special provision was made for draymen, because the 
arduous nature of their work left them particularly prone to 
accidents and illness. Carrying casks of perhaps two 
hundredweight, draymen frequently suffered from broken limbs 
or hernias. Bronchitis, arthritis and rheumatism were 
occupational diseases. Being on call to meet demands for 
beer, the hours of those employed in the supply department, 
like draymen or the horsekeepers, were long and irregular. 
Draymen could be at the brewery an average of 92 hours in a 
slack week. Hard work forced them to retire between the ages 
of 50 and 55, unless they could be transferred to another 
department. Pensions, consequently, were necessary due to 
the nature of their employment. The loyalty and reliability 
of draymen were encouraged by breweries insuring them 
against the short and long-term risks of their job. The 
"yard" men at Watneys, therefore, had their own Yard Club. 
Total benefits could not exceed the subscriptions paid to 
the fund, although the directors considered cases where this 
occurred. During the 1890s, beer was available to all
1. Westminister R.O., 789/208, Register of Pensions,
10 Feb, 3 March & 7 April 1892; Ibid, 789/7,
Minutes of Cobham Brewery, 30 Aug 1922.
2. Ibid, 789/208, Register of Pensions, 1860-1898; 
Knox (1956), p p . 134-5.
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workers at meal times in the allowance room, and Watneys
owned a street of model houses abutting on to the works.
There were 91 dwellings housing 546 poeple. Its community
was served by a club, library, and bagatelle-room. Another
100 people were accomodated at Brewers Street.^
By 1911, brewery welfare was extensive enough for the
Brewers J ournal to argue that the National Insurance Bill
could undermine company paternalism. Social legislation was
depicted as relieving brewers of the responsibilities they
had freely assumed. Workmen, moreover, were considered
2
better cared for under the existing system. Guinesses 
sacked their 4,000 employees, and re-employed them only 
after they had signed a formal, contract. It stipulated that 
"any payment which may be made to any employee in the nature 
of sick allowance or pension will be purely gratuitous, and 
in granting it the board will take into account the benefits 
derived from the Insurance Act". The discretion exercised by 
the brewers was an important element of the industry's 
paternalistic welfare.^
Some brewers claimed that the extra costs imposed by 
the Insurance Act, coupled with increases in licencing 
duties in 1911, had undermined profitability and the finance 
available for welfare. Some of the smaller breweries 
undoubtedly announced the cancellation of excursions or the
1. Barnard, Vol.I (1889-91), p.367. Watneys employed 
about 400 men in the 1890s.
2. Brewers ' Journal , 15 May 1911, p . 260 ; 15 Dec 1911,
p . 660.
3. Ibid, 15 Jan 1913, p.8.
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termination of company sick pay. The principal reason,
however, was the particularly sharp fall in the demand for
beer during the Edwardian period.^ It affected wages as well
as welfare with the result that the general labour unrest of
these years occurred in the brewing industry also. One of
the partners at Bass, Ratcliff, & Gretton came to
acknowledge how the cutting of company benefits, reduced
wages, high prices, and redundacies had brought about a
2
spate of strikes.
Russell & Wrangham introduced profitshafing in 1911 as 
a response to a strike threat. Shares were awarded to all 
those who had been employed for three or more years.^ 
Throughout 1913-14, strikes for increased wages were 
reported at the Northern Brewery Company Limited, Peter 
Walker & Sons, Showells Brewery, Messrs Shipstones & 
Company, and at a number of firms at Burton, London, and
4
Bradford. Employees seeking an increase of 6d an hour and 
overtime pay formed "A Brewery Labourers' Branch of the 
Workers' Union" in October 1913. Their membership spread in 
Burton, Nottingham, and Bradford especially.^ In February 
1914, a National Union of Brewery Workers was founded in 
London. Meeting with some initial success, they sent
1. Brewers Journal, 15 April 1908, p . 233; 15 April 
1909, p . 214; 15 June 1909, p . 349; Brewing Trade 
R e v i e w , I May 1911, p . 212.
2. Brewing Trade R e v i e w , 1 Dec 1913, p . 575; 1 Nov 
1913, p . 494.
3. Brewers J o u r n a l , 15 May 1911, p p . 260-1.
4. Brewing Trade R eview, I May 1913, p . 239; Brewers
Journal, 15 May 1913, pp . 544,548; 15 Feb 1914,
p . 63; 15 July 1914, p. 386 .
5. Brewers' Jou r n a l , 15 Oct 1913, p p . 544,548.
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officials all over the country to enlist support.^
The employers policy of giving benefits and gifts to a 
quiescent and grateful workforce on an informal 
brewery-to-brewery basis was challenged by the creation of 
unions. Their aims and ideals opposed the traditional 
authority of brewers. The N.U.B.W. 's leader, Ed Pratt, 
declared class war aginst "the brewery kings".^ Workers
were accustomed to petitioning their employers for a wage 
increase. The firm would privately discuss the issue, and 
make a non-negotiable decision.^ The N.U.B.W., however, 
wanted to bargain as an equal, and was conscious of the 
results of welfare capitalism. It saw brewery workers as 
"serfs" and demanded that they think and act for themselves 
by combining "like all other workers".^
Burton brewers jointly negotiated with the brewing 
union, and agreed to an average wage of 23s for a 54-hour 
week. The B re w e r s ' Journal, however, urged employers to 
adopt the "excellent tactics of Messrs Watneys" and to 
refuse to talk to unions. "Sympathy and kindliness between 
employer and employed had not been excelled in any other 
industry" and "....it is quite obvious that when there is an 
alien organisation, those who avail themselves of this kind 
of intervention must in future forego any of the privileges
1. Ibid, 15 Feb 1914, p.63.
2. Brewing Trade R eview, I June 1914, p.329.
3. Cf. Westminister R.O., 789/138, Watney, Coombe & 
Reid, Minutes, 10 Oct 1890.
4. Brewers ' Journal, 15 Feb 1914, p p . 444-5.
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which belonged to the old regime".^ Improvements in pay and
conditions at Watneys were conceded in July 1914, however,
because workers were "solid on their Association being 
2
recognised". But those who had actually joined the union
were sacked and replaced by "free labour" on the
next day.^
The labour shortages of the Great War "cheated
(brewers) of one of their best weapons of defence, namely,
the right to employ other men in place of those who decide 
to go on strike". Employers, like those at London and 
Burton, were forced to agree to district collective pay
4
agreements. In June 1915, however, the industry was placed 
under the control of the Central Control Board. It was
empowered to grant war bonuses to meet the rapidly rising 
cost of living. From the 3rd March 1915 to the 5th February 
1919, workers at Huggins and Company, for example, recieved 
total increases of 17/- a week,^ and awards continued to be 
made until the Control Board was disbanded in 1921.^ 
Confronted with increased trades union strength, the 
industry had to consider the question of Whitley Councils.
It was recognised that the policy of buying peace through
high wages could not be continued indefinitely. The Brewers
1. Ibid, 15 Feb 1914, p.76.
2. Ibid, 30 July 1914.
3. Ibid, 15 Aug 1914, pp. 436-7 ; 15 Feb 1915, p . 63.
4. Ibid, 15 Feb 1915, p.63.
5. Westminister R.O., 789/3, Huggins and Company, 
Minutes, 3 March 1915 to 5 Feb 1919.
6. Brewing Trade Review, I Sept 1919, p.255; 1 May
1920, p . 142; I June 1920, p.193; 1 July 1920, 
p . 23 3; Brew e r s ' J ournal, 15 Jan 19 21, p . 13.
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Society reported that employers would have to establish a
means of consulting their employees. The industry was
concerned that trade unionists, once given representation on
joint councils, could claim some credit every time employers
improved conditions. The industry not only objected to the
Whitley Act s interference in pay-bargaining, but to the
very determination of wages on a national basis. A national
Joint Industrial Council was successfully opposed, but,
because district bargaining was already established,
district councils were accepted. The Brewers Society
supported proposals for the founding of works councils, if
their constitutions were independently agreed by each brewer
and if their tasks were confined to issues like improving
production-methods, conditions of employment, works
discipline, profitsharing, sick clubs, and social
activities.^ In fact, the employers' opposition to works
councils ensured that they were not established in
breweries, and, when district committees during the slump of
the early 1920s became instruments for imposing wage-cuts,
they gradually lost credibility as a means of joint 
2
determination.
Despite reductions in their standard of living, most 
brewery employees remained at work during the General Strike 
of 1926. A weakened trades union movement and threats of
1. Brewers Society, Minutes, 20 March 1919. Cf. 
Brewing Trade R e v i e w , March 1919, pp.76-80.
2. B rewing Trade R e v i e w , I May 1920, p.142; 1 July 
Ï921, p.263; I Aug 1921, p . 332; I March 1922, 
p . 122; I Aug 1922, p . 320.
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dismissal were contributory factors.^ Much, however, was 
accredited to the type of firm prominent in brewing. While 
other industries had concerns so large that they had become 
a "sort of semi-military organisation...", only ten or so 
breweries in 1921 employed 1,000 or more workers. The
brewing industry was said to treat its employees as
individuals. Goodwill could not be established by the mere 
payment of wages. The industry promoted a mixture of social 
and athletic clubs, sick pay, works committees, bonuses, 
pensions, profitsharing, gratuities for labour-saving 
suggestions, convalescent homes, and house magazines. "A 
few words of friendly counsel, as a rule," said the Brew e r s ' 
J o u r n a l , "proved sufficient to restore (the) better
judgment" of workers when strike action was contemplated. 
"It is one of the cherished traditions of the Brewing Trade 
that the industry should be a model employer, and in this 
case the fruits of that wise policy have been the general 
and steadfast loyalty of brewery employees".^ No worker 
struck at Courages because of "the kindness and goodwill of 
the Directors".^ The personal relations of small-scale 
industry and welfare retained industrial peace.
The philosophy underlying this policy was outlined in a 
comprehensive document drawn up in 1926 by Warre S.Bradley 
of Watney, Coombe, and Reid, called "Industrial Welfare in
1. Ibid, I Sept 1926, p . 331; Brewers J o u r n a l , 15 May 
1926, p p . 193-4.
2. Brewers' J o u r n a l , 15 Feb 1921, p p . 49-50.
3. Ibid, I June 1926, p.203.
4. J.Courage & Co. The Development and Growth of the 
Company's Brewery (1933), p . 53.
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Practice". The principle behind company provision was "to 
effect a closer relationship between the worker and the 
employer, and that was even more possible in small concerns 
than in large businesses". Watneys spent heavily on welfare 
because willing service was considered worth the cost. The 
firm had organised a non-contributory pension scheme, so 
that a worker "receives (a pension) as a gift from his 
employer, or it would be more accurate to say as a reward 
for long and faithful service". These two attributes should 
determine the scale of the pension awards, which could be 
altered or terminated at the pleasure of the Board. Men
could retire between 60 and 65 years, and women at 50. "Now 
an employer who provides his people with this safeguard 
forges the first and, perhaps, the greatest link in the 
chain which binds them to the employer's business as loyal 
and faithful servants. Not a chain of slavery, but a chain
formed of such links as good will and gratitude....... "
Moreover, because pensions would only be awarded for
continuous and faithful service, they would not be given to 
one-time strikers. Therefore, pensions "will often be the 
means of staving off a disastrous strike". The pension was 
transferable to widows, because a wife would then be more 
anxious that her husband worked hard, stayed at his job, and 
did not strike.^
The "next step" was to provide a means of reward for 
long service which, in contrast to pensions, operated during 
the employees' working life. At Watneys, men with three 
years' service received a bonus of 2s a week; eight years
1. Brewers' J ournal, 15 Dec 1926, p p . 559-61.
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entitled a worker to 4s; 11 years to 5s; and over 14 years'
employment brought 6s extra. The money was placed into a
company savings bank at 4% interest, and paid in a lump-sum
to the men every quarter as a reward for good conduct during
the previous three months. Furthermore, Watneys in 1926
introduced a profitsharing scheme, called a "prosperity
gift". Wage earners received "until further notice" a bonus
when share dividends reached above 10%. When between 10-15%,
a bonus of one week's wages would be paid annually to all
workers who had been employed for one year. When the figure
was between 15-25%, 2 weeks' pay would be granted, and, if
over 25%, 3 weeks. The dividend was 17% in 1925. It was
considered important that all bonuses were given separately
from wages so it was obviously a gift and not "earned". For
a similar reason, management made it clear that sick and
accident pay, awarded in addition to Health Insurance and
Workmen's Compensation, was ex g r atia. Sports, and
recreational facilities were believed to encourage
efficiency, health and individual effort. The company sports
club had its own ground and 1,800 members. Watneys also had
a convalescent home in Surrey for the use of its workers.^
Friary, Holroyd and Healey's Breweries also attempted
to secure the loyalty of their men when it organised a
pension scheme in 1922. It was "entirely gratuitous on the
2
part of the company" and restricted to non-union employees. 
By 1927, John Courage's had introduced a Savings Bank and a 
Sick Fund. A Sports Club Hall was situated next to the
1. Ibid; Industrial W e l f a r e , Jan 1931, p.95; Brewing 
Trade R e v i e w , I Oct 19 26, p p . 344-5.
2. Brewing Trade Review, I March 1922, p . 105.
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the brewery, and catered for indoor games like billiards as
well as outdoor pursuits like football. Membership cost 2d a
week. By 1931, Mitchell and Butlers had founded a
recreation club, and allowed their men a week's paid holiday 
2every year.
Mr Harry Whitbread in 1924 stated that Whitbread's was 
one of the most successful companies in the City, "due to 
the efficient and loyal support of an unusually capable 
staff". Their methods were called "old-fashioned and our 
business is managed more on family than Limited Company 
lines. Far from denying this, I assert and rejoice in it, 
and I believe it to be one of the causes which contribute 
materially to the welfare and happiness of those who are 
working for you and with you...." The good feeling existing 
in the works was "due to the fact that the Directors were 
human beings and regarded all employees as such, and they 
had the welfare of the men at heart, whether in connection 
with their work or their play". Through the firm's house 
magazine, the personality of Harry Whitbread as an 
understanding and caring employer was carefully cultivated. 
Great stress was laid upon the value of all kinds of sport 
in connection with the company, and social events were 
supported because they induced good feeling. They brought 
together all classes of employees. All sports and games 
clubs were associated with the London Breweries Amuater 
Sports Association and its leagues and competitions.
1. J.Courage & Co. (1933), p.53.
2. U n i t y , Jan 1931, pp.199-202.
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Whitbread s also established a savings bank and a benefit 
club. With no systemisation of management or welfare, there 
were different benefit clubs at each store or depot. But 
they all received company support. At the brewery itself, 
95% or 570 of its employees were members of the Hospital 
Savings Association. 3d a week guaranteed free hospital 
treatment and payments for opthalmic and dental treatment. 
In 1926, Whitbread's issued 300 vouchers to its employees 
who wanted hospital treatment, and 80 claims for other 
treatment were met. Workers also received pensions. In 1936, 
the canteen at the brewery was replaced by a modern 
cafeteria with more adequate eating facilities.^
House of Whitbread, Jan 1924, p p . 41,45; May 1924, 
p . 19; July 1925 , pp. 43-45 , 47 ; October 1925, p . 19; 
July 1926, p.19; Jan 1927, p p . 40-1,44,46-7; April 
1928, pp.48-9; Jan 1936, pp . 23-24; April 1936,
p . 82.
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(ill). Conclusion.
The welfare practices of brewing companies were 
expanded during the 1920s, particularly in large companies 
like Watney, Coombe, and Reid. Yet the discretionary nature 
of "welfare" in the 1920s was not markedly different from 
the brewery "paternalism" of the 19th Century. Indeed, 
George Middleton, M.P. for Carlisle, embarassed the 
government in 1931 when he sought Parliament's permission to 
found a pension scheme for brewery workers in his 
constituency. The industry there had been nationalised 
during the Great War in order to encourage sobriety amongst 
munitions workers. The point was that "For some time past 
they have been making unfavourable comparisons between the 
interest which the private employer took in the old workers 
and the indifference with which the Government treats 
t h e m " .  ^ Industrial welfare, therefore, helped fulfil the 
material needs of workers and encouraged their loyalty to a 
firm. But the ex gratia company provision which was 
traditional to this industry also carried a threat of 
intimidation and discrimination.
I. Brewers' Journal, 15 May 1931, p.288
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Chapter 7.
The Place of Industrial Welfare in British Industry.
(i ) . Introduction.
The previous chapters have focussed upon the connection 
between market strategy and industrial structure in various 
industries, and showed how corporate companies freed 
themselves from the capriciousness of unfettered free 
enterprise. Company bureaucracies, by replacing markets for 
the coordination of raw material extraction, production, and 
wholesaling, exercised greater "discretionary behaviour". 
Objectives could be decided by a process of internal 
bargaining within a firm. The accumulation of "discretionary 
profits", which were net profits minus the minimum return to 
dividends acceptable to shareholders, increased the 
opportunities for and the scale of welfare.
Greater profits stemmed from five sources. Firstly, 
monopolistic or oligopolistic companies enjoyed higher 
profit margins through their control over prices and output. 
Secondly, large-scale and standardised production and the 
use of flow-production techniques brought returns to scale. 
Thirdly, internal labour markets, based on the need to 
retain skills acquired at an employer's cost, depended upon 
the stability of the product market or the levels of 
capitalisation in production. The better utilisation of what 
were often firm-specific skills increased labour 
productivity. Fourthly, those industries which grew in the
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20th Century either through technological innovation or 
through meeting the demands of new, mass consumer markets 
experienced better profit margins. The last source of higher 
Profits, the conscious integration and organisation of 
economic activity within large firms, is seen by Chandler as 
central to the fullest exploitation of all these 
developments. Management structures, which delineated the 
lines of communication and command, and assessed and 
regularised production from raw material to finished 
product, fulfilled the requirements of corporate enterprise. 
Therefore, two principal factors upon which the corporate 
company came to be based,- oligopoly or monopoly, and 
managerial structure,- moulded developments in industrial 
w e l f a r e .
The early merger wave of 1898-1902 attempted to 
restrain ruinous competition in some industries. There was 
little or no rationalisation of production and a number of 
loosely-coordinated holding-companies with appalling 
managerial inefficiencies were formed. The corporate 
company, nevertheless, can be said to have emerged in 
British industry during the period 1914-1930. Large 
companies did not necessarily induce the systemisation of 
industrial welfare, for it was specifically the emergence of 
managerial bureaucracies which replaced the personal control 
of employers and led to the drawing up of guidelines in the 
administration of benefits.
Certain industries, however, continued to rely heavily 
upon casual labour, and did not consequently require the 
sort of managerial structures which could coordinate a
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settled workforce. They, therefore, had little incentive to
invest in industrial welfare, although there were exceptions
to the general rule. The shipping industry founded an
accident insurance society in 1893, and, on the strength of
the benefits it paid, successfully campaigned to be excluded
from the 1897 Workmen's Compensation Act despite the high
accident rate amongst mariners.^ While it was acknowledged
that welfare and profitsharing little affected the lives of
casual labourers, the cost of labour turnover could be
reduced by enlisting the loyalty of a "cadre of permanent 
2
employees". Sick allowances and schemes which supplemented 
employers' liability payments were to be found in the docks 
industry which differentiated between permanent employees 
and "casuals". Discretionary pensions were sometimes paid. 
Welfare and permanent employment were often anti-union 
tools,- permanently employed supporters of London's 1911 
dock strike, for example, were replaced by "free labour". 
Many dock companies invested in sporting, social and canteen 
facilities, particularly during and following the Great 
War.^ The employment of "core" workers at the general 
builders G.F .Trollopes in the 1860s was noted as a common 
practice of the industry. Discretionary benefits were paid
1. Liberty Re v i e w , 24th Feb 1894, p . 193; Hansard, 26 
March 1906, 4th ser., vol.154, cols.913-914.
2. J.Ramage "Profit-Sharing and Co-Partnership in
Great Britain" in Gannet & Catherwood (1939),
pp.261-62.
3. PP 1892 (C. 6708-V) xxxv 1, Q s . 4590,6906-7155 ;
J.G.Broodbank History of the Port of London 
(1921), p . 448, & ch.26,s.8; PP 1899 (C.9203)
xxxiii 871, Qs.143-223; Shipbuilding and Shipping,
6 Feb 1919, p . 169; Industrial W elfare, May 1921, 
pp.191-2.
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in large and small firms throughout this period. John Laing 
by the 1920s and 1930s had canteens and lodging facilities, 
and an ex gratia fund for permanent employees which covered 
sickness and old age, widows and orphans pensions, and paid 
h o l i d a y s .^
The situation of these industries differed markedly 
from the circumstances of public utilities and natural 
monopolies. Competition in the provision of transport and 
fuel caused the unnecessary duplication of services. They 
could depend on steady rates of return with which to fund 
industrial welfare. The profitsharing and welfare policies 
of the St Marlyebone Electric Supply Company in 1913 aimed 
to rid workers of their worries about their economic 
security in the event of sickness, accidents, and death. 
Housing was also provided. Such "Applied Psychology" was 
based on the principles of the "model employer" George 
Livesey of the South Metropolitan Gas Company.^ 
Profitsharing was later provided for under the London 
Electricity Supply Act 1925. It allowed schemes to be 
founded without each company having individually to seek 
Parliamentary permission. Extensive welfare services were
1. A.D.Webb "The Building Trade" in Webb & Freeman 
(1912); PP 1867 (C. 3980-1 ) xxxix I, Qs. 2880-2947 ;
Master Builders Association J ournal, Feb 1898,
pp.15-16,31; PP 1920 (C.544) xxiii 765, p p . 119-20;
R.Coad L a i n g :__ the Biography of Sir John W.Laing,
C.B . E . , (1879-1978) (1979), p p . 68,93, 95,141; Team 
Sp i r i t , Nov 19 46.
2. Cf. Chs.2,3.
3. A.H. Seabrook The Management of Public Electric
Supply Undertakings (1913), pp.II,15,19-20,22,
23-24,26-7. Cf. C h . 3, s.(iii).
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also available in local and municipal transport concerns.^
Many tramway companies had founded friendly societies by the 
2
1890s. The North Metropolitan Tramways Provident Society in 
1904 collected weekly subscriptions of 6d in return for 
l7/6d a week sick pay over a three month period and for 8/9d 
in the following quarter. £200 were awarded as a death 
benefit. The company donated 6s a member every year.^ The 
London Traffic Combine, a holding-company incorporated in 
1902 to coordinate London's transport services, held that 
industrial welfare for their 46,000 workers was second in 
importance only to questions of wages and hours. Social, 
sporting, and cultural associations, convalescent homes, 
sick pay, and discretionary pensions were available. When 
London Transport was formed in 1933, it inherited and 
continued the large number of welfare facilities promoted by 
the Combine. The L.T. Sports Association began to coordinate 
the activities of the sporting clubs throughout the new 
company, and a Chief Welfare Officer was appointed in 1937. 
Friendly societies were numerous, and the Benevolent Fund, 
which helped in all cases of financial distress, had 68,000 
m e m b e r s .^
This chapter generally analyses welfare in major
1. PP 1890-91 (C.6267) Ixxviii 15; Electric Railway
and Tramway J ournal, 2 Jan 1914, p . 7; 16 Jan 1914,
p . 49; 13 Feb 1914, p.112; 3 Jan 1919, p . 2; 10 Jan
1919, p . 7.
2. P.S.Bagwell in Wrigley (1982), p . 246.
3. East London Observer, 6 Feb 1904 , p . 5.
4. Un i t y , Nov 1930, pp.167-170; H.A.Clegg Labour 
Relations in London Transport (1950), p p . 154-66.
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competitive industries which have not been covered in the 
previous case-studies. But it must be remembered that, as it 
does not rely on company records, much of the evidence is 
impressionistic. The evidence presented, however, does 
correlate with the preceding chapters. Sections (ii), (iii), 
(iv) and (v) review the histories of industrial welfare in 
the staple industries of textiles, coalmining, shipbuilding, 
and engineering. These sections complement Chapter 4 on iron 
and steel production. Section (v i ) looks at other 
traditional trades like paper and glass-making. Sections 
(vii), (viii), and (ix) detail events in the "new"
industries of electrical engineering, motor cars, and food 
and tobacco. They are the archetypal illustrations chosen by 
Chandler of corporate development in the United States, and 
comparisons can be drawn with chemicals in Chapter 5. 
Section (x), on the other hand, looks at the circumstances 
of small-scale production in the footwear industry. It 
reflects the situation of the brewing trade in Chapter 6. 
Section (x i ) will draw comparisons between industries
outlined in this and previous chapters, and sum up the
evidence presented in all the case-studies.
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(ii ) . Textiles.
Pollard shows that many cotton firms tried from the
1830s to create a settled, cooperative labour force. That
decade marked the success of mechanisation and capitalist
production in the cotton industry over domestic outwork, and
saw a brief end to over fifteen years of economic upheaval
and depression. Employers had to build houses alongside
their factories in order to accomodate workers. They
provided sick and accident clubs, libraries, chapels,
sporting facilites and institutes for the communities which
formed around their expanding businesses. Under such
circumstances and particularly within the many factory
villages that were established in isolated areas, it was
impossible to separate work-discipline and community life.^
Large concerns like the Strutts, however, had built
houses for their workers as early as the 1790s, and
constructed community schools and churches soon afterwards.
Indeed, the Strutts claimed that the worst excesses of
insanitation and overwork occurred in less profitable and
less wealthy small workshops. Having trained their workers
in factory production, the firm did not want them to leave
for other employers. A Sick Club was established in the
1820s. Arkwright at Cromford found it necessary to offer
employment to whole families and to provide them with homes
in order to convince them to move from Nottingham, Derby or 
2
Manchester. Paternalism was also an essential feature of
1. Pollard (1964), p p . 513-531? Pollard (1965), 
pp.234-5.
2. R.S.Fitton & A.P.Wadsworth The Strutts and the
Arkwrights, 1759-1830: A Study of the Early
Factory System (1958), p p . 193,246-254.
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other factory villages established in the early part of the
I9th Century, like David Dale and Robert Owen's New Lanark,
Kirkman Finlay s Deanston village, Samuel Greg's Quarry-bank
mill, the Evanses at Darby Abbey, and the Peels' settlements
at Bury. The early factory masters had to overcome the
reluctance of labour to working in mills, particularly when
they were located in remote countryside where adequate water
power could be obtained. David Dale had imported pauper
2
apprentices to New Lanark. McConnel and Kennedy, William 
Hollins, and Ashworth and Company were amongst those which 
established factory communities in the 1830s,^ and Samuel 
Greg still regarded the "restless and migratory spirit" of 
his workers as one of his main problems as an employer.^
Joyce has traced the development of small-firm
paternalism and its influence on Lancashire's cotton mills 
during the middle of the 19th Century.^ Trade cycles and the 
limited resources of small producers, however, limited the 
effectiveness of paternalistic practices.^ Joyce also argues 
that the arrival of the limited company caused the decline
1. Pollard (1964), p p . 513-531; S.D.Chapman The Cotton 
Industry in the Industrial Revolution (197 2), 
p. 55.
2. Chapman (1972), p . 53.
3. C.H.Lee A Cotton Enterprise, 1795-1840; a history 
of McConnel and Kennedy, fine cotton spinners 
(1972); R.Boyson The Ashworth Cotton Enterprise:
The Rise and Fall of a Family Firm, 1818-80
(197 0 ) ; F.A.Wells Hollins and Viyellai A Study in 
Business History (1968). Cf. also Robertson in 
Pollard & Salt (1971), pp.149-153.
4. Quote in Chapman (1972), p.54.
5. Joyce (1980), pp.xiv-xxi. Cf. Ch.l, s.(iv).
6. Dutton and King (1982), pp.59-74.
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of paternalism.^ In the sense of paternalism meaning the 
personal involvement of an owner-employer in the life of a 
local community,- whether in a village or in a district 
within a town,- this is undoubtedly true. Large combinations 
were formed in the cotton spinning and finishing trades by 
the late 1890s, but production and control remained in small 
units, and did not reap some of the benefits of returns to 
scale exploited in the United States.^ Chandler, 
nevertheless, points out how the main emphasis in textile 
management was on improving the methods of machine-tending 
rather than on company organisation,^ and changes in the 
nature of production and labour management in Britain were 
few, English Sewing Cotton was formed in 1897, and the 
paternalistic traditions of each of its constituent 
companies were continued/*
Even before the publicity for industrial welfare during 
the First World War, cotton employers were urged to finance 
company provision as a prophylatic against the resentment 
caused by the monotomy of work.^ The Textile Manufacturer in 
1919 reflected that early paternalism in manufacturing, if 
"not exactly comparable with modern ideas of welfare work", 
had provided the operatives with educational facilities,
1. Joyce (1980), p . 136.
2. A.F.Lucas Industrial Reconstruction and the
Control of Competition (1937), pp . 50-51.
3. Chandler (1977), p . 69. On this issue, cf.
M.W.Kirby "The Lancashire Cotton Industry in the
Inter-War Years: a study in Organisational
Change", B u s .H i s t . (1974), pp.145-159.
4. English Calico Ltd English Sewing Cotton Company
Ltd (19 58), p.5.
5. Textile Manufacturer, 15 Dec 1912, p . 397.
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recreation, and better housing. Such practices had,
consequently, been continued by small firms like Messrs
Burgess, Ledward & Company Limited, which had just begun
building dining, rest and recreation rooms, and laying
bowling, tennis, cricket, and football grounds.^ Although it
was felt by 1920 that the cotton industry had ignored
developments in welfare for nearly two decades, Tootal,
Broadhurst & Lee, Richard Howarth & Sons, Kelsall & Kemp,
John Bright & Brothers, Bannerman & Sons, as well as
Burgess, Ledward & Company, were quoted as notable
2
exceptions during this period.
The cotton industry, deemed die-hard supporters of 
laissez-faire, had not reacted wholly unfavourably to the 
Liberal welfare reforms. Undoubtedly, Sir Charles Macara, 
President of the Association of Master Cotton Spinners, was 
instrumental in founding the Employers Parliamentary 
Association in 1911, which orchestrated an unsuccessful 
campaign against Lloyd George's National Insurance Bill. 
Macara viewed it as damaging to labour-intensive industries 
like coal and cotton.^ The Textile Manufacturer also 
condemned the damage that the 1911 Insurance Act might do to 
the industry's competitiveness, but it believed cotton 
employers would surmount this difficulty. By acquiring the 
benefits of a healthier workforce, they would not "regret
4
having contributed their full share to that end". During
1. Ibid, 15 Feb 1919, p . 32.
2. Ibid, II Sept 1920, p . 256.
3. C.Macara Recollections (1922), pp.217-225.
4. Textile Manufacturer, 15 July 1912, p . 217.
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the Great War, Messrs Eccles at Darwen, Dugdale and Company, 
Messrs E.Heyworth, and W . D .Coddington and Sons installed 
canteen facilities, and working conditions continued to be 
improved after 1918,^
One of the large combines, J. & P. Coats, from its 
founding in 1896, established statistical, and buying and 
selling departments. The lines of communication between the 
central office and the branches were delineated, and 
accounting procedures were standardised. In addition, 
company welfare was increasingly directed centrally and 
eventually placed on a more orderly footing. Coats developed 
what they saw as a proud record of "conditions of working
and w e l f a r e  In 1919, the company introduced
profitsharing,* and, in 1920, a contributory pension scheme 
began providing allowances of 30/- for its women workers at 
56 years.^ Another combine, the Amalgamated Cotton Mills 
Limited founded a profitsharing scheme in 1920.^ The Fine 
Cotton Spinners Association, created in 1898 out of 30 
firms, in 1919 set aside £100,000 to provide pensions for 
its 25,000 workforce. The aim was to encourage "assiduous 
and whole-hearted service", and it enabled the company to
1. Ibid, 27 March 1919, p. 335 ; U n i t y , May 1920 , p . 7.
2. P.L.Payne "The Emergence of the Large-scale
Company in Great Britain, 1870-1914", EHR (1967), 
P P .519-542.
3. J . & P.Coats Ltd The News R e e l , June 1947,
p p . 10-11,23.
4. PP 1920 (C.544) xxiii 765.
5. Textile Manufacturer, 15 May 1920, p . 542.
6. Ibid, 30 Oct 1920, p . 440.
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have its pick of job-applicants,^ The Association believed
that, by meeting the demands for economic and social
security amongst its workers, it would secure industrial 
2
peace. T o o t a l , Broadhurst and Lee, which remained a 
loosely-run federation throughout the Inter-War period,^ 
nonetheless initiated profitsharing in 1919,  ^ and in 1923
established a contributory Pension Fund. Opera and sports 
societies were also supported by the company.^ The Spirella 
Company of Great Britain advocated a Scientific Management
which took account of the importance of the human element.
By the late 1920s, works committees, death and sick
benefits, pensions, sports and recreation clubs were 
available at the firm.^ In 1920, moreover, the Cotton 
Reconstruction Committee took charge of a fund to pay 
accident allowances above that due from Act of Parliament.^ 
In 1923, Industrial Welfare concluded that leading 
employers in the textile finishing trades, the "combines" 
established in the 1890s, had pursued a very enlightened 
policy in regard to the well-being of their workpeople. The 
Bradford Dyers Association, for example, had by 1920 
introduced copartnership and sick pay. By 1925, the
Association had founded a pension scheme for staff and
1. Ibid, 15 June 1919, p . 160.
2. Ibid, 19 June 1920, pp.683-4.
3. Hannah (1979), p.87.
4. Textile Manufacturer, 15 Sept 1919, p . 2 57.
5. U n i t y , Aug 1930, pp.120-122.
6 . U n i t y , Feb 1929, pp.328-30.
7. Textile Manufacturer, 31 July 1920, p.98. Cf.
Ch.9, s.(vi).
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operatives as an approved society under the recently-passed
Pensions Act.^ The Bleachers Association in 1926 felt that
since their founding in 1900 they had been able to establish
better working conditions because of the market strength
amalgamation had given them. Costs between the various
branches could be compared and economies made. Horizontal
amalgamation had allowed the new company to be sure of its
sellers market. Its very size allowed its directors "to
develop certain welfare schemes...which would have been
impossible, or in any case difficult, for the individual
firms to have carried out". Concern for the human side of
industry was seen as contributing in large measure to the
success of the company. Its housing stock, much of it
inherited from the efforts of local and once independent
firms, was improved. Customary retirement allowances
available from works managers were replaced after a grant of
£325,000 to a central Superannuation Fund. It was
non-contributory, remained under the complete control of the
directors, and paid discretionary pensions to men with 50
years' service. Special help was available for those in
financial need because of sickness, and sporting facilities
2
were further developed.
The Linen Thread Company, formed in 1898, also 
continued the paternal practices of the firms which composed 
it. By 1914, model villages at Hilden, Gilford, and
1. NCEO Archive, MSS 200/B/3/2/C645 Pt.l,
Correspondence with BDA, 9 & 13 June 1925; PRO
LAB2/716/186/1920, Memo, on works committee.
2. Industrial W e l f a r e , June 1923, pp.154-7; Bleachers
Association Concerning the Bleaching Industry
(1926 ), pp. 36-37 ,46-49 .
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Kilburnie contained schools, medical facilities, and
community centres.^ As early as the 1790s, the flax-spinners
Marshalls of Leeds had encouraged its men to form a friendly
society covering sickness and death. From the 1830s,
labourers were granted holidays. Fans and blowers regulated
working conditions, and changing rooms, stoves, and baths
were provided. A surgeon, dispensary, admittance to an
infirmary, allotments, schools, and library were other 
2
advantages. Factory villages had existed, moreover, in 
Ulster's linen industry since the 18th Century.^ John 
Martin's, near Shingley,- at first a cotton mill,- became a 
linen firm in 1845, and had an established industrial 
community. Founded in 1846, the firm of the Quaker 
J.G.Richardson built Bessbrook in Newry, with its numerous 
educational and social facilities, as a model village. The 
Liddles constructed Donaghcloney in the 1870s. ^
Being less mechanised than the cotton trade, Joyce 
argues that the labour demands of the woollen and worsted 
industry in Yorkshire were different and did not favour the 
development of industrial paternalism.^ But it is the 
implications of the employment-relationship in any context
1. Linen Thread Company The_Faithful Fibre (1956).
Cf. also Industrial Welfare, May 1920, p p . 156-7.
2. W.G.Rimmer Marshalls of Leeds, Flax-Spinners,
1788-1886 (I960), pp.80-1,105-6,108-9,119-21,
216-7,121,216.
3. Cf. D.G.Lockhart "The Linen Industry and the
Advancing of Towns and Villages in Ireland, 
1700-1750", Textile History (1977), p p . 183-5.
4. Meakin (1905), pp.419-20.
5. Joyce (1980), pp.xx-xxi.
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and the need for income-maintenance which explain the 
necessity for industrial welfare.^ Indeed, Sir Titus Salt of 
Bradford was famous for the practice of paternalism. His 
mills had good lighting, ventilation, and heating, and 
Saltaire from the 1860s was served by a public-dining hall, 
church, schools, baths and washhouse, almshouses, infirmary, 
club and institute, and a park. The village's 600 houses 
had cost a total of £100,000 to build. Samuel Akroyd's 
constructed the Halifax suburb of Akroyden. Benjamin Gott's 
woollen mill and the Worsley complex of enterprises were 
further examples of paternalism in the woollen and worsted 
industry.^ Profitsharing as adopted at Thomson's of 
Huddersfield in 1886 derived from George Thomson's Ruskinite 
philosophy. The scheme succeeded because it genuinely sought 
to involve workers in the management of the firm through a 
committee of elected directors. A Provident Fund provided 
pensions and sick pay.^ Taylors, which dominated the town of 
Batley, had a wholly different and autocratic view of 
industrial welfare. A Sunday school and a Temperance Hall 
instilled the moral views of the employers. In the 1860s, a 
hospital, maternity home, Christmas gifts and socials were 
bestowed on Batley. The firm adopted profitsharing for the
1. Cf. Ch.I, s. (i),(iii),(iv).
2. Owen (1965), p p . 381-386; Pollard (1964),
p p . 513-531; Meakin (1905), p p . 416-7; Ashworth 
(1950-1), pp . 378-7. Cf. also T.Balgamie Life of 
Sir Titus Salt (1877), & A.Holroyd Saltaire and
its Founder (1871). Cf. also J.G.Reynold in 
Bibliography.
3. Pollard ( 1965 ) , p . 235.
4. R.B,Perks "Real Profitsharing: William Thomson &
Sons of Huddersfield, 1886-1925", Bus.Hist. 
(1982), p p . 156-74.
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whole workforce in 1896, but control of the scheme was not 
given to the workers. The town's remoteness limited labour 
turnover and made profitsharing an effective anti-union 
tool. A Workers' Benefit and Sick Fund was founded in 1903.^ 
In 1892, Messrs Martin of Huddersfield and Kay & Crowthers 
of Lockwood established mill committees in order to improve 
communication and to reduce the possibilities of a strike, 
a policy still favoured by wool and worsted employers in the 
1930s.3
Beginning as silk-spinners and producers of fine crepe, 
Courtaulds emerged as one of Britain's foremost companies by 
exploiting the development of rayon. The U[rvitcx.niolH  
Courtauld family believed it exercised a stewardship over 
its labour force. Its workers were subjected to strict 
industrial discipline, but the firm rejected the notion of 
obtaining the greatest level of output for the cheapest 
wages. Samuel Courtauld spoke of a "Social Economy" which
bound employers and workers. The value of work skills was
1. S.Pollard & R.Turner "Profit-Sharing and
Autocracy: The Case of J.,T.,& J.Taylor of Batley, 
Woollen Manufacturers, 1892-1966", B u s .H i s t . 
(1976), pp.4-34. Cf. also T.C.Taylor One Hundred 
Years: Records, Recollections, and Reflections
(1946); G .A.Greenwood Taylor of Batley: A Story of 
102 Years. (1957 ) .
2. PP 1892 (C.6708-VI) xxxiv I,
Q s . 4898-99,4902-3,5048.
3. D.R.H.Williams Textile Factory Organisation and 
Management (1934), p p . 49-50. Examples of 
industrial welfare can also be found in other 
aspects of the woollen industry. Cf. A.Plummer &
R.E.Early The Blanket Makers, 1669-1969: A History 
of Charles Early & Marriot (Witney) Ltd (19 69 ) ,
pp . 78-9,8 3 ,104,123,147-8 ,1 59-60; W.Ross Crombies
of Grandholm and Co t h a l , 1805-1960 (197 5 ) ,
pp.135-138. The carpet-makers John Crossley's of 
Halifax built the suburb of West Hill Park (cf.
Owen (1965), pp.381-2). Cf. also J.N.Bartlett
Carpeting the Millions: the growth of Britain's
carpet industry (197 8 ) .
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recognised, and Courtaulds, rather than sacking workers
during a decline in trade, preferred to retain labour by
putting them on short-time. Fetes and social functions were
held for workers. Hostels were available for the many young
girls employed at the Courtauld factories. The firm also
built cottages, and provided schools, libraries, workmen's
clubs, provident societies, a hospital, and a convalescent
home. Pensions were paid directly by the partners until 1897
when an ex gratia fund was established. Paid holidays were
given by the 1890s. Even after Courtaulds became an
international enterprise, the founding family remained
firmly in control. Welfare, consequently, seems to have
remained discretionary.^ Examples of extensive welfare can
also be found amongst other silk firms. John Heathcot of
Tiverton, Devon had founded by the 1920s sick pay, pensions,
profitsharing, and works councils. The schemes were
systematically organised in order to remove fears of
destitution amongst the workers, and the firm's manager,
John Amory, believed that the actions of Liberal Progressive
employers like themselves had complemented the work of
2
Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith in government. Ford, Ayrton 
dominated the village of Low Bentham and provided extensive 
benefits and community facilities.^ The North British Rayon 
Company created a public utility society in 1919 to provide
1. D.C.Coleman Courtaulds t ^  economic and social
history (1969), Vol.I, pp.230-60, & Vol.II,
pp. 155-70,429-59 ; C .H .Ward-Jackson A History of
Courtaulds (1941), p p . 45-6,50-1,60.
2. W.Gore Allen John Heathcot and his Heritage
(19 58 ) , pp.126 , 14 5 , 148-9 , 151-5 , 161 ,166-7 , 181-2.
3. E.R. & J.H.P.Pafford Ford, Ayrton & Company Ltd,
Silk Spinners (1974), pp . 2-3,7,14,48, 53-55,58.
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industrial housing at Jedburgh.^
Industrial welfare in the textile industries was with 
few exceptions ex gratia. It enabled firms which faced
volatile or declining markets to trim expenditure according 
to resources. The holding-company structures which were 
formed in cotton spinning and the finishing trades sought to 
consolidate their workforces by expanding outlays on 
welfare. Centralised discretionary pensions and
copartnership funds appear to have been seen as 
interchangeable policies in the 1920s. They supplemented but 
did not replace the traditions of small firm paternalism, 
because the operations of the units within holding-companies 
generally remained untouched by changes in ownership. 
Textiles did not have the industrial structure nor the
management to invest heavily in systematic welfare
expenditure.
1. NCEO Archive, MSS/200/3/2/C591. Memo. on housing 
conditions. Cf. Ch.9, s.(v).
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(iii). Coalmining.
Although the ownership of the coalmining industry 
remained anarchic and fragmented throughout this period,^ 
coal-owners did cooperate in the provision of industrial 
welfare. The strategical importance of coal as an energy 
source and the need to pacify and cooperate with a cohesive 
and well-organised workforce moulded coalmining's industrial 
relations and involved the government directly in matters of 
strikes, hours, and wages. The work-experience and skill of 
the miner was important in a largely unmechanised industry, 
and the 1887 Mines Act required a man to have two years' 
employment before he could work underground alone. The 
community welfare of the industrial village, the permanent 
relief societies established in the 1870s, and the Miners' 
Welfare Fund founded in 1920 were the three major elements 
of the industrial provision which developed in the 
coalmining industry during this period to cope with its 
special circumstances.
Benson has pointed out that company villages were not
2
necessarily the norm for many miners. A tradition of "free" 
houses in Durham and Northumberland, however, had grown with
1. cf. M.W.Kirby "Government Intervention in 
Industrial Organisation: Coal Mining in the 
19 30s", Bus.Hist. (1973), p p . 160-73.
2. J.Benson British Coalminers in the I9th Century: A
Social History (1980), pp.82-88. Cf. also
M.J.Daunton "Miners' Houses: South Wales and the 
Great Northern Coalfield, 1880-1914", I.R.S.H. 
(1980), pp.143-175; & "Down the Pit: Work in the
Great Northern and South Wales Coalfields, 
1870-1914", Econ.H.R. (1981), pp . 578-597.
307
the binding" system which was abolished in 1844,^ Many of
the earliest reading rooms and lending libraries provided
for mining communities appear to have been little used and
were eventually closed. But the colliery communities
established in the 1860s, preceding a sustained period of
economic growth, survived intact. The success of the Mickley
Colliery Workingmen s Institute, providing lectures,
concerts, and a library, depended upon the active interest
2
of the company agent. Denaby Main, built wholly by the 
local colliery, had schools, churches, a hotel, sports, 
water and gas supplies, an operatic society, and a large 
hall. Such paternalism was not a symptom of good industrial 
relations, but of the need to contain bitter 
class-conf1 ict.  ^ The Colliery Guardian praised the social 
facilities made available by Mercer and Evans to cope with 
the urban expansion of Wigan and Ashton-in-Mackersfield. It 
argued that "kindness" rather than wages won the cooperation 
of workers, because a bond beyond the cash-nexus militated 
against strikes and established mutual obligations. 
Festivals and celebrations gave expression to the 
paternalistic relations at the firm.^ Mining companies
1. H.F.Bulman Coal Mining and the Coal Miner (19 20), 
p . 247.
2. Colliery Guardian, 26 Jan 1861, p . 51. For examples
in other pits, cf. Ibid, 9 March 1861, p . 154; 28
Dec 1861, p . 438; & Gwent R.O., MISC MSS 1147, The 
Tredegar Iron and Coal Company, 1873-1923 .
3. J.MacFarlane "Denaby Main: a South Yorkshire
mining village" in J.Benson & R.G.Neville (eds)
Studies in the Yorkshire Coal Industry (19 76 ) ,
pp.112-3,115,117.
4. The Colliery Guardian, 26 Jan 1861, p . 53; 2 Feb 
1861, p.72.
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continued throughout the 19th Century to construct 
industrial homes either to attract workers to the location 
of isolated coal-seams or to overcome shortages in urban 
housing. The model Woodlands Colliery Village, near 
Doncaster, was built by the Brodsworth Main Colliery in 
1907.1
Under the Coal Mines Act 1911, a two-thirds vote by
miners could compel employers to install pit-head baths,
although the Wharncliffe Silkstone Colliery had put up
2
washhouses in 1902. By the 1900s, nearly every coalfield
had its own miners' institute.^ The institute at Kelty,
although administered by miners, was a personal gift from 
the company chairman. The Fife Coal Company wanted to 
involve workers in the running of welfare facilities, and
began to encourage individual house-ownership. Cooperation 
and good home conditions improved industrial relations, 
whereas a sense of dependence on the part of the workers was
4
perceived by the company as detrimental. After the Great 
War, the Housing Department was reorganised and a Housing 
Manager was appointed. In 1927, a Convalescent Home was 
established for aged and infirm workers.^ After 1918, Harden 
Collieries began laying a new village with an institute, 
theatre and church. The Brodsworth Company constructed a
1. Ashworth (1950-1), pp.378-87. Cf. GLRO, LCC 
Housing Sub-Committees, Presented Papers N o . 9.
2. Bulman (1920), p.252.
3. Benson (1980), pp . 152-3.
4. K.Durland Among the Fife Miners (1904), p . 109.
5. A.Muir The Fife Coal Company Ltd (1953?), 
pp.82-84. Cf. Gwent R.O., GKN Archive, D . 409.21.
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jointly-administered workmen s club with a wide variety of
social facilities. Emerson Bainbridge, Sanquhar and
Kirkconnel, William Baird, and the Maltby and Rossington
Colliery, which spent £5,000 on an institute, also expanded
their community welfare in the 1920s.^
During the Inter-War period, owners in the expanding
coalfields of the East Midlands sought to ensure their
investment by the building of company villages. They were
convinced that colliery houses and the provision of numerous
social and sporting facilities enabled them to exercise
influence over their miners. 54% of the colliery housing
erected between 1918-25 was constructed in the East
Midlands. Paternalism and welfare encouraged deferential
behaviour. It, therefore, helped George Spencer to establish
the Nottinghamshire Miners Industrial Union, which during
its brief existence from 1926-1937 practised the principles
of mutual cooperation rather than conflict with employers.
The Nottinghamshire coal-owners also generally refused to
recognise the official union and prevented it from
2
collecting dues at the pits.
The founding of permanent relief societies from the
1870s onwards demonstrated that the traditional pit-club was
unable to provide adequate accident provision. They were
small, accumulated no reserves, and set subscriptions with
1. Bulman (1920), pp.265,271-2,274,277-8,282,284,
286-289,304,307,312-3.
2 . R.J.Waller The Dukeries Transformed: the Social
and Political Development of a Twentieth Century 
çyâ ï fï^ïd [1983), pp.75-130,189-207,254-260, 
275-280.
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little calculation of the potential liabilities involved.^ 
Colliery employers had granted relief to injured employees 
or their widows, and company clubs had in some cases been 
extended to cover medical treatment and ordinary sickness. 
The Alloa Colliery fund paid for school-fees, medical care, 
christening bonuses, widows' allowances, sick pay and 
pensions in return for contributions of 8 d per week. In 
1869, Messrs Grouchett and Sons' men thanked their employer 
for his "kindness in introducing the system of assuring the 
colliers of the firm..." against accidents. Joining the 
provident fund at the Stavely Company, as in many clubs, was 
a condition of service, and its workers' committee by 1880 
was in charge of £65,000. The company preferred joint mutual 
funds rather than taking out a policy with an insurance 
firm.^ Employers usually controlled pit-clubs, and could
4
arbitrarily refuse payment.
As colliery funds were usually actuarially unsound, 
relief for the victims of major accidents depended upon 
public appeals. In 1861, The Colliery Guardian depicted 
pit-clubs as an outdated hinderance to labour-mobility and 
suggested the formation of a national and financially-viable 
institution. The men had to take the initiative and support 
themselves but, "Having done so, they will find abundant
1. E.Melbourne The Miners' Unions of Northumberland 
and Durham (1923), pp . 83-4.
2. Iron and Coal Trades Review, 20 Oct 18 69, p.575.
3. Colliery Guardian 4 June 1880, p . 901.
4. Benson (1980), pp.177-201.
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assistance flow towards them from their employers",^ After
the Oaks disaster in 1862, some West Yorkshire
co l 1 iery-owners tried to establish a county-wide friendly
society, but the majority was content to rely on individual
pit-clubs. The size of benefits which an employer felt
obliged to pay after another tragedy in 1875 finally
persuaded the Yorkshire industry of the advantages of
actuaria1ly-ca1culated schemes. By enlisting contributors
and determining benefits, they would, at least, place a
ceiling on any awards to be made. It was felt that a 20%
donation to a joint, independent fund would establish
industrial goodwill, and the West Riding Miners' Permanent
2
Relief Fund was founded.
By 1892, the Northumberland and Durham Miners' 
Permanent Relief Fund Friendly Society, founded in 1862, had
108,000 members, and provided allowances for widows and 
orphans. A superannuation fund, begun in 1874, paid pensions 
to men over 60 or to any unfit to work. Income came from 
members' contributions, donations from employers, charitable 
subscriptions, and investments. Members of the Monmouthshire 
and South Wales Permanent Provident Society, which covered 
accident compensation, were generally members of other 
friendly societies catering for sick benefits and pensions, 
but the Society began organising a contributory pension 
scheme in 189 9.^
1. Colliery Guard i a n , 2 Feb 1861, p p . 71-72.
2. PP 1892 (C.6078-1) xxiv 1, Q s .2468-2539.
3. Ibid.
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110,000 miners contracted out of the 1880 Employers
Liability Act through the relief societies of which they
were members. Colliery employers argued that they could not
afford to pay both donations to the funds as they stood and
liability under the Act. They wanted through contracting out
exclusion from the terms of the legislation.^ The miners'
leader, Burt, believed that coal-owners were willing to
increase contributions in order to fund contracting out,
because it was cheaper than paying liability and
implementing strict safety procedures. In all cases except
that of the Northumberland and Durham Fund during the 1880s,
employers remained represented on the societies' committees.
In the North East, the miners rejected in a ballot the
employers' suggestion to contract out. As a consequence, the
employers transferred their indemnity to insurance
companies. Before the ballot, some two-thirds of employers
had participated and subscribed 12.5% of the Fund's income.
Following the vote, some owners withdrew altogether and the
remainder provided 5.7% of the contributions. The Society
was put into debt. Employers were, however, involved in pit
clubs that collected "smart" money to cover the early weeks
of injury which, under the Act, did not entitle victims to 
3
compensation.
Events in other coalmining regions occurred 
differently. The North Staffordshire organisation altered
1. Colliery G uardian, 4 June 1880, p p . 892,897.
2. R.N.Boyd Coal Pits and Pitmen (1895), p . 236-7.
3. PP 1892 (C.6708-1) xxxiv 1, Q s .2468-2539.
313
its rules to suit the Act. A local miners leader himself
obtained changes in the rules of the Lancashire and Cheshire
Society in case the employers established an alternative
masters relief fund. Owners' contributions were, as a
consequence, increased by 1 0 % to 25%, and allowances for
accidents were improved by 2s to 10s. But the agreement was
ended after a strike was called on another issue.
Company-based contracting-out through pit-clubs became
common in Yorkshire and South Wales. Pit-clubs could also
pay benefits which were supplementary to awards made under
the Act or by permanent societies. In agreement with the
North Wales Fund, local employers increased their donation
from 10% to 25% and allowances from 6 s to 7s. Contracting
out became a condition of employment in West Lancashire.^
Colliery-owners, therefore, had good reason to be prominent
opponents of the controversial 1893 Employers' Liabilty Bill
2
which proposed ending the right to contract out.
The permanent relief funds expanded rapidly because of 
an essential administrative convenience. Employers normally 
allowed them to deduct contributions directly from 
wage-packets. By 1892, therefore, some 275,000 miners were 
members of some permanent society. The West Riding Miners' 
Permanent Relief Fund grew in membership until 1908. In that 
year, the Yorkshire Coal Owners Mutual Indemnity Company 
Limited, which had contracted out of workmen's compensation 
and was separate from the permanent relief fund, halted the
1. Ibid, Q s . 8264-8328,8504-62.
2. Colliery Guardian, 9 June 1893, p.1061; 17 May,
p . 985; 31 May, p.1098; 7 June, p . 1132.
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fund s collection of contributions direct from wages.^ The 
relief funds were incorporated into the 1911 National 
Insurance Act as Approved Societies.^ Moreover, sick and 
pension pit-clubs continued into the 20th Century. Company 
benefit societies at the Fife Coal Company in 1904 collected 
subscriptions for sick and accident pay, death grants, and 
funeral expenses.^ Messrs. Newton & Chambers helped in cases 
of accident, sickness, and widowhood. Pensions were 
available at 65 years.^
Welfare provision in coalmining was changed greatly by 
legislative interference after the Great War. The Miners' 
Welfare Fund was established in 1920 to coordinate 
industrial welfare in the collieries.^ It was set up by Act 
of Parliament as a pallid alternative to nationalisation, 
and was financially supported and controlled by the 
employers. The Sankey Report in 1919, commissioned in order 
to stave off industrial strife in the coalfields, proposed 
either nationalisation or "joint control". Lloyd George, 
unwilling to countenance nationalisation, agreed to a 
diluted form of "joint control" through two channels. Pit 
representation committees would discuss industrial welfare
1. J.Benson "The establishment of the West Riding
Miners' Permanent Relief Fund" in Benson & Neville 
(eds) ( 1976 ) , pp. 92-102 .
2. Colliery G u a r d i a n , 2 Aug 1912, p . 246. Cf. C h . 9, 
ss.(ii),(iii).
3. Durland (1904), p p . 131-5.
4. Colliery G u a r d i a n , 29 March 1912, p . 632.
5. POWE 1/47, Annual Report to the Board of Trade
1923 .
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but not actual management. Miners, however, would be able to
elect a number of directors to Area Boards which could
consider production matters and wages. The industry was to
be regulated through the Department of Mines at the Board of
Trade, a National Board, Area Boards, and District and Pit
Committees. Pit committees were directly financed by the
owner, while higher bodies were paid out of a tonnage levy.^
A central Miners Welfare Fund would cooperate with these
bodies to try and improve miners' social conditions which
were held to be the seed-bed of their militancy.
The Government was suggesting, therefore, a traditional
formula of works committees and industrial welfare. The
employers, however, ensured that the miners were denied a
voice in production matters and given a minimal say in
welfare provision. The 1920 Act stated that if within one
year of its passing joint committees were not appointed they
would be a dead-letter. Following industrial strife in
1920-21, the owners refused to found district joint
committees. The Miners Welfare Committee was legally obliged
to consult with these joint committees before it could
allocate any funds, and their absence held up grants in
1921. By September, the Secretary of Mines suggested that ad
hoc joint "District Welfare Committees" be appointed as an
alternative. Their constitutions were determined locally,
and were never placed on a regular footing. The 1927 Statute
Law Revision Act repealed legislative mention of the joint
councils "thus emphasising the purely voluntary character of
1. Hansard, 18 Aug 1919, 5th s e r . , vol.119, 
cols.1996-2003 ,2007-8; Ibid, 30 June 1920, 
vol.131, c o l s .479,482-3,487-94,585-7.
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the machinery which had been set up for the assistance of 
the Miners' Welfare Committee".^
Originally, the Miners Welfare Committee was to 
determine the allocation of grants but from the outset it
merely acted on the recommendations of the District Welfare 
2
Committees. This decision was defended on the grounds that 
it was the best way of obtaining work-face cooperation.^ 
District Committees, in their turn, dealt with applications 
from the colliery committees which organised institutes, 
sports, and recreation at the pits.^ The Miners' Welfare 
Fund was based on the legislated provision of industrial 
welfare as a right to miners. Yet the Committee decided in 
1922 that claims under £500 would not be investigated in 
detail on the grounds that "It was clear that the mining 
community would derive benefit from such a scheme, even if 
it was under the Company's ultimate control".^ The Fund had 
become so decentralised that it served the interests of the 
colliery companies. Evan Williams, President of the Mining 
Association of Great Britain, in 1932 argued that it was the 
joint committees at company-level which had been the Fund s 
one success, and he objected to the notion of a centralised, 
statutory fund.
1. POWElO, BX3/3. Committee of Inquiry, Paper N o . 2, 
Origin of District Welfare Committees, 1932.
2. Ibid.
3. POWEl/45. Circulars of MWF, 1921-23. Cf. statement 
by C.S.Mason, South Wales Organiser of the IWS to 
the Central MWF Committee: POWE 1/47, 1st Annual 
Report 1921-22, pp.8-9.
4. POWElO, BX3/3, Committee of Inquiry, Paper N o . 7.
5. POWEl/1. Miners Welfare Committee Minutes, 28 
March 1922.
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That many employers agreed with him was illustrated by 
the welfare work carried out by companies in addition to the 
Fund. Early in 1920, the M.A.G.B. contacted the Industrial 
Welfare Society to discuss the promotion of schemes.^ The 
Society received a £2,000 grant from the Welfare Fund in 
1923 for its work in collieries, and District Boards 
independently added to this amount in their areas.^ 
Ashington, an employer of some 10,000 miners, preferred to 
deal with the I.W.S. direct. It funded its own welfare 
activities and used M.W.F. grants to build only pit-head 
baths. The colliery provided recreation grounds, and its 
model village of Lynemouth was served by a local hall and
4
cinema. It was recognised that an essential advantage of
the Fund was its ability to concentrate its resources on 
"backward" employers. In the 1920s, the Mining Association, 
therefore, favoured the private I.W.S. replacing the state's 
central Miners' Welfare Committee as administrators of the 
Fund. The Fund, in any case, was heavily dependent on the 
advice and professional services of the Society.^
The statutory scheme was jeopardised by the Great 
Depression. Some owners questioned whether they could afford 
to pay for the Fund, and the M.A.G.B. argued for a reduction
1. POWElO, BX3/3. Committee of Inquiry, 23 March 
1932 .
2. Industrial W e l f a r e , June 1920, p.203.
3. POWE 1/1, Miners' Welfare Committee Minutes, 27 
Feb 1923.
4. Industrial W e l f a r e , Feb 1923, p p . 35-40; U n i t y , Dec 
19 30 , pp. 184-186 .
5. POWE 1/1, Miners' Welfare Committee Minutes, 3 Feb 
1921; 29 May 1923.
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in the levy to half-penny a ton.^ Williams stated, however,
that. I am not going to deny for one moment that as between
the owners and the men the welfare schemes have been worked
in the best spirits" and probably contributed to *'the
comparative peacefulness since the 'war' in 1926". One large
combine in Yorkshire, in particular, felt that the welfare
expenditure had significantly benefited industrial
relations. Williams argument was that profits had been
squeezed too hard, and that schemes could be extended by
employer-union negotiations without the interference of the 
2
state. The Fund continued its work in the 1930s, however, 
financing aged miners' homes, clinics, holiday centres, and 
institutes.^
Industrial paternalism was a feature of the mid-19th 
Century coalmining industry, but the inability of separate 
companies to cater for the large numbers of victims caused 
by individual and large-scale tragedies necessitated
cooperation on a regional basis. Actuarial and contributory 
permanent relief funds, which were later extended in order 
to provide sick pay and pensions, existed despite
coalmining's atomised structure. But over-competition 
limited the commitment of owners to these societies, and 
community welfare and company-clubs remained discretionary 
and arbitrary in their application. Faced with the powerful
1. POWElO, BX3/3. Memo, on the M.W.Committee, Paper 
N o . 22, 1932.
2. Ibid, Evidence of MAGB, 23 March 1932.
3. POWE 1/10, Miners' Welfare Committee Minutes, 24 
Jan, 21 March, 16 May, 19 Sept 1939.
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position of the Miners' Federation after the War, government 
and employers agreed to a statutory welfare fund, although a 
change in the economic climate during the 1920s allowed its 
provisions to be undermined. The employers preferred the 
colliery-based arrangements which suited an industry 
composed of small and sometimes marginal firms.
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(iv). Shipbuilding.
The structure of the shipbuilding industry was altered
by the substitution in the 1870s of steel for iron as its
raw material. With the considerable capital costs of steel
production, the industry by 1900 consisted of large firms.
Few, though, were public companies.^ By 1939, shipbuilding
achieved a greater degree of rationalisation than cotton
textiles or coalmining, although the operations of
individual yards remained untouched by corporate 
2
management. Yet the problems of running even one large yard 
did induce changes in works organisation and labour 
management.
The fluctuations in the market for ships during this 
period were a consequence of the changing levels of demand 
in international trade. But the particular sharpness of the 
economic cycles in the shipbuilding industry was a factor of 
the capital costs involved in constructing even a single 
ship. The loss of a contract could ruin a firm, and a 
shipbuilder was, therefore, normally in a weak market 
position. A highly capitalised industry which produced large 
single products was also especially vulnerable to excessive 
competition. Moreover, shipbuilding was basically an 
assembly-operation, and coordination between each stage in 
production was essential. Cost-control and production 
planning, therefore, drove shipbuilding companies towards a 
form of centralised, multi-functional management with common
1. J.R.Parkinson The Economics of Shipbuilding in the 
United Kingdom (1960), c h .1.
2. Lucas (1937), p . 58.
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features throughout the industry. An Estimating Department
prepared tenders with information from the Costing
Department, while a Works Department was in charge of
operations. Management had to coordinate the flow of output,
allocate capital and labour resources between departments,
and balance the levels of work between them. Cost-controls
at every level of production facilitated the drawing up of
tenders and increased competitiveness. The board issued
detailed operational guidelines, and oversaw a hierarchial
management. But the economic vicissitudes of shipbuilding
hindered the development of internal labour markets. They
were essential technologically to an industry which was
reliant upon manual effort and labour skills. Although
skilled craftsmen organised production, employers tried to
maximise their supervisory control over yards as a means of
reducing labour-costs, and incentives and sanctions were
used to encourage loyalty and long-service. Cooperation
enhanced the coordination necessary for the assembly of 
1
s h i p s .
The shipbuilding industry invested heavily in
industrial housing as a solution to labour-supply problems.
1. A.Slaven "Strategy and Structure in the
Shipbuilding Firms on the Clyde" in A.Slaven &
D.H.Alderoft Business, Banking, and Urban History 
(1982). The need for a core of skilled workers was 
illustrated by the effects of the Great Slump. Sir 
Maurice Denny of Denny Brothers in 1937 noted that 
fewer apprentices had been trained in the 1930s 
and that men redundant for many years were not 
immediately employable. The result was a 
bottleneck in production. He put four priorités 
before the shipbuilding industry: achieving a
steadier level of production; cutting costs;
recruiting and training labour; and preserving
industrial peace. Cf. Sir M.Denny The Shipbuilding
Indus try : Rapid_and Substantial Improvement: the
Shipyard"Labour"Situation (19 37 ) .
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Palmers Shipbuilding and Iron Company so dominated Jarrow 
that it was called "Palmer's Town". In the 1860s, the 
company sponsored a building society for its workers, and, 
by 1900, nearly half the town was owned by them. Charles 
Palmer, Jarrow s first mayor and its M.P., built a hospital 
in 1870 and staffed it with a resident doctor and nurses. It 
was financed and administered jointly with the workers.^ 
Palmers established profitsharing in 1903, and, by 1906, 
supported a club, canteen and brass band. Because Glasgow's 
high rents were proving prohibitive for shipyard workers, 
Alexander Stephens and Sons developed a ten acre site to 
house skilled men. William Denny and Brothers owned homes in 
the 1850s, founded Dennystown, and funded friendly societies 
and accident clubs. John Brown's gave precedence to 
supervisory workers in its allocation of cottages, and so 
its housing policy helped the imposition of industrial 
discipline, Glasgow's shipbuilding firms, in addition, often 
awarded houses firstly to "regular" workers. By 1905, 
Beardmores in expectation of naval orders was planning the 
construction of new homes,^ and the Ministry of Munitions,
1. M.Dillon Some Account of the Works of Palmers
Shipbuilding and Iron Company Limited (19 00 ),
p p . 8,11-14.
2. Palmer Re c o r d , Sept 1903, p.27; May 1904,
p p . 126-7; Oct 1906, p.104. On the challenge of 
Pete Curran to the political dominance of the 
Palmer family in Jarrow, cf. A.W.Perdue "The 
Liberal and Labour Parties in North-Eastern 
Politics, 1900-14: the Struggle for Supremacy",
I.R.S.H. (1981), pp.1-24.
3. J.Melling "Employers, Industrial Housing, and the
Evolution of Company Welfare Policies in Britain's 
Heavy Industry: West Scotland, 1870-1920 ,
I.R.S.H. (1981), pp.255-301. Cf. also J.Melling 
(0 d . ) Housing, Social Policy and the State (1980 ) .
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concerned about ship production during the Great War, 
subsidised industrial housing in Glasgow and Barrow.^
The comprehensive labour strategy developed by
A.F.Hills, General Manager of the Thames Ironworks Company,
revealed q  link between labour-costing and welfare in a
highly competitive industry. After a strike in 1889, he
proposed dividing profits above 1 0 % equally between
shareholders and workers. The workers rejected this
proposal, but a Good Fellowship Scheme was founded in 1892.
It was differentiated from profitsharing or the payment of
individual bonuses. The management, in consultation with
workers, would distribute to each department the value of
the savings they had collectively made from each contract
costed at trade union rates. Each section had its own
Fellowship Council and they met monthly to hear the
production results, and the successes and failures of each
department. In 1895, Hills received a workers' testimonial
for introducing an eight hour day, which he claimed was the
2
result of the efficiency produced by Goodfellowship. 
Bonuses were distributed twelve times a year as a constant 
reminder to the men of the scheme s advantages. £80,000 was 
paid in benefits by 1903.
By reducing unit-costs, Goodfellowsip encapsulated the 
principles of Scientific Management. Assessing the
1. Ministry of Munitions (1919), Vol.V, pp.44-5,55 6 ;
Cf. also Shipbuilding and Shipping Record, 3 Jan,
p . 19; 27 June, p.707; 5 Sept 1918, pp.240-1.
2. Thames_____Ironworks Gazette, June 1903,
P P .8-10,25,99-101.
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performance of each department required extensive
bookkeeping, and the company acquired accurate information
on the prime cost of each contract and the profitability of
each department and worker. By 1894 , 3-400 men had been
dismissed at the request of other workers who were asked to
criticise their work-mates' efficiency. The scheme, indeed,
was intended to instill a self-regulating discipline.^
G o o d f e 11owship broke down the sub-contracting system, in
which the ganger could reward himself undeservedly, and
replaced it by managerial measurement and reward. The scheme
was also meant to restore the company's traditional
"friendly feelings" after so much strike bitterness. Hills
realised that "the prosperity of any individual organisation
depends as much upon discipline as upon good will; and I
further learned that the interest of the individual workman
must be guarded and encouraged for the securing of the
common interest of all". A judicious mixture of discipline
and goodfellowship would produce a "corporate patriotism".
In 1895,the company began publishing The Thames Ironworks
Gazette as a means of communication between workers and
management, because, in the interest of industrial morale,
workers had to be confident that the company was well 
2
a d m i n i s t e r e d .
Dramatic and choral societies, a boat club, science 
classes, a cycling club, an Art and Literary Society, a
1. Ibid, Jan 1895, pp.23-24.
2. Ibid, p p . 1-2,23-4; June 1903. pp.99-101
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Temperance League, social clubs, athletic and football 
associations, bands, and a cricket club were supported by 
the company. By 1895, so many clubs had been formed that a 
Federal Council was appointed to coordinate their 
activities. The company was concerned that these groups 
would dissolve as quickly as previous institutions.^ The 
company also organised joint pensions and sickness insurance 
schemes. Hills believed that industrial provision would make 
the introduction of state pensions unnecessary. The 
company's donations accumulated after 25 years to provide an 
old-age income. The combination of three schemes,- sickness, 
pensions, and goodfellowship,- was seen as a sufficient 
guarantor of peaceful industrial relations.^ A joint 
Accident Fund was introduced in 1895 to cover Employers' 
Liability.^ Another fund in 1900 gave aid to the widows, 
wives, and children of employees who had gone as reservists 
to the Boer War.^
Developments at the Thames Ironworks were reflected in 
other shipbuilding firms. W.Denny and Sons set up an 
Accident Fund Society in 1875, although it was disbanded in
1. Ibid, Jan 1895, pp.5,8,14,18-21.
2. Ibid, Jan 1896, p . 32; 1 June 1896, p . 834.
3. PP 1893-4 (C.6795-IV) xxxii 1, Q s . 24,89 3-25,140 
Royal Commission on Labour.
4. Thames Ironworks Gazette, Jan 1896, p.26,
5. Ibid, 31 Dec 1900, p.48.
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1880 with the enactment of Employers Liability.^ In 1878, 
Sir Joseph Armstrong had established a savings bank. The 
company also provided two-thirds of the contributions to an 
accident fund, which was organised by a committee of workers 
and which contracted out of the 1880 Employers Liability 
Act. Incapacity pay was awarded whether the accident was the 
worker s fault or not. A profitsharing scheme was extended 
to the new, amalgamated company of Armstrong-Whitworths when 
it was formed in 1896.^ In 1900, Sir Christopher Furness' 
South Durham Shipbuilding and Iron Company introduced a 
copartnership scheme and a works council into its Hartlepool 
shipyard. The company sought a cure for its constant labour 
strife, but the scheme was abandoned within a few years.^
The Dublin Dockyard Company exemplified the link 
between shipbuilders' industrial welfare and labour supply. 
Founded in 1901, it needed to attract immigrant workers from 
the Clyde. It was calculated that "Economical operating 
depends in great measure upon the harmonious working of all 
factors of production", and that the "personal element 
factor" was crucial. Welfare was the main means of coping 
with work-disaffection. A building with sleeping cubicles, 
social hall, and dining room, and a non-sectarian social 
club were constructed, and private firms were allowed to 
erect homes in the yard. Apprentice s class fees were paid.
1. Denny & Bros Denny, Dumbarton, 1844-1950 (1950), 
p. 13.
2. PP 1893-94 (C.6894-1) xxxii 1, Q . 25,495; PP 1920 
(C.544) xxiii 765. Armstrong-Whitworth was a major 
firm engaged in all sections of the engineering 
industry,- cf. references to Melling in s.(v).
3. W.G.Willis South Durham Steel and Iron Company
Limited (1969), pp.5,10,17.
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Subscriptions for an Accident Fund created by the workmen in
1911 were deducted directly from wages, and in 1920 the
company agreed to donate annually 50% of the total
contributions. The Fund contributed to those local hospitals
which treated the company's workers, and a separate fund
provided for their families.^
The demand for labour during the Great War concentrated
the minds of employers on housing and apprenticeship
schemes. But amalgamations and expansion between 1914 and
1918 also intensified the problems of managing large
enterprises which employers like Hills, Palmer, and Furness
had tried to solve before the War. Messrs Denny was amongst
the first "to put their scheme for the welfare of their
apprentices on a definite basis by the appointment of a
welfare supervisor and the provision of suitable premises."
These schemes led naturally to similar provision for adult
workers. Canteens had been established at all large yards
like Barclay, Curie and Company, Fairfields, and Harland and
2
Wolff by 1918. Directors and partners had become involved 
in a^ hoc negotiations with labour. This was considered
inefficient, "partly because it involves the use of big men 
on small occasions and partly because it lacks the solid 
basis of the sound organisation of Labour affairs". Labour 
Directors were appointed to maintain industrial relations
and to keep employers informed.^
1. J.Smellie Shipbuilding and Repairing in Dublin: A 
Record of Work Carried out by the Dublin Dockyard 
Company, 1901-1923 (1935), p p .1,61-81,168-69,177.
2. Shipbuilding and Shipping Re c o r d , 5 Sept 1918, 
p p . 240-1.
3. Ibid, 7 Feb 1918, p.138.
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Welfare, therefore, began to be organised more formally 
during the War. Barclay, Curie had hired a welfare 
supervisor in 1916 and its Welfare Department by 1919 
provided a recreation room for boys and apprentices, a 
lecture room, and various outdoor sports. The supervisor 
vetted job applicants and kept personnel records. The 
welfare officer in shipbuiding usually had a particular 
pastoral responsibility for apprentices.^ By 1919, The 
Shipbuilding and Shipping Record reported that most yards in 
the Clyde had welfare departments . The workers' search for 
better conditions and a role in management was diverted into 
copartnerhip and works committees.^ It was thought that 
efficiency depended upon a "happy industrial atmosphere", 
and cloakrooms, heating, ventilation, and refreshments added 
to the physical health and psychological contentment of 
workers. But factors outside the works,- recreation as well
4
as housing,- were not "left to chance".
An industry requiring a large number of apprentices had 
an interest in instilling industrial discipline and 
cooperation at an impressionable age. To William Beardmore, 
welfare promoted an esprit de corps and class goodwill. By 
1917, he saw sport as integral to apprenticeship training, 
and created the Patriotic League in Sympathy with Boy 
Welfare. The League became the Boys Welfare Association in
1. Ibid, 18 Dec 1919, pp . 716-17.
2. Ibid, 25 Sept 1919, p . 360.
3. Ibid, 22 May 1919, p.653.
4. Ibid, 1 May 1919, p.556.
5. Ibid, 29 May 1919, p . 745.
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1918 and the Industrial Welfare Society in 1919. it
attracted the support of shipbuilding employers who wanted
to ensure that industry rather than the state controlled 
welfare matters. Boys at Beardmores were placed under a 
Superintendant Supervisor.^ The firm founded a Labour
Bureau, and a welfare department which organised athletics
and youth organisations. Help was given for doctors' bills, 
medicines, and rents.^ In 1917, a self-managed Workers' 
Relief Fund superseded the Local Relief Fund, which had 
helped the dependants of employees on active service, and 
its remit was extended to aiding sick workers and donating 
to hospitals and convalescent homes on their behalf/* A 
Holiday Fund was established in the same year.^ In 1923, 
Beardmores appointed works councils "which were to be 
co-partners with the management in the oversight of 
p r o duction".^
William Beardmore, to whom welfare was an arm of 
industrial efficiency, wanted British industry to study 
carefully "the first principles of the production of 
material in bulk". The Science of Motion Study could
1. Forge N e w s , 4 Sept 1917, pp.2-3. Cf. Ch.8,
ss . (i ) , (iii ) .
2. Ibid, 18 Sept 1917, p . 1-2,4; 4 Oct 1917, p . 2;
Beardmore N e w s , 6 Nov 1917, p . 2; 19 March 1918,
p . 2; 28 May 1919, p . 6.
3. Forge N e w s , 4 Sept 1917, pp.2-3.
4. Ibid, 4 Oct 1917, p . 3; Shipbuilding and Shipping.
R e c o r d , 28 Aug 1919, p.246.
5. Beardmore N e w s , 18 Oct 1917, p.2.
6. J.R.Hume & M.S.Moss Beardmore: the History of the
Scottish Giant (1979), pp . 206-7.
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eliminate the unnecessary movements of each worker.*" Lessons 
in science and technics, designs, and manufacture, volume 
and economy of production, and finally, the relation of both 
employer and employee to all of these" had to be learnt. 
Technology had to be developed with the realities of 
industrial relations in mind, and welfare gained the 
cooperation management needed to minimise labour-costs. 
Beardmore also argued that overcompetition in the 
shipbuilding industry prevented it making satisfactory 
p r o f i t s . ^
Scotts paid similar attention to work-planning in their 
yards. Central managerial control over men and materials
reduced overlapping. Moreover, the company carried out an
"enlightened policy in their treatment of apprentices and 
young tradesmen". A supervisor was responsible for a boys' 
club, a gymnasium, baths, lecture hall, recreation and study 
rooms, and outdoor sports.^ By 1918, a club room was made 
available to adult workers, who could join a number of 
friendly societies.* Messrs A.Stephen and Son established a 
Welfare Department during the War. The Department was 
originally intended to cater for workers during working 
hours only but it gradually expanded its activities into
sport and recreation. It directly employed the apprentices 
and kept careful records detailing their timekeeping and
1. Forge N e w s , 18 Sept 1917, p . 2.
2. Ibid, 4 Oct 1917, p.2.
3. Scotts of Greenock Two Centuries of Shipbuilding
by the Scotts at Greenock (19 20), p.160.
4. Shipbuilding and Shipping Re c o r d , 5 Sept 1918,
p p . 240-1.
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conduct. Each work-shop was supposed to have a "systematic" 
approach to passing on labour-skilIs to apprentices but 
special supervisors were appointed to oversee training. A 
Savings Scheme offered 5% interest, and a works magazine was 
designed to keep employees in touch with welfare 
activities.*" By 1919, John Brown's, Napier and Miller, 
Yarrow s, Fairfield s, Simmons and Company, and Denny 
Brothers had set up welfare departments. Swan, Hunter and 
Wigham Richardson in 1918 built a technical school and
welfare institute for apprentices, and organised sports for 
them.^ The men at Armstrong-Whitworth's Scotswood yard had 
by 1918 subscribed £125,000 to funds "supported by the Works
4
Committee". Palmers in 1919 built a hostel with a dining
hall for 800 men, who were able to use its football pitch,
laundry, and sitting-rooms.^ Profitsharing was reintroduced 
at Palmer's in 1919.^ William Gray's established a 
profitsharing scheme in the same year,^ and later founded a 
recreation ground, institute and a £38,000 convalescent
home.® The Ayrshire Dockyard Company at Irvine financed a 
sports club, a cycling club, library, a male-voice choir,
1. A.Stephen & Son Ltd A Shipbuilding History,
1750-1932 (1932), pp.154,158-63.
2. S h ipbuilding and Shipping Re c o r d , 18 Dec 1919, 
p p . 716-17.
3. Ibid, p . 374.
4. Ibid, 29 Aug 1918, p.222.
5. Ibid, 29 May 1919, pp . 691-3.
6. Ibid, 15 May 1919, p.639.
7. Ibid, 20 March 1919, p.547.
8. Ibid, 22 Jan 1920, p.115.
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and house magazine.*"
Due to the demands of large-scale capital production 
and a highly competitive market, management in shipbuilding 
yards required systemisation. Although costing procedures 
were mainly abandoned in 1916-21 due to the inflated demands 
of wa r-produc t i o n , they were soon reimposed. Yet, the scope 
for corporate management still remained limited by the scale 
of shipbuilding operations. Welfare, nevertheless, became 
centrally directed within firms, and played an important 
role in the industry's labour management. Cooperation and 
loyalty to a firm was important to the process of
shipbuilding. Labour supply, however, was a particular 
problem, and welfare attracted new workers or aided the
training of apprentices. Company provision expanded quickly, 
therefore, during the manpower shortages of the First World 
War. The ordering of welfare into special departments and 
the increase in facilities set a pattern which continued 
largely unchanged throughout the Inter-War years. But the 
extreme fluctuations of trade in shipbuilding prevented the
formation of extensive internal labour markets in companies
and, therefore, the establishment of long-term welfare 
projects like pension schemes.®
Ibid, 25 Sept 1919, p . 360.
Although the industry agreed in 1930 to establish 
the National Shipbuilders Security Limited with 
the object of buying out redundant berths, its 
success was partial.
The Thames Ironworks Company is an exception.
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( V ). The Engineering Industr y .
The engineering industry s complex machinery and 
skilled labour could be better utilised through improved 
shop-floor organisation rather than corporate management.*" 
Its fragmented structure produced over-competition and low 
profitability, and so reduced the opportunities for 
large-scale capital investment. Therefore, the manual 
skills of the workforce, passed on through a self-regulated 
apprenticeship system, were essential to production. The 
employers attempted to exert some control over output by 
trying to undermine the value of the worker's craft. Rather 
than introducing 1ine-production methods or Taylorism, they 
employed non-apprenticed labour, piece-rates, and regular 
overtime. After the defeat of the Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers in the lock-out of 1897, this exercise of 
managerial prerogative was enshrined in the "Terms of 
Settlement" the following year. Yet, the employers' success 
was partial and temporary, and the workforce maintained its 
sense of craft.® Good wages and high labour mobility 
reinforced the engineers' independence,* and encouraged the 
formation of self-reliant and trade union friendly 
societies. The welfare benefits provided by the A.S.E. 
helped it retain members against the employers efforts to 
exercise a greater degree of workplace control, and company 
schemes, therefore, were often designed as an anti-union
1. Chandler (1977), pp.269-72.
2. Channon (1973), pp.150-1.
3. Cf. Zeitlin in Gospel and Littler (1983).
4. Cf. Ch.l, s.(ii).
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strategy. Welfare policies, therefore, often had specific
aims like gaining the loyalty of foremen, and that of the
rapidly-expanding numbers of apprentices and women workers
during the Great War whose employment diluted traditional
practices. But unsystematic management and the craft-status
of the engineers undoubtedly limited the scope of company
provision in the engineering industry.
Tangye Brothers of Birmingham was a prominent company
which recognised the value of retaining direct control over
labour matters. In 1871, Tangyes disagreed with Sir
W.G.Armstrong's opposition to the Nine Hour Day, and stated
that it would deal with labour questions internally rather
than through an employers' association. Tangyes believed
that welfare maintained its labour supply. It was a means of
organising the workforce and was seen, therefore, as
complementing the company's placing of apprenticeship on a
regular footing in the 1900s. Tangyes had, by the 1860s,
established a school and a mess hall serving cooked meals. A
sick visitor appointed in 1871 soon revealed the need for
more medical treatment if men were to return quickly to
work. The Works Dispensary, founded in 1877, was managed by
the company until 1895, when a workers' committee with the
power to appoint medical officers took control. In 1883,
Richard Tangye replaced the four provident societies with a
single self-administered organisation. Costs were lessened
and standard benefits introduced. Members of the new Sick
Club automatically joined the Accident Fund which contracted
1. Melling in Gospel and Littler (1983); &
"Non-Commissioned Officers: British Employers and
their Supervisory workers, 1880-1920 , S o c .H i s t .
(1980 ) , pp. 183-221 .
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out of the 1880 Employers Liability Act. For, "...they 
wished to tie in their new responsibility with the other 
welfare schemes . Tangyes paid generously even in cases of 
accidents caused by the victims themselves. Profitsharing 
was begun by 1891.®
Salters, another prominent Birmingham firm, organised
works outings, and dramatic and choral societies existed in
the 1870s. A Compensation Committee inquired into the
circumstances of each accident and made awards. A Works
Committee advised on conditions at work. Pensions were
introduced in 1901, and an Approved Society was established
under the National Insurance Act "so that instead of
belonging to a vast impersonal concern, they had their own
Society, entirely self-governed..." It was the duty of
shop-mates to visit sick employees and check against
fraudulent claims. The premises of the Works Club, built in
1859 with a library, reading room, recreation room and
dining room, were improved in 1919. A Welfare Committee took
over its administration. In 1928, a social centre with
2
playing-fields was opened at the Salters' old family home.
The Engineer in 1918 felt that insufficient attention 
had been given to works committees as a method of dealing 
with wages, conditions, and "the social side" of industry. 
William Fosters, Listers, John Wrights, Boxfoldia, and
1. R .E.Waterhouse A Hundred Years of Engineering
Craftsmanship, 1857-1957 ; a History _ _ p f _ T a n g y ^
Limi ted (1957 ), pp.59-60 ; PP 1890-91 (C.6267)
Ixxviii 15.
2. M.Bache Salter; the History of a Family Firmu
1760-1960 (1960), pp.82-85.
3. The E n g i n e e r , 31 March 1918, p p . 473-5.
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Beckett, Laycock and Watkinson introduced recreational
facilities after the War. But the chief cause of industrial
unrest was assumed to be labour s lack of social security,
and pensions were particularly important in attracting and
2
keeping workers. Allen and Sons, which had built the 
workers village of Queens Park at Bedford in the 1890s, 
established in 1918 a non-contributory Annuity Fund to 
provide allowances after 25 years' service.®
In 1919, a Works Director at Vickers felt that, despite 
its rapid growth, the company had managed to retain the 
"human touch". Workers, nonetheless, had to recognise their 
status and accept managerial authority. A house magazine 
kept employees in touch with management, and men with long 
service were awarded a gratuity of £10. The Sheffield Works 
Swimming Club was open to all workers, and a works club, 
sports club and canteen were founded at a Coventry 
subsidiary. The Welfare Supervisor at the Erith Works had at
4
his disposal funds for the promotion of welfare activities. 
Vickerstown was a company village which supplied houses for 
its workers. The Sentinel Works (1920) Limited, a public 
utility society, had a tenants committee to organise various 
community facilities.® Short Brothers of Belfast founded 
Shortstown, and Houston and Hornsby of Lincoln were granted
1. Ibid, 8 March 1918, p.203; U n i t y , April 1928, 
p p . 168-9; Sept 1928, pp.248-9; June 1929, 
p p . 393-5; Sept 1932, pp . 130-1.
2. T he E n g i n e e r , 7 Feb 1919, p . 125.
3. W.H.Allen and S o n s , Nov 1948 , p . 5.
4. V i c k e r s N e w s , April 1925 , p . 217; July 1926 , p . 13,
Sept Ï926 , p. 352 ; 15 Nov 1919, p . 5.
5. Industrial W elfare, May 1920, pp.156-7.
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£10,000 under the 1918 Housing Act to construct Swanpool
Garden Suburb to accomodate 3,000 workers.®
Smith s Dock Company believed that welfare was the only
means of solving human problems in industry. Company
provision was not concerned with " getting on' but with
life" in its broadest sense and "its vital essential is that
everybody wishes and works for the well-being of everybody 
2
else". By 1919, indoor and outdoor sports, lectures, and 
canteens were provided and administered by the men.® Smiths 
also had a savings bank scheme.* The Employees' Hospital
Committee paid donations to local institutions on behalf
of the men, and a Yards Benevolent Fund gave further 
assistance.® John Browns had formed a sports club in 1903 at 
their Atlas and Norfolk Works as a means of encouraging 
esprit de c o r p s . In 1938, a welfare officer was appointed to 
coordinate all the companies' sports clubs which existed in 
its various works. John Browns assisted them financially, 
because "The value of such an institution in large 
industrial concerns is almost impossible to over-estimate". 
The board believed, nevertheless, that the clubs had to be 
self-administered if they were to thrive.
Industrial welfare in the engineering industry mainly
1. Works Management, Nov 1919, pp.38-44.
2. Smith's Dock Monthly, Jan 1921, p.785.
3. Ibid, June 1919, pp.6-7.
4. Ibid, July 1920, pp.524-5.
5. Ibid, Aug 1920, p . 581.
6. Sir A.Grant Steel and Ships: t h e j i i s ^ r y  of John
Browns (1950), pp.52-55.
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concerned a minor investment in recreation and conditions of 
work, and generally operated on an ad hoc basis. But 
exceptions like Tangyes and Salters did exist. Moreover,
because Vickers and John Browns were engaged in the more
repititious and more capital-intensive processes of
armaments manufacture, they became large, amalgamated 
companies which established in the Inter-War more
centrally-directed welfare policies.
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(V i ). The Materials Users.
Materials users, like those engaged in the pottery, 
timber, paper, glass, and metal-working industries, also 
inherited paternalistic traditions from the 19th Century. 
Joseph Wedgwood, the famous potters, constructed Etruria as 
a means of retaining skilled workers and instilling factory 
discipline.® Royal Doulton gave financial aid to sick 
employees, and established a social institute in 1892.  ^
Frederick Bralys was granting pensions by 1856, and the 
Morgan Crucible Company started providing for its employees' 
old age in 1883. Morgan's allowed paid holidays in 1891, and 
appointed a joint advisory committee in 1919. By 1929, the 
firm's pension was supplementing the state allowance by E l , 
and, ten years later, family allowances for the children of 
employees who were under 14 years were introduced.®
The City Saw Mills, a timber company, wished to remove 
the "fear of sickness" and accidents, and founded a 
compulsory Mutual Aid Society in 1877. Its committee was 
elected by workers although day-to-day administration 
remained with the management. The firm added £50 for every 
£100 subscribed by employees. The Society was wound up in 
1913 with the implementation of the National Insurance Act. 
But an ex gratia Benevolent Fund to help in cases of 
personal hardship replaced it. In 1927, the Mutual Aid
1. N.McKendrick "Joseph Wedgwood and Factory 
Discipline", H.J. (1961), p p . 30-55.
2. D.Eyles Royal Doulton, 1815-1965 (1965),
p p . 35-6,121.
3. Morgan Crucible Co Ltd Battersea Works^ 1856-1956
(1956), pp . 13,33,36-7; Unity, Jan 1929, pp.312-3.
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society was refounded at the request of the workers, and a
pension fund for staff, foremen, and leading hands was 
created in 1938.®
In 1899, the leading manufacturers of wallpaper
combined to form the Wall Paper Manufacturers Limited. Small
firm paternalism, however, survived within the units which
composed the new company. Potter's retained "the old,
indispensable intimacy between employer and employed,- the
social activities, clubs, and outings..." which had begun
in the 1870s. In the 1920s, WPM was still meeting the
"psychological need" for leisure and developing "a community
spirit". A model housing estate was built at a Cheshire
2
works in 1924. After the Great War, initiatives in welfare 
came from the Joint Industrial Council which WPM dominated. 
The Council was encouraged by the 1925 Pensions Act into 
collecting equal and joint industrial pension conributions. 
Unemployment benefit was supplemented by 50%, and holidays 
with pay were introduced.®
Robinsons of Bristol expanded as a producer of 
speciality wrappers and packagings, and cricket, football, 
and athletic facilities were extended from 1891-1905. Over 
the next six years, a savings scheme, prof itsharing, and a 
convalescent home were founded. A rest-room for girls was 
established in 1912, and a part-time female doctor was also
1. J.L. Carvel One Hundred Years in Timber:____The
History of the City Saw Mills, 1849-1949 ( 19 51 ) , 
p p . 145-7.
2. Wall Paper Manufacturers Ltd WPM: The pattern of__a 
great organisation (19 49).
3. U n i t y , Oct 1929, p p . 455-7. Cf. Ch.9, s.(vi).
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employed. A Temporary Help Committee offered assistance in 
cases of financial difficulty. In 1912, a canteen had been 
built at the Malago factory. "Internal" welfare work for 
male employees began in the 1920s with the appointment of a 
Welfare Officer. Such work was "not managed from cold 
Olympian heights above', for every factory had a workers' 
committee presided over by its manager. The Welfare 
Committee, originally established to promote the company's 
profitsharing scheme, gradually assumed the role of central 
coordinator of all works welfare activities.® By 1929, 
Dickinson's was organising a contributory pensions scheme, 
sickness and death benefits, and unemployment allowances for 
workers laid off for weekly periods. The number of workers 
doubled to 1,000 during the Inter-War years at the paper 
millers, R.Tullis. Consequently, the "modern structure" of 
recreational and educational facilities was established at 
the same time. Sir David Russell, however, rejected the 
concept of contributory schemes. He personally directed 
discretionary benefits in his relatively small firm as a 
means of rewarding only deserving and efficient workers.®
The Metal Box Company was formed in 1921 by the 
amalgamation of four family firms, and the new company soon 
gained a near monopoly in the production of tin-cans. But it
1. E.S.& A.Robinson & Co Robinsons of Bristol,
1844-1944 (1947), pp.67-8; PP 1920 (C.544) xxiii
765.
2. U n i t y , Sept 1929, p p . 403-5.
3. C.D.M.Ketelbey Tullis Russell i__ T h e _ H  i s t or y oj
R.Tullis & Co and T.Russell & Co L tdj_ 1809-1952
(1967), pp.232-37.
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continued to function as individual units.® Male workers at 
Scott, Hepworths, one of Metal Box's constituent companies, 
had formed a Sick Club in 1861 and a similar organisation 
for women was established later. A doctor attended the works 
and in 1911 a Holiday and Convalescent Home was founded. The 
firm appointed a lady welfare worker in 1906. Scott, 
Hepworths welfare worker was responsible for hiring 
employees, and supervising the girls' rest, dining, and 
recreation-rooms. A week s paid holiday was dependent on 
good timekeeping. Atkins of Hull set up a Welfare Department 
in 1913.2
Hans Renold, the chain makers, adopted the industrial 
welfare practices of its German parent-company. It provided 
a canteen from 1896 onwards. In 1909, the Hans Renold Social 
Union, the basis of the company's welfare and recreation 
policy, was established with the aim of regulating the 
existing social activities. In 1910, a nurse and a personnel 
officer were appointed. In 1913, C.G.Renold said that 
F.W.Taylor had merely articulated what industry already 
practised. He criticised him, however, for ignoring 
shop-floor resistance to increasing managerial control and 
monotomy at work. In 1921, the company introduced a 
profitsharing scheme run by a workers committee. Workers 
were granted one week s paid holiday, and the factory was 
equipped with rest-room amenities. The Social Union s sick 
pay and pensions schemes were ejc gratia, until contributory
1. Channon (1973), p.184.
2. W.J.Reader Metalbox (1976), pp.28-31.
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pensions were introduced in 1938.®
Barker says that recreational facilities at Pilkingtons 
were expanded in the 1870s to cope with the workforce's 
increasing size. A new sports ground was laid, and a 
coffee-room was founded at the sheet works in 1874 and a 
dining-room in 1888. In 1881, the glassblowers' sickness and 
burial society was allowed to meet at the works in return 
for opening its membership to employees of every grade. 
Pilkingtons wanted to oversee provident provision within the 
firm, and to provide adequate benefits. The company also 
hoped to make overall savings. By subscribing to the new 
club, it was free to terminate their contracts with doctors 
commissioned to treat workers injured at Pilkingtons. Costs, 
however, rose because the fund proved insolvent and in need 
of continually increasing contributions, A company doctor 
was hired in 1905. In 1920, a Welfare Department began 
organising medical and convalescent services. Pensions were 
ex gratia until a joint contributory scheme was formed in 
1925.2
"Materials users" is a broad category covering a
variety of very different industries. Pottery manufacture
was small-scale, and largely continued the paternalism of
personal and direct relations with the workforce. This was
1. B.H.Tripp Renold Chains: A History of the Company;
and the .Rise of the__Precision Chain Industry^
r 8 7 9 - 1 9 5 ^ U 9 5 6 T 7 ”pP* 29 ,94 ,96; Chandler (1976 ), 
p p . 39-40; U n i t y , May 1930, pp.72-5.
2 . T.C.Barker Pilkington_Brothers and— ^ e — Glass
Industry (1960), pp.1 7 9 -1 8 1 ,215.
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also true of works belonging to WPM, but, despite its lack 
of 3 corporate structure, its near monopoly enabled it to 
finance major welfare expenditure. Although Robinsons, 
Dickensons, and Pilkingtons remained controlled by their 
founding families, they were in the 1920s expanding, 
profitable businesses with oligopolistic power. Like WPM, 
they had the means to finance extensive company provision. 
They differed from Metal Box, a badly structured company 
which often funded welfare amenities for its poorly-paid, 
casual and largely female workforce following threats of 
investigation from its wages council. Hans Renold, which 
internally rationalised in the 1920s, developed through its 
Social Union a unified approach to welfare. Contributory 
pensions at Pilkingtons, Renolds, WPM, Dickinsons, and 
extensive provision at Robinsons were significant steps in 
industrial welfare.
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(V i i ) . The Electrical Goods Industry.
The technological development of electrical goods was a
costly and time-consuming process. Production was equally
complex, and required large outlays of capital in machinery
and raw materials. The manufacturers of electrical goods
were, therefore, the first non—monopolistic concerns
extensively to raise external capital. Moreover, the variety
of electrical goods produced necessitated the
decentralisation of responsibilities between company
departments which could concentrate on a particular line of
products. Yet, the production, marketing, and obtaining of
materials both for standardised switches and lamps, and for
non-standardised turbines and generators called for close
scheduling within and between departments. Electrical goods
could be composed of many pieces that had to be manufactured
separately and then assembled. Commercial departments and
sales outlets were also essential to the promotion of
consumer goods. Capital requirements, the demands of
coordinated production, and marketing led to the
establishment of large companies and sophisticated
managerial structures. By 1914, the British market was
dominated by British Thomson Houston, the General Electric
Company, and Siemens. They also limited competition through
an effective system of national and international cartels.
Hirst, G.E.C. 's founder, began his business as a
retailer and diversified vertically into manufacturing in
1. Chandler (1973), pp. 362-70 ,426-32 ; R.Jones &
O.Marriot Anatomy of a Mergerj— A— History o _
G E C A .E .I ., and English Electric ( 19 70 ) ,
(1979), pp.110-12.
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order to safeguard his supply of a full-range of
standardised electrical goods. The company had an early 
conception of the problems of management. h Supplies
Department in the 1880s anticipated consumer-demand, 
coordinated with the manufacturing units, and standardised 
designs. Hirst responded to a rapidly growing demand by 
beginning construction of the Witton works in Birmingham in 
1900 . He wanted to concentrate all G.E.C. 's production
there, but different goods were dependent for their
production on existing specialist local labour skills. 
Output at the Hammersmith lamp works, for example, had been 
delayed for a year after its opening in 1894 because each 
operative had to be taught and trained in 40 or more 
different tasks. G.E.C. eventually decided, therefore, to 
establish geographically and functionally-separate works 
throughout the country. Independent and authoritative heads 
of department in charge of each works had to be appointed.
"They became, in effect, managing directors of their
particular un d e r t a k i n g....... " but they had to work within
the general policy of the board.
Hirst did, however, centralise marketing in 1900, but 
its complexities grew with the expansion of electrical
household goods in the ,1920s. Selling was eventually
decentralised through branches and sub-branches which were 
"complete self-acting sales centres, with warehouses and
showrooms, under the charge of expert salesman and technical 
men". G.E.C. was set upon a clearly-formed policy; "The 
object of rationalisation is to co-ordinate all the sections 
of an industry, to acquire full command over raw materials.
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to establish an effective selling organisation, and to make
the streams of production flow steadily through the well-cut
channels of distribution for the adequate service of the
largest possible demand".®
Social events had been held for employees at G.E.C.'s
Manchester works in the 1880s. Its contributory,
self-administered Sick and Benefit Society was founded on
the initiative of the work's employees, but it became the
basis of a company-wide Benevolent Society. The Witton works
was built "as a complete industrial community, with houses
and shops for its own workpeople and with the highest
possible amenities in the way of sports grounds, clubs and
open spaces". Its "Magnet" Club had a gymnasium, large hall,
dining, rest, and billiard rooms, and was served by a seven
acre playing-field. Indeed, each G.E.C. factory in the 1900s
developed "a centre of social life". In 1920, a Contributory
Pension scheme was inaugurated and funded by 4% deductions
from wages and equal company donations. A Benevolent Pension
Fund, established by a grant of £108,000, provided ex gratia
allowances for those too old to join the contributory
scheme. G.E.C. claimed that, as a competitive firm, it could
only pay average wages. But "Regular employment;
comfortable, healthy houses ; good food ; reasonable hours of
l a b o u r ,- these and similar prime necessities may be ensured
to the wage-earner. It is clear, however, that the higher
amenities of life do not lie within the economic range of
the individual at this level". G.E.C., therefore, provided
1. A.G.Whyte Forty Years of Electrical Progress; the 
Story of G.E.C. (1930), p p . 9,11-13,17-20,23-26,32,
3 4-4 2,49-5 4,57,59,69,70,74-76,100,102-104-108-110; 
Hannah (1979), p p . 110-111,134-5.
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the capital to build up a "co-operative system of dealing
with sickness, unemployment, and...pensions, by uniting the
resources of workers, employers, and taxpayer". Welfare
provision was dependent on the mutual and interlinking
assistance of the state and the company. Because provident
and recreational associations were under the charge of
workers' committees, G.E.C. was deemed a contented
"democracy". Welfare and employer-worker cooperation
developed the "G.E.C. spirit".®
In 1872, Werner Siemens formally adopted a systematic
labour policy at his British works. Its principles were
derived from the practices of its German counterpart. The
firm was determined "to be a paternal employer". But such a
relationship "was not to be a soft one; it was based upon
the ordinary industrial discipline of the p e r i o d  " Every
year awards and bonuses paid for loyal service. Invalids
received financial assistance, and a pension scheme and an
endowment fund for widows and orphans were founded. But the
"simple unselfconscious paternalism" which was natural in
1900 was considered out of place by 1920. A welfare officer
was appointed to bring a "modern" approach to the company.
Provision after the War consequently differed from the
"personal kindliness and organisational indifference" of
2previous years.
The British Westinghouse Company, which became 
Metropolitan-Vickers during the War, combined in 1928 with 
British Thomson-Hous ton to form Associated Electrical,^
1. Whyte (1930), p p . 35,114-123,126-7.
2. J.D.Scott Siemens Brothers, 1858-1958; An Essay in 
the History of an Industry (1958), p p . 247-59.
349
Industries. But A.E.I. continued to operate as two separate
companies and had no central office or functional
organisation.^ British Westinghouse built workers' houses at
Trafford Park, which, although it provided homes for
workers, was not held to be a model village. In the early
1900s, the company imported American foremen to introduce
their own production methods. Dismissals were frequent, and
labour turnover was fast. "Yet in a few years this chaotic
youth developed to an ordered maturity, thanks to a spirit
of cooperation engendered above all by a man,- P.A.Lange,-
and an organisation,- the British Westinghouse Engineers'
Club". Membership of the Club, which organised sporting and
social events, was open to trained engineers or apprentices.
The company provided the Club with premises in 1907. British
Westinghouse began an Approved Society in 1912 to supplement
2
National Insurance payments, because it disliked the
prospect of outside interference in matters of sick pay.^ In 
1912, the Engineers' Club was opened to all male employees, 
and the word "Engineers" was dropped from its title, 
"...thenceforward it played an ever-increasing part in 
developing a 'Westinghouse spirit' throughout the
organisation." New premises were opened, and a house
magazine was first published in 1913. Works and staff
committees were formed in 1917, and they dealt with every 
aspect of employment not within the remit of the employers'
1. Channon (1973), pp.132-4.
2. J.Dummelow 1 8 99-1949_:________M e t r o p o 1itan-Vickers
Electrical Company Limited (1949), p p . 27-28,34-5,
52-3 .
3. Hansard, 14 Dec 1911, vol.v, n o . 32, c o l . 2532.
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associations. The works committee promoted industrial
welfare schemes, as well as providing a platform for the
discussion of greivances. A Suggestions Scheme was started
in the same year. In 1921, a contributory Works Benevolent
Fund began helping in cases of accident, sickness, and
widowhood. Membership was a condition of employment for all
"clock" employees. The fund replaced Westinghouse's many
shop clubs, and by 1949 it had paid out over £210,000 in
sickness and accident benefits alone. The company donated
£100 a month to the fund, yet did not assist the staff
provident scheme. An Accident Prevention Committee, and a
debating society were established in 1925. A thrift scheme
was begun in 1926 offering a rate of 4%. In 1928 the company
began a "special grants account" to provide ex gratia
pensions in return for long service. For Id a week and Id
for his wife, a worker could join the hospital scheme. The
company added £500 per annum to these subscriptions.^
Brush Electrical Engineering in 1887 founded a
profitsharing scheme. Participants were individually
2
selected by the directors. The project only lasted for a 
few years, but another scheme automatically open to all 
employees was introduced in 1926. It aimed to give 
"employees a direct and continuing interest in their work 
and in the success of the company". Profits above a 10% 
dividend were distributed in stock or cash. A Copartnership 
Council organised the scheme, a sick room, the sports club,
1. Dummelow (1949), p p . 54-55,87,89,90-91, 94,204.
2. PP 1894 (C.7458) Ixxx 575.
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and the Hospital and Benevolent Fund.^
The electrical goods industry is a classic example of 
how c a p i t al-demands, research and development, the need for 
effective marketing, and work-scheduling between departments 
brought about the establishment of decentralised corporate 
management. The experiences of G.E.C., Siemens, and 
Metro-Vick proved the advantage of retaining "core" 
workforces and their skills. Although companies continued to 
employ many casual, female workers, the loyalty and 
cooperation of the labour force was crucial if bottlenecks 
in the industry's capital-intensive flow-production 
processes were to be avoided. British Westinghouse attempted 
to introduce 1ine-production methods, but had to abandon 
fully-fledged Taylorism in favour of a welfare strategy. 
Company provision was transformed from conciliating only the 
most highly skilled workers,- the engineers,- into an 
all-embracing corporate strategy. The reliability of all 
workers within the scheme of production had become 
important. Managerial planning, crucial to the manufacture 
of mass-produced electrical goods, enabled welfare 
administration to be systemised. G.E.C., in comparison to 
A . E . I . , English Electric, and Siemens, was the most 
rationalised concern. It had adopted a unified company 
approach to all forms of company provision by 1914 with the 
object of meeting material and recreational needs 
unfulfilled by the state. It founded a contributory pension 
scheme in the Inter-War period. Siemens, nonetheless, had
1. U n i t y , Feb 1930, p p . 18-20.
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devised a positive welfare policy in the 1870s. Recreational 
facilities at Metro-Vick by the time of the First World War 
were organised effectively, but provident societies were not 
placed on a regular footing until the 1920s.
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(V i i i ). The M otor C a r I n d u s t r y .
The production of cars is associated with Henry Ford's
advocacy of absolute managerial authority, direct control
over the rate of work, and mechanisation. But Lewchuck shows
that before 1939 British car employers relied on
payment-by-results rather than line-production methods to
control output. He also concludes that the car-manufacturer
Morris was personally uninterested in industrial welfare.^
Lewchuck, however, seems to be referring to the industry's
poor work-conditions, for Morris did personally fund a
2
number of "external" welfare schemes. When managerial 
reorganisation was implemented by L.P.Lord in the 1930s, 
welfare schemes were also removed from the direct control of 
Morris and placed on a more secure financial footing. The 
efficient flow of production between units was improved by 
an appropriate welfare policy as well as by the requisite 
managerial structure.
During the 1920s, the British motor car industry was 
dominated by the Big 3 of Morris, Austin, and Ford. But 
Morris Motors quickly overtook Fords as Britain's largest 
firm through aggressive pricing and efficient standardised 
production. When market demand was affected by taxes on car 
horse-power and falling consumer incomes, the Big 3 failed 
to respond to changing conditions. Other competitors, like 
Singer, Standard, and H i l I m a n - H u n t e r , stimulated demand for 
the smaller car from 1926-27 onwards. But over-competition 
in an atomised industry rocked profi t - s t a b i l i t y .
1. Lewchuck in Gospel & Littler (1983), p p . 82-110.
2. Cf. Ch.I, s . (ii).
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Manufacturers tried to overcome the problems caused by the
high income elasticity of demand for cars by adopting in the
1930s product market strategies.^
Employers like Morris and Austin were engineers rather
than managers. By 1921, Austins was crippled by its
investment in its large 20 h.p. car, and was not allowed by
its creditors to invest in a smaller model until Engelbach
was appointed Production Manager. Low-price cars developed
in 1926-27 brought good returns, negotiated the company
through the Slump without crisis, and funded the
installation of continuous production methods in the early
1930s. The company, therefore, expanded through growth
rather than integration with other concerns, and its
management continued without radical change despite its
increased size. In 1928, Fords also finally abandoned
relying on the sales of a large car. The company intended
that its new works at Dagenham would mass produce 8 to 10
h.p. models. Fords captured 50% of the 8 h.p. market in
1934, but its investment was, nonetheless, wrongfooted in
the late 1930s when increasing product competition reduced
the market for low priced cars. Morris' experiences of
mass-production during the First World War led him to
conclude that efficient production could be best achieved by
purchasing parts through specially-contracted small
suppliers. Managerial problems were, therefore, minimised.
But, from 1919 to 1926, the capacity of his suppliers in
engines, bodies, sheet, radiators, cylinder block castings,
1. R.Church & M.Miller "The Big Three; Competition, 
Management, and Marketing in the British Motor
Industry, 1922-1939" in Supple (ed) (1977).
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and carburettors was outstripped by Cowley's expanding
demand, and bottlenecks held up production. Morris at first
responded by financing or building additional shops under
the management of his suppliers, but he was eventually
forced to buy them out. Moreover, the company diversified
into taxis and ambulances by purchasing in 1923 Wrigley
Limited, and into the higher-priced market by taking over
Wolselys in 1926. The number of process-stages and products
under Morris' direct control had, consequently, grown.^ Yet,
Morris continued his costly policy of encouraging
competition between different works often engaged in making
the same parts. He also ignored until 1928 arguments for a
low-priced model to counter Austin's challenge. The market
for Morris' 11.9 h.p. car collapsed during the Slump, and
the company did not recover till 1935. Morris himself
shunned board meetings, and yet was unwilling to consult or
delegate authority. It was Lord, as managing-director from
1933-36, who reorganised the company into coordinated
component groups, built up the capacity to produce new
models, adopted a central marketing strategy, restructured
the capital, and installed assembly-line techniques with
2
moving tracks and conveyors.
The direct control of Morris over production matters
was reflected in his approach to industrial relations.
Before 1914, Morris still owned a small company and 
personally organised socials and concerts. He provided
1. Andrews & Brunner The Life of Lord Nuffield: A
Study iji Enterprise and B e n e volence (1955 ) ,
p p . 87-93,95-6,99,100,112,124-34,143,147-9,151-2, 
154,156,160,340-1.
2. Church & Miller in Supple (1977).
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generous club and sports facilities, but was anxious that 
work and leisure were kept as separate activities. Sports 
facilities were greatly expanded during the 1920s. By 1927, 
the Athletic Club at Oxford had a building worth £30,000 and 
a membership of 2,000 out of 2,700 workers. There were also 
concerts, whist-drives, lectures, a dramatic society, 
canteen, and brass band. Dental and medical services with 
X-ray, radiotherapy, and massage units were also available. 
The Morris Employees Benefit Scheme was founded in 1926, and 
the life insurance scheme gave £100 to a bereaved wife or 
dependant mother.^ Wolseley Motors had established an 
Athletic Club in 1903 and provided provident benefits, which 
were continued after the firm's take-over. Pressed Steel, 
which as an Oxford sheet producer gradually came under 
Morris' control, published a house magazine from 1928 
onwards, paid donations to a local hospital, and ran works 
dances, sports meetings, and a rifle club.^
At first, Morris gave donations to hospitals in
Coventry, Birmingham, and Oxford if they would receive sick 
or injured workers. But hospital donations and the Benefit 
Fund were superseded by the reorganisation of the 1930s. 
Professional management at Morris', established under Lord, 
had replaced the founder's ad hoc methods. In order to
1. Andrews & Brunner (1955), pp . 14-15,274,340-1; 
Whiting (1977 ), pp. 162 ,164-6 ,172-3 ; H.A.Goddard 
"Profitsharing and the Amenities of the Nuffield 
Factories" in Gannet and Catherwood (1939), 
p p . 268-9.
2. Vickers N e w s , July 1924, p p . 26-7.
3. R.C.Whiting "The Working Class in the 'New 
Industry' Towns between the Wars: the case of
Oxford" (D.Phil. Oxford, 1977), pp.162,164-6, 
172-3.
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promote and retain managerial resources, staff were provided
with pensions in 1935. Workers were offered holiday pay
after five years' service, a contributory Provident Fund,
and a Savings Club. The Benefaction for Employees, a trust
created by the setting aside of Ordinary shares in Morris',
reduced labour turnover. Benefits were given according to
length of service, sex, and age, if workers had been
employed for more than a year. In 1936, it paid out £111,799
when the total wages bill was £3,116,841. The Trust's board
had representatives from every Morris factory.^ In 1939, one
manager at Morris' concluded that, although a living wage
was the primary instrument for guaranteeing industrial
peace, the company considered it important to provide good
working conditions and leisure facilities if the best
possible production results were to be obtained. The aim was
to build up a corporate loyalty. "The principle underlying
this policy is that it is an employer's duty to see that his
workers are happy, not merely from altruistic motives, but
because he knows that a happy man is going to produce better
work than a discontented one. The greatest factor which the
average working man has to fight against is fear; fear of
losing his job; fear of ill-health; fear of old age and its
attendant possibility of being thrown on the industrial
scrap heap." Morris' welfare schemes were designed "to give
2
to their workers a sense of security".
With the expansion of demand during the First World 
War, Austin's needed to attract labour. The company obtained
1. Andrews & Brunner (1955 ), pp. 15 ,214-5 , 275-6 ;
Whiting (1977), p p . 161,166,172-3.
2. Goddard in Gannet & Catherwood (1939), p p . 265-9.
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the help of the Ministry of Munitions in 1917 to build 250
homes near Longbridge on "garden suburb lines". By 1918,
amenities included a village hall, clubrooms, steam laundry,
and an Anglican Mission. Austin believed it was important to
maintain the skills of his workforce whom he continued to
employ even during a moulders' strike in the winter of
1919-20. Profitsharing was introduced in 1932.^ The Leyland
Motor Company, which after the Great War faced a labour
shortage, received a government subsidy of one-third of the
2
cost of building housing near Preston.
In 1918, Rolls Royce began developing comprehensive 
welfare services. The workers proved hostile to the 
introduction of p r o f i t s h a r i n g , but agreed to a Welfare Fund 
in its place.^ In 1934, every employee with one year's 
service at Vauxhall Motors received a share of 1% of company 
profits, a sum which amounted to £66,000. By 1937, Vauxhall 
Motors consulted workers through works committees. The 
Vauxhall Recreation Club had a canteen, which was used also 
as a theatre, cinema, dance-hall, and an area for indoor 
sports. By 1939, the profitsharing scheme paid bonuses on an 
incremental scale after 6% had been issued in dividends.^
Lucas' was an electricals manufacturer which came to 
specialise in motor-car parts. In 1907, Harry Lucas set up a
1. R.Church Herbert Austin: the British Motor Car
Industry to 1941 (1979), p p . li,lii,43,57-8,
147,152,155.
2. Works M a n a g e m e n t , Nov 1919, p p . 38-44.
3. I.Lloyd R o lls Royce: the Years of Endeavour
(1978), p p . 20-22.
4. Ramage in Gannet & Catherwood (1939), p p . 243-250;
House of W h i t b r e a d , Jan 1937, p p . 234-6.
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Savings Bank to supplement a Sick Society. Works committees 
on health, canteens, and even effluent were appointed after 
the Great War. The hoc Sick Society was replaced by a 
Benevolent Fund with an elected committee. It depended on 
subscriptions of Id a week and donations from the company. 
By 1924, a Welfare Officer and a Safety Superintendant had 
been appointed. Sports were expanded in the early 1920s and 
later placed under the charge of a full-time organiser. A 
Death Benefit Fund was formed in 1928 after Lucas donated 
£8,000 with the stated object of winning the loyalty of its 
workforce. A widow would receive a grant of £100, and the 
fund's solvency was guaranteed by the company. Full-time 
doctors, a dentist, and nursing staff, and a girls' rest 
home were financed. With the fall of profits in 1933, Lucas 
decided against introducing a profitsharing scheme, but 
placed £100,000 of dividends into a general welfare fund 
called the Lucas Workers' Shares Bank. It provided, for 
example, £10,000 in 1932 to found the Work Peoples' Old Age 
Fund. During the 1930s, the Workpeoples' Holiday Fund 
collected Is a week from the men and the company added 50% 
of total donations. A Hard Luck Fund was created in 1937.^
The need to attract and retain a workforce in the early 
1920s was an important factor in the development of the car 
industry's welfare policies. Housing schemes and sports 
facilities were of particular concern. Weak, personal
1. H.Nockolds Lucas: the First One Hundred Y e a r s ,
Vol.I (1976), p p . 139-140,209-10,191-2,
282,299,318; U n i t y , Jan 1930, p p . 7-10.
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management, however, militated against the systemisation of 
company provision, while its industrial structure and 
profit-instability reduced the possibilities for large 
outlays on welfare. There were, for example, no systematic 
and contributory pension schemes for workers. But, 
undoubtedly, large-scale capital investment and managerial 
reorganisation in the early 1930s did increase the scope and 
necessity for industrial welfare in the car industry. The 
introduction of line-production methods and managerial 
reorganisation at Morris' was matched by the founding of a 
contributory provident scheme whose finances were secured 
through a permanent benefaction administered by an elected 
workers' committee.
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(iX ). Food and T o b a c c o ,
It was a common characteristic of food, drink, and 
tobacco companies that sustained growth depended on securing 
the brand-loyalty of consumers. A stable market facilitated 
decisions on the rate at which to produce 
quickly-deteriorating goods. It regularised returns on 
capital and allowed oligopolistic pricing to be introduced. 
Comprehensive retailing and wholesaling services, and 
widespread advertising were well established in Britain by 
1914. ^
Managerial staff at Cadburys, for example, were
recruited, trained and allocated clearly-defined duties,
although the firm remained predominately a family concern in
this period. Managers ran separate departments through
committees and answered directly to the Board.
Reorganisation began in 1915 "with the objects of
centralising production control and maintaining an even flow
of work, daily, and weekly, through the factory." By the
1930s, Cadburys had developed a coordinated system of
production, distribution, and retailing to cope with the
2
problems of quickly turning over consumer-pe r i s h a b l e s .
In 1912, George Cadbury argued publicly with Scientific 
Management theorists. He rejected the assumption that 
workers would unquestionably accept repetitive work because 
of their low mentality. He argued that efficiently-organised
1. Hannah (1979), p p . 85,114-5,119.
2. Cadbury Brothers Industrial Record 1919-39 (1945), 
p p . 6,10,14.
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production required the workers' c o o p a r a t i o n .  ^ Cadburys
sought the loyalty of their employees by funding industrial 
housing, sports events, socials, cultural societies, and
provident provision. Bournville Village was founded in 1895, 
and a Savings Fund in 1897. From 1900, a Medical Department 
with a works doctor and a dental clinic were established,
and a Sick Benefit Scheme was begun in 1902. Shop-floor
works committees existed from about 1900, and were credited 
with being primarily responsible for the firm's good 
industrial relations. Day continuation classes, under the 
supervision of the Works Education Committee, originated in 
1906, and, along with youth clubs, instilled "social 
education". In the same year, a contributory Pensions Scheme 
was introduced for men, and in 1911 for women. Every male 
employee under 50 joined the pension fund, while the 
remainder continued to receive discretionary allowances.
Two works councils, one for men and one for women, were 
created in 1918 to coordinate all aspects of welfare. They 
replaced the many shop-floor committees with a single, 
unified structure because "With the growth of the business 
the old order of the intimate relation of master and man had 
inevitably, through the sheer scale of modern works 
organisation, either to disappear or yield to a new order". 
The Welfare Fund was created in 1923 by the company setting 
aside a block of Ordinary shares. The Fund, for example, 
financed a Short Time Scheme designed to help workers during 
a seasonal fall in trade. Family allowances were set at 5s a 
week for each third or subsequent child, and a contributory 
1. Chandler (1976), p p . 43,54-7. Cf. Ch.l, s.(ii).
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Sick Benefit Scheme supplemented National Health Insurance. 
Pensions continued to be seen as the company's most vital 
scheme and its benefits were improved by additional help to 
bereaved widows. The Rowheath Recreation Ground was laid in 
1924.1
Like the Cadburys, Joseph Rowntree viewed his company
as a Christian trust. An eight hour day was established in
1896, for, as B.Seebohm Rowntree put it, adequate leisure
time and the opportunity for "recreation and self-expression
outside the factory" were essential to industrial
efficiency. Clubs organised a large variety of sports,
hobbies and pleasure pursuits. A Self-Help Medical Club
begun in the 1890s distributed medicines, and Sick and
Funeral Societies existed by the early 1900s. A works doctor
was appointed in 1904, and later a full-time dental staff
was employed. Continuation classes for boys were augmented
in 1905 by a Domestic School for girls, and all workers
under seventeen were obliged to attend some form of
education at the company. Along with after-care committees
and lads' clubs, they aimed to safeguard "the transition
from the discipline of school to the comparative freedom of
industrial life".
Joseph Rowntree in 1904 devoted half his industrial
wealth to founding charitable trusts. The Village Trust
financed the construction of New Earswick and its assets
1. Cadbury Brothers Industrial Record 1919-39 (1945),
p p . 62,65,67-75; & A Century of Progress (1933);
Current O p i n i o n , Nov 1922, p . 24; Works M a n a g e m e n t ,
Dec 1919, p p . 91-3; PP 1919 (C.4I0) xxvii 299,
Report of Departmental Committee on Old Age 
Pensions, Q s . 3909,3911,3913,3949,3951-3,3958,3961, 
3963,4032,4042-3,4052; Meakin (1905), p p . 433-442. 
Independent of the company, the Bournville Village 
Trust's housing was not tied.
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were reposed with a Village Council. A joint Pensions 
Scheme, inaugurated in 1906, provided incomes worth half the 
average wages earnt by any individual in his or her final 
five years of work. In 1917, Rowntrees granted widows' 
benefit, and gave, by the 1920s, additional unemployment 
allowances in the belief that state benefits were
inadequate. In B.S.Rowntree's view, industry's efficiency 
depended upon the quick transfer of labour to profitable 
trades and, therefore, upon the availability of labour 
reserves. But the lack of economic security within such a 
system was to him also the main cause of labour unrest. He 
argued that, if the capitalist claimed the profits as the 
right of the risk-taker, he could not leave the worker a 
victim of commercial failure. He supported unemployment 
insurance by industry, because it made each trade
responsible for its own labour pool. Rowntree introduced 
profitsharing in 1923 not as a means of giving financial 
incentives but in order to develop worker participation. 
Labour would no longer accept industrial autocracy although 
"'there must be some one in supreme control, and there must
also be d i s c i p l i n e  '" In other words, although a joint
Appeals Committee judged breaches of factory rules, the 
directors at Rowntrees retained an unquestioned veto in all 
matters. The Committee, moreover, had no jurisdiction over 
dismissals due to individual inefficiency or falling trade, 
which were considered matters of production and, therefore, 
of concern to managers only. Factory discipline merely
worked better if employees were at least consulted.
In 1917, Seebohm Rowntree stated that "organised
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Welfare work" had its origins in the fact that "industry, 
which used to be conducted in small units, is now more 
frequently conducted in very large units, and the attempt to 
create a good working environment which was often made quite 
informally in the small unit, must be organised, lest it be 
overlooked, in the increasing complexity of the unit". Wages 
and conditions were dependent on technical achievement and 
sound business organisation, and the responsibility for
securing the conditions for industrial peace rested with the 
e m p l o y e r .^
The confectioners Clarke, Nicholls and Coombs had a
2
profitsharing scheme in 1890. Another fund provided sick 
pay, death grants, pensions, and marriage bonuses of £5 for 
women with five years' service. The aim was to promote good
relations and continued service but all benefits were a gift
given without rights.^ Pascalls invested in sporting and
4
recreational facilities by the 1920s.
Another Quaker employer, Huntley and Palmers, employed 
a schoolmaster in the 1850s as a means of training juvenile 
workers. Being the largest employer in Reading, they faced a 
low labour turnover and paid minimal wages. "Deserving"
1. A.Briggs Social Thought and Social Action: a Study
of the Work of Seebohm Rowntree, 1871-1954.
(1961), p p . 60-1,81,89,91-7,99-100,102-3,12 8,130,
14 4-5,147,155,231-3,275-6; B.S.Rowntree The Way to 
Industrial Peace and the Problem of Unemployment 
(1914), p p . 34-6,56-60; Rowntree (1922), p p . 3,6-7, 
10-13,15-17,20-23,25-35, 37-46,48. As at
Bournville, housing at New Earswick was not tied.
2. PP 1890-91 (C.6267) Ixxxiii 15.
3. PP 1920 (C.544) xxxiii 765.
4. U n i t y , Oct 1928, p p . 264-66.
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employees received bonuses, and ex gratia pensions,
amounting to €2,750 in 1898-99 and £6,350 in 1913-14, were
given for 50 years' service. Socials, a canteen, and library
facilities were provided. The Sick Fund was considered the
firm's most important amenity. All adult employees
contributing 6d weekly received 12s a week when sick. Sports
were encouraged from the 1870s onwards. All welfare benefits
at Huntley and Palmers remained discretionary, and an ad hoc
approach was matched by managerial weaknesses. In 1921, the
firm excahanged shares with Peek, Freens in order to found
Associated Biscuit Manufacturers.^ Peek, Freens paid the
administrative expenses of its sick club, in existence since
2
the 1860s, and the wages of a doctor.
James Robertson and Sons, preserve manufacturers, was 
also a family business. By 1929, it gave discretionary 
pensions according to status and length of service. 10s 
bonuses were given on marriage, and workers were allowed one 
week's holiday. Money was granted to several sports and 
recreational societies. A visiting doctor was employed, and 
a Benevolent Fund was bestowed on the firm by the partners. 
The Workers' Representation Committee was above all
3
considered largely responsible for harmonious relations. 
Chivers, another preserve manufacturers, built the model 
village of Histon, near Cambridge during the 19th Century,
1. T.A.B.Corley Quaker Enterprise in Biscuits: 
Huntley and Palmers of Reading, 1822-1972 , c h s .
7,11.
2. PP 1892 (C.6708-V) xxxv 1, Q s . 232-3,242-3,245.
3. U n i t y , March 1930, p p . 39-41; April 1930, pp . 55-7.
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and W.P.Hartley of Liverpool constructed Aintree.^ Hartley's
introduced profitsharing and extended sports and
2
recreational facilities during the 1920s.
In 1925, it was noted that welfare work, namely sports 
and club-houses, had existed in the flour-milling industry 
before the Great War. Joseph Rank, for one, had purchased a 
sports ground for his mills at Birkenhead, and works 
committees after 1914 were considered essential as the size 
of firms increased.^ Given the demand for labour immediately 
after 1918, the employers agreed to the establishment of a 
J.I.C. in the hope of minimising the bidding up of wages. 
But rationalisation continued to concentrate production in 
the larger mills. In 1929, the industry, therefore, created 
a company which would with the aid of levies buy out 
superfluous mills. But the employers felt obliged to 
compensate long-serving workers, who were traditionally 
retained in milling companies, but whose labour they now 
intended to shed. An industry-wide pension scheme was 
introduced in 1930, which would pay 10s at 65 years. 
Moreover, annuities were available for those made
4
redundant. Hovis Limited in 1929 provided paid holidays, 
discretionary pensions, sick pay, profitsharing, sports
1. Ibid, April 1932, p p . 44-8.
2. Industrial W e l f a r e , May 1920, p p . 156-7.
3. E.L.Pearson Organisation and Management in the
Flour Milling Industry (1925), p p . 168-79,183-9.
4. L.H.Green "Labour Problems in the British Flour 
Milling Industry: An Experiment in the Ordering of 
Industrial Relations" in Gannet & Catherwood (eds) 
(1939), pp.120-32; Lucas (1937), p p . 58-9.
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faciliites, and a Savings Association.^
By acquiring the exclusive use of the Bonsack
cigarette-making machine in the 1880s, Wills came to
dominate the tobacco industry by the 1890s. In 1900, the 
Imperial Tobacco Company was formed from most of Britain's
leading firms as a protective measure against the
competitive threat from America. Wills owned 60% of
Imperial's capital. Tobacco companies, on the whole, 
adopted loose holding-company structures, and a degree of 
rivalry between the constituent companies of Imperial
continued. But the tobacco industry had become a highly
concentrated industry at an early date, and oligopoly was 
strengthened by restrictive agreements in the 1930s.^
The Willses, as Congregationalists, believed they had a 
duty to the less fortunate. Wills provided from the 1870s 
cooking facilities and adequate breaks and meals at
subsidised prices were available in the 1880s. Pensions were 
granted by the 1870s, and profitsharing was introduced in 
1889. Annual outings, fetes, and entertainments were 
familiar features, and employees from 1895 with one year's 
employment were given one week's paid holiday. A permanent 
matron was engaged in 1889 to deal with minor sickness and 
injury, and a works doctor was appointed in 1895. It became 
such a frequent practice to supplement the Sick Club that in
1. U n i t y , Dec 1929, p p . 488-90.
2. B.W.E.Alford "Penny Cigarettes, Oligopoly, 
Entrepreneurship in the U.K. Tobacco Industry in 
the Late 19th Century" in B.Supple (1977).
3. Channon (1973), p p . 99-101.
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1899 Wills decided to place its funding on a formal basis.
Contributions to the Club guaranteed sick pay equal to
three-quarters of a weekly wage. The Wills Convalescent Home
was opened in 1889 and a Savings Bank offered 3.5% interest.
The Willses were disappointed that their men failed to save
their profitsharing payments, and decided in 1899 to retain
a third of any bonus. These savings were used to provide a
gratuity when a man reached 60 years, changed employment,
faced exceptional hardship, or left a widow. Ejx gratia
pensions, which continued to be paid, commonly amounted in
this period to 10s a week. Cricket and football clubs, a
brass band, lending library, and evening classes were
subsidised. Wills' welfare policies, being the most generous
amongst tobacco manufacturers, were adopted by others within
the Imperial group.^ Carreras and Rothmans, like Gallahers,
remained independent of the combine, however. Rothmans in
1904 were involved with the Tobacco Trade Athletic
Association which catered for cricket, snooker, darts,
2
athletics, table tennis, and football. Carreras developed 
sporting and social activities in the 1920s.^
Industrial paternalism is associated with the religious 
commitment of Quaker employers and particularly with 
Cadburys and Rowntrees. It does not follow, however, that 
their welfare practices were uncommon. Quaker views on the
1. B.W.E.Alford W.D. & H.O.Wills and the Development
o f  ^ e   Tobacco Indus try ( 19 7 3 ) ,
p p . 279-81,284-5,288,290-93.
2. The B u l l e t i n , Jan 1950.
3. U n i t y , March 1929, pp.340-1.
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responsibilities of the employer were no different to those 
of Congregationalists, Unitarians, and the many other 
businessmen who were Nonconformists. Cadburys and Rowntrees 
were merely in the mainstream of employers' attitudes to 
industrial participation. Workers at both firms had no say 
in production matters. Their involvement in the organisation 
of welfare schemes was constrained by a managerial veto, and 
continuation classes and youth clubs were used to discipline 
a young, largely female, workforce. Huntley and Palmer was a 
Quaker employer and yet it was often investigated by Wages 
Councils. Its ungenerous and unprogressive welfare schemes 
were merely a reflection of general managerial malaise, 
while Rowntrees and especially Cadburys were more 
systematically organised and more concerned about company 
provision. It is probable that the influence of Quaker 
goodfellowship was minor in comparison to the demands of 
labour management. In 1949, Seebohm Rowntree confessed that, 
despite "his absorbing interest in the welfare of workers", 
he saw it as a "part, and only as a part, of the wider 
problem of the management of industry..."^
Although total labour costs were minimal in comparison 
to total capital at Wills, welfare was paid for by the 
stream of profits its market position provided. Both the 
tobacco trade and the food industry, therefore, are good 
illustrations of the connection between market, managerial 
structure, oligopoly, labour management, and industrial 
w e l f a r e .
1. Urwick & Brech, Vol.I (1949), p . 59.
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{X ). The Boot and Shoe Industry.
Like brewing, boot and shoe manufacture continued in 
this period to be largely composed of small producers, and 
two factors, in what was a homework industry even in the 
1880s, explain the development of its industrial welfare. 
Firstly, the very transformation into a factory system 
increased the need for company provision. Secondly, the 
rapid expansion of the Inter-War years changed the 
organisation of welfare. The history of Clarks of Street, 
Somerset clearly illustrates these two influences. The firm 
introduced factory machinery in the 1880s, and American 
mass-production methods in 1908. The opening of new 
factories throughout the country was witness to the
prosperity of the firm from 1919 onwards, and growth was
based on horizontal diversification into different types and 
styles of footwear. During the 1930s, it was necessary to 
diversify vertically into retailing so that outlets against 
the encroachments of competitors could be secured. A 
separate retailing department was founded to assess the 
effectiveness of advertising and changes in consumer-demand. 
By adopting a policy of channelling at least 10% of sales 
through their own outlets, output-levels were steadied. In 
1933, Labour Management and Welfare Departments were 
appointed to organise a more settled workforce. The Welfare 
Worker supervised provident and leisure facilities, while a 
Labour Manager administered employment and promotion 
m a t t e r s .^
To The Shoe Manufacturers Monthly in 1904, the main
1. L.H.Barber Clarks of Street___ 1825-1950 (19 50),
pp.13-15.
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purpose of welfare was to retain the valued skills of
workmen,^ an analysis which underlied policies at Clarks.
The early 19th Century reading room proved so popular that
the new Crispin Hall was built in 1885. With a public hall,
lecture room, and library, recreational facilities could be
extended. A gymnasium, billiard rooms, and sports amenities
were later added. The Street Club and Institute was
accomodated at Crispin Hall. The company wanted to make it
part of the life of all the town's inhabitants, because
their links with it would help establish a steady labour
pool. Clarks had built much of the housing at Street, and
set up the Street Tennants Limited to administer the housing
stock. Three sick clubs, the Street Shoemakers Benefit
Society, the Street Women's Benefit Society, and the Street
Women's Club for outworkers, catered for its varied
workforce. By 1913, they were joined under a single
provident society, and sums were accumulated to pay pensions
2
at 65 years or for early retirement.
The small threshhold for capital entry into the
industry encouraged the founding of workers' cooperatives.
By 1923, the Leicster Cooperative Boot and Shoe
A
Manufacturing Society was issuing bonuses which built up the 
capital of individual workers. A cricket club and dances 
were organised, and £500 were found annually to supplement 
state pensions and to provide sick allowances, funeral
1. Shoe Manufacturers M o n t h l y , July 1904, p . 78
2. Barber (1950) p p . 19,21-22,58-60,77,152.
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expenses, and paid holidays.^ Moreover, manufacturers in
regions where footwear production was concentrated
cooperated over the provision of welfare. In 1908, Alderman
Lennard of Lennards Limited in Leicster asked employers to
increase contributions to the Shoe Workers' Rest Home for
sick and injured operatives. The London maunufacturers ' Boot
Trade Benevolent Society, and the Leather and Hide Trade
Provident and Benevolent Institution, founded in I860, paid
grants to the victims of accidents or to their widows and
2
orphans. In 1911, Lennard wondered whether his workers
could afford to contribute to the firm's benefit fund and
National Insurance. But, he concluded, "'The objects of the 
Chancellor were excellent, and it only remained for all
classes to co-operate to obtain the maximum advantage with 
the least disturbance to existing institutions'".^ The Shoe 
Manufacturers Monthly believed that the 1911 Act would 
increase industrial efficiency.*
In 1919, one employer held that the skill element in 
boot and shoe manufacture had declined by the end of World 
War One and given way to more mechanical and repetitive 
processes. Employers had to take an increased interest in 
workers' leisure to counterbalance the effects of
w o r k -disaffection. Messrs Bostock, therefore, had appointed
1. E.G.Greening A Pioneer Copartnership, being the 
History of the Leicster Cooperative Boot and Shoe 
Manufacturing Society Ltd (1923).
2. Shoe Manufacturers M o n t h l y , July 1908, pp.67-71; 
May 1911, p . 13; Oct 1911 p . 183; Nov 1933, p . 183.
3. Ibid, May 1911, p . 20.
4. Ibid, June 1911, p . 34.
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a Social Welfare Officer.^ Alexander and Shaw financed 
canteens and sporting and social activities. The Shoe 
Manufacturers Monthly backed the Whitley Scheme because it 
complemented welfare work, the importance of which had grown 
with the size of workshops. Industrial welfare, therefore, 
had to be a matter for employers and not government. Roberts 
& Sons' rest rooms, institutes, and surgeries were called a 
"fitting supplement" to Joint Industrial Councils.^ The 
first question dealt with by the Boot and Shoe J.I.C. was 
the joint contributory Holiday Provision Scheme.^ The 
Council also complained about the inadequacy of unemployment 
benefits and drew up an Insurance by Industry scheme under 
the terms of the 1920 Act.^
Meanwhile, Clarks founded a Savings Bank in 1917, and 
continuation classes were established in the following year. 
A Factory Council was appointed in 1924 as a means of 
integrating a workforce which had greatly expanded during 
and since the Great War. The Council was also charged with 
coordinating welfare facilities. The Centenary Pension Fund 
was begun by a £25,000 gift from directors and shareholders. 
It began collecting contributions in 1925 with the aim of 
guaranteeing every employee 10s a week when 65. At first, 
the fund could afford to pay only 7/6d a week, but, in 1932, 
a Supplementary Pensions Scheme was established to pay the
1. Ibid,Feb 1919, p . 267.
2. Ibid, Feb 1920, p . 331.
3. Ibid,Jan 1920, p p . 298-300.
4. Magazine of the Boot Manufacturers' Fede r a t i o n , 1 
Dec 1919, p . 24; I Feb 1920 , p . 72.
5. Ibid, I March 1920, p . 96. Cf. C h . 9, s.(vi).
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extra 2/6d. It was "a voluntary and whole-hearted response
from the employees" to fulfil the original aims of the
Centenary Fund. The interests of employers and workers had
combined. But, to meet the growing cost of pensions, the
"self-administered" Street Tenants Limited was wound up in
1934, and rents from company houses were used as income for
the Pension Fund.^
The Shoe and Leather N e w s in 1919 felt that pensions
reduced "the floating element of labour which has been one
2
of the great banes of industry for many years past". Messrs 
Crockett and Jones gave £20,000 to establish a pensions 
scheme in 1925, and Lewis' established a similar scheme on a 
self-managed "democratic basis".^ The Abingdon Pavlova 
Leather Company followed their example in 1934.^
Footwear employers usually provided benefits which were 
discretionary and not actuarially calculated. Grants of
pensions and sick pay did not guarantee workers rights by 
reason of being participants in schemes, although their 
involvement in the administration of welfare was encouraged. 
The expansion of the industry during the Inter-War period, 
nonetheless, provided some footwear employers with the funds 
to begin pension schemes. As the demand for skilled labour 
was high, the chief object was a reduction in labour
turnover. Clarks even founded a contributory fund, although
1. Barber (1950), p . 23,74-5.
2. Shoe and Leather N e w s , 15 May 1919, p . 342.
3. Shoe Manufacturers M o n t h l y , Jan 1925, p . 285.
4. Ibid, Jan 1934, p p . 239-40.
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its existence continued to depend on the largesse of the 
employers. Welfare at Clarks by the 1930s was relatively 
well systemised and unified in comparison to other boot and 
shoe companies, for the size of Clarks' workforce and the 
geographical isolation of Street made particular demands on 
its welfare organisation. Clarks in the 1930s paid as much 
attention to company provision as to managerial structure.
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(xi). C o n c l u s i o n .
The five chapters on the railway, gas, steel, 
chemicals, and brewing industries during the years 1870-1939 
have emphasised the material fact that the incidence of high 
levels of industrial welfare expenditure depended on the
ability of companies to find the required outlays. Railway 
and gas employers, as monopolies, were able to spend 
extensively on industrial welfare. Yet, the organisation of 
company provision was largely determined by the systematic 
approach to management, which as large enterprises the 
complexities of their operations required. The growth in 
company size in other, more competitive industries from the 
1890s onwards induced changes in their managerial 
structures, and ex gratia paternalism was also increasingly 
systemised into corporate labour management. Large amounts 
of capital and the necessity for flow-production, 
scheduling, or coordination increased the employer's 
reliance upon a cooperative worker. In the interests of 
optimum efficiency, labour turnover and work-disaffection 
had to be minimised. Bureaucratic means replaced the 
personal in relations between employers and workers. The
industrial welfare established in the 19th Century differed, 
therefore, from the type of company labour management later 
used to obtain the better administrative organisation of the 
workforce. Yet, industries which relied heavily upon the
employment of casual labour had little incentive to promote 
or develop industrial welfare policies.
Until 1914, the staple industries of steel, textiles, 
coalmining, shipbuilding, and engineering, upon which
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Britain built its industrial fame, consisted largely of 
small and medium-sized firms, owned and administered by 
single employers or partnerships. They share similarities, 
therefore, in early developments of their industrial 
welfare. Steel, textiles, and coalmining contained many 
examples of industrial villages, and firms sought to attract 
workers to new locations. Employers had to foster a sense of 
community between themselves and their workers, and 
paternalism was a common feature of British industry in the 
I9th Century. It was central to the industrial relations of 
the textile industries. Coalowners, despite competitive 
rivalries, did cooperate voluntarily in the funding of 
mutual benefit societies, and, during the 1920s, they had 
legal responsibilities for the Miners' Welfare Fund. 
Shipbuilders, although concentrated in ports and urban 
centres, nevertheless built houses in order to attract the 
right sort of labour. From 1890-1918, the shipbuilding 
industry was centralising management and promoting the type 
of company-based welfare policies suited to the requirements 
of their heavily-capitalised businesses. Company provision, 
especially from 1918 onwards, assisted in maintaining works 
discipline and reducing labour turnover. The engineering 
industry's structure and the sort of labour it employed 
militated against heavy expenditure on welfare. Ex gratia 
company provision, however, was available in many 
engineering firms.
The iron and steel industry realised in the 1920s that 
their continued lack of profitability derived from their 
failure to rationalise and invest in plant of the size used
379
by American and German rivals. The construction of 
large-scale works in the 1930s necessitated the planning of 
flow-coordination and the type of management that would 
facilitate it. The internal labour markets that were created 
needed to be trained and maintained, and systematic welfare 
policies had an important place in the emergence of 
corporate labour management. Other traditional trades like 
certain materials users remained under family management. 
Those with expanding markets, however, such as Robinsons and 
Dickensons in paper, Pilkingtons in glass, and Hans Renold 
in chain-production, did not prove deficient in management, 
and organised welfare provision effectively. Moreover, even 
the adoption of holding-company structures brought changes 
in the nature of welfare provision. Certain textile firms in 
the finishing and spinning trades in particular increased 
outlays on welfare, while the oligopoly which the founding 
of the Wall Paper Manufacturers created enabled it 
significantly to expand its welfare expenditure.
The success of the high technology or the "new" 
industries depended on oligopolistic controls over product 
markets and effective multi-functional management. High 
margins financed the growth of these expanding industries, 
and the electrical engineering, chemical, and some food 
processor companies were amongst the earliest systemisers of 
management. Although chemical and food processor companies 
had a long tradition of paternalism, welfare in all these 
industries altered with the changing structures of the 
companies and their markets. Like the chemical trade, 
management in electrical engineering needed to coordinate a
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variety of products and a sales organisation, and much 
thought and effort was placed in slotting labour into the 
scheme of production. Food and tobacco on the other hand did 
not rely on technological innovation as a market strategy. 
They did, however, balance production with consumer demand 
which they hoped to stabilise by the promotion of brand 
loyalty. The organised management this required was 
noticeably successful in the case of Cadburys, whose welfare 
policies are usually seen only as an extension of Quakerism. 
The motor car industry was not as highly concentrated as 
other "new" industries, nor its management so systemised. 
Industrial welfare in motor car production did not, 
therefore, match the provision of chemicals and electricals 
companies, and certain food and tobacco concerns.
Despite the comparatively greater commitment of large 
companies to industrial welfare, it would be wrong to assume 
that the small firm or partnership epitomised the practices 
of the profit-maximising capitalist. Industries which 
retained a highly atomised structure, like those involved in 
brewing, footwear, wool and worsted, and pottery, confronted 
economic reality and not theory. They granted unsystematic 
and discretionary benefits, because, whatever the size of 
the company, welfare was a means of coping with the 
ever-present fact of class conflict. Paternalism 
particularly suited small productive units.
Company provision had an important role in many major 
industries like the railways, iron and steel, textiles, 
coalmining, shipbuilding, electrical goods, food and 
tobacco, and, to some extent, engineering and motor cars.
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The place of industrial welfare in British industry,
therefore, was extensive and pervasive.
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Chapter 8.
The Labour Copartnership Asso ciation and 
the Indu s t r ial Welfare S o c i e t y .
(i ). Introduction.
The Labour Copartnership Association and the Industrial
Welfare Society, established in 1902 and 1918 repectively,
were organisations concerned with the coordination and
promotion of industrial welfare. Employers gave their
support to both organisations because they required
professional advice on company provision. Financially
supported by business, the L.C.A. and I.W.S. nourished ideas
and policies which reveal the purpose of employer-designed
welfare as a requirement of labour management.
The Labour Copartnership Association was originally
formed in 1884 as the Labour Association for the Promotion
of Cooperative Production. Most of its founders, J.M.Ludlow,
E.V.Neale, the author Thomas Hughes, E.O.Greening, and
G.J.Holyoake, derived their principles of industrial
self-help and cooperation from Christian Socialism.^ In
1902, the influence of employers within the Association
compelled . the choice of a new title, the Labour
Copartnership Association. The change indicated that,
instead of self-management, workers would be urged to share
in the nominal ownership of industry. Managerial
I. E.Bristow "Profitsharing and Labour Unrest" in
K.D.Brown (ed.) E ssays in Anti-Labour History
(1974), p p . 266-7; cf. also A.D.Murray John Ludlow: 
the Autobiography of a Christian Socialist (19 81).
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prerogative, moreover, was accepted as essential to 
industrial organisation.
The Industrial Welfare Society was established 
following government efforts during the Great War to boost 
munitions output by the improvement of working conditions. 
Its founder, Robert Hyde, was brought into the Welfare 
Department at the Ministry of Munitions, which was under the 
direction of B .S .R o w n t r e e , the chocolate manufacturer. Hyde 
was charged with supervising the interests of juvenile 
labour, and, through visiting "model" factories, he became 
acquainted with a number of important shipbuilders on the 
Clyde. Together they evolved the idea of an independent
Boys' Welfare Association with the object of advancing what 
was descibed as the best industrial practice. The large 
numbers of apprentices employed in shipbuilding had focussed 
much of their attention on the specific difficulties of 
teenage labour, but, by 1919, the scope for welfare in
labour management and the demand for advice encouraged the 
extension of the organisation's remit and the revised name 
of Industrial Welfare Society.
The change in the philosophy of the Labour
Copartnership Association in the years 1890-1939 illuminates 
the labour management strategies devised by companies. The 
L . C . A . , with its roots originating from the industrial 
democracy of the cooperative enterprise, differed only 
nominally by the 1920s from the activities of the Industrial 
Welfare Society, founded by employers to preach an 
ameliorative approach to industrial relations within the 
contemporary system of capitalistic ownership and managerial
384
control. Despite the claims of the L.C.A. and I.W.S. to be 
impartial between the interests of capital and labour, both 
organisations represented the views of employers interested 
in establishing an efficient system of man-management.
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(il). The Labour Copartnership Associ a t i o n .
Some of the founders of the Labour Association first
met in the 1840s, when they formed links with Owenite
cooperators and the Rochdale pioneers. As rich men, they
were able to become the financial backers of numerous
cooperatives, and, in 1850, they founded the Christian
Socialist Society for Promoting Working Men's Associations.
Its publication, the Christian Socialist, preached
industrial cooperation as part of the universal brotherhood
of man. The Society had contacts with the chairman of the
Employers' Association of South Yorkshire, Henry Briggs.^
Briggs introduced profitsharing at his Whitwood colliery in
1865 as a means of combatting nascent unionism and as a
solution for recurring strikes. When Briggs failed in both
2
his objectives, he soon abandoned his scheme. Profitsharing 
was defined as the allocation of shares by employers to 
workers, while the election of employee-directors by 
employee-shareholders was called copartnership. The terms, 
however, were often confused. Ludlow, moreover, was critical 
of Briggs' scheme for being a bribe and contrary to 
Christian Socialism, but Hughes saw nothing incongruous in a 
combination of profitsharing and "strong" management.^ As 
supporters of individualist radicalism and Gladstonian 
Liberalism, members of the Labour Association in 1884 were 
anti-statist and anti-socialist, and not anti-capitalist.
1. E.C.Mack & W.H.G.Armytage Thomas Hughes; the Life
of the Author o f Tom Brown 's Schooldays ( 19 52),
p p . 54-69,144-152.
2. Bristow (1974), p p . 266-7.
3. Mack & Armytage (1952), p . 155.
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The man who emerged as the Association's most prominent
advocate, G.J.Holyoake, was equally vociferous in the cause
of the Liberty and Property Defence League.^ Its Liberty
R eview portrayed Cooperation's links with Robert Owen as a
disastrous "Socialist blight", but praised the "realistic
attitude" of the Rochdale pioneers because they had
practised self-help and understood the ineradicable laws of 
2
the market.
The Labour Association was a propaganda organisation 
linked to the Cooperative Production Federation, which aided 
a variety of self-managed workshops in the actual running of 
their businesses. These firms could operate in the market 
according to the ideals of democratic Cooperation because of 
their small size. Yet, from the 1890s, the L.C.A. came to 
accept that the pressures of competition and the demand for 
large-scale capital would force the replacement of 
shop-floor cooperation with shareholders' ownership and 
supervisory c o n t r o l . Copartnership could be supported not on 
the grounds of "unobtainable" equality but because it 
increased efficiency. An employer would "not need constant
watchfulness to d e t e c t  waste" due to w o r k - d i s a f f e c t i o n .^
Finding an answer to the problems of managing sizeable 
workforces gave rise to argument within the L.C.A. The 
Society in the 1890s vacillated between true industrial 
democracy and employers' profitsharing schemes. The original 
idealism of the Association led them to reject Thomas
1. N.Soldon "Laissez-faire as Dogma: the Liberty and 
Property Defence League" in Brown (1974).
2. Liberty Review, April 1906, p p . 179-181.
3. Ibid, 17 Feb 1894, p p . 179-181.
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Bushill 's proposals in 1894 for ameliorating the differences
of employer and employee rather than erasing the
dividing-line itself. Bushill, therefore, resigned from the
Association and formed the short-lived Industrial Union of
Employers and Employed which promoted "unity of endeavour"
between capitalist and worker.^ But profitsharing as
implemented by employers and increasingly supported by the
L.C.A. had close similarités to the ideas of Thomas Bushill.
To the L.C.A., profitsharing was intended to be an
arrangement between equals, although workers rarely received
the full voting rights of Ordinary shareholders. The
differences between the theory of profitsharing and its
actual practice have led to misunderstandings about its
objectives. The promoters of profitsharing viewed the
capitalist firm as essentially divided by class interests,
which could be superseded, not through the dialectics of
increasing conflict, but by allowing the "have-nots" to
become minor capitalists in their own right. Accepting this
definition, one commentator notes that only some 250,000
workers were by 1920 involved in profitsharing and
copartners i p , but such comparatively small numbers are no
2
reason for disparagement. Too much attention is paid to
1. Industrial Union of Employers and Employed The 
Industrial Union of Employers and Employed (1894).
2. Bristow (1974), p . 270. This figure is taken from 
the PP 1920 (C.544) xxxiii 765. It cannot,
therefore, take account of developments within
large companies during the 1920s. The interest of 
large companies in profitsharing during these
years was noted in Ministry of Labour G a z e t t e ,
July 1930, p p . 238-242. Net figures, however, never 
changed dramatically throughout the Inter-War 
period. Cf. also Ibid., July 1930, p p . 238-242;
June 1934, p . 194; or Aug 1939, p p . 288-9. The 
L.C.A., though, did not accept the (cont.)
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the actual allocation of shares. In fact, many employers 
recognised that the occasional payment of dividends would 
not win the loyalty of workers. The usefulness of these 
schemes rested on the joint consultation, cooperation, and 
complaint-channels provided by profitsharing and 
copartnership committees. Such works councils were usually 
responsible for the management of a variety of welfare 
schemes other than profitsharing. Profitsharing was, 
therefore, part of a broader practice in industry, and 
should not be analysed as a separate and isolated movement.^
A report from the Board of Trade in 1891 revealed the 
diversity of the term profitsharing. Proposals for the 
alleviation of industrial strife had attracted the attention 
of government during the many strikes of 1889-90. The report 
viewed profitsharing as a previously-determined scheme
guaranteeing benefits before workers actually participated. 
An employee also had to be convinced that his efforts were 
an "improvable quantity" in terms of personal reward.
Although the report sought evidence of the successful 
distribution of dividends and bonuses, it acknowledged that 
profitsharing was widely accepted as encompassing any means 
of "class cooperation", such as extra wages at Christmas or 
company-supported benefit funds, so long as it could be said 
that an employer had given up part of his profits, A wide 
variety of welfare schemes, it was concluded, reduced the 
cost of superintendence, improved the quality of work,
lessened labour-turnover, and encouraged the workers to
Ministry's narrow definition of copartnership. Cf.
I b i d . , April 1920 , p . 169.
1. C f . Ch.I, s.(iv).
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suggest better w o r k - m e t h o d s . Employers like Tangye Brothers
agreed that profitsharing enhanced good industrial
relations, but only because it complemented an elaborate
system of benefit clubs, mess-rooms and schools.^ One
witness wrote to the Board of Trade making the observation
that, if cooperation was the desired aim, and if
profitsharing ranged from stockholding to benefit-payments
and the building of libraries, then "'there are few large
employers in this country who might not claim a place in
profitsharing lists'". Moreover, profitsharing schemes
generally could be altered or terminated at the discretion
of the employer, for "the absolute authority of the employer
to deal with the workmen, irrespective of his claims in the
division of profits, would appear to be indispensable" to
2
the success of profitsharing and the company itself.
During the 1890s, many types of capitalist concerns 
encouraged stock-holding amongst their employees, including 
biscuit manufacturers, McVitie and Price; Idris and Company, 
the soft drinks manufacturer; the British Electrical 
Engineering Company; and Peto Brothers, the general 
builders. Yet, it was the influence of the South 
Metropolitan Gas Company through the medium of its owner, 
George Livesey, which above all resolved the argument within 
the L.C.A. over its principles.^ Although Livesey's 
opposition to trades unionism remained an embarassing fact
1. C f . C h . 7, s .(V ).
2. PP 1890-91 (C.6267) Ixxviii 15, Report of Board of 
Trade on Profitsharing.
3. C f . C h . 3, s.(iii).
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to the Association,^ the hope that the South Metropolitan
and its subsidiary the Central Gas Company would eventually
join their organisation was too attractive a possibility for
the L.C.A., previously associated only with small productive
2
societies, to ignore. In 1898, therefore. Labour 
C o partnership had confirmed that the term "Labour 
Association" implied not only "the association of workers" 
but, in addition, the "association of labour with capital in 
a partnership".^ Holyoake "wanted the principle of 
profitsharing pushed among employers, persuading them it was
4
for their benefit". The Labour Association became committed
to what was termed "the transformation of capitalism".^ In
1901, by removing its "free labour" clause from its own
copartnership scheme, the S.M.G.C. was allowed to join the
Labour Association.^
After three years of regular questioning by the
Association's Executive Committee of its name and
objectives, a new constitution was proposed.^ At the 1902
Annual General Meeting, it was advised that their
organisation become the Labour Copartnership Association,
"for Employers were somewhat scared by the present name.
1. Labour C o p a r t n e r s h i p , Feb 1899, p . 26.
2. Ibid, May 1897, p . 71.
3. Ibid, July 1898, p . 118.
4. Liberty R e v i e w , Aug 1902, p p . 87-92.
5. Labour C o p a r t n e r s h i p , Oct 1899, p p . 175-6.
6. Bristow (1974), p . 268.
7. LCA Minutes, 5 May 1902.
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thinking it was some extreme organisation in the proposed 
interest of labour, not taking into account the interests of 
capital and consumers". Livesey seconded the motion and 
stressed the point that "what was wanted was the enlistment 
of the sympathy of employers in the work of labour 
copartnership".^ For, "...the importance of copartnership 
outside the cooperative movement had come to be more and 
more recognised". The argument in favour of employers' 
profitsharing had been won.
Labour Copartnership, in 1904, summed up the advantages 
of industrial participation in the sphere of labour 
management: "Give the worker his share of the profits in the 
capital, in the control, in the responsibility of his life's 
work, and you afford him every inducement to look beyond a 
mere receipt of wages. He begins to understand the position 
of the capitalist, the difficulties of management, the risks 
and rewards of enterprise". By appreciating that work is 
mental as well as manual, the worker will see that mental 
labour "is the most important of all". Employers would then 
be able to impose the "discipline which is the result of 
conviction" rather than "the discipline which is enforced". 
As small workshops were replaced by large-scale plants, the 
ties of loyalty which had bound master and craftsman were 
disappearing. The increasing potential for industrial strife
1. Labour Copartnership, Oct 1902, p p . 151-2
2. Ibid, May 1905, p p . 73-75.
392
could be countered by state socialism or copartnership.^ In
support of the second alternative, one economist outlined
the benefits of integrating Scientific Management, welfare,
and copartnership: the highest efficiency possible; the
"substitution of pleasant and educative forms of production
for those which are monotonous or positively unpleasant or
retarding to the worker's self-realisation"; the application
of productive powers to the most commendable desires; the
"proper motives in respect of the relations between
individuals" in a factory; and the better sharing of wealth.
Where new machinery reduced skilI-requirements and a man's
involvement in the planning of his job, copartnership
2
revived his identification with his place of work. The 
proper consideration of copartnership at individual firms 
replaced "rule of thumb methods" in labour management.^ 
Indeed, the Labour Copartnership Association was to mourn 
the death of F.W. Taylor, Scientific Management's greatest 
advocate, as "a distinct loss upon the world of industrial 
organisation".^
To promote their new concept of profitsharing, the 
Association in 1905 sought the help of some eminent figure 
who could summon a private conference between politicians, 
capitalists, and labour leaders.^ When Theodore Taylor M.P.
1. Ibid, I Aug 1905, p p . 1-2.
2. LCA Minutes, Half-yearly meeting, 4 May 1907.
Professor S.D.Chapman on "Labour Copartnership in 
Relation to Social Progress".
3. Labour C o p a r t n e r s h i p , 1 March 1902, p . 253.
4. Ibid, May 1915, p . 245. C f . Ch.I, s.(ii).
5. LCA Minutes, 3 Oct 1905.
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of Taylor and Company, a well-known profitsharing firm,^ was
elected president of the L.C.A., he arranged a meeting at
the House of Commons between himself, other employer M.Ps.,
2
and the trades unionist, Thomas Burt. Livesey also 
continued to campaign on behalf of the Association. During 
the threatened railway strike of 1907, he argued that 
differences could be resolved by copartnership. Railways, 
like gas companies, were capital-intensive industries which 
could easily issue to workers shares paying the regular 
dividends of all monopolies.^ As labour unrest continued to 
mushroom after 1911, Asquith imitated the government in 1890 
and commissioned a committee of "employers and public men" 
to investigate copartnership as a system of industrial
4
organisation. The L.C.A. capitalised on this renewed 
interest in profitsharing by emphasising its versatility. 
Profitsharing was not a unique system but a principle 
"capable of varied expression".^ Critics of profitsharing 
argued that it would only work in monopolies where returns 
were consistent enough to maintain the interest of the 
workforce. Supporters replied that some competitive 
companies had set up funds which accumulated profits made 
above dividends payable to shareholders. Such a fund.
1. Cf. Pollard & Turner (1976), p p . 4-34; & Ch.7,
s.(ii).
2. LCA Minutes, 24 Aug 1905, 6 March & I May 1906.
3. Labour C o p a r t n e r s h i p , 8 Jan 19 07 , p. 33.
4. PRO CAB 37/107, No 8, 1911.
5. Labour C o p a r t nership, June 1912, p . 82; Aug 1912,
p. 119.
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benefiting from good trading years, could smooth out the 
effects of trade fluctuations and regularise the paying of 
b o n u s e s .^
The First World War and talk of Reconstruction in 1915
encouraged the L.C.A. to convene an "Industrial Conference"
to discuss copartnership. Sir William Lever of Lever
Brothers, Charles Carpenter of the South Metropolitan Gas
Company, and J.R. Clynes, the railwaymen's leader, 
2
participated. In seeking to be involved at the highest 
level in debates about the "joint control" of industry, the 
L.C.A. believed it was being damaged by its association with 
workers' cooperatives. One spokesman "considered that the 
present time offered a grand opportunity to launch a wide 
propaganda for the adoption of Copartnership, and to insist 
on the right of labour to share in the profits of industry. 
If the L.C.A. felt hampered by its connection with the 
Cooperative movement then separation might be necessary". 
Some Association members felt that severing their contact 
with the Cooperative Production Federation would irreparably 
damage their remaining credibility with the labour movement. 
Nonetheless, wholly separate committees, without dual 
membership, were appointed so that the two organisations 
could be easily differentiated.^ Whitley himself told the 
Labour Copartnership Association that his Committee, which 
had reported in 1916-17, "had naturally considered very
1. PP 1912-13 (C.6496) xxxxiii 853. Report on
Profitsharing and Copartnership.
2. LCA Minutes, AGM, Feb 1915; 27 July 1916; 31 July 
1916.
3. Ibid, 23 Oct 1916. '
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carefully all that had gone before in the way of schemes of
copartnership and profitsharing". Although his report made
no recommendations on the subject, employers at a conference
in 1920 stated that Whitley and factory councils, which, "to
a very large extent, controlled the conditions of
employment", were themselves a successful form of
copartnership, even if no shares had been issued to
workers.^ The L.C.A. held talks with the National
Association of Employers and Employed, which by 1917 the
Federation of British Industries saw as a means of
forwarding the cause of Whitley Councils. They discussed
worker participation, rather than profitsharing or
copartnership, as an alternative to nationalisation 
2
proposals. The L.C.A. decided in 1923 that the word 
"Labour" should be removed from their title and replaced 
with "Industrial". It was a reflection of their increasing 
involvement in any scheme of industrial cooperation.^
The 1920 Ministry of Labour Report on Copartnership and 
Profitsharing noted their links with industrial unrest or
4
periods of labour shortage. It discovered that post-War 
schemes were often undertaken by well-known limited 
liability companies. They were valued because they enabled 
the constant involvement of workpeople in copartnership,
1. LCA Report o n  London Copartnership C o n g r e s s ,
26-28th Oct, 1920, p p . 1-3.
2. L abour C o p ar t n e r s h i p , June 1917, p . 59; LCA
Minutes, AGM, May 1919; Speech by Lord Robert 
Cecil. Cf. C h . 9, s.(iv).
3. LCA Minutes, 30 May 1923. The Industrial
Copartnership Association later became the 
Industrial Participation Association.
4. PP 1920 (C.544) xxxiii 765.
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welfare, and works committees.^ Sir Vincent Gaillard of
Vickers, one-time president of the F.B.I., agreed that
channels of communication eased management's difficulties.
Lever Brothers, and the confectionery-makers, Nicholls and
Coombs, organised an annual gathering of its workers in
their various factories in order to ascertain their views.
Copartnership committees, like those at the Bradford Dyers'
Association and the British Cyanide Company, administered
2
benefit funds and workshop conditions. Profitsharing at 
Ford Ayrton and Company, the silk-spinners, centred around a 
works council with a say in the running of non-contributory 
sick and pension clubs intended to "augment the National 
Health Benefits and to assist cases of hardship".^ The 
L.C.A. asserted that the "corollary of Co-partnership is 
welfare work and the ultimate result of welfare work must be 
to enable the workers to share in the control,- as the 
Whitley Report states it, to 'have a greater opportunity of 
participating in the discussion with those parts of industry 
by which they are most affected',- and then to share in the 
ownership". Welfare work itself was "proof indeed that the 
spirit of Co-partnership has been accepted and not only in 
its economic system".^ The L.C.A. argued that its principles 
had been adopted in the coalmining settlement of 1920 when 
it was decided to divide profits on an 83-17% basis between
1. PRO LAB2/716/186/15/1920, Letter, 9 Dec 1926.
2. Ibid, Memo. on Works Committees. Cf. C h . 5. 
ss . (i ),(iii ) ; C h . 7, s.(ii).
3. ICA Profitsharing in Practice: A Brief Outline of 
the Profitsharing Scheme of Ford Ayrton & Co. Ltd.
(1949 ) .
4. Labour C o p a r t n e r s h i p , Jan 1919, p . 4.
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labour and capital respectively.^
Copartnership featured in Conservative and Liberal
manifestoes throughout the 1920s, and had a keen advocate in
the Cabinet minister. Lord Robert Cecil of Chelwood. The
L.C.A. advertised the fact that the employers, Mond,
M i I n e - W a t s o n , W.Howard Hazell, and the T.U.C. President, Ben
Turner, who all participated in the Mond-Turner talks of
2
1927, were prominent members of the Association. The L.C.A. 
argued that the employer should organise his business "so as 
to afford reasonable wage standards, security, and control
to his w o r k e r s  " despite the cycles in trading
conditions. The Association believed that this attitude in 
industry had merely been given legislative effect by the 
passing of the Widows, Orphans, and Old Age Contibutory 
Pensions Act of 1925. Companies could contract out of the 
state scheme or establish supplementary pension funds.^ 
Indeed, with the state's attitude during the Inter-War 
period towards industrial cooperation being friendly but 
strictly non-interventionist,^ voluntary initiatives rather 
than government direction were the norm.^
Industrial Peace argued that rational industrial 
organisation by "scientific methods" could be capped by
1. LCA Minutes, Annual Reports, 1920.
2. Ibid, 1927-28.
3. PRO LAB2/1295/IR460/27. Memo, on Copartnership as 
a Means of Improving the Relations between 
Employers and Employed, 1927. Cf. C h . 9, s.(vi).
4. LCA Minutes, Annual Reports, 1918.
5. Labour Copartnership, Sept 1926, p p . 18-2 0.
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copartnership as a symbol of cooperation within large
companies.^ Mergers during the 1920s were facilitated by the
involvement of potentially more alienated labour forces in
works councils. Sir Alfred Mond of I.C.I. believed that
copartnership introduced a "new psychology" into industry by
2
making employers and workers feel they were "co-workers". 
Worker stock-holding itself was an experiment in labour 
management which met with partial success, but it was in 
practice designed as only one aspect of a company's welfare 
policy. Profitsharing and copartnership committees, where 
they existed, tended to deal with welfare work in general. 
The L.C.A., therefore, had by 1939 changed from being an 
advocate of true industrial democracy into, at first, a 
promoter of labour copartnership between capital and labour, 
and, then, into an organisation which campaigned for forms 
of industrial participation on the grounds they improved 
labour efficiency.^
1. Industrial P e a c e , Aug 1918, p p . 9-12.
2. A.Mond Industry and Politics (1937), p . 110.
3. NCEO Archives, MSS/200/B/3/2/C140, Pt.l, Leaflet 
from ICA.
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(i i i ). The Industrial Wei fare S o c i e t y .
The Ministry of Labour did not respond appreciatively
when in 1919 Robert Hyde founded a private institution to
promote the cause of industrial welfare. Hyde's
persuasiveness was acknowledged, but he was said to have
achieved few concrete results at the Ministry's Welfare
Department, with the exception of the contacts he had forged
with Scottish shipbuilders.^ One of these, William Beardmore
of Beardmore and Company established a welfare department at
his own works in 1917 and rallied his apprentices in the
cause of the 1st Patriotic League in Sympathy with Boy
Welfare. Beardmore thought that economic conditions after
the War would be harsh, but he believed that British
shipbuilding could protect its position by introducing
modern technology. Boys' welfare would promote the good
labour relations essential to industrial success. It was
intended by Beardmore to be a means of superseding the
apprenticeship system and involving the company directly in
2
the training of workers in new techniques. His influence 
with other shipbuilders on the Clyde led to the setting up 
of the I.W.S. and guaranteed its initial success. The 
I.W.S.'s first Council, which met in 1918 at the 
headquarters of the Shipbuilding Employers Federation, was 
composed of six representatives of shipbuilding firms and 
Hyde.^ The formation of the Society was, nevertheless, 
discussed with the Engineering Employers Federation, the
1. LAB2/741/T6402/1920, Memo., 21 Oct 1919.
2. Forge N e w s , 4 Sept 1917, p . 2; 4 Oct 1917, p . 2; 11
Dec 1918, p . 3. Cf. C h . 7, s.(iv).
3. IWS Minutes, Council, 25 July 1918.
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Federation of British Industries, and the National
Association of Employers and Employed.^ Donations were
received from the E.E.F., the S.E.F., and the British
2
Commonwealth Union.
Despite the origins of the Society, the I.W.S. claimed 
a non-sectarian outlook in industrial relations. Many trades 
unionists, including J.R.Clynes, Arthur Hen^derson, and 
F.S.Button, were associated with it, but only as 
individuals. Although attempts were made to gain the
allegiance of the Engineers, Boilermakers, and Gas and
General Workers, Labour on the whole remained hostile, and 
the Trades Union Congress in 1932 condemned industrial 
welfare as an anti-union tool.^ Yet, because welfare at the 
company-level often enabled employers to cooperate with 
their workforces, many union leaders in practice took a 
pragmatic attitude. As General Secretary of the Gas and
General Labourers, Will Thorne recognised the advantages of
negotiating with employers rather than confronting them. He 
was willing to be a member of the I.W.S.'s Council, but 
rarely attended its meetings. For the sake of retaining his 
name in the ranks of the Society, he was dissuaded for many 
years from resigning, despite the passivity of his
4
c o m m i t m e n t .
That the Industrial Welfare Society sought to protect
1. Ibid, Forward and Minutes, 1918.
2. Ibid, Finance Committee, 6 Nov 1919. Cf. Turner 
(1978), p p . 528-551.
3. E.Sidney The Industrial Society 1918-1968 (19 68), 
p p . 6-8,11-15.
4. IWS Minutes, Council, 1918-21, passim.
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managerial prerogative from the encroachments of labour and 
the state was revealed in its early dealings with the 
Ministry of Labour and the Welfare Workers' Institute. The 
Institute had been founded in 1913 as a professional body 
for welfare supervisors, and was largely composed of women 
engaged in industries heavily dependent upon female labour. 
It became, in 1931, the Institute of Labour Management.^ The 
state, however, was at first perceived as the greatest 
threat. In 1920, the Ministry of Labour wanted the Society 
and the Institute to join forces, partly so "that out of the 
amalgamation an executive should be formed capable of really 
controlling Mr Hyde" who otherwise "will come to a 
shipwreck". During the two years after the end of the Great 
War, Reconstruction or large-scale government intervention 
in industrial and social matters was still a prospect. The 
Ministry held that it was "impossible" for it "to wash its 
hands of all responsibi1ty for what goes on inside the 
works". The Society's future, of course, depended on 
industrial welfare being left to private initiative, and 
employers' support for the I.W.S. was in part a strategy for 
demonstrating that state intervention was unnecessary.
It was an outlook shared by Sir Allen Smith of the
E.E.F., who opposed those within the F.B.I. in favour of a 
general agreement on industrial relations between 
government, business, and labour. He used his influence 
within the E.E.F. to establish in 1919 the National 
Confederation of Employers Organisations as the employers'
1. Cf. Ch.l, s.(ii).
2. LAB2/741/CS204/1920. Memo., 2 March 1920.
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forum for discussing labour matters. His rejection of 
consensus and his advocacy of commercial and managerial 
freedom helped to ruin any hope of progress at the National 
Industrial Conference in 1920.^ Engaged in the work of the
I.W.S., Smith issued a circular to members of the E.E.F.
2
recommending the work of the Society. Hyde and he led a 
delegation which asked the Secretary of the State, Horne, in 
March 1920, "To withdraw the Ministry of Labour from all 
welfare work and give the Association (sic) a monopoly".^ By 
1921, any threat of a Coalition government involving itself 
in the details of industrial affairs had faded with the 
eventual decontrol of the wartime economy.
The Ministry was certain that the Industrial Welfare 
Society was an organisation financed by "a large number of 
influential employers". One-sidedness, it was believed, 
would irredeemably hinder the Society in its declared aim of 
solving the problems of industrial unrest.^ Yet, it was 
because the Welfare Workers' Institute was an independent 
body that employers were opposed to it. They preferred to 
set the standards and determine the organisation of welfare 
schemes. To Hyde and many employers, the Institute was 
discredited by having reportedly received financial support
1. Cf. R.Lowe "The Failure of Consensus in Britain: 
the National Industrial Conference, 1919-21",
H . J . , 1978.
2. IWS Minutes, Council, 8 July 1919.
3. LAB2/7 4 1 / C S 2 0 4 / 1 9 2 0 . Letter from Smith, 22 March
1920 .
4. Ibid, Memo., 21 Oct 1919.
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from "labour circles".^ The Ministry also criticised the
Institute's connections with the Labour Party, but concluded
that welfare supervisors needed allies because of the
2
cooperation given to the I.W.S. by employers.
The Ministry thought that the Institute was in danger 
of being dictated to. On the Society's founding, Hyde had 
"informed certain of the supervisors that their employers 
subscribed to him and that consequently they must do what he 
told t h e m " .  ^ Hyde's second response was to propose an 
amalgamation between the I.W.S. and the Institute. The 
Welfare Workers argued that the Society wanted to annex its 
connections with the trades union movement in order to
4
improve its own credibility. As Hyde was "looked upon as an 
employers' man", the Welfare Workers held that amalgamation 
would prejudice their professional and neutral status.^ The 
Society was also concerned about talks between the Welfare 
Workers and the Labour Party, and the N.C.E.O. was 
particularly worried by the notion of welfare supervisors 
siding with workers against management. The Institute had 
supported the Labour Party's Parliamentary opposition to the 
introduction of a two-shift system for women and children in
1. NCEO, MSS200/B/3/2/C189, Pt.l, Letter from
Beardmores to NCEO, 22 Oct 1920.
2. LAB2/741/T6042/1920, Memo., 27 Feb 1920.
3. Ibid, Memo., 21 Oct 1919.
4. IWS Minutes, Central Committee of Industrial
Welfare Supervisors Associations, 17 May 1919;
Meetings with Welfare Workers Institute, 1920.
5. Ibid, Memo., 21 Oct 1919.
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1920.^ Beardmore and Company responded to the threat of the
Welfare Workers' Institute by refusing to employ its 
2
members. Hyde believed that the Institute, faced with the 
opposition of employers, would be unable "to further extend 
their operations in the direction of interference with the 
management of labour".^ By 1931, the I.W.S. incorporated the 
advisory and promotional activities of the Institute under 
the Society's name, and the new Institute of Labour 
Management had no direct influence over welfare schemes.^
The I.W.S., freed from government and independent 
rivals, had achieved by the early 1930s a preeminence in the 
coordination and encouragement of welfare activities in 
factories. The Society sought to promote industrial welfare 
on behalf of their clients, because it saw its practice as 
an aspect of company-based labour management. By emphasing 
the central role of the firm, the I.W.S. and company 
provision were acceptable to employers because they sought 
to assuage the aspirations of labour to control 
wo r k - m e t h o d s . They reinforced managerial prerogative. Hyde 
asserted that welfare work could only succeed if it arose 
from the shopfloor "good will and experience of employers 
and representatives of labour" and not from state 
imposition. Employers should not bestow patronage but seek 
"real cooperation" by using welfare as a means for both
1. IWS Minutes, Meetings with Welfare Workers 
Institute, 1920; NCEO, MSS200/B/3/2/C189, Pt.l, 
Letter to Members of the NCEO, 21 Oct 1920.
2. MSS200/B/3/2/C189, Pt.l, Letter from Beardmores to 
NCEO, 22 Oct 1920.
3. Ibid, Letter from Beardmores to NCEO, 10 Nov 1920.
4. IWS Minutes, Council, 19 April 1931.
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sides of industry to meet as equals.^ Hyde argued that the
giving of gifts could not establish "mutual interests" in
the way a well-thought-out, and presumably contributory, 
2
scheme could.
As the I.W.S. did not interfere in matters of wages and 
hours, it claimed it was not an anti-union body and that its 
views on labour combinations were kindred to the National 
Association of Employers and Employed.^ Moreover, once the 
Whitley scheme had proved by the late 1920s a failure in 
private industry, the National Association began to
concentrate on welfare rather than collective bargaining.^ 
The Industrial League and Council, which in 1924 amalgamated 
with the N.A.E.E, to form the National Industrial Alliance, 
wished in 1923 to join with the Society because of the 
similarity of their outlook. The I.W.S., however,
distinguished between "Labour" and "Welfare" topics.^ But, 
in seeking to protect managerial p r e r o g a t r i v e , industrial 
welfare was very much a "Labour" issue. The I.W.S. stated 
that, while academics depicted welfare as an alternative to 
Nationalisation, Guild Socialism, or a universal system of
Whitley Councils, Mr John Smith was "not greatly concerned
with the exact method by which industry is controlled", but 
was, "however, tremendously interested in the conditions
1. Ibid, Annual Report, 30 June 1919.
2. Industrial W e l f a r e , June 1920, pp . 176-7.
3. Ibid, April 1919, p p . 17-18. Cf. C h . 9, s.(iv).
4. U n i t y , 1928-32, passim.
5. IWS Minutes, Executive Committee, 7 Nov 1923.
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under which he follows his daily round".^ Joint Industrial
Councils had, therefore, become engaged in welfare work, and
"closely allied with the welfare movement is the question of
Works Committees, on which bodies the initiation and
carrying out of welfare work generally and mainly devolves".
Only such cooperative machinery could gain "the intelligent
2
and careful use" of welfare facilities. Rather than control 
over investment and production, the discussion of welfare 
matters demonstrated the "right relationship between 
management and the worker".^ The activities of the Whitley 
Councils and the Industrial Welfare Society merged as they 
adjusted to the requirements of the firm.
As a complement to Scientific Management, the ultimate 
aim of I.W.S. schemes was to increase the volume of
production, and talks in 1931 were opened with the British 
Works Managers Association on improving industrial 
efficiency.^ Industrial Peace viewed welfare as "of primary 
importance to the employer" because full and economical use 
of each agent of production was possible only "in 
frictionless co-operation". Workers, it was claimed, could 
only be satisfied if the activities of the factory reflected 
the life of the community through sporting and social clubs 
and if basic needs, like sick pay or pensions, were
fulfilled.^ By 1927, the I.W.S. was involved in the type of
1. Industrial W e l f a r e , May 1920, p . 145.
2. Ibid, Jan 1922, p p . 9-11.
3. Ibid, March 1920, p . 71.
4. IWS Minutes, Annual Report, 30 June 1927.
5. Industrial P e a c e , Jan 1927, p p . 137-9; Nov 1927,
p p . 72-3.
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personnel management concerned with hiring and training, and
considered dropping the word "Welfare" from its title. But
the name was kept intact because welfare schemes were
recognisably distinct from the wage-contract and the actual
task of production.^ The Balfour Committee on Industry and
Trade praised the role of the I.W.S. and the voluntary
efforts of employers, and linked improvements in workshop
life, industrial peace, continuity in personnel, and
2
productive efficiency. But the Committee minimised the 
Society's activities, mentioning only advice on canteens, 
clubs, heating and ventilation. The I.W.S. also helped 
companies in the administration of sick-pay and in planning 
for the never-implemented industry-based unemployment 
benefit clauses of the 1920 Act.^ The Society drafted the 
Flour-milling Joint Industrial Council's supplementary 
pension scheme.^ The I.W.S., in addition, was able to 
coordinate cooperation between small employers, as on the 
riverside in the East End of London, where £80,000 was spent 
on a social club, gymnasium, and theatre.^ This
IWS Minutes, Annual Report, 30 June 1927. The Home 
Office in 1931 acknowledged the good image 
attached to industrial welfare (of. NCEO, 
MSS/200/3/2/C189, Pt.l, Home Office Welfare 
Pamplet N o . 3 (HMSO 1931), p p . 3-5.
Industrial W e l f a r e , April 1926, p p . 111-5. Cf. also 
PRO BT/55/2/BAL4.
Ibid, Sept 1920, p p . 111-5,278-80; Oct 1920, 
p p . 314,331; Nov 1928, p p . 365-9.
NCEO, MSS/200/B/3/2/C189, Pt.l, Letter from ICA, 
22 Feb 1933. Cf. Ch.7, s.(ix).
U n i t y , July 1921, p p . 287-8.
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type of "cooperative welfare" was demonstrated by 38 cotton 
mills in Lancashire which also pooled their resources.^
By 1921, the I.W.S. had been funded by all branches of
industry, from aircraft manufacturers, motorcar producers,
brewers, shipbuilders, engineering companies, dyestuffs,
chemical, iron and steel, rubber, food processor, gas and
electricity concerns, and cotton and woollen interests, to
cigarette and dock companies, while administering the
2
Miners' Welfare Fund. The Industrial Welfare Society 
preached the "unitary ideal" of the company, and, opposed by 
organised labour, it helped employers organise schemes 
designed to ameliorate work-disaffection and to maintain 
managerial prerogative.
1. NCEO, MSS/200/B/3/2/C189, Pt.l, Home Office 
Welfare Pamphlet (1931), p . 25.
2. IWS Minutes, Council, passim; PRO
LAB2/741/CS204/1920. Cf. Ch . 7, s.(iii).
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{iV ). Conclusion .
Despite the increasing mechanisation of industry in the
early decades of the 20th Century, employers could not
simply rely upon supervisory control and the regular
patterns of flow-production to manage their labour.
Management theorists, aware of the realities of industrial
life, emphasised leadership rather than Taylor's simplistic
notions of total industrial authoritarianism. His belief
that workers were unthinking beasts of burden was rejected.^
George Cadbury, the chocolate manufacturer, argued
forcefully on behalf of British employers who had adjusted
2
the demands of "objective" efficiency to suit human wants. 
Discussion during this period and especially during the 
First World War concentrated on "Human Factor Psychology", 
industrial fatigue, and the work of C.S.Myers. Yet
working-conditions during the War and the following twenty 
years remained poor. In the 1930s, debate focussed on
arguments about "Human Relations", "social satisfactions" 
and group cohesion on the production-line, whose chief 
proponent was Elton Mayo.^ Emphasis upon Taylorism, Myerism, 
and Mayoism overlooks the more practical and concrete 
achievements of welfare schemes which did not interfere with 
shop-floor organisation. When the Institute of Welfare
Workers became the Institute of Labour Managment, it was not 
indicative of a general abandonment of copartnership and 
welfare schemes in favour of management sciences as a
1. Gulick (1936), in Gulick & Urwick (1969).
2. Cadbury (1913) in Chandler (1979).
3. Cf. Rose (1975), passim.
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solution to labour problems. While the Institute of Labour 
Management became a professional organisation for personnel 
managers, the I.W.S. and the L.C.A. were company-backed 
bodies expressing the interests of employers. Their work in 
many industries probably had a greater impact than the 
limited application of Taylorism or the Bedaux system in the 
1930s.
The object of industrial welfare was to stem 
rank-and-file militancy and resentment by dealing with it at 
the level of the shop-floor. The employers' concern for 
workers' deep-seated worries about death, ill-health, and 
old-age was meant as proof of their' joint interests. Both 
the L.C.A. and the I.W.S. sought a thoughtful approach to 
management, and to this end they, above all, recognised that 
a man's work environment and the treatment he received were 
central to his perception of a company's hierarchial 
a u thori ty-structure.
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Chapter 9.
Industry and Social Reform .
(i ). Introdu c t i o n .
Industrial welfare in Britain has attracted from
historians less attention than state provision. Explanations
of the undoubted "growth" of the Welfare State during the
20th Century have in the majority of cases looked at the
development of social legislation from the perspective of
politics only.^ The previous chapters have shown that
welfare was also a phenomenon of business organisation.
Changes in the structure of the economy, the size of
companies, and the nature of management were increasing the
2
possibilities of and the need for industrial welfare.
The existence of company provision throughout British 
industry affected the attitudes of some employers to state 
schemes. They realised that the workers' fear of destitution 
contributed to poor industrial relations, work-disaffeetion, 
and costly strikes. The organisation of a company's labour 
force required more than the mere payment of wages or 
piece-work bonuses. By funding social needs like housing and 
sports grounds, or by providing income maintenance through 
illness or old age, management attempted to sustain a 
cooperative, experienced workforce. Drawn into supporting
1. Cf. D.Fraser, J.F.Harris, J.R.Hay, B.B.Gilbert,
A.Marwick, & P.Thane in Bibliography.
2. Cf. Ch.l, s { i ) ,(iii),(iv); C h . 2, ss.(i),(ii),
(iii); & C h . 4, ss.(i),(ii).
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company welfare, businessmen found state schemes more 
acceptable. Employers engaged in competitive industries 
naturally resented and sometimes opposed the tax increases 
which paid for social legislation, and there was an 
ideological objection to large government. But they had to 
deal with the problems of industrial life pragmatically, and 
the benefits of universality, standardisation, compulsory 
powers, and funding which were at the command of the 
government in the provision of welfare were clear. Employers 
solved their dilemma by lobbying in support of "contracting 
out" by which private provident societies could participate 
in state schemes while retaining their autonomy. Welfare 
could then remain as part of the relationship between 
employer and worker.
Indeed, the underlying philosophy behind social reform 
before the creation of the Welfare State after 1945 was not 
to underwrite sustenance "from the cradle to the grave" but 
to encourage private providence and personal thrift. Welfare 
from 1880-1939 was not an all-embracing system of 
state-provided benefits, but was often dependent upon 
private institutions merely coordinated by government. 
Social reform did not conflict with the interests of 
employers, but accomodated them.
Before analysing the involvement of employers in 
welfare legislation, their ability to affect political 
events must be placed in context. Middlemas has looked at 
the relationship between industry and politics.^ He 
correctly argues that politics was not a closed system and
1. K.Middlemas Politics in Industrial Society (1979).
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that government took account of the views of pressure-groups
like employers associations. He does not, however, asssess
the degree of influence employers' organisations had over
the process of government. For it was the state in Britain
which exerted the formative influence upon employers
associations. The Railway Companies Association was formed
in 1845 to represent the industry in Parliament, which had
begun to subject its monopoly to regulation. The R.C.A. had
the reputation of being an effective lobby-group but its
influence in Parliament was comparatively small in relation
to party political considerations.^ The National Federation
of Iron and Steel Manufacturers and the British Iron and
Steel Federation were created respectively in 1917 and 1934
only at the behest of government. It was the state which
sought the cooperation of the industry to carry through
plans of industrial rationalisation. The staple industries,
divided by competitive rivalries, were generally unable and
2
reluctant to act collectively.
It is not surprising, therefore, that attempts to set 
up an umbrella organisation for British industry as a whole 
all failed before the First World War.^ The government 
proved the catalyst in forming the Federation of British 
Industries in 1916. The scale of state involvement in a war 
economy forced employers to negotiate on issues of
1. G.Alderman The Railway Interest (1979), p p . 222-8.
2. Turner (1978), p p . 528-551.
3. Cf. National Federation of Associated Employers of 
Labour (1873); Employers' Parliamentary Council 
(1898); Manufacturers' Association of Great 
Britain (1905); Employers Parliamentary
Association (1911).
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centralised industrial planning, and government needed to
speak to the representatives of industry. The Ministry of
Reconstruction was founded to consider schemes in social
welfare, industrial relations, and central economic planning
to be implemented by government after the War. Without the
nationalisation of industry, employers' associations like
the F.B.I. were to play an important coordinating role
between the state and individual companies. The Federation
supported proposals for a permanent industrial parliament
representing employers and unions, and advocated tariffs, an
imperial trading union, and the subsidising of industries
vital to the national interest. In 1917, an F.B.I. report
predicted that economic conditions after the War would
require extensive rationalisation and reorganisation on the
part of British industry. Such changes, it argued, also
needed the consent and cooperation of labour, and the report
proposed a scheme of social insurance covering old age
pensions, sick pay, and unemployment benefits and funded
jointly by employers and trades unions.^ The F.B.I. in 1919
favoured the calling of a National Industrial Conference to
discuss industrial relations, but the officials within the
F.B.I. were not necessarily representative of its
membership. Employers set up the National Confederation of
Employers Organisations to represent them at the Conference,
and helped forestall any agreement being made. The F.B.I.
1. Cf. Turner (ed.) (1984), p . 42: "Report of the
Labour Sub-Committee on Industrial and Commercial 
Efficiency", FBI Circular, 6 Dec 1917, EEF 
Archives. The report was drawn up by a 
sub-committee chaired by W.P.Rylands, a 
paternalistic producer of steel wire: cf. Ch.4,
s.(iv).
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was left to deal with commercial matters, and by 1919 had
abandoned its support for any form of state intervention in
the economy. Government decontrol of industry by 1921
destroyed the major reason for many employers' support for a
national representative organisation. Both the F.B.I. and
N.C.E.O. had few resources and no means to discipline
members, and their credibility was weakened by the divisions
within them. They proved ineffective as pressure groups, and
seemed to exist despite having no clear purpose. Indeed, the
Federation avoided making any decision about tariffs from
fear of alienating any part of its membership until by 1932
the affects of the Great Depression had made the issue
u n c o n t e n t i o u s .^
Miliband argues that employers controlled the direction
of government, but the influence of employers associations
has been greater in the minutiae and in the amendments of
2
legislation and has had little strategic input. Research, 
administrative pressures, reforming civil servants, and not 
least the ambitions and electoral calculations of 
politicians are the important contributory factors in the 
passing of social legislation.^ Employers' reactions to
1 . Cf. W.P.Grant & P.C.Marsh The Confederation of
British Industry (1977), chs.1,2; J.Turner "The
Politics of Business" & "The Politics of 
'Organised Business' in the First World War" in 
Turner (ed.) ( 1984 ), pp. 1-19 , 33-49 ; S.Blank
Industry and Government in Britain: the Federation 
of British Industries (1973), p p . 4-40.
2. Cf. R.Miliband The State in Capitalist Society 
( 1973 ) .
3. Cf. J.R.Hay The Origins of the Liberal Welfare
Reforms (1975), c h s . 1 , 2 , 3; J.F.Harris "Social
Policy making in Britain during the second world 
war" in W.J,Mommsen The Emergence of the Welfare 
State in Britain and Germany (19 81).
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Workmen's Compensation, old age pensions, and National 
Insurance in a succession of Acts from 1880 to 1925 suggest 
that on the whole they acquiesced in their passing or lacked 
the power to halt legislation.
Employers did, nonetheless, influence the final form of 
social reform in these years. The legislative process can be 
restricted to "safe" issues to help gain its acceptance. 
Leaving industry in private hands gives significant power 
over investment, production, and wage-levels to employers, 
and this position was never seriously threatened by 
Parliament in this period. Employers, therefore, did not 
feel the need to engage widely in politics. Yet, company 
provision was an integral part of industrial relations, and 
employers naturally opposed the direct involvement of the 
state in this sensitive area. "Contracting out" made social 
reform for employers a "safe" issue. While other groups like 
friendly and insurance societies also lobbied hard for the 
right of private institutions to act as agents for the 
state,^ the following evidence suggests that employers 
played an important part in winning concessions from 
government.
Section (ii) of this chapter deals with employers' 
liability legislation from 1880 to 1897, and section (iii) 
analyses the Shop Clubs Act and the introduction of old age 
pensions and National Insurance in 1908 and 1911. Section
(iv) discusses the Whitley Council scheme, and section
1. Gilbert (1966), pp. 340-1 , 373-4 , 378-9 , 383 , 387 , 
428-9.
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(v) housing and education after the Great War. Section (vi) 
looks at the 1920 Unemployment Insurance Act and the 1925 
Contributory and Widows Pensions Act.
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(ii). Employers' Liability, 1880-1906.
By the 1870s, the law for compensating workers for
industrial accidents was recognised as an unfair
anachronism. The Common Law of employers' liability
stipulated that a worker was entitled to compensation only
if he was in "common employment". In other words, an
employer had to exercise direct supervision over the worker
and, therefore, have direct responsibility for him. The law
was suited to an economy of small workshops, and had
remained unchanged despite the growth of company size and
the consequent delegation of authority to managers and
supervisors. The law was also anomalous. While liable for
accidents to passengers, railway companies were not
considered responsible for injuries to men at work.
Colliery, shipping, and railway employers were the most
actively opposed to reform of the law, because, as
industries with high accident rates, they faced the prospect
of heavy costs from compensation cases.^
The first signs of change were indicated by Sir Edward
Watkin, the chairman of the Manchester, Sheffield,
Lincolnshire, and South Eastern Railways, whose proposals
during the 1870s for the reform of Employers Liability have
been interpreted as contrary to the interests of a railway 
2
employer. As a Member of Parliament, Watkin had introduced 
Liability Bills in 1874 and 1875 proposing a maximum of one 
year's wages as accident compensation. Many railway 
employers at this stage would undoubtedly have preferred no
1. Railway N e w s , 2 7 March 1880, p p . 428-9.
2. Alderman (1979), p.63.
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change in the law. They ensured that they had four 
representatives sitting on a Select Committee on Employers 
Liability in 1877, and the resulting report was a
conservative document opposing reform. Its recommendations 
won the support of other employers' associations.^ Moreover, 
the Railway Companies Association joined the Mining 
Association of Great Britain and other employers in 1877 to 
lobby against a Liability Bill initiated by Alexander 
McDonald, the miners' leader and Lib-Lab M.P.. But there 
was an essential difference between McDonald and Watkin's
Bills. Watkin's proposals had stipulated that any judicial
assessment of compensation would take into account sums 
already paid by company friendly societies. It was a 
suggestion which appealed to railway companies. The law was 
clearly unjust, and railway employers, like Watkin, had
already begun to provide for the victims of accidents 
voluntarily. Such provision helped maintain cooperation and 
discipline. Managerial orders were more questionable if 
accidents suffered while working on a railway remained 
uncompensated. There was, in addition, a value in aiding 
sick workers to return quickly to work. When legislation 
became likely after the election of a Liberal government in 
1880, both the R.C.A. and Watkin were agreed on the need to 
protect the role and existence of company friendly societies 
by a system of "contracting out" of any new legislation.^
1. Bagwell (1963), p p . 117-8.
2. Cf. P.S.Bagwell "The Railway Interest: its 
Organisation and its Influence", J l . of Transport 
History (1965), p p . 65-86.
3. Railway N e w s , 11 Dec 1880, pp . 781-2.
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Committed to the Liberal ideal of removing anomalies 
and privileges, Gladstone favoured reform of accident 
compensation law. At first, the new government proposed an 
Employers Liability Bill which only allowed workers to sue 
employers whose negligence contributed to accidents at work. 
Consequently, "large and influential bodies of employers", 
representing iron and steel, building, port, railway, gas, 
and shipbuilding interests, sent a deputation to Gladstone. 
They preferred to involve their men in private mutual 
insurance schemes which promoted class cooperation, and 
argued that the proposed Bill would lead to constant and 
bitter litigation between employers and workers. Moreover, 
no employer could afford to continue with a mutual scheme if 
still liable under the law to civil action. Gladstone 
refused to abandon the Bill or to concede the principle of 
workers having a right to civil redress. In response, the 
employers sought a means to contract out of the future Act. 
Workers could sign an agreement with their employers by 
which they conceded their legal right to take employers to 
court in return for the security of a joint insurance 
s c h e m e .^
The case for contracting out in the coal and railway
industries was particularly strong. Mr Baxter M.P., on
behalf of the Mining Association of Great Britain, pointed
out how colliery-owners already contributed to mutual
accident schemes, and that probably 113,000 out of 500,000
1. Iron and Coal Trades R e v i e w , 13 Feb 1880, p . 180; 
Hansard, 28 May 1880, 3rd s e r . , vol.252, 
cols.638-9; Alderman (1979), p p . 781-2. Re. schemes 
in the railway and coalmining industry, cf. Ch.2, 
s.(iv), and C h . 7, s.(iii).
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miners were already so covered. The others were likely to be
aided by charitable funds when necessary. Most railway
companies also had accident schemes, and the R.C.A. promised
to match the contributions of railwaymen who contracted out.
The employers' delegation achieved a postponement of the
Bill's Second Reading to allow time for further
consultation.^ Mr Knowles, M.P. for Wigan and a coalowner,
argued in the House of Commons that his colliery's orphans'
provident societies received 10-15% of their funds from the
company, and he claimed that "the people have been satisfied
with it". He suggested that the Bill had failed to
acknowledge the role of private provision in coal and
2
railway companies. Railway employers, like Sir Daniel Gooch
and Watkin, moved contracting out amendments. The Iron and
Coal Trades Review supported them because, while employers 
could still be liable for accidents, private schemes would 
have scope to continue.^ When Gladstone finally agreed to 
these amendments, Railway News came to regard the Bill as a 
non-contentious measure.^ Robert Ascroft, M.P. for Oldham, 
held that it was the example of the L.N.W.R. which had above 
all convinced Members of the need for contracting out.^
Employers "had several interviews" with Joseph 
Chamberlain who was given responsibility for steering the 
Bill through Parliament. He ensured that the "contracting
1. Ibid..
2. Hansard, 3 June 1880, 3rd ser., vol.252,
c o l s . 1094-1102 .
3. Iron and Coal Trades R e v i e w , 2 5 June 1880, p . 719.
4. Railway N e w s , 5 June 1880, p p . 751-3.
5. Iron and Coal Trades Review, 3 0 July 1880, p . 123.
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out" clause met the business community's concerns.^ The
Employers Liability Act 1880 allowed employers and employees
to reach a mutual agreement outside the parameters of the
legislation. Companies could either set up their own company
schemes, or pay a premium to an insurance company like the
newly-founded Employers Liability Assurance Corporation 
2
Limited. The level of compensation paid by mutual 
arrangements could be freely determined. The contracting out 
clause, however, was seen as experimental and had to be 
renewed in Parliament every six years. The Act also gave 
accident victims who were without private financial 
protection the right to sue. Yet, permanently disabled men 
did not have the financial resources to take employers to 
court, and temporarily injured workers still required the 
goodwill of their employers if they were to return to work.
In 1893, the Liberal Home Secretary, Asquith, proposed 
in his Employers' Liability Bill to prevent workers
conceding their legal right to sue an employer even when
they had contracted out. He praised the 1880 Act as a great 
social advance but emphasised that it had done "still more 
in promoting and establishing mutual insurance schemes...." 
The Iron Trades Employers Association, for example, had 
established in 1880 an insurance scheme for companies that 
had contracted out. Half the miners in South Wales were 
compensated privately, and the Shipping Federation had set
up a mutual fund in 1891.^ Moreover, Asquith did not
1. Hansard, 4th ser., v o l . 48, cols.l437ff.
2. Cf. Sir H.P.Robinson The Employers Liability
Assurance Corporation Limited, 1880-1930 ( 19 30 ) .
3. Cf. C h . 7, s . ( i ) , (v).
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consider many workers "free agents" in the matter, since 
agreeing to contracting out was often a condition of
employment. Railway employers believed that Asquith was 
interfering with the right of employers and workers to 
settle their own differences by free contract. To them, the 
crucial point was still that no employer would undertake the 
expense of contributions to a mutual fund while the
possibility of further court claims by a worker might have 
to be met.^
The Liberal Party was accused of appeasing trade
unions, which opposed contracting out. Labour leaders
emphasised the prohibitive expense of legal action, and they
saw contracting out as a way of avoiding the greater cost of
better safety-precautions at work. Trades unions wanted
automatic compensation for accidents to be given as a right
rather than as an element of some company welfare scheme
2
which might undermine union loyalty. Employers, however, 
conducted campaigns at their works to obtain the support of 
their employees for contracting-out.^ Railway companies
claimed that the existence of their mutual accident funds 
was threatened. Men of the London, Brighton, and South Coast 
Railway petitioned Parliament. The M.P. for Crewe, a town 
heavily dependent upon the London and North Western, hoped
1. Hansard, 20 Feb 1893, 4th ser., vol.10,
c o l s .1943-55 ; Wigham ( 1973 ), p . 20; Liberty R e v i e w ,
9 Dec 1893, p p . 24-5; Rail 1098/51, RCA Minutes, 20
Feb 1893, no.2026.
2. P . S . B a g w e 11 Industrial Relations (1974), p p . 70-9;
Liberty R e v i e w , 2 Dec 1893, p.l & 17 Feb 1894,
p . 176; Railway Ne w s , 6 Oct 1894, p . 485.
3. Liberty Review, 6 Jan 1894, p . 82; 13 Jan 1894,
p. 98.
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the House would hesitate before "destroying a great system,
which has been worked for many years by both parties, and
created a friendly feeling between employer and employed".
He introduced a contracting-out amendment and was supported
by a member from another railway constituency.^ John Burns,
the dockers' leader, refused to believe, however, that the
L.N.W.R. would withdraw its £17-20,000 per annum
subscription to its benevolent funds, because of its
usefulness "against the mischievous attacks and tactics of
2
men like himself". The Miners Federation of Great Britain 
repudiated the authority of a joint delegation from the 
miners permanent relief societies, whose elected 
representatives claimed to speak on behalf of miners and 
their interests.^ A workers' delegation from Pearson, 
Knowles, and Company of Warrington complained that the Bill 
would destroy their liability fund. The Peninsular and
4
Oriental Line put forward similar arguments. The engineers 
Tangye Brothers argued that their workers preferred private 
provision because "There is no delay, there is no law, and 
there is no ill-feeling".^
During the debates, Mr Wrightson M.P. stated his belief 
that the 1880 Act would not have been passed "unless the
1. Hansard, 25 April 1893, 4th ser., vol . 11, 
cols.1211-1212; 8 Nov 1893 , v o l . 13, c o l s . 483-494 ;
23 Nov 1893, vol . 13, col.1648.
2. Ibid, 24 March 1893, vol.10, c ols.684-9.
3. Ibid, 12 Dec 1893, vol.10, c o l s . 1167.
4. Hansard, 24 March 1893, v o l . 10, c o l s .1056,1581-88.
5. Ibid, 25 April 1893, v o l . 11, c o l s .1211-1212 ; 8 Nov
1893, vol.13, cols.483-494; 23 Nov 1893, vol.13, 
c o l .1648.
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power of contracting out had been included. Many of the
employers of labour would have resisted the passing of that
Act very much more strongly if the power of contracting out
had not been allowed to their servants".^ Indeed, the
Railway Companies Association in 1893 did not organise
opposition in the Commons with its pro-government majority,
because it calculated correctly that the Lords would protect
2
the interests of employers and reject the measure.
The Workmen's Compensation Bill of 1897 was greeted 
with a mixture of distrust and approval. It left the 1880 
Act intact and merely guaranteed automatic compensation in 
certain industries even if the worker was at fault. On 
death, a worker's dependants would receive either the sum of 
three years' salary or £150, whichever was the larger. By 
setting out a scale of compensation for accidents to 
particular workers, it interfered directly in agreements 
between employers and employees, and was, to the Iron and 
Coal Trades R e v i e w , "one of the most revolutionary pieces of 
industrial legislation attempted within recent years". But, 
it was added, "the Bill has evoked a remarkable amount of 
approval from all classes of the community".^ Because 
responsibility for accidents had no longer to be proved 
before a court of law, the Bill won the support of employers 
who were concerned at the potential damage of litigation 
to industrial relations. Chamberlain, who had had
1. Ibid, 10 Nov 1893, vol . 11, cols.684-9.
2. Rail 1098/51, RCA, 8 Nov 1893, n o . 2051; Railway
N e w s , 9 Dec 1893, p . 907; Liberty R e v i e w , 16 Dec 
1893, p p . 40-41.
3. Iron and Coal Trades Review, 28 May 1897, p . 803.
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responsibility for the Liberals' 1880 Act, was in charge of
the passage of the 1897 Bill, this time as a Unionist. He
acknowledged that his main object was to avoid litigation,
and he attacked the 1893 Bill which would have prevented
contracting out instead.^
Sir John Brunner supported the 1897 Bill because it
imitated his company's policy. Brunner, Mond paid
compensation without assessing who was at fault, and so
2
avoided the possibility of litigation. The Mining 
Association of Great Britain agreed with the Bill for the 
same reasons.^ Moreover, limitations on the compensation to 
be paid meant that employers could insure their risks. 
Contracting out had similarly enabled employers to estimate 
the extent of their liability, and the very fact that 
compensation was automatically available under the 1897 Bill 
according to set limits was to discourage private schemes. 
Nevertheless, the Registrar of Friendly Societies would 
certify mutual insurance schemes if they were voluntary and 
could pay on a par with the legal scales. Some funds, 
therefore, had to change their rules in order to continue. 
The government agreed that the section on mutual societies
was "controversial even if the others are not". Although no
worker would be able to sign away his right to compensation,
the government wanted to promote mutual provision. It
desired "to give them room to provide further advantages of
1. Hansard, 3 May 1897, v o l . 48, cols. 1424-37.
2. Ibid, 18 May 1897, vol . 49, cols.763 ff.
3. Ibid, 20 July 1897, vol . 51, cols.529.
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any kind it may be in their power to provide".^ The Act was 
passed in 1897.
By the 1870s, employers' liability law was clearly in 
need of reform and had become a political issue. Gladstone, 
who undertook to change the law, proved willing to make 
concessions to employers. The 1880 Bill was a threat to the 
existence of the accident provident societies established in 
many industries and companies, until employers gained the 
right to contract out. Businessmen, therefore, were 
uniformly opposed to the 1893 Bill which was defeated 
because, unlike its predecessor, it was a contentious 
measure. Chamberlain had the political acumen in 1897 to 
emphasise to all sides the advantages of his Workmen's 
Compensation Bill. It removed employers' concern about 
litigation and limitless accident claims, while granting 
workers an automatic right to compensation which could not 
be ceded by mutual contract. Chamberlain, however, did not 
seek to outlaw contracting out, although the solvency and 
benefits of private schemes had to be certified. The 1897 
Act was also restricted in its application, and left many 
sectors, including seamen, domestic servants, and 
agricultural workers, unaffected. The logic of including 
most workers was accepted by a succession of Acts in 1900, 
1906, 1920, 1923. Contracting out continued until the
National Insurance (Industrial Accidents) Act 1946.
1. Ibid, 3 May 1897, vol.48, c o l s . 1424-37
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(iii ) . The Shop Clubs Act 1902, and the Liberal
Welfare R e f o r m s , 1908-11.
It was impossible for the Liberal governments of the
Edwardian period to assess the affects of their welfare
legislation on employers' pension and sick schemes because
of the absence of figures indicating the number of them in
existence. A Home Office Report in 1899 had investigated
interested complaints from friendly societies about workers
being compelled to join shop clubs as a condition of
employment. It concluded that, "During the last few years,
many large firms and companies have established Provident
Funds and Societies for providing sick pay, superannuation,
and funeral allowances for their employees". These funds
were generally founded and controlled by employers. Such
shop societies were either the more common slate clubs,
which varied contributions according to needs and usually
divided the surplus every Christmas, or more permanent
institutions. Only the second category could be allowed
voluntarily to register under the Friendly Society Acts 1876
and 1896, yet few actually did so. Registered societies had
to have set contributions and benefits, and membership could
not be a condition of employment.^
In evidence to the Report's investigative committee,
employers replied that compulsion was necessary for
actuarial reasons. Moreover, it would be hard for an
employer to ignore a request of financial help from workers
who were non-participants, despite the fact that such aid
would then create a justifiable grievance amongst
1. PP 1899 (C.9203) xxxiii 871. Home Department
Report on Shops Clubs.
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contributors. Where a majority of workers were members of a
shop club, it was argued, they preferred membership to be
made compulsory. The committee sympathised with these
points, but agreed to compulsory and contributory shop clubs
only if they were registered under the Friendly Society
Acts. It required rules which would provide for compensation
when a worker changed employers, set contributions and
benefits, written rules for the election of officers, and a
guaranteed subvention from the employer. These
recommendations were made law under the 1902 Shops Clubs
Act. Railways and municipal concerns, whose funds were
established under individual Acts of Parliament, were
specifically ommitted from its terms.^ The Engineering
Employers Federation's Parliamentary Committee was concerned
about any "legislation prejudicial to voluntary Sick Clubs",
and tried to restrict the Act's provisions to registered
2
societies only. It decided to "compromise" and advised its 
members to make their societies voluntary so that they 
avoided the necessity of complying with the legislation.^
The Old Age Pensions Act introduced by the Liberal 
government in 1908 was a measure enjoying wide support. In 
1892, Charles Booth calculated that the old formed nearly a 
third of all paupers. The size of this figure supported the 
case of those who argued that all elderly paupers were 
members of the "deserving poor". Old age poverty did not 
stem from a lack of thrift in earlier life but from the
1. Ibid.
2. EEF Minutes, Parliamentary Committees, 26 March 
1902 .
3. Ibid, 25 Feb 1903.
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inability of most workers to finance their retirement.
Statistical evidence was refuting the charge of personal
moral failing. Edward Cadbury, the chocolate manufacturer,
was a prominent member of Booth's non-contributory pensions
campaign in 1899. This movement influenced the Local
Government Board to agreeing, in the same year, to grant all
elderly paupers "adequate" relief. Having assumed some
responsibility for all aged poor, the state clearly needed
to tackle and solve the "pensions question". Administrative
as well as political pressures bolstered arguments in favour
of pensions legislation. In 1900, the Unionist government
declared itself in favour of state allowances.^ William
Lever of Lever Brothers, in 1907, proposed to the Commons
the introduction of a weekly 5s pension for those of 65
years or over. 232 voted for his motion and only 19
2
opposed. Although the Liberal Party was uncommitted to 
state pensions, individual candidates had declared their
support during the General Election in 1905. The Cabinet had 
accepted the need for a non-contributory fund by April 1907, 
and the Old Age Pensions Act was passed in the following 
year. It provided for a pension of 5s to all men and women 
of 70 years or over.^
Walter Long for the Conservatives supported the Bill in 
general but claimed it would damage employers' pension
1. Gilbert (1966), p p . 161-232.
2. Hansard, 10 May 1907, 5th ser., vol.174, 
c o ls.470-5. Cf. C h . 5, ss.(i),(ii).
3. P.Thane "Non-Contributory versus National
Insurance Pensions, 1878-1908" in P.Thane The
Origins of British Social Policy (197 8 ),
p p . 84-106; Hay (1975), p p . 54-7.
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schemes.^ Alfred Mond M.P. of Brunner, Mond, however, said
that businessmen would appreciate the proposed measure. He
claimed that all employers had to tackle the problem of
retiring workers, but could not afford to give pensions to
workers who had not undergone long-service with their
company. Several elderly workers, consequently, were left
2
with no income. The 5s pension was a small weekly sum and 
was not intended to provide sustenance. It was meant to 
encourage self-help and private provision. Retired workers 
would receive the full state benefit unless they had an 
income above £21 a year, which was a comparatively large 
figure. Pensions were then adjusted along a siiding-scale to 
a minimum Is for all incomes above £21 but below £31 10s. 
Employers could conveniently change the level of company 
pensions to ensure workers received the full state benefit 
plus an additional retirement income, which together would 
amount to a sum they considered adequate. Most workers, in 
any case, had ceased work or died before they were 70, and 
pensions were required before such a late age. Scope, 
therefore, was left by the terms of the Act for the 
continuation of industrial welfare. The London and North 
Western Railway, for instance, believed that the Act had 
left their funds intact since most of their men retired at 
63. Even after 70 years, their workers still required a 
company allowance. Men at Cadbury Brothers retired at 60,
1. Hansard, 16 June 1908, 5th ser., vol.190,
c o l s .736-7 40.
2. Ibid, 15 June 1908, v o l . 190, c o l s . 643-7. Cf, C h . 5, 
s s .{i ),(iii ) .
432
and women at 56.^
The National Insurance Bill of 1911, tackling
ill-health and unemployment, was the second phase of the
Liberal government's attempts at "social reform". Its
origins are legion. Civil servants, administrative
pressures. National Efficiency, defence against Socialism,
democratic politics, growing unemployment, revision of the
concepts of poverty, and electoral calculation all had a
role. The dynamism and ambitions of politicians like Lloyd
George and Churchill were also c r u c i a l , and they
respectively guided Part I of the Bill on health insurance
and Part II on unemployment insurance through the Commons.
Lloyd George's visit to Germany in 1908 when he investigated
its system of health insurance was a turning-point, but the
2
evolution of unemployment provision is less certain. The 
principle of contributory insurance schemes fitted well with 
the traditional Liberal precepts of personal providence and 
self-help. The final form of the National Insurance Act 
resulted from a number of expedients and compromises 
designed to placate insurance companies and friendly 
societies, the medical profession, and, not least, 
e m p l o y e r s .^
Lloyd George said the German employers supported health 
insurance because it increased workers' efficiency. The 
Imperial scheme merely supplemented the welfare provided at
1. PP 1919 (C.410) xxvii 299. Report of Departmental 
Committee on Old Age Pensions, Q s . 3730-3810,3913.
2. Hay (1975), p p . 25-42; W.Beveridge Power and 
Influence (1953), p . 82.
3. Gilbert (1966), p p . 319-20.
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their works and at their own expense.^ Sir George White
M.P., "on behalf of a very considerable number of employers"
who had not been "prominent in the debates", approved of
2Lloyd George's Bill. Sir Alfred Mond, however, explained 
why the German system would be unacceptable in Britain. The 
Imperial scheme had a central fund from which all benefits 
were paid. Its advocacy demonstrated "a curious want of 
knowledge of what is actually going on in our great 
industrial centres. There is scarcely one large works which 
has not got a sick club, or where some system of insurance 
between employer and workmen does not exist". These had to 
be incorporated into the legislation and their existence 
assured. He defended the competence of the joint committees 
that administered company schemes, because at Brunner, Mond 
they had greatly contributed to cooperation between employer 
and employee.^
In opposing the passing of the National Insurance Bill, 
therefore, the hostile views of the cotton employer and 
founder of the Employers Parliamentary Association, Sir 
Charles Macara, were not necessarily representative of 
industry in general.^ Even the E.P.A., however, did not 
condemn the measure in principle but wanted to delay its 
passing for further consultation. The point was that Macara 
disagreed with employers having to contribute to the scheme 
because it would particularly hurt competitive and
1. Hansard, 4 May 1911, vol.25, c o l s . 618-9.
2. Ibid, 29 May 1911, vol.26, c o l s . 818-828 .
3. Ibid, 29 May 1911, cols.440-63.
4. For alternative views in the cotton industry in
particular, cf. Ch.7, s.(iv).
434
labour-intensive industries like cotton and coalmining.
Although employers were certainly concerned at increased
costs, they could see the value of sick pay whether paid by
the company or the state.^ The E.P.A. failed, however, to
become the representative organisation of British industry.
The engineering employers refused to join the Association
and argued that, when employers shared mutual interests,
2
"joint action could no doubt be arranged".
Indeed, employers' reactions to health insurance 
demonstrated a general lack of co-ordination. The railway 
and gas industries both lobbied ministers but do not seem to 
have consulted one another on the issue. By May 1911, the 
Midland Railway company had been the first to see Lloyd 
George, and had asked him to exclude their industry from the 
operation of the Act altogether. Railways already had 
contributory sick societies, established by Parliament under 
various railway Acts. The company felt that their suggestion 
"had not been unfavourably received". The Railway Companies 
Association, on behalf of the whole industry, made similar 
representations to the Chancellor, and appointed a special 
committee to watch the course of the Bill. Despite earlier 
impressions, Lloyd George refused to exclude railwaymen from 
the legislation, but agreed to suggestions "which may enable 
railway societies to undertake the administration of the
1. Macara (1922), pp . 166,217-225. Cf. also the
Birmingham Chamber of Commerce's objection to 
employers' contributions in J.R.Hay "Employers and 
social policy in Britain: the evolution of welfare 
legislation, 1905-14", Soc.Hist. (1977),
p p . 435-456.
2. EEF Minutes, MSS 237, 26 April 1912. The E.P.A. 
was finally absorbed by the Federation of British 
Indus t r i e s .
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benefits under the Act".^ The Association felt by July that
Lloyd George had met all their fears by agreeing to
contracting-out, and convinced the industry that the
government would allow company friendly societies, in
receipt of government donations, to operate almost
autonomously. Employees would be allowed to join the
National Health Insurance scheme by signing on with an
Approved Society. The idea of "transfer values", enabling
men to leave their employment with compensation for their
contributions, was also acceptable to the Association. The
R.C.A. was certain that contracting out "would be a very
2
valuable option".
With the support of their employers, gas workers 
campaigned for total exclusion from Health Insurance on the 
grounds they already paid smaller contributions for greater 
sick benefits.^ Woodal of the Gas Light and Coke Company 
wrote to Lloyd George pointing out the existence of the 
company's provident societies.^ When the Chancellor refused 
to consider such exclusion from the terms of the Act on 11th 
July 1911, Carpenter of the South Metropolitan argued that, 
instead. Parliament should allow gas companies to contract 
out.^ To obtain concessions, "activity behind the scenes"
1. Rail 1098/53, RCA, NI Committee, 16 May 1911; 24 
May 1911; 10 July 1911.
2. Rail 1098/53, RCA, Council Meeting, 25 July 1911.
3. The A n ti-Socialist, 6 Sept 1911, p . 247. Cf. also
Journal of Gas L i g h t i n g , 16 May 1911, p . 431; 11
July 1911, p.91; also Industrial W e l f a r e , March 
1927, pp.75-8.
4. B/GLCC/4 4/1.
5. Journal of Gas L i g h t i n g , 11 July 1911, p p . 91-2.
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was initiated with the S.M.G.C. encouraging its employees to
lobby ministers.^ Lloyd George met South Metropolitan
representatives on the 14th August 1911 and said that the
idea of contracting-out was "favourably entertained" by the 
2
Government. The S.M.G.C. in total canvassed 107 M.P.s about 
the Bill and felt, by the time of its passing, they had left 
their mark upon it. Although preferring exemption from its 
terms, the company was content with being able to form an 
Approved Society.^ Indeed, the company was instrumental in 
founding and promoting the National Federation of Employees 
Approved Societies, whose president Henry Lesser was an
4
employee of the South Metropolitan.
Lloyd George finally introduced a clause into the 
National Insurance Bill in October 1911 which enabled 
employers' sick clubs to be integrated as approved societies 
into the legislation.^ Employers had been successful in 
ensuring that the amendment guaranteed the autonomy of 
approved societies and the control they could exercise over 
them.^ Employers were allowed representation in the 
management of an approved society if they were responsible
1. Ibid, 1 Aug 1911, p . 281; 8 Aug 1911, p . 344.
2. Ibid, 28 Nov 1911, p . 586.
3. Ibid, 20 Feb 1912, p . 519.
4. PP 1919 (C.411) xxvii, Q s .3772,3879,4179-80,4332.
5. Hansard, 27 Oct 1911, v o l . 30, c o l s . 440-463.
J.R.Hay "Employers' Attitudes to Social Policy and 
the Concept of Social Control, I900-I920" in Thane 
(1978), p p . 120-1 acknowledges the advantages of 
Clause 19 of Part I of the Act to employers, 
although he does not detail the lobbying of 
certain employers to obtain it nor explain its 
operation in practice.
6. Ibid, 27 Oct 1911, vol.30, c ols.440-63.
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for its solvency or agreeable to making substantial 
contributions. They could then appoint one quarter of the 
committee. For small societies, the employers' donation was 
the factor which made it actuarially viable. An employer was 
also responsible for underwriting the level of benefits 
payable, the prime provision which in law enabled an 
approved society to avoid grouping with the General Fund. 
Part I of the Act also provided the opportunity for the 
setting up of supplementary funds to pay additional 
benefits. Moreover, approved societies could be divided into 
two parts. The first provided basic benefits regulated by 
the terms of the Act, while the second paid supplementary 
a 1lowances.^
Masterman, Financial Secretary of the Treasury,
admitted that he did not know how many unregistered company
benefit societies were dissolved because of the Act, rather
2
than continuing or becoming approved societies. But it made 
no difference to the trades unionist and Labour M . P . , 
G.N.Barnes, who spoke in opposition to the approved 
societies. Indeed, he was wary of the Act in general because 
"deductions (from wages) have been associated with truck or 
with the grandmotherly, or shall I say grandfatherly, 
schemes of employers who very often organise superannuation 
funds and schemes connected with shop clubs, not altogether
for the benefit of the workmen, but incidentally having the
effect, if not the intention, of splitting the workmen up
1. PRO PIN4/7, Ministry of Health, Memo. on 
Employers' Funds. 1912-13; PRO M H / 8 1/55/MS5004/1;
Rail 226/530, GCR, Circular on NH Insurance, I91I,
Feb 1912.
2. Hansard, 21 March 1912, v o l . 35, c o l . 2209.
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into sections all over the country, and it is very largely
because of that the workmen have been so bitter against any
deductions from their wages".^ Shop-clubs were depicted as
an anti-union tool, and contributory schemes placed the
employer's proper burden upon his workers. They were also an
influential means of reducing labour-turnover. Barnes
acknowledged that a ballot could be held to ascertain the
support of workers for a proposed approved society, and that
no individual would be prevented from joining the General
Fund. But "....those who have had experience of workshops
know that such provisions on paper are absolutely no good
when face to face with the facts". Barnes opposed the
existence of shop clubs and, therefore, that part of the Act
which encouraged their formation through state financial
assistance. The experience of supposedly democratic shop
clubs made him suspicious of the control which workers would
actually enjoy over their own approved societies through
2
elected committees of management.
Part II of the Act introduced state Unemployment
Insurance for the building, construction, shipbuilding, 
mechanical engineering, ironfounding, and vehicle
construction industries. In 1909, a joint deputation from 
the Engineering Employers Federation and the Shipbuilding
Employers Federation discussed its proposals with Churchill. 
As highly competitive industries, they wanted to avoid the 
cost of the employers' contribution, and believed that
1. Re. working-class attitudes to social legislation, 
cf. H.M.Felling Popular Politics and Society in 
Late Victorian Britain (1969), ch.l.
2. Hansard, 24 & 29 May 1911, 5th ser., vol . 30,
c o l s . 308,440-63; 27 Oct 1911, cols.440-63.
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that Workmen's Compensation should be solely financed by
workers' contributions. Churchill gave an assurance that any
further developments in old age pensions provision would
require workers' donations. He drew their attention,
however, to the apparent advantages given by his Bill to the
shipbuilding and engineering industries. On the Clyde and
North East coast, "employers there have paid out of their
own pocket in charitable subscriptions and so forth, in
keeping people going, far beyond anything which a really
scientifically organised insurance scheme over a term of
years would ever come to". These company out-of-work
payments during periodic lay-offs helped retain the skills
and loyalty of workers. Unemployment insurance would, by
tiding workers over difficult periods, also create "a
steadier class of men" and give employers "a hold over the
men that you will have not had before".^ By 1911, Lloyd
George was able to tell the S.E.F. that it was the only
employers' association still objecting to the National
Insurance Bill. The shipbuilding industry was noticeably
prone to foreign competition and increased costs. Buxton,
Churchill's successor at the Board of Trade, noted that
employers in general had associated themselves with the
2
National Insurance Act.
The Liberal social reforms of 1908-1911 were primarily 
political initiatives which met a mixed response from
1. LAB2/1483/LE(1)1750/1911; EEF Minutes, 16 June
1910, Parliamentary Committee, MSS 237.
2. LAB2/1483/LE(1)1750/1911, Deputation from S.E.F.
to S.C.Buxton, 14 June 1911.
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employers. Objections were raised largely on grounds of
cost, and because of their association with socialism. The
latter objection seems to have been strongly voiced by
Lancashire employers.^ This attitude may have been a
reflection of the nature of Liberal politics there as a
result of the party's attempt to found a working-class
2
constituency during this period. The Old Age Pensions Act 
1908 was least opposed because it did not interfere to any 
great extent with company provision. But, in general, 
employers had to respond pragmatically to the Liberal 
reforms. The railway and gas industries, which were 
experienced in the lobbying of M.P.s and ministers, were 
instrumental in convincing the government that, if it 
legislated for health insurance, company societies should be 
integrated into rather than absorbed by the state system. 
Unemployment insurance which employers did not finance 
privately in any case was less contentious. Companies had 
little interest in providing for workers they had 
d i s c h a r g e d .
1. Cf. Macara above, and P.F.Clarke "The end of 
laissez-faire and the politics of cotton", H.J. 
(1972), p p . 493-512.
2. Cf. P . F.Clarke Lancashire and the New Liberalism 
(1971).
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(iV ). The Whitley Council Scheme and the National 
Industrial A l l i a n c e .
During the First World War, the government faced a 
severe manpower shortage and a consequent increase in trade 
union strength. The labour disputes on Clydeside in May 1915 
induced the government to consider reconstruction plans 
after the War. By 1916, a committee under the chairmanship 
of the Commons Speaker, John Whitley, was appointed to 
suggest improvements in the machinery of collective 
bargaining. Its reports, printed in 1917 and 1918, noted 
three problems confronting British industrial relations. 
There was a demand from workers for higher wages and a 
higher standard of living, and many were arguing for 
workers' control. In addition, the existing bargaining 
system and disputes procedures were seen as deficient. 
Whitley proposed a hierarchy of joint industrial councils on 
a national, district and factory level.^ A sub-committee 
issued a report on works committees in 1918. It stated that 
better relations between employers and workers could "best 
be arrived at by granting to the latter a greater share in 
consideration of matters with which they are concerned". 
While rates of wages and hours of work concerned national or 
district committees, "there are also many questions closely 
affecting daily life and comfort in, and the success of, the 
business, and affecting in no small degree efficiency of 
working, which are peculiar to individual workshop matters". 
It was recognised that works councils had a long history, 
and that they had often been used to oppose trades unionism.
1. Charles (1973), p p . 94-121.
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Nevertheless, rather than government controlling the 
circumstances under which works committees would be set up, 
the report recommended that employers and employees be left 
to make independent arrangements.^
A Labour M.P., Mr Toothill, in 1918 recalled the fact 
that works committees had existed before the Whitley Report. 
There was a "system of direct cooperation between the
employers, the managers, the foremen, and,other subordinate
V
officials in the workshops". It relied, however, principally
upon "the most trusted and capable and skilful men in the
workshops" who could explain the difficulties of running a
business to their workmates. Mutual confidence encouraged
2
industrial peace. Another commentator noted that "They
dealt chiefly with complaints, welfare work, and conditions 
of employment, and they were generally consultative and 
advisory in their functions, the management reserving the 
power of making the final decision". These works committees 
were usually found in large factories where the size of the 
labour force was a managerial problem. Where labour turnover 
was low, they could build upon the workers' loyalty to their 
firm. Works councils were, therefore, rarely founded in
industries where the size of the labour force was 
continually adjusted to meet short-term changes in demand. 
Moreover, established works committees seldom joined 
the Whitley Councils which were set up from
1. PP 1918 (C.9001) X V  951. Ministry of
Reconstruction Committee Report on Relations 
between Employers and Employees: Report on Works 
C o m m i t t e e s .
2. Hansard, 6 March 1918, 5th ser., v o l . 104,
c o l s .2084-7.
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1918 onwards.^
Indeed, the Whitley scheme was designed to develop and
not replace the existing organisation of industrial 
2
relations. The Coalition government accepted that Whitley 
Councils were in general superfluous to the iron and steel 
industry, which had a comprehensive collective bargaining 
machinery.^ An F.B.I. memorandum in 1917 favoured Whitley, 
but saw district and works committees as potentially 
dangerous to the authority of management. It opposed the 
concept of joint committees, and suggested instead a 
representative body of workers whose advice was not in any 
way binding on employers. The F.B.I. was willing to consider 
"consulting" their workers, and presented this concession as 
a "democratic" alternative to public ownership. The demand 
for nationalisation from power and transport workers was 
especially strong, as was the case for government control of 
natural monopolies. The memorandum was equally anxious to 
counter the propaganda of guild socialists and calls for 
direct workers' ownership. The Federation's response was to 
try and conciliate workers who might resent having no power 
of decision over their working lives. They were not offered 
participation in production and investment matters, however.
1. J.B.Seymour The Whitley Council Scheme (1932), 
pp . 81-2,84,86. Cf. C h . 2, s.(v); C h . 3, s.(iv); 
C h . 4, s s . (i v ) ,(v)(II)(b), (v)(III)(a); C h . 5, 
ss.(ii); Ch . 7, passim.
2. International Labour R e v i e w , Dec 19 21, p p . 56 3-78.
3. Cf. C h . 4, s.(iv).
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but consultation over "working conditions".^
It was an attitude reflected in the policy of the
Coalition government. Lloyd George upheld the principle of
managerial prerogative. "Steps", he said, "ought to be taken
to humanize industry, by the improvement of the conditions
in the workshops", to give workmen "an interest in the
industry", but "not management, because you cannot manage a
2
business by committee". The Ministry of Labour believed
that works committees encouraged workers to have greater
interest in and responsibilty for the work they were paid to
do. Companies needed a "recognised means of consultation
between management and workpeople". Sub-committees were
necessary in large works, or when there was a need to
promote separate but complementary activities like
industrial safety or welfare.^ Whether or not
nationalisation on any scale was ever seriously considered
by the government, the Post-War Slump and the weakening of
the trades union movement ended any prospect of its 
4
o c c u r r i n g .
Interest in Joint Industrial Councils similarly waned. 
By 1921, there were 74 national councils, and, by 1923, 62. 
The Whitley scheme originally affected some two million
1. FBI Archive, MSS/200/F/1/2/2, "The Control of 
Industry", Memo. to members of Nationalisation 
C o m m i t t e e .
2. Hansard, 18 Aug 1919, 5th ser., vol.119, 
c o l s . 1996-2003 . Cf. C h . 7, s.(iii) for how this 
view affected the Mines Act 1920 and the Miners 
Welfare Fund.
3. L A B 2 / 7 1 6 / 1 8 6 / 1 5 / 1 9 2 0 , Works Committees J.I.C.s.
4. Cf. Lowe (1978), pp.649ff.
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workers, and the numbers declined as the Inter-War years
progressed.^ Rather than becoming the recognised means for
joint negotiation, many Whitley Councils gradually took up
the administration of industrial welfare. In 1919, the
Industrial Council for the Building Industry proposed that,
when all capital claims on profits had been met, the surplus
could be used to encourage education and research and to
2
finance a superannuation scheme for all registered workers. 
The Labour Copartnership Association viewed the scheme as 
p r o f i t s h a r i n g . The problems of labour management, it 
asserted, would be eased by interesting workers in the 
quality of their work, which was usually low because of 
their "non-participation in control".^ In 1920, the J.I.C.'s 
Education Committee established an apprentic^hip training 
scheme. It saw no dividing line between education and 
welfare because both sought to develop a worker as a citizen 
and man.* Ben Turner, President of the cotton weavers union, 
concluded that "The promotion of works committees,- which 
are separate organisations from trades unions shops 
committees,- has brought along with it welfare work, and in 
many textile mills they have improved certain barbqrous 
conditions of things out of existence". Such work was to be 
developed, not out of patronage, "but on the lines of mutual 
respect and copartnership in friendship". Industrial welfare 
paid for itself through increased efficiency, and Turner
1. Charles (1973), p p .130-60,215-26,299-306.
2. Labour Copartnership, Sept 1919, p . 69.
3. Ibid, May 1920, p p . 59-60.
4. Industrial W e l f a r e , July 1920, p . 216; Aug 1920,
p p . 260-1.
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urged trades unions to welcome the new trends in
management.^ Out of the four times a year that the Welsh
Plate and Sheet Trade J.I.C. met, three meetings were
devoted to discussion "partaking of the character of welfare
work". They considered the different virtues of industrial
2
or state insurance for sickness and old age. The National 
Council of the Pottery Industry sought to improve welfare 
standards throughout the whole industry,^ as well concerning 
itself with research, industrial administration,
4
apprenticeships, and works committees.
The establishment of Whitley Councils was promoted by 
the Industrial League and Council founded in 1919. It sought 
the voluntary cooperation of employers and employed for the 
drawing up of joint programmes. The League and Council was 
an amalgamation. One of its predecessors, the Industrial 
League was a result of discussions between Labour M.P.s and 
M.P.s with business contacts at the outset of the Great War. 
"So useful were these meetings, being composed of equal 
numbers of representatives of Labour and Commerce, and so 
quickly did they grow in size, that it became necessary to 
create a proper organisation". The League was formally 
founded in 1918 when it could count G.N.Barnes of the War 
Cabinet, the Food Controller J.R.Clynes, the Minister of 
Pensions John Hodge, and the Minister of Labour G.H.Roberts
1. U n i t y , May 1920, p . 7.
2. Labour Copa r t n e r s h i p . May 1920, p p . 294-6. Cf.
C h .4, s s .(i V ),(V )(I I I )(c ). The meetings of the 
J.I.C. were set aside under standing orders.
3. Industrial W e l f a r e , Oct 1923, p p . 321-2.
4. C u r r e n t ___ Opinion, Dec 1920, p p . 477-8. Re.
Flour-milling J.I.C., cf. Ch.7, s.(ix).
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amongst its members. The one-time railway employer and
President of the Board of Trade, Albert Stanley, had also
joined, as had the engineering employer Colonel Armstrong,
the shipbuilder Sir A.Denny, Hugo Hirst of G.E.C., and Huth
Jackson of the F.B.I. Branches of the League were
established throughout the country.^
The League's magazine C urrent Opinion held that "The
employer is much to blame for the unrest that exists. He has
seen paternal associations lapse into antiquity and has not,
except in very few instances, put forward any new and
up-to-date methods for grappling with the new situation that
has arisen". Workers had, therefore, become "disinterested"
in their work. They were driven to advocating legislation
like the Truck Acts, the Employers' Liability Act, and
National Insurance, "which should have beem harmoniously
considered and ungrudgingly given by the employers". The
League argued that "Welfare Work should be actively pressed
forward, as, after all, the solution of the industrial
problem lies in closer relationships....... " Industrial peace
could be promoted through "amenities and perquisites" for
2
faithful service, and the single avenue by which industry 
could be humanised was through the meetings of the joint 
Whitley Councils. The League sought, to take advantage of
the "Reconstruction p e r i o d  to change the whole face of
future industry". It was attitudes which needed to be
1. Current O p i n i o n , Sept 1918, p p . 1-3
2. Ibid, Dec 1918, p p . 19-23.
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a l t e r e d . ^
In 1919, the League joined forces with the Industrial
Reconstruction Council which John Whitley had himself helped
to found as a means of promoting his report. The Council had
argued that the War had brought the "era of unlimited
competition" to an end. Trade parliaments and inter-company
cooperation allowed the pooling of ideas and resources. So,
"employers will certainly acquire more inside knowledge of
the conditions and mentality of the workers than by the
present spasmodic attempts at welfare w o r k ...... ", while
unions might even believe employers to be "human beings".
Whitley Councils were an alternative to state economic 
2
intervention. When the new Industrial League and Council 
was founded in 1919, Whitley became its president.^ The new 
organisation made early contacts with the Industrial Welfare 
Society,* because they both argued for more efficient and 
humane management as an alternative to the control of 
workers over the production process itself.^ Indeed, the 
League and Council gave lectures in Scientific Management 
and tried to demonstrate it meant more than just "aggressive 
American hustling".^ It was contended that Scientific
1. Ibid, March 1919, p . 36.
2. Industrial Reconstruction Council Reconstruction
Handbook (1918).
3. Current Opinion, Dec 1919, p p . 136-7.
4. Ibid, Sept 1920, pp . 372-6.
5. Industrial League The Industrial League (3)
(1921); Industrial League and Council Whitley 
Councils; What they are and what they are doing 
(1920) by J.H.Whitley M.P.
6. Current O p i n i o n , April 1920, p p . 210-11; March 
1920, p . 207.
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Management required the cooperation of workers. Industrial 
councils would be the forum for finally deciding upon what 
"is really the proper unit of time" of work as established 
by experiments carried out "in a scientific way". The work 
achievable per unit of time could be enhanced by adequate 
rest periods and good working conditions.^ The League and 
Council appointed a Scientific Management Committee in 
1921.2
The Industrial League and Council joined with the 
National Association of Employers and Employed to form the 
National Industrial Alliance in 1925.^ The N.A.E.E. had been 
established in December 1916, and held that the experience 
of the Great War had demonstrated the need and ability to 
end industrial friction through better hours, wages,
4
housing, education, and health provision. The N.A.E.E. 
wanted to draw up joint employer and employee proposals for 
the greater regulation of employment after the War. The 
employers' side was largely composed of F.B.I. members, and, 
at its first meeting, Huth Jackson made it clear that the 
Association had the Federation's full support.^ In January 
1917, the F.B.I. President, Dudley Docker, was asked to do 
everything possible "to emphasise (to his members) the fact 
that the body came into being under the wing of the 
Federation, and that on . the employers' side (of the
1. Ibid, Feb 1920, p p . 166-171. Cf. Ch.l, s.(ii).
2. Ibid, Jan 1921, p . 23.
3. U n i t y , June 1925, p.l.
4. U n i t y , Feb 1919, p . 3,
5. FBI Archive, M S S / 2 0 0 / F / 3 / D 1 / 3 / 1 1 , Memo, from FBI,
11 Dec 1916.
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N.A.E.E.) it i_s the Federation". The F.B.I. provided the
National Association with most of its funds.^ While
attempting to establish contacts with the T.U.C. through the
N.A.E.E., the F.B.I. considered establishing direct contact,
so long as such talks were kept secret and did not prejudice
the N.A.E.E. negotiations. "If this is done, we can still go
ahead with the Alliance (sic), keeping a second string to
our b o w  " It was felt that whenever an agreement for
cooperation could be reached with labour leaders, public
2
opinion in 1917 would ensure its success.
Although seeking a joint programme of industrial 
reorganisation, the Association opposed the notion of the 
state assuming a leading role. From 1918-1921, the N.A.E.E. 
lobbied the government over questions of Reconstruction 
housing, unemployment insurance, and Whitley Councils.^ The 
Association worked fully with the F.B.I. in establishing 
employer-employee public utility societies under the 1918
4
Housing Act as avenues for industrial cooperation. In 1920, 
an N.A.E.E. deputation was interviewed by the Prime Minister 
and the Minister of Labour about the Unemployment Insurance 
Bill 1920. The F.B.I. representatives on the Association 
argued that the proposed 15s insurance benefit was 
insufficient, and urged that the emergency of demobilisation 
and rising unemployment necessitated the payment of dole.
1. Ibid, Letter to Dudley Docker from FBI, 1 Jan 
1917. Cf. R . P .T .Davenport-Hines Dudley Docker; the 
life and times of a trade warrior ( 19 8 4 ) .
2. Ibid, Letter to Docker from FBI, 6 March 1917.
3. Ibid, Letter to H.E.Morgan from FBI Director, 15
March 1917; Industrial P e a c e , Nov 1917, p p . 24-6;
U n i t y , Nov 1919, p p . 8-9.
4. C f . s . ( v ) .
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They argued for publicworks and a fairer division of work.^ 
The N.A.E.E. and the F.B.I. favoured the idea of the 
National Industrial Conference in 1919 and criticised the 
government's "hand-to-mouth policy" on questions of wages 
and hours. But the Conference's failure was further proof 
that a programme of industrial cooperation and 
reconstruction had little relevance with the governmental 
decontrol of industry and the onset of the Slump from 1920 
onwards. Like the League and Council, the N.A.E.E. by 1921 
had few means with which to promote its ideas of industrial 
cooperation. The Whitley scheme and Reconstruction in 
general had proven disappointing. Moreover, the N.A.E.E.'s 
search for "consensus" could not cover over the differences 
between its employer and worker representatives. Arthur 
Henderson's hope that the N.A.E.E. would secure the 
"democratic control of industry through Whitley Councils" 
contrasted with the employers' aims. U n i t y , the 
Association's journal, rarely pronounced itself in favour of 
one argument, and aimlessly allowed employers and unions to 
write two, sometimes opposing, viewpoints on one page.^
After the National Industrial Alliance was formed in 
1925, it stated its support for the continuation of the 
approved society system in health insurance, which was under 
investigation from a Royal Commission. The Alliance believed 
industrial welfare committees provided an opportunity for
1. LAB2/1210/17624/1920, Pt.l, 9 Nov 1920. Cf.
s.(vi).
2. U n i t y , June 1919, p . 3.
3. U n i t y , Feb 1919, p p . 3-9, & passim; Industrial 
P e a c e , Jan 1918, p.12.
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joint cooperation,^ and their attitude contrasted with that
of the Labour Party and the trades unions. The N.I.A., which
could no longer just advocate the promotion of Whitley
Councils as its main objective, supported any form of
welfare provision in the factories which might encourage
2
good industrial relations. A Ministry of Labour inquiry in 
1927 similarly focussed not, as it had done in 1918, on the 
rules and procedures for a formal system of joint 
negotiation, but on any cooperative measure in industry
which work commmittees could effect. But the Ministry
admitted that "we really know very little as to the number 
of Works Committees in existence, their success, the reasons 
for their failure, or their scope".^ The Alliance's interest 
in industrial welfare led it to appoint in 1931 a Pensions 
Sub-Committee. Because of the poor levels of state 
provision, it finally reported in favour of adequate
pensions for all through company funds. It noted that 
industrial pensions for workers had existed in the 1850s but 
that an increasing demand had led to the replacement of ex 
gratia payments with contributory schemes. It was a trend 
which gave workers rights in the organisation and conditions 
of pensions. Set rules freed workers from the arbitrary 
wishes of supervisors or employers, and transfer values
4
ensured the mobility of labour.
1. Ibid, Nov 1926, p . 99.
2. Ibid, 1928-1931, passim.
3. LAB2/1295/IR545/27, Works Committees, 14 April 
1927 .
4. U n i t y , Feb 1933, p p . 179-182.
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The Whitley Council scheme had no lasting influence on 
British industry, and only gained permanency in civil 
service or local government negotiations. Unable to 
establish themselves as the trade parliaments for each 
industry, many Joint Industrial Councils began to involve 
themselves in company welfare schemes. Consequently, the 
Industrial League and Council, the National Association of 
Employers and Employed, and their successor the National 
Industrial Alliance were organisations whose roles had lost 
much of their relevance. The Industrial League and Council 
is interesting in revealing the willingness of Labour 
politicians and businessmen to establish a consensus 
workable enough to operate a degree of economic planning. 
The N.A.E.E. was an attempt by the F.B.I. to gain the 
cooperation of trades unions at a time of labour shortage
and the involvement of the state in industry. The return to
laissez-faire in the 1920s left the National Industrial
Alliance only with possibility of supporting voluntary
company initiatives.
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(V ), E ducation and H o u s i n g .
A Consultative Committee on Education had as early as
1909 declared itself in favour of continuation classes. The
apprenticeship system, which it declared had provided
constant tuition and "continued discipline" for a boy, was
in decline. New machinery was increasing repetitive,
"non-educative employment" and undermining the "capital of
the rising generation". Fourteen of the sixteen railway
companies, B r u n n e r - M o n d , Crosfields, the United Alkali
Company, Cadburys, and the Calico Printers Association
considered it sound business to give young lads a break from
work and to offer them chances of promotion. Education
classes countered the resentment and disinterestedness of a
monotonous occupation. They instilled self-discipline,
encouraged less waste at work, and improved the quality of
output.^ The government sought the cooperation of employers
to extend a system of continuation classes. The engineering
industry claimed that its apprenticeship system was intact.
Its opposition to compulsory state classes was known to "be
very strong". As boys were essential as assistants to gangs
of workers, expensive machinery would be left idle during
their absence. Coalowners saw continuation education as
impractical because their young workers had to be available
2
for a three-shift system. By 1916, the new President of the 
Board of Education, H.A.L.Fisher, favoured raising the 
school-leaving age, but met the resistance of local
1. PP 1909 (C.4757) xvii 6. Consultative Committee on 
Education, p p . 17,19,33-7,96-100,130.
2. PRO RECO/1/768/323,3405,6208. Board of Education 
Bill 1914, Memo. no. 22.
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authorities. His Education Act in 1918, however, made
attendance at school compulsory until 14 years. Local
authorities were also permitted to raise the age limit to 15
or to provide for one day a week continuation classes for
youths aged between fourteen and sixteen.^ Yet, the
necessary funding for continuation schools was curtailed by
expenditure cuts in 1921.
Employers had a direct interest in technical education,
and could gain advantages from a better educated workforce
even if they just became "more contented" members of
2
society. Few, though, were prepared to pay the costs. 
Levers, Rowntrees, Cadburys, Tootal, Broadhurst and Lee, and 
Brunner, Mond combined to form the Association for the 
Advancement of Education in Industry and Commerce in order 
to promote the 1918 Act, but they were hardly typical. The 
Association eventually concentrated on the training of 
foremen.^ A supervisor occupied a "strategic position in the 
hierarchy of executives" because "He is nearest to the 
workers, and is the medium through whom policies are
4
interpreted and orders given".
In 1920, the F.B.I.'s Education Committee sent a report 
to the government. 2,000 of its members, who had been
1 . Hansard, 23 April 1918, 5th ser., vol.105, 855-6.
2. A.Abbott E ducation for Industry and Commerce in 
England (1933), p p . 33-5,48-9; Hansard, 13 March 
1918, vol.104, cols.344-53. Cf. P.L.Robertson 
"Technical Education in the British Shipbuilding 
and Marine Engineering Industries, 1863-1914", 
Econ.H.R. (1974), p p . 222-235.
3. Labour Copartne r s h i p , Oct 1919, p.77; May 1922,
p . 65. Cf. Melling (1980), p p . 183-221.
4. Industrial Peace, June 1928, p p . 115-7.
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canvassed, viewed the prospect of compulsory continuation
classes with alarm. The Federation itself favoured the idea
in principle but doubted its practicality. As an
alternative, they supported the extension of elementary
education for children of proven ability, but wanted most to
concentrate on their work only.^ The National Federation of
Iron and Steel Manufacturers believed that junior education
instilled discipline, reliability, and efficiency. But the
Federation opposed the right of local authorities to compel
attendance at continuation classes. It held that the purpose
of education was defeated if young workers were temporarily
absent from the works and if the pace and coordination of
production were disrupted. But, where continuation classes
were established in the steel industry, class-room
accomodation was not considered a problem because of the
2
number of buildings already available for welfare purposes.
If its only use was to improve the efficiency of the 
workforce, education had the same purpose as company 
provision. Industrial Welfare felt that "There is, and can 
be, no dividing line between 'welfare' and 'education'. The 
true aim of the former is to make provision in an agreeable 
manner for the development of the worker as a m a n ” . 
Employers had to prove to their workers that their interests 
were mutual.^ Education classes at Port Sunlight, Reckitts, 
and Brunner, Monds were organised more as "part of the 
Welfare Department and Welfare activities than as an avenue
1. Industrial W e l f a r e , Feb 1920, p . 65.
2. BSC 802/6/35, 19 Jan 1921. Cf. C h . 4, s.(iv).
3. Industrial Welfare, Aug 1920, pp.260-1.
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to advanced scholarship".^ George Cadbury ran continuation
classes at his firm on the basis that they were advantageous
to employer and worker, and avoided the necessity for state
provision. His company had benefited from the "more
intelligent outlook of our employees". Eustace Percy, a
former Conservative President of the Board of Education, in
1935 saw Cadburys and other enlightened employers as
2
forerunners to the Fisher Act. F.W.Bain of the United 
Alkali Company believed that "The problem of our time is to 
obtain co-operation between the different organised classes. 
There is growing a new spirit in industry, a new sense of 
social responsibility, which is, among other things, 
apparent with regard to education". United Alkali promoted 
continuation classes and the Workers' Educational 
Association because they produced efficient workers and 
"responsible citizens". Bain saw the public expenditure cuts 
in education in 1921 as bad business.^
Industrial Welfare during the 19 20s held that the 
immediate difficulty was not technical education or output 
as such, but the particular problems associated with youth 
workers. They were especially prone to accidents, low 
attendance, and high labour turnover. Employers could most 
easily mould the attitudes of workers during their
1. R.W.Ferguson Day Continuation Schools (1935),
p p . 10-12,143-6.
2. Foreward by G.Cadbury, and Address by Lord E.Percy 
in Ferguson (1935), pp.3-4 (Reckitts, Messrs 
Norland and Impey, Tootal, Broadhurst and Lee, and 
W. & R.Jacobs are also quoted as forerunners to 
the Act); Cadbury in Chandler (1979).
3. Industrial W e l f a r e , March 1920, p . 80; May 1920, 
p . 165; Aug 1924, p p . 223-7.
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impressionable years. Education, like housing, health,
unemployment benefit, and pensions, could be seen as a right
which the market lamentably failed to secure, and whose
absence could cause industrial discontent. Moreover,
education in citizenship had become more problematical as
companies grew bigger in size and increasingly alienating.^
Despite their opposition to continuation classes, the F.B.I.
recognised their role in helping to assuage strikes and
w o r k - d i s affection. The management theorist, Gulick, believed
that for a factory to function efficiently all the people in
it had to work for an acknowledged aim. With the increasing
division of work, "workers will forget there is a central
purpose, and so devote their best energies only to their own
2
individual advancement and advantage". Continuation 
classes, however, could instill a mutuality of purpose. 
Schemes at Cadburys, the Gas Light and Coke Company, Lever 
Brothers, and the Dunlop Rubber Company supposedly enabled 
young and talented working-class men to become executives. 
Although they affected very few workers, the fact of their 
existence was "a powerful stimulant to goodwill".^ In truth, 
the G.L.C.C. was mainly concerned with the training of 
gas-fitters, and its apprentices had attended the 
Westminister Technical Institute since 1908 in cooperation 
with the London County Council.^ But employers in general 
believed that education was an expensive outlay
1. Ibid, Oct 1926, p p . 323-5.
2. Gulick (1936), in Gulick and Urwick ( 1969 ), p . 6.
3. Industrial W e l f a r e , Feb 1927, p p . 174-7.
4. GLRO, L C C/MIN/2970, Education Committee, Meeting 
of Employers, 5 Jan 1914.
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with only marginal importance to efficiency, profits, and 
industrial relations. By placing reliance on voluntary 
initiative and cooperation, the Education Act 1918 proved a 
f a i l u r e .
As well as a reform of education, the Coalition
considered housing as part of its Reconstruction programme.
The Munitions of War Act 1915 had introduced government
control over armaments production. The new Ministry of
Munitions sought to increase output and needed,
consequently, to encourage and direct the transfer of
workers to its controlled factories. It was soon clear,
however, that private builders could not construct enough
houses to accomodate the influx of workers. The housing
shortage was a important contributory factor to the labour
strife in Glasgow in May 1915.^ The Ministry undertook the
financing of homes, particularly in Glasgow, Coventry, and
2
Barrow where the problem was most acute. The Salisbury 
Committee, which included Seebohm Rowntree, the chocolate 
manufacturer, estimated that 300,000 houses would be needed 
after the War, and for many decent housing was uniquely 
associated with post-War Reconstruction.^
The resulting 1919 Housing Bill was intended to
1. Cf. J.Mel ling (ed) Housing, Social Policy, and the 
State (1980).
2. Ministry of Munitions (1919), Vol.V., 
p p . 44-5,55-6.
3. Cf. M.Swenarton Homes Fit for Heroes: the Politics 
and Architecture of Early State Housing in Britain 
(1981). The 1919 Act was considered a failure, 
mostly because it fell victim, like the Education 
Act, to the Geddes Committee. Chamberlain's 1923 
Act actually financed 438,047 homes and Wheatley's 
1924 Act funded another 520,298.
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stimulate the building of 176,000 houses. Walter Runciman
for the government "hoped that a certain number of big
employing concerns may in the industrial areas put up a
large number of houses for their own people". He saw this as
a sound business proposition to attract labour, and,
therefore, opposed their subsidisation.^ In response the
F.B.I. and the National Association of Employers and
Employed formed a Joint Housing Committee to try and win
government aid for industrial housing projects. They
considered state support as essential to the financial
success of employers' Public Utility Societies. They were
trusts for the construction of employees ' homes and were
non-profitmaking bodies registered under the Friendly
2
Societies Acts. The Federation emphasised the possibilities 
of Public Utility Societies during the "reconstruction 
period", particularly as their prospects were best in the 
industrial areas where housing was most needed. All 
occupants would be members of such societies. They would 
elect their own trustees, and own the property and finances. 
As their homes would not be tied dwellings, it was hoped 
that workmen would take an interest in their upkeep and that 
members would help obtain rent arrears from fellow workers.
"Moreover the s c h e m e ......... forms an admirable medium for
establishing better relations between the Employer and his 
workpeople". The F.B.I. argued that company housing projects 
were more economical than local authority buildings. Yet, 
their prospects were constrained by the high costs of
1. Hansard, 28 Oct 1918, vol.110, cols.1166-7.
2. MSS/200/F/3/D1/4/1, Meeting of Joint Housing
Committee of FBI and NAEE, 17 Dec 1918.
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b u i l d i n g .^
The government finally agreed to incorporate the
subsidising of public utility societies into its 1919 
2
Housing Act. The Ministry of Health would provide 75% of a 
society's capital if employers guaranteed the other 
quarter.^ The National Association of Employers and 
Employees argued that workers who became tenant-shareholders 
with the assistance of their employers had been shown a
4
demonstrable proof of mutual interests. Poor housing and 
slums were recognised as contributors to social and 
industrial unrest.^ It was hoped that workers who had a 
happy home life would be more reasonable to deal with.^ The 
National Confederation of Employers Organisations, however, 
noted that employers would only bear the burden of 
house-building under the Act if they faced acute labour 
supply problems. Industrial housing was uncommon in the 
engineering industry because of a highly mobile workforce. 
But there were numerous instances in the papermaking 
industry, sometimes with the "object of increasing the
1. Ibid, FBI Housing Committee Draft Report on Public 
Utility Societies, 5 April 1918.
2. Ibid, Minutes of Interview with Mr Tennyson of 
FBI, re. employers' capital investment in P.U.S.s 
after the War.
3. Industrial Wel f a r e , May 1920, p . 160. Cf. the 
housing trust founded by Dunlop Rubber Company 
(U n i t y , Feb 1928, pp.136-8, & B.S.C. 003/2/1); and 
passim in previous chapters.
4. U n i t y , Jan 1920, p.3.
5. Industrial W e l f a r e , April 1923, p p . 91-6; Aug 1920, 
p p . 254-6.
6. Works M a n a g e m e n t , Nov 1919, p p . 38-44.
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firm's hold on the workpeople". Gas and railway employers, 
like municipalities, had permission to build homes under 
their private Parliamentary charters.^
By having to rely on the cooperation of employers and 
local authorities, Fisher's Education Act was seriously 
weakened, especially as it was clear that most industries 
would not undertake the expense of continuation classes. 
Teenage education did, nonetheless, form an element of many 
companies' welfare schemes. The 1919 Housing Act was altered 
to help employers finance the construction of industrial 
housing. Despite the large capital costs involved, 
employers, particularly during the post-War economic boom of 
1918-1921, were willing to undertake house-building to 
overcome severe labour supply shortages.
1. NCEO, MSS/200/ B / 3 / 2 / C 5 9 1 , Memo., on Housing
C o n d i t i o n s .
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{V i ). The Unemployment Insurance Act 1920, and the Pensions 
Act 1 9 2 5 .
The London and North Western Railway, the Gas Light and 
Coke Company, the South Metropolitan, Cadburys, and 
Rowntrees all gave evidence to the Departmental Committee on 
Old Age Pensions in 1919. They agreed that the pension age 
of 70 years was too high, and that retirement at 65 would 
more closely accord with industrial experience. They also 
saw the amount of the allowance as too small. Cadburys and 
the S.M.G.C. pressed for the removal of the 1908 means test. 
It acted as a disincentive to private providence, and 
inflation, in any case, had made its level unrealistic. 
Large employers of labour, they argued, tended to promise 
their workers a substantial pension in order to make it 
worth their "while to stay and work properly". But the 
Committee in its final report believed that the removal of 
the means test would prove too costly. It recommended, 
however, a 10s weekly pension, and an increased income limit 
of £63. The Committee called for further investigation into 
lowering the age for eligibility, and urged that all public 
assistance should be placed on an insurance basis. From 
listening to witnesses, the Committee was impressed with the 
notion "that it is desirable in the future for industry to 
be so organised as to provide adequate pensions for all 
employees on their retirement", and "that any system which 
tends to discourage the initiation of such schemes is 
detrimental to the community".^
1. PP 1919 (C.410) xxvii 299, Q s .3730-3810,3913-4032,
1563-4120,4336-44454. Also, Recommendations,
pp . 6-11.
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The case for state contributory pensions was
strengthened by the growing number of old people as a
proportion of the population. Yet, despite the financial
pressures, change was slow. By 1922, government pensions
were costing £25.3 million and consituted the highest item
of social security. 93% of pensioners were receiving the
maximum state pension, and 70% of this group were women.
Moreover, some 142,015 children of widows were in receipt of
Poor Relief, although their poverty was clearly the result
of tragic misfortune rather than an unwillingness to work.
By 1923, all three major parties supported the principle of
contributory pensions to finance the growing cost of
provision for old age and widowhood.^ Neville Chamberlain
finally introduced his Widows, Orphans, and Old Age
Contributory Pensions Act in 1925. The legislation adopted
many of the 1919 Report's recommendations, which had
received the support of those employers who had given
evidence. Contributions would be collected from all those
paying health insurance, their employers, and the state. 10s
pensions would be paid at 65 years, and the contributory
principle made the means test unnecessary. Uninsured workers
would still receive the state grant of 5s at 70 under the
1908 Act. Furthermore, widows and orphans were covered by
2
the legislation.
The N.C.E.O. did not object to the notion of 
contributory state pensions, but opposed an overall increase
1. J.L.Cohen Social Insurance Unified (1924), 
p p . 102-7.
2. PP 1924-25 (C.2405) xxiii 667. Memo., Explanatory 
to the Bill, p p . 2,3,6.
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in burdens upon industry at a time of economic depression.
The Confederation, therefore, argued that the funding of
widows and orphans' pensions should be met out of existing
national insurance funds.^ Like the N.C.E.O., the National
Federation of Iron and Steel Manufacturers had no objection
in principle to state schemes and wanted to meet the
anxieties of workers about old age. The Federation sought,
however, a concomitant reduction in the employers' health
2
contributions if its members were to finance pensions. Sir 
Alfred Mond, no enemy of state or industrial welfare, also 
felt that the projected extra costs of £22.5m to £54m on 
employers were too great.^ The F.B.I. pressed for the 
postponement of the Bill to allow time for a review of 
social services. It hoped that, through the better 
coordination of government provision, savings could be 
made.^ Employers, however, were compelled by Chamberlain's 
Act to make contributions. The N.C.E.O. had to acknowledge 
that the views of industry had been ignored by the
g o v e r n m e n t .^
Yet employers and their associations were satisfied by 
the inclusion of approved societies in the legislation. The
Railway Companies Association had been involved in the
1. NCEO Archive, MSS/200/B/3/2/C645, Pt.l, 15 May 
1925 .
2. BSC 802/6/35, CCWA, Minute Book, 10 July 1925, 11
Sept 1925; Iron and Coal Trades R e v i e w , 10 July
1925, p . 876.
3. Ibid, Extract from Hansard, 20th May 1925.
4. NCEO Archive, M S S / 200/B/3/2/C645 Pt.l, Draft of 
Statement by FBI on Old Ages Pension Bill.
5. Ibid, 21 May 1925.
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drawing up of the Act at its committee stage. In
consultation with the R.C.A.'s solicitors, Sir Robert Horne
moved that, when employers' contributions to pensions were
assessed, grants paid by them to company benefit funds
should be taken into account. Employers could not be
expected to pay for state and private pensions.^ Although
Horne's suggestion was defeated, the government responded by
enabling company funds to become a part of the state system.
Indeed, the government felt that "One of the most
satisfactory things in connection with the scheme has been
2
the demand for voluntary insurance....... " The N.C.E.O.
advised their members of the advantages of "contracting 
out".^ By 1927, the Federation of Master Printers negotiated 
with the Life Assurance Society to provide pensions 
additional to state allowances. For, the Federation believed 
that "There seems to be a feeling amongst employers that one 
of the solutions of the present state of unrest amongst 
employees is the introduction of some form of pension scheme
4
for their w o r k e r s ........ "
The Coalition government's review of state benefits 
after the Great War included a reassessment of unemployment 
insurance as well as pensions. Unemployment pay, however, 
was of greater urgency because of the dislocation peace 
might bring to the labour market, and the govenment was
1. Rail 1098/53, Meeting of RCA, 14 July 1925, minute 
4259 .
2. Hansard, 13 July 1926, 5th ser., v o l . 198,
c o l s . 369ff .
3. NCEO Archive, MSS/200/B/3/2/C645 Pt.2,
Correspondence with solicitor, 4 & 6 July 1925.
4. Ibid, MSS/200/B/3/2/C595, 9 Feb 1927.
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largely unprepared when the armistice was signed. Fear of
revolution amongst unemployed workers and ex-servicemen was
a major consideration for the government. The setting up of
an approved society system within the unemployment insurance
scheme was considered as a means of defraying the state's
extra costs. A Ministry of Labour memorandum in 1918 looked
at the prospects of allowing employers and workers to
contract out. Beveridge, then at the Ministry of Labour,
favoured the idea, which also won the support of
B.S.Rowntree. Unemployment insurance approved societies were
to be organised on an industry-wide basis, since no single
company had a direct interest in aiding a worker it had made
redundant. The difficulties of drawing demarcation barriers
between industries, however, was recognised. Moreover, the
mobility of labour between industries would be hindered by
insuring workers within their own trade. The financing of
unemployment approved societies would also create
insuperable problems for industries with high incidences of
unemployment. Where the incidence was low and industry-based
insurance consequently feasible, it would have served little
purpose. Furthermore, the employers' ability to sack workers
would be constrained if it led to an increase in insurance
premiums.^ Nevertheless, "Unemployment Insurance by
Industry" achieved some credibility after the Great War
because it could be organised through the proposed
industry-wide Joint Industrial Councils.
The Unemployment Insurance Act 1920 extended the 1911
1. PRO PIN3/8. Cf. J.Harris Unemployment and
Politics: A Study in Engl i s h  Social Policy,
1886-1914 ( 1972 ), pp. 303-4, 334 .
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scheme to all workers, improved benefits, and introduced the
non-contributory out-of-work dole.^ Section 18 allowed a
with the sanction of the Minister of Labour, to
create its own insurance scheme. It would receive a 30%
subsidy from the Treasury. Proposals had to be submitted to
the Ministry by July 1921. Supplementary schemes, under
Section 20 and which improved the basic benefits under the
Act, would also be allowed. It was thought possible that
three and three-quarter million of the 12 million insured
2
might contract out.
As unemployment soared, it became unrealistic to expect 
industries voluntarily to undertake the cost and
administration of unemployment insurance. Severe structural 
unemployment made the transfer of labour between industries 
imperative, and confirmed unemployment as a national and 
governmental problem. The F.B.I. and the N.C.E.O. supported 
insurance by industry in 1920, but it proved workable in 
banking and insurance only. In 1922, the Minister of Labour 
decided to suspend consideration of insurance by industry 
schemes. The views of employers were, therefore, canvassed, 
and the N.C.E.O. asked for the re-activation of Section 18. 
Both the Confederation and the F.B.I. seriously investigated 
insurance by industry as late as 1922,^ because state 
schemes failed to encourage a "spirit of cooperation between 
employers and employed". Businessmen who accepted direct
1. Although the 1911 Act had already been expanded to 
include munitions workers in 1916.
2. J.L.Cohen Insurance by Industry Examined (1923), 
pp.26-32,51-2.
3. NCEO Archive, MSS/200/B/1/2/1, General Purposes 
Committee, 3 May 1922.
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responsibility for out-of-work payments could win the
attachment of workers.^ Industrial Peace acknowledged that
unemployment was the workers ' greatest fear during these
years. The workers' status had to be improved, and, it
argued, "industries must themselves carry the work of
insurance farther than the State could, and on better
principles" by transferring the responsibility of
unemployment insurance to those whose provision it directly 
2
affected. The N.C.E.O. recognised the practical and
administrative difficulties of insurance by industry, but 
placed greater hopes upon supplementary schemes within
firms, especially as companies were increasing in size. The 
Confederation argued that all companies rather than 
employment exchanges should issue benefits, a right given 
only to those who operated supplementary schemes. The state 
was seen as having a duty to promote voluntary initiatives.^ 
The National Federation of Employees Approved Societies 
contended that contracting out allowed a worker to
sympathise with the circumstances of an employer who "helps 
them to tide over the period of depression by contributing
4
jointly with them to their own unemployment fund".
The National Federation of Iron and Steel Makers in 
1920 talked to the Ministry of Labour, and a "Special
1. Ibid, MSS/200/3/2/C4, Pt.l, Meeting of GPC, 23 Nov 
1922 .
2. Industrial P e a c e , Jan 1921, p p . 165-7.
3. MSS/200/3/2/C4, Meeting of GPC, 23 Nov 1922; FBI,
MSS/200/F/1/2/17, 1st Draft Report of the
Unemployment Insurance C o m m i t t e e , 28 June 19 22.
4. U n i t y , April 1925, p p . 4-5.
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Scheme" was drawn up requiring union agreement to joint
contributions for an industry-wide approved society.^ The
Woollen Textile, Hosiery, Boot and Shoe, Printing,
Wire-making, and Match-making J.I.C.s all drew up
2
contracting out schemes in 1921. The Council for the 
Hosiery industry and the N.C.E.O., in 1922, blamed the 
failure of such schemes on the government's lack of 
cooperation.2 The Chemical Industries Federation had 
appointed an actuary to investigate the idea, but he had
reported unfavourably. The Federation was still willing,
however, to reconsider the proposal in 1922. Sir Charles 
Macara for the cotton spinning industry and the Association 
of British Chambers of Commerce favoured contracting out. 
The Food Manufacturers Federation and the National Employers 
of Vehicles Builders hoped to implement their schemes in 
more favourable circumstances. The Bradford Dyers 
Association argued for the more flexible administration of 
unemployment insurance. It envisaged a mixture of national, 
industrial, and company schemes, with each worker having the 
right to join or re-join the general fund if he left his
employment. But the National Federation of Building Trades 
Employers and the Mining Association of Great Britain 
pointed out the parlous and unpredictable economic situation
4
they faced and simply opposed contracting out. Natural
1. BSC 802/6/5, Parliamentary Committee, 8 April 
1920; 20 Oct 1920; 17 Nov 1920.
2. PP 1922 (C.1613-11) ii 1123; NCEO Archive,
MSS/200/B/3/2/C240.
3. Current O p i n i o n , Dec 1920, p . 477; May 1922, p . 7.
4. PIN7/61, Summary of Replies to Minister's
circular, 22 Feb to 17 June 1922.
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monopolies which enjoyed little unemployment, generally 
showed small interest interest in contracting out, although 
supplementary schemes were considered because of the low 
level of expected claims.^
The government's consideration of pensions policy after
the Great War had to take account of the view of employers
and the role of industrial pensions, and a general consensus
seems to have existed. Those who gave evidence to the
Departmental Committee in 1919 supported state provision as
supportive of their own company welfare policies. The state
for its part was keen to encourage voluntary initiative. The
Industrial Welfare Society in 1949 argued that when the
state had first guaranteed a 10s pension, "many employers
asked how this position was likely to affect the firm's
pension schemes. Eighteen years' experience has furnished
the answer to this question. Pensions and superannuation
schemes grew at a far more rapid rate after 1926 than
before", because "the very provision of government pension
directs the worker's attention to the need to provide for 
2
his old age". Contracting out in the 1925 Act was in line 
with the precedents set in 1880 and 1911 and was passed 
without controversy. State pensions after 1918 were 
generally accepted without the type of anti-statist 
arguments deployed against the pre-War Liberal social 
reforms. Although the F.B.I. and N.C.E.O. naturally sought
1. Cf. Rail 1115/4, G NR Sick and Funeral Allowance
Fund, Report of Committee of Management, 31 May
1920. Cf. also C h . 3, s.(iv).
2. IWS Employee Benefit Schemes (19 49), p . 7.
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some means of defraying any extra costs industry might bear, 
their campaign to limit increases in government expenditure 
was in effect ignored by the government. Section 18 of the 
Unemployment Insurance Act 1920 proved a failure. While 
employers could administer health insurance approved 
societies on a company-basis, obtaining the necessary 
intra-industry cooperation for the contracting out of 
unemployment insurance proved prohibitive. The Post-War 
Slump, in any case, ended any prospect of insurance by 
industry. But the interest of employers in the proposal as 
late as 1922 illustrates their continued support for 
contracting out, and the way during this period that state 
and industrial welfare were considered as feasible 
alternatives even in the area of unemployment insurance. As 
in the case of pensions, the N.C.E.O. and the F.B.I. during 
the Inter-War period attempted to reduce the cost of 
unemployment insurance on industry, without directly 
attacking the principle of state provision. Their efforts 
were, likewise, rebuffed by the government.^
In 1927, the N.C.E.O. took up the recommendations 
of the Blanesburgh Committee on Unemployment 
Insurance. The Economy Act of 1926 had set 
payments at 8d an employer, 7d a worker, and 6d 
from the state. But the Committee had suggested 
parity of payments between all three contributors, 
and the setting of benefits at what the "nation 
could afford". The Confederation led a delegation 
to 10 Downing Street on the 7th November. Baldwin 
said that the balancing of economy with the cost 
of unemployment insurance was a problem but not 
the "deciding factor". He told the N.C.E.O. that 
there were factors which "perhaps we are better 
acquainted with than you, and that is political 
pressure which it would have been almost 
impossible to avoid". The request for a cut in the 
employer's contribution was refused. Cf. PRO 
PIN3/117, 17 Nov 1927.
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(V i i ) . C o n c l u s i o n .
The State welfare system which had developed before
1939 was altered by the consequences of the Second World
War. It was remembered that promises of Reconstruction
during the 1914-18 conflict had answered questions about the
value of fighting on, but had been broken on the actuality
of unemployment and poverty during the 1920s and 1930s. As
during the Great War, government was certain to consider
matters of state and industrial welfare as the shortage of
labour increased and its value grew.^ The promotion of
welfare schemes through the joint production committees set
up in 1940 by Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labour, was
indicative of a renewed interest in the health and
2
efficiency of the civilian worker. The necessity of state 
control was more quickly accepted during the Second World 
War than in the conflict with Germany 25 years earlier, when 
the lessons of government planning for a total, industrial 
war had still to be learnt. Bevin in 1941 emphasised that 
the morale of the armed forces and the home front depended 
upon state guarantees of social security and full 
employment. The need for common sacrifices during the War 
supported the case of those who argued for the creation of a 
fairer society offering freedom from destitution "from the 
cradle to the grave".
The Beveridge Committee was appointed in May 1941 to
1. IWS Elements of Industrial Welfare and Personnel 
Management (1940).
2. A.Bui lock The Lif e  and Times of Ernest B e v i n ,
Vol.II: the Minister of Labour (1967), p p . 94-5.
Cf. H.M.Vernon The Health and Efficiency of 
Munition Workers (1940).
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investigate the social services, and its proposals were
published seventeen months later. The Beveridge Report
argued for the replacement of the separate health,
unemployment, and pensions schemes by a single, unitary and
universal system of national insurance. Seeking merely to
rationalise the payment of state benefits, it was not an
innovative measure. Indeed, two of the Report's underlying
assumptions, a National Health Service and full employment,
were more revolutionary in concept than its proposals for
action. The streamlining of the state's benefits system had
been a familiar demand of the Federation of British
Industries, the British Employers Confederation, and many
businessmen in the Inter-War years.^ Their support for
contracting out, however, could not easily be matched with
their wish to see centralisation and rationalisation. The
payment of larger basic allowances by certain Approved
Societies was attacked as unfair by the T.U.C. Beveridge also
wanted equal, basic benefits, and popular support for the
principles underlying his Report ensured its acceptance by
2
the government in 1943.
J.Harris has pointed out that the attitude of employers 
towards the Beveridge Committee and its Report was mixed. 
They agreed with the Report's aims, but opposed any 
increase in industrial costs.^ Their opposition,
1. Cf. especially s.(vi). The National Confederation
of Employers Organisations was renamed the British
Employers Confederation in 1932.
2. P.Addison The Road to 1945 (1977), p p . 168-9.
3. J.Harris "Some Aspects of Social Policy in Britain 
during the 2nd World War" in W.J.Mommsen The
Emergence of the Welfare State in Britain and
Germany (1981), p p . 249-50.
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therefore, was an exact reflection of the position they had
taken towards the 1925 Pensions Act. The response of Lords
Melchett and McGowan of I.C.I. was more positive. The paper
they presented to the Beveridge Committee, "A National
Policy for Industry", sought a partnership between corporate
paternalism and state welfare. Industrialists would be
responsible for the proper housing of employees, and would
undertake to supplement state pensions and unemployment pay.
Government, on the other hand, would provide the basic
social benefits and family allowances, and raise the school
leaving age to 16.^ Melchett and McGowan's Paper had 120
signatories from industry, and, according to a survey, 73%
of employers favoured the Beveridge Report. The opposition
of the textile industry was, however, notably strong,
because it was labour intensive and susceptible to
2
competitive pressures.
The Wool and Allied Textiles Employers Council, for 
example, wanted to end "the duplication of administrative 
machinery" which was employed in the processing of three 
separate insurance schemes, but sought guarantees of 
government economy and upper limits to the overall levels of 
social expenditure. The Railway Companies Association also 
saw the advantages of coordinating the state insurance 
schemes, but the cost to employers and the state was 
"the more important point". Due to the permanence of railway 
employment and the industry's high expenditure on company
1. Addison (1977), p p . 214-5.
2. Middlemass (1979 ), p p . 286-8 , 292 , 294 , 314 . The poll 
was carried out by the British Institute of Public 
Opinion (Gallup).
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welfare, the R.C.A. wanted complete exemption from
unemployment insurance and partial exemption from health
insurance.^ When Sir William Jowitt's Advisory Panel on Home
Affairs was established in 1942 to canvass expert opinion on
the Beveridge Report, it interviewed employers like
B .S .R o w n t r e e , Samuel Courtauld, Sir Samuel Beale and
representatives of Guinesses, Marks and Spencer, British
Copper, Austin and Morris, and various heavy engineering
firms. None of them raised objections to the principles of a
universal and contributory insurance scheme, and opposition
2
proved greater amongst ministersand civil servants.
Harris correctly points out the need for greater 
research into employers' responses to proposals during the 
Second World War for greater economic and social planning by 
the state.^ Employers' attitudes in 1942, however, must have 
been influenced by their involvement in industrial welfare 
schemes and Approved Societies. Their usefulness to good 
industrial relations would have made them more sympathetic 
to Beveridge's proposals, and the creation of large 
corporate companies during the Inter-War period increased 
the need for welfare provision and the ability of industry 
to pay for it. Government, industry, and unions were 
impressed by the necessity of placing Britain on a war 
footing. Moreover, the failure of Lloyd George's
1. PRO 1098/9, Meeting of RCA, 6 Aug 1942; 
MSS200/B/3/2/C216 F t . 3., Observation from RCA to 
NCEO, 24 Feb 1942; Wool and Allied Textie 
Employers Council; Post-War Social Services,
14/4/42; Meeting of BEC Council, 15 Jan 1943.
2. Harris in Mommsen (1981), p p . 253-5.
3. Ibid, p . 260.
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Coalition to implement its Reconstruction proposals and 
memories of mass unemployment between the Wars were powerful 
influences on public opinion after 1939. Political realities 
made employers campaign for a close scrutiny of government 
expenditure while offering a cautious welcome to Beveridge's 
proposals. It was a tactic born of weakness, and, as during 
the Great War, it was the state which determined the nature 
of social and economic planning. State welfare, in any case, 
had often promoted the opportunities for industrial welfare. 
But, in accepting Beveridge's proposals, employers 
effectively abandoned contracting out. The rationalisation 
of state welfare, which had grown haphazardly, of course had 
its own logic. Yet the success of Beveridge's campaign in 
support of an all-embracing state benefits system in 1943 
was undeniable, and the election of a Labour government by a 
large majority in 1945 was further evidence of support for 
social and economic reform. The National Insurance Act and 
the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act passed in 
1946, to be implemented by 1948, wound up the Apporoved 
Societies.
Although the involvement of company provident societies 
in the administration of basic benefits had been terminated, 
supplementary private schemes expanded after 1945. In 1949, 
the Industrial Welfare Society stated that National 
Insurance allowances had helped bridge the gap between a 
worker's earnings and his needs, "but it was never pretended 
that they eliminated the need for private thrift schemes and 
assisted saving. The establishment where the worker is 
employed provides the best unit for such a scheme since, as
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the organisation is ready at hand, any assistance the 
employer gives is clearly in the interest of the employer's 
business". Pensions, in particular, encouraged loyalty, and 
recent National Insurance legislation provided a basis for 
industrial welfare. "It is not intended that this new 
national standard should in any way adversely affect those
covered by existing provident s c h e m e s ........" Supplementary
sick schemes would still be attractive to married men 
earning above the basic state benefits of 46s or 26s for 
single men. The same was true of accident compensation for 
workers earning respectively above 45s or 35s. Such schemes 
could still be made compulsory if they were registered under 
the Shops Clubs Act 1902. A company donation which was 
deductable from tax, however, usually made the terms they 
offered attractive enough.^
Brook in his review of personnel management and 
industrial welfare in 1952 noted the link between company 
size and the systemisation of labour management. Company 
policy aimed to instill a team-spirit, cooperation and 
mutual respect between employer and employee. The success of 
a welfare policy was to be measured by collecting statistics 
on labour-turnover, absenteeism and sickness, and the 
accident-rate. Therefore, "Most businesses with a large 
labour force have in existence a workers' pension scheme, 
and more and more firms are tending towards making provision 
of this description for their employees". Management usually 
made the membership of pension schemes a condition of
1. IWS Employee Benefit Schemes (1949), p p . 5,7-9, 
14,17,27,30-33,36, 42-45.
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employment because "removing the fear of old age penury"
encouraged cooperation on the factory floor. Actuarial
calculations provided another reason: the sick clubs
organised by large companies were "generally under the
administration of a sick fund committee and run on actuarial
principles". Such schemes provided benefits additional to
state allowances. Moreover, despite the creation of a
National Health Service, companies were successful in
promoting the Hospital Savings Association and the Hospital
Saturday Fund. Sick and medical contributions were regularly
deducted from employees' wage-packets because their
collection on the factory floor interfered with production,
and, "In many firms, the central funds of the club are
augmented by an annual donation from the Management". Thrift
schemes, and Christmas, holiday and day-trip clubs were also
organised jointly.^ In 1954, H.V.Potter, chairman of
Bakelite Limited, argued in a lecture to the Society of the
Chemical Industry that company welfare continued to
influence employees in their choice of employment. It
improved job-contentment and reduced labour-turnover. The
expense and benefits of welfare schemes were difficult to
assess. Schemes could cost between £50-90 per worker every
2
year, depending on the size of the company.
A survey by the Industrial Welfare Society in 1958 
concluded that the state and industrial welfare expenditure 
undertaken by each company amounted to an average 15.81% of 
the payroll. Its sample of 55 companies with 294,000
1. Brook (1952), pp . 16,19,21,30-1,34-5,156-9.
2. H.V.Potter Welfare in Industry (n.d.), p p . 3-8.
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employees was, however, small. Reid and Robertson state that 
the figure for operatives was probably nearer 10%, and 
significantly higher for salaried staff. There were, 
however, no reliable figures for British industry, although 
it was clear that labour management could not rely upon 
basic wages and overtime alone. Overhead labour payments 
which did not directly or over a short period affect 
production or effort were also important. Fringe benefits 
influenced labour supply and turnover in the long run, and 
was an investment in the work-force. Indeed, they tended to 
establish loyalty and keep rather than attract workers,
because "most companies provide(d) welfare s e r v i c e s  "
Company pensions were "regarded as essentially an extension 
of the social security system". The government in 1958 had 
recognised employers' donations to pension funds to be a 
valid "business expense". They were of value to the company 
rather than just being a perquisite to an employee. The 1959 
National Insurance Act enabled employers to contract out of 
the funding of the graduated part of pension payments, 
although state control over basic benefits remained. It was 
acknowledged that state benefits were kept at a level low 
enough to encourage private provision.^
The Beveridge Report benefited from the degree of 
consensus which war conditions had produced. The role of 
employers after 1939 is not the subject of this thesis, and 
detailed research on their attitudes and responses still 
needs to be undertaken. The creation of the Welfare State, 
1. Reid & Robertson (1965), p p . 21-25,30,40-1,45.
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however, undoubtedly undermined the necessity of direct 
employer involvement in the provision of sick pay and 
pensions. The Approved Societies were ended, and state 
allowances were finally set at levels of sustenance. But the 
establishment of universally-available state benefits was 
not the only solution to the problems of income-maintenance. 
The wide-spread existence of industrial welfare before 1939 
was an argument in favour of the continuation of a "Welfare 
Society" in which government would coordinate services and 
interfere directly only where private provision proved 
inadequate. There was no inevitable trend towards the 
"Welfare State". Indeed, systemised company benefits 
survived and flourished after 1948. The movement during the 
20th Century in favour of welfare of whatever kind, 
therefore, is linked to proposals about better industrial 
relations and the labour requirements of the firm.
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E p i l o g u e .
The evidence of company records and published business 
histories challenges the views of commentators who hold 
that, while examples of industrial welfare can be found in 
British industry, they were uncommon. Such examples can, of 
course, be found in available historical literature. But 
this thesis has synthesised the many elements of industrial 
welfare over time and throughout different industries, and 
added important new evidence.
Company provision in British labour management from 
approximately 18 4-G to 1939 had antecedents in small-firm
paternalism. The growth of larger companies, however,
induced crucial changes in the nature of management. 
Personal and ejc gratia paternalism became gradually less 
appropriate to many industries. Changes in the
administration of commercial management often accompanied
alterations in the administration and scale of industrial 
w e l f a r e .
Each change has to be understood in the context of each 
industry's market and structure. Just as markets determined 
industrial structure, structure moulded the context of 
labour relations. The nature of employment on the railways 
required a systemised and comprehensive scheme of welfare 
benefits. In the gas industry, the need for regularity and 
security of supply proved more influential than the factor 
of seasonal employment in the determination of welfare
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policies.
Yet, the natural monopolies contrasted strongly with 
competitive industries. Changes in the welfare organisation 
of the steel and chemical trades awaited the restructuring 
of capital and management. Where industries continued to be 
unrationalised, as in the cases of engineering and 
shipbuilding, welfare remained less developed.
Those, like the dockers, who were engaged in casual 
trades generally suffered from job-insecurity, low wages, 
and a lack of welfare provision. The rationalisation of 
industries and the establishment of more capital-intensive 
processes increased the necessity for internal labour 
markets and industrial welfare strategies. But their main 
aim was to reduce the natural friction between employer and 
worker, and the wage-relationship alone could not the remove 
the fear of penury due to misfortune, illness or old age.
Social legislation before the Welfare State proved an 
aid to company provision rather than a challenge. As for the 
role of industrial welfare since 1945, its history still 
needs to be undertaken.
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Thble n
Vhcps of Mhrual Vfarters on an Indjstry b/ Indjstry basis, 
(figjres in diillings and pence.)
1886 1906 1931
V'hges Vfeges Vëges
Irtijstry Industry Nfen Worren Industry ^bn Wmen
Gotten TTBTufacture 25/3 15/3 Gotten 29/6 18/8 Gbtbon 45A 27A
Vtollm ïïamfactüre 23/2 13/3 ltx)llen & worsted 26A0 13A0 Woollen & worsted 49/4 27A
Werstad & stuff 23/4 11/11
LLren 19/9 BAl Linen 22/4 10/9 linen 36/5 20/8
Silk 22/3 lOA Silk 25Æ llA Silk & rayon 60/0 26A
Cbal,ircn ere &
ircn-stcne mires 22/11 8/2 GCalmining 41A1
China cler^' &c wcrks 18/^ 8 6/9 Rxoelain, china.
earthen/are 32/4 llAl
CasÆrks 27/2 GOs 9-çply 32/6 Gds sjpply 62A1
Pig iron 24/0 Pig iron 34/4 Pig iron 54A
Iron & steel 39A Iron & stæl 54A1
Ehgineering & Ehgineering &
TTBchirery 25/13 boilermaking 32/5 13A Ehgineering 51/8
Shipbuilding (iron Shipbuilding &
& steel) 28/8 r^Biring 51/9
Tirplate works 33/5 10/4 Tinplate 42/0 14/9 Sheet metal wcddng 51/9 26/]
Boot & diœ Boot & shoe Boot & dre
(fectory) 24/3 12/6 (ready-nacfe) 28/8 13A (rædy-made) 52A0 31A
Breweries 24/3 Whiting & brewing 26A 9/4 Br^ing, malting
& bottling 57/6 24A1
Gbooa, chooolate & Gbooa, daooolate
s o ^  confectionary 30/9 11/9 s u ^  Gonfectiorary 61A 27/9
Totacoo, cigar.
ci<^rette, g-uff 30/6 12/0 Tbfcacoo 58A0 36/9
Ihper manufacture 29/] llAl
Ghsnical manufacture 29A Ghsnical 59/2 27/0
feilway service 26/9 r^lvBys 56/4
Presea^ jed food, jam 
& sauoe 56/4 25/^
Sourœ: Cepartnent of Brplcynenb British labour Statistics: Historical tetract (BSD 1971), pp.92-97.
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Thble ni
BrplcyTent Statistics of Industrial Nhiual Wotters, 1871-1931.
Industry 1871 1881 1891 1901 1911 1921 1931
Transport &
Qjmunicaticn 620,480 792,313 1,131,748 1,320,783 1,618,553 1,363,784 1,530,687
Chs, Electricity
& 'l^ ter 21,818 28,725 46,037 62,426 86,257 179,588 227,203
Nfetal
>hnifacture 440,951 475,252 525,743 297,473 360,190 498,232 382,774
Chemicals 70,288 77,052 97,174 86,324 122,628 241,006 199,689
Rod, Drink
& Ttkaoco 526,273 592,898 769,454 933,627 1,132,498 624,073 651,523
Textiles 1,311,891 1,298,748 1,287,586 1,169,215 1,298,051 1,308,292 1,116,379
Mining &
Quarrying 376,783 484,900 632,400 780,100 1,049,400 1,248,200 931,400
Siiptauilding &
Mirine 61,421 72,572 94,035 121,293 158,885 408,469 195,902
Ehgineering
Nfedianical
Engineering 168,631 204,230 265,679 432,087 516,326 707,057 464,667
Electrical
engineering 2,600 13,362 53,708 101,245 175,420 245,319
\thicles 58,957 66,954 86,098 125,757 192,738 375,380 410,730
Clcthing &
Rxtwear 981,801 1,031,498 1,142,625 1,138,864 1,143,559 874,693 826,677
Tttal 4,639,294 5,127,742 6,091,941 6,521,649 7,708,330 7,404,194 6,762,950
Othar Industrial
WbckETS 1,648,911 1,876,478 2,133,251 2,125,739 2,038,700 3,166,708 3,127,375
Tttal Industrial
Wuckers 6,288,205 7,004,220 8,225,192 8,647,388 9,747,030 10,570,902 9,902,325
Other BrploÆes 5,587,959 5,725,997 6,274,540 7,664,151 8,604,336 8,435,696 9,005,620
Grand Tttal 11,876,164 12,730,217 14,499,732 16,311,539 18,351,366 19,006,598 18,907,945
Source: C.H.Iee Bdtidi Ffegicral Brployment Statistics, 1841-1971 (1979).
275.000 were enplaned cn the railways in 1873; 643,000 in 1913. The ^ s  industry enployed 74,900 in 
1907 , 92,700 in 1924, & 98,800 in 1931. 360,000 workers were erplq^ed in the iron and steel industry 
in 1871, 271,700 in 1911, and 166,500 in 1931. BrsÆrs in 1907 led 69,000 enplcyees, 69,700 in 1924, 
54,900 in 1931, and 51,600 in 1935. There were 376,783 ccaMrErs in 1871, 1,049,400 in 1911,
931.400 in 1931. 33,900 were arplo^ in the tobacco trafo in 1907 , 32,900 in 1924 , 36,300 in 1931,
40.000 in 1935. 117,600 were encpged in footwear in 1907, 148,8CX) in 1924, 111,700 in 1931, &
110.400 in 1935. Cf. Ctnsus of Rpulaticn and Census of Production Eata, 1871 to 1935.
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Table I V .
C ompany Personnel O r g a n i s a t i o n .
 1-------
Administrative Research Personnel Production
Organisation Organisation Organisation Organisation
- Safety Organisation
Marketing
Organisation
Labour Dept 
-Labour 
Of ficer
Welfare Dept 
-Welf are 
Of f icer
Medical Dept 
-Medical 
Officer
»  1
Staff Federations & 
Appointments Provident
Associations
Health R e h a b i 1iation Medical First Industrial Industrial Works 
Service Records Aid Diseases Nurse Hygiene
Labour
Supply
Employee
Records
Welfare First Aid 
Liason
Labour
Relations
Employment Training Recreation Services 
to Employees
Source: F.H.C.Brook Personnel Management and Welfare (1952 ), p . 21
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Table V .
Average Per Company Cost of State and Industrial
Welfare Services in Britain in 1954
(based on the experience of Bakelite Ltd).
Welfare Service CTotal
Cost 
per head 
in 
£ s
% of 
total 
p. a.
expenditure
Sports and social facilities £3,000 £1 0
Health services £4,500 £1 10s
1.75
2.5
Canteens £7,000 £2 0 3.5
General welfare £18,000 £6 0 10.5
Statutory holiday payments £15,500 £5 0 8.75
National Insurance £35,000 £12 0 2 0 . 0
Pensions- contributory 
& non-contributory £85,000 £28 0 50.0
Sick pay schemes £1,500 0 10s 0.875
Dependants' benefits
Education
£1,000 0 3s
£2,500 £1 0
0.3
1.75
Sundries (ex gratia payments) £1,000 0 3s 0.3
Totals £174,000 £56 6s 100.00
Source: H.V.Potter Welfare in Industry (n.d.), p . 5
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Primary S o u r c e s .
(Contemporary published works 
can be found under Secondary Sources.)
Chapter 2 .
Public Record Office:
Barry Docks Railway Company
Great Central Railway
Great Eastern Railway
Great Northern Railway
Great Western Railway
Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway
London and Birmingham Railway
London and North Eastern Railway
London and North Western Railway
London, Midland and Scottish Railway
London, Brighton and South Coast Railway
Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway
Metropolitan Railway
North Eastern Railway
South Eastern Railway
Southern Railways
Taff Vale Railway
Railway Companies Association.
H a n s a r d .
Report of the Home Department on Shop Clubs, PP 1899 
(C.9203) xxxiii 871
Report of Board of Trade on Railway Superannuation 
Funds, PP 1910 (C.5349) Ivii 35
Minutes of Evidence for Report of Board of Trade on Railway 
Superannuation Funds, PP 1911 (C.5484) xxix-I 687.
Great Central Railway Journal 
Great Eastern Railway Magazine 
Great Western Railway Magazine 
Herapath's Railway Journal 
L.M.S. Railway Magazine 
Railway News 
The Railway Review 
The Railway V i g i l a n t .
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Chapter 3 .
Greater London Record Office:
Central Gas Company 
Commercial Gas Company 
Gas Light and Coke Company 
Imperial Gas Company 
Independent Gas Company 
Phoenix Gas Company 
South Metropolitan Gas Company
Metropolitan Board of Works.
Public Record Office:
Board of Trade, BTl
Joint Industrial Council for the Gas 
Industry, LAB2.
H a n s a r d .
Report of Select Committee on the Metropolis' Gas Industry, 
PP 1859 (C.225-1) i 507
Minutes and Report of Select Committee on Gas (Metropolis) 
Bill, PP 1860 (C.493) xxi 29; PP 1860 (C.417) xxi 37
Minutes and Report of Select Committee on the Sale of Gas
(Amendment) Bills, PP 1860 (C.462) xxi 429; PP 1860 (C.78)
iii 485
Report and Minutes from Select Committee on London (City) 
Corporation Gas, &c. Bills, 1866 (C.270) xii 63 
Special Report from the Select Committee on the Metropolis 
Gas Bill, PP 1867 (C.520) xii 1
Correspondence of City of London, Metropolitan Board of
Works, London Vestries, and gas companies re. supply of gas 
in Metropolis, PP 1867 (C . 118-1,118-11) Iviii 497,557,565 
Report from Select Committee on Metropolitan Gas Companies 
Bill, PP 1875 (C.281) xii 1
Reports to Board of Trade on Profitsharing, PP 1890-91 
(C.6267) Ixxviii 15; 1894 (C.7458) Ixxx 575 
Royal Commission on Labour, PP 1892 (C.26) iv 308 
Report to Board of Trade on Profi t s h a r i n g , PP 1895 (C.7848) 
Ixxx 103
Report from the Select Committee appointed to Inquiry into
the Powers of Charge conferred by Parliament on the
Metropolitan Gas Companies, PP 1899 (C.294) x 19
Report of Departmental Committee on Gas Testing in the
Metropolis, PP 1904 (C.2118) xxiv 667; 1904 (C.2203) xxiv
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Report on Profitsharing and Labour Copartnership, PP 1912 
(C.6496) xliii 853
Report of the Joint Select Committee of the House of Lords 
on Gas Authorities (Residual Products), PP 1912-13 (C.392) 
vii 253
Report from the Select Committee on Gas Undertakings 
(Statutory Prices), PP 1918 (C.74) iii 589
Report from Fuel Research Board on Gas Standards, PP 1919 
(C.108) xxii 569
Report and Proceedings on Gas Regulation Bill, PP 1920 
(C.127) vi 1071
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Report and Proceedings on Public Utility Companies Bill, PP 
1920 (C.47) viii 413
Report on Profitsharing and Labour Copartnership, PP 1920 
(C.544) xxiii 157.
Copartnership H e r a l d . Journal of the Commercial Gas Company, 
London
C o p a r t n e r s ' M a g a z i n e . Journal of the Gas Light and Coke
Company
Gas Trade Circular and Review
Jo u r n a l o f Gas Lighting
Liberty R e v i e w .
Chapter 4 .
British Steel Corporation:
Abercarn Tinplate Company 
Bolckow-Vaughn 
Cargo Fleet Company 
Consett Iron Company 
Dorman-Long
Stanton and Stavely Iron Company 
Stewart and Lloyds 
Richard Thomas and Company 
United Steel Companies
British Iron and Steel Federation
National Federation of Iron and Steel Makers
Gwent Record Office:
Blaenavon Coal and Iron Company 
Guest, Keen & Nettlefords 
Tredegar Coal and Iron Company
Public Record Office:
Iron and Steel Wire Manufacturers 
Association, L A B 2 .
Royal Commission on Trades Unions, PP 1867 (C.3980-1) xxxix 
1
Report of the Departmental Committee on Iron and Steel
Trades after the War, PP 1918 (C.9071) xiii 423
Imports Duties Advisory Committee, PP 1937 (C.5507) xii 393.
C olvilles Magazine
Edgar Allen Magazine
Iron and Coal Trades Review
Marshall News
Wise Group News
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Chapter 5 .
Unilver PLC.
Imperial Chemicals Industries PLC
C hemica l Trade Review 
I.C.I. Magazine 
Port Sunlight Monthly 
P r o g r e s s .
Chapter 6 .
The Brewers Society:
Brewers Society
Country Brewers Trade Association
London Brewers Company
National Trade Defence Association
Westminister Record Office:
Watneys & Sons.
Brewers Journal 
B rewing Trade Review 
House of Whitbread.
Chapter 7 .
Public Record Office:
Miners Welfare Fund, POWEl & 10
Gwent Record Office:
The Tredegar Iron and Coal Company.
Royal Commission on Trades Unions, PP 1867 (C.3980-1) xxxix 
1
Report on P r o f i t s h a r i n g , PP 1892 (C.6708-VI) xxxiv 1 
Report on Profitsharing and Copartnership, PP 1894 (C.7458) 
Ixxx 575
Royal Commission on Labour, PP 1892 (C.6078) xxiv 1 
Report on Profitsharing and Copartnership, PP 1920 (C.544) 
xxiii 765.
H a n s a r d .
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W.H.Allen & Sons
Beardmore N ews (formerly Forge N e w s )
The Colliery Guardian 
E ast London Observer
E lectric Railway and Tramway J ournal 
The Engineer
Iron and Coal Trades R e v iew
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Shoe and Leather News
Shoe Manufacturers Monthly
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T extile Manufacturer
Thames Ironworks G a z e tte
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Chapter 8 .
The Industrial Society:
Industrial Welfare Society, Minutes & Reports
The Industrial Participation Society;
Labour (later Industrial) Copartnership
Association, Minutes and Reports.
Public Record Office:
Ministry of Labour, LAB2.
Report of the Board of Trade on Profitsharing, PP 1890-91 
(C.6267) Ixxviii 15
Report on Profitsharing and Copartnership PP 1894 (C.7458) 
Ixxx 575
Report on Profitsharing and Copartnership, PP 1912 (C.6496)
xxxiii 853
Report on Profitsharing and Copartnership, PP 1920 (C.544) 
xxiii 765.
Beardmore News (formerly Forge N e w s )
Industrial Peace 
Industrial Welfare 
Labour Copartnership 
L iberty Review 
Ministry of Labour G a z e t t e .
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Modern Records Centre, Warwick University:
Engineering Employers Federation 
Federation of British Industries
National Confederation of Employers Organisations
Public Record Office:
Railway Companies Association.
Joint Industrial Councils, LAB2.
Ministry of Health, PIN3, PIN4, PIN7, MH81
Ministry of Labour, LAB2
Ministry of Reconstruction, R E C O l .
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Consultative Committee on Education, PP 1909 (C.4757) 6 
Ministry of Reconstruction Report on Reations between 
Employers and Employed, PP 1918 (C.9001) xv 951 
Report of Departmental Committee on Old Age Pensions, PP 
1919 (C.410) xxvii 299
Memorandum explanatory of the Old Age, Widows, and Orphans 
Contributory Pensions Bill, PP 1924-25 (C.2405) xxiii 667.
The Anti-Socialist 
Current Opinion 
Industrial Peace 
International Labour Review 
Iron and Coal Trades Review 
Journal of Gas Lighting 
Liberty Review 
Railway News 
Unity
Works M a n a g e m e n t .
494
B ib l i o q r a p h y .
Secondary W o r k s .
(The place of publication is 
London unless otherwise stated.)
Chapter 1 & General.
N .Abercombie 
& S.Hill
V.L.Allen
W . H .G .Armytage
W .Ashwor th
P.S.Bagwe11
W.J.Baumol
R.Bendix
H.Braverman
F.H.C.Brook
F.H.C.Brook 
& G.Poulton
K.Burgess
J .Butt (e d .)
E .Cadbury
A.Carey 
A.D.Chandler
"Paternalism and patronage", Brit. Jl. of 
Sociology (1977), vol.27, n o . 4, 
p p . 413-429. This is a useful article 
which draws a distinction between 
paternalism and patronage.
Sociology of Industrial 
Relations (Longman, 1971).
Heavens Below (Routledge,
Kegan & Paul, 1961).
"British Industrial Villages in the 19th 
Century", E c o n .H .R ., 2nd ser., 
vol.Ill, n o . 3 (1950-51), p p . 378-87. 
Industrial Relations (Dublin:
Irish U . P . , 1974 ) .
The Railwaymen (George Allen &
U n w i n , 1963).
Economic Theory and Operations Analysis 
(Eaglewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hal1, 1965). 
Work and Authority in Industry 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1966).
Labor and Monopoly Capitalism (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1974).
Personnel Management and Welfare (B u r k e , 
1952).
Personnel Management 
(publisher not stated, 1943).
The Origins of British
Industrial Relations: the 19th Century 
Experience (Croom Helm, 1975).
Robert Owen; Prince of Cotton Spinners 
(Newton Abbott: David & Charles, 1971). 
"Scientific Management in Industry : the 
Case against Scientific Management" in
A.D.Chandler Management Thought in 
Britain (MacMillan, 1979).
"The Hawthorne Studies: A Radical 
C r i t i c i s m " ,Am. Sociological Review 
(1967), v o l . 32, p p . 403-16.
Strategy and Structure: Chapters 
in the History of Industrial Enterprise 
(Camb. Mass.: MIT Press, 1973).
The Visible Hand: the Managerial
Revolution in American Business 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U . P . , 1977).
495
A.D.Chandler 
& H.Daems
D. F .Channon
R.Charles
J.Child
H.A.Clegg 
S .Cleland
G.D.H.Cole 
M.Cole
P .L.Cook 
F .B.Copley
P .J.Curwen
R.M.Cyert 
& J.G.March
R.W.Dunn
H . I .Dutton 
& J.E.King
A.Flanders 
A. Fox
A.Friedman 
J.K.Galbraith
Managerial Hierarchies 
(Camb. M a s s .: Harvard U . P . , 1980). 
S trategy and Structure in British 
E nterprise (MacMillan, 19 73).
T he Development o f Industrial Relations 
in Britain, 1911-1939: Studies in the 
evolution of collective bargaining at
natio n a l and industry level
(Hutchinson, 1973).
British Management Thought : A 
Critical Analysis (Allen & Unwin, 1969) 
The Business Enterprise in Modern 
Society (MacMillan, 19 69).
"Quaker Employers and Industrial 
Relations", Sociological R e v i e w ,
12,3,N o v . , pp.293-315.
The System of Industrial Relations 
in Great Britain (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1970), esp. p p . 161-7,193-4.
The Influence of Plant Size 
on Industrial Relations (New Jersey : 
Princeton U.P., 1955).
The Life of Robert Owen 
(Frank C a s s , 1965).
Robert Owen of New Lanark 
(Batchworth Press, 1953).
Effects of Mergers : Six Studies 
& U r w i n , 19 58).
Frederick W.Taylor,
(Allen
Father of
IIScientific M a n a g e m e n t , V o l s .I & 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1923).
The Theory of the Firm (MacMillan: 
1976 ) .
A Behvioural Theory of the 
Firm (New Jersey: Prentice-Hal1 
Labor and Automobiles (London:
1963 )
Modern Books, 1929).
Ten Per Cent and No Surrender: 
the Preston Strike, 1853-54 
(C.U.P., 1981)
"The limits of paternalism: the cotton 
tyrants of North Lancashire, 1836-54", 
S o c .H i s t . (1982), v o l . 7, n o . 1, 
p p . 59-74.
"Collective Bargaining: A Theoretical 
Analysis", British J l . of Industrial 
Relations (1968), v o l . 13, n o . 2,
p p . 1-26.
A Sociology of Work in Industry 
(MacMillan, 1971 ) .
Industry and Labour;
Class Struggle at Work and Monopoly 
Capitalism (MacMillan, 1977).
The New Industrial
E state (Lowe & Brydone, 1974).
496
R. G .Garnett
W .R .Gars ide
H. F . Gos pe 1
H.F.Gospel &
G .W .MacDonald
H . F .Gospel 
& C .R .L i 1 1 1er
L.H.Gulick & 
L . P .Urwick
E .Hopkins 
H . J .Habbakuk 
S .Haber 
L.Hannah
L . Hannah & 
J .A.Kay
C.G.Hanson
Cooperation and the Owenite Socialist 
Communities in Britain, 1825-45 
(M.U.P.: 1972).
"Management and Men: Aspects 
of British Industrial Relations in the 
Inter-War Period" in B.Supple Essays in 
Business History (Oxford :
Clarendon, 1977).
"Employers' Labour Policy: a study of 
the Mond-Turner Talks, 1927-33",
B u s .H i s t ., vol.xix, n o . 2 (1979), 
pp.180-197.
"Employers' Organisations: Their Growth 
and Function in the British System 
of Industrial Relations in the Period 
1918-1939" (London P h . D . , 1974).
"An Approach to a Theory of the Firm in 
Industrial Relations", Brit. J l . of 
Industrial Relations (1973), vol.xi,
pp.211-228.
"The Mond-Turner Talks, 1927-33; A Study 
in Industrial Cooperation", H.J. (1973), 
vol.xvi, p p . 807-829.
Managerial Strategies and Industrial 
Relations (Heinemann, 1983).
Papers on the Science of
Administration (New York: Augustus 
1st edn. 1937).M.Kelly, 1969,
"Working Hours and Conditions during the 
Industrial Revolution: a Re-Appraisal", 
Econ.H.R. (1982), vol.55, pp.52-66. 
Industrial Organisation since 
the Industrial Revolution (University 
of Southampton, 1968).
Efficiency and Uplift; Scientific 
Management in the Progressive Era, 
1890-1920 (Univ. of Chicago, 1964).
T he Rise of the Corporate Economy 
(Methuen, 1979).
Management Strategy and Business 
Development: An Historical and 
Comparative Study (MacMillan: 1976) 
"Managerial innovation and the rise 
the large-scale company in 
inter-war Britain", E c o n . H . R . (1974), 
v o l .27
of
2nd ser p p . 267-9.
Concentration in Modern Industry: 
theory, measurement, and the U.K. 
experience (MacMillan, 1977).
"Craft Unions, Welfare Benefits, and the 
Case for Trade Union Law Reform, 
1867-75", Econ.H.R. (1975), vol.28, 
pp.243-259.
497
J.R.Hay
S.Hill
E .H .Hunt
J .S .Jeans
J .B .Jef frys
H . Jones
S . Kakar
J.E.Kelly
M.Kozak 
C.R.Littler
J.Lovell 
A.F.Lucas 
H .W.Macrosty
R . Marris
Welfare Benefits, and the 
Union Law Reform, 1857-75 
H.R. (1976), v o l . 29,
"Craft Unions,
Case for Trade 
A R e p l y " , Econ 
p p . 631-5.
"Employers' Attitudes to Social Policy 
and the Concept of 'Social Control', 
1900-1920" in P.Thane (ed.) The Origins 
o f British Social Policy 
(Croom Helm, 1978).
ion and Control at Work:
the New Industrial Sociology 
(Heinemann, 1981).
British Labour History,
1815-1914 (Weidenfield & Nicolson, 
1981).
C onciliation and Arbitration
in Labour D isputes
(Crosby, Lockwood & Son, 1894).
The Story of the Engineers,
1800-1945 (Lawrence & Wishart, 1946) 
"Trends in Business Organisation 
in Great Britain since 1856" (London 
Ph.D., 1938).
"Employers' Welfare Schemes and 
Industrial Relations in Inter-War 
Britain", B u s .H i s t . (1983), 
vol.XXV, p p . 61-75.
a study in personality
X P P
F.W.Taylor:
and innovation (Camb. Mass.:
1970 ) .
Management Possible?
M.I.T. Press, 
Is Scientific
(Faber & Faber, 1968).
"Understanding Taylorism: some 
comments", B r i t . J l .of 
Sociology (1978), vol.xxix, 
n o . 2, p p . 203-207.
Women Workers in the First 
World War (Hull Ph.D., 1975).
"The Bureaucratisation of the Shop 
Floor: the Development of Modern 
Work Systems" (London Ph.D., 1980).
The Development of the Labour Process 
in Capitalist Societies 
(Heinemann, 19 82).
"Understanding T a y lorism", B r i t . J l .of 
Sociology (1978), vol.xxix, 
n o . 2, p p . 185-202.
British Trades Unions, 1875-1933 
(MacMillan, 1977)
Industrial Reconstruction and the Control 
o f Competition (Longmans, 19 37).
The Trust Movement in
B ritish Industry: a study in business 
organisation (Longmans, 1907).
T he Economic Theory of 'Managerial 
Capital ism ' (MacMillan, 1964 ).
498
R.Marris & A.Wood 
T.Matsumara
E . Mayo 
B ,Meakin
J.Mel ling
W.J.Mommsen 
& H.G.Husung
Ministry of 
Munitions
A.E,M u s son
C.S.Myers
The Corporate Economy
(Camb. Mass.: Harvard U . P . , 1971).
The Labour Aristocracy Revisited: the 
Victorian flint glass makers, 1850-1880 
(M.U.P., 1983).
Human Problems of Industrial 
C i v i l isation (MacMillan, 1936).
Model Factories and Villages:
Ideal Conditions of Labour and Housing 
(T.Fisher Urwin, 1905).
"Non-Commissioned Officers: British 
employers and their supervisory workers, 
1880-1920", Soc.Hist. (1980), vol.v, 
n o .2, p p . 183-221.
"Review Essay: Enterprise and 
Emancipation in Capitalist Industry", 
Bus.Hist. (1984), p p . 81-7.
The Development of Trades Unionism 
in Great Britain and Germany, 1880-1914 
(George Allen & Unwin, 1985).
History of the Ministry 
of Munitions, Vol.V (H.M.S.O. 1919) .
B ritish Trades Unions, 1800-1875 
(MacMillan, 1972).
"Craft Unions, Welfare Benefits, and the 
Case for Trade Union Law Reform, 1867-75 
A Comment", E c o n . H . R . (1976), vol.29, 
p p . 626-6 30.
The Typographical Association 
(O.U.P., 1954), esp. p p . 270-297,397-402. 
Business Rationalisation 
(Pitman & Sons, 1932).
Industrial Psychology in Great Britain
D.Nelson
D.Nelson & 
S . C ampbel1
M.N.Niven
C.H.Northcott (ed)
D.Owen
P .L.Payne
(Jon Cape, 1926)
Present Day Applications of Psychology 
(Jon C a p e , 1918).
Managers and Workers 
(Univ. of Wisconsin, 1975).
"Taylorism versus Welfare Work 
in American industry". Bus.H.R. (1972) 
vol.46, no.l (1972), p p . 1-16.
Personnel Management: The
G rowth of Personnel Management and
the Development of the Institute
(Weston-super-Mare: Lawrence Bros, 1961)
Factory Organisation
(Pitman & Sons, 1928).
E nglish Philanthropy, 1660-1960 
(O.U.P. 1965).
"The Emergence of the Large-scale 
Company in Great Britain, 1870-1914", 
Econ.H.R. (1967), 2nd ser., 
vol . 20, p p . 519-542.
499
H . Felling 
R.Penn
E.T.Penrose
E.H.Phelps Brown
I .Pinchbeck
M.J.Piore &
P .Doerinqer
S .Pollard
S.Pollard & 
J.Salt (eds)
J . H .Porter
R.Price
G.L.Reid &
D .J .Robertson
J .H.Richardson
D.Roberts 
M.Rose
B .S .Rowntree
C .Shaw
A History of British Trades 
Unionism (Penguin, 1979).
"Trade union organisation and skill in 
the cotton and engineering industries in 
Britain, 1850-1960", Soc.Hist.
(1983), vol.8, p p . 37-542.
The Theory of the Firm 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972).
The Growth of British
Industrial Relations (MacMillan, 1965). 
W omen Workers and the Industrial 
Revolution, 1750-1850 (Routledge, 1930).
Internal Labour Markets and Manpower 
Analysis (Lexington, Mass.: Heath 
Lexington Books, 1971).
"Factory Discipline in the Industrial 
Revolution", E c o n .H .R . (1963-4),
2nd s e r . , vol.xvi, pp.254-271.
"The Factory Village in the Industrial 
Revolution", E .H.R., vol.xxix, 
no.cccxii (1964), p p . 513-531.
T he Genesis of Modern Management 
(P e l i c a n , 1965).
Robert Owen, prophet
o f the poor (MacMillan, 1971).
Contains J.F.C.Harrison "A New View of Mr 
Owen", pp.1-12, & A .J .Robertson "Robert 
Owen, Cotton Spinner: New Lanark, 
1800-25", p p . 145-165.
"Wage Bargaining under Conciliation 
Agreements, 1860-1914", Econ.H.R.,
2nd ser., vol.xxiii (1970), p p . 460-75. 
"The Labour Process and Labour History", 
S o c . H i s t . , vol . 8, p p . 57-75.
Masters, Unions, and Men 
(C.U.P., 1980).
Fringe Benefits, Labour 
Costs, and Social Security 
(G.Allen & Unwin, 1965).
"Employers' organisations in 
Great Britain" in F.E.Gannett &
B.F.Catherwood Industrial and Labour 
Relations in Great Britain (New 
York: no publisher stated, 1939). 
Paternalism in Early Victorian 
Britain (Croom Helm, 1979).
Industrial Behaviour: Theoretical 
Development since Taylor (Penguin,
1982 ) .
Industrial Unrest; a way 
out (Longmans, 1922).
"The Large Manufacturing Employers 
of 1907", B u s . H i s t . , vol.xxv, 
no.l (1983), pp . 42-60.
500
0 . Sheldon
J .0.S pringhal1
G.Stedman Jones
F.W.Taylor
E .P.Thompson
S .Toi 1iday 
& J.Zeitlin
J.Turner
L.F .Urwick
L.F.Urwick 
& E.F.L.Brech
M.A.Utton
H.M.Vernon
J.K.Walton
T.Watson 
S.Webb
"The Organisation of Business Control" 
in C.H.Northcott Factory Organisation 
(Pitman, 1928 ) .
The Philosophy of Management 
(Pitman, 1965, 1st edn. 1923).
"The Boy Scouts, Class and Militarism 
in Relation to British Youth Movements, 
1908-1930", I.R.S.H. (1971), vol . 16, 
pp . 125-158.
"England's first proletariat:
'Class struggle and the Industrial
Revolution'", New Left
R e v i e w , n o . 90, (1975), p p . 35-69.
Outcast London (Peregrine, 1984).
The Principles of Scientific 
Management (New York & London: Harper 
B r o s , 1913).
Shop Management (New York &
London: Harper & Bros, 1911).
The Making of the English 
Working Class (Penguin, 1968).
"Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial 
Capitalism", Past & P r e s e n t , 
v ol . 38 (1967), p p . 56-97.
Shop Floor Bargaining and the 
State (C.U.P., 1985 ) .
"Man and Braverman", History ( 19 8 5 ) , 
vol.70, p p . 236-242.
The Life and Work of Elton
Mayo (Orr 
Personnel
& Partners 
Management
n . d . ).
in relation
to Factory Organisation
(Institute of Labour Management, 1943).
The Making of Scientific 
M a n a g e m e n t , Vols.I-III (Management 
Publications Trust, 1949).
"Some Features of the Early Merger 
Movements in British Manufacturing 
Industry", B u s . H i s t . , vol.xiv 
(1972), p p . 51-60.
Fatigue and Efficiency in the 
Iron and Steel Industry (Industrial 
Fatigue Research Board, 1920).
Health and Efficiency of 
Munition Workers (Oxford Medical 
Publications, 1940).
Industrial Fatigue and Efficiency 
(Routledge & Sons, 1921).
"The demand for working-class seaside 
holidays in Victorian England",
E c o n . H . R . , vol.xxxiv (1981), p p . 249-265. 
The Personnel Managers 
(Routledge, Keegan, Paul, 1977).
The Works Manager Today
(1917) in A.D.Chandler Management Thought 
in Britain (MacMillan, 1979).
501
s. & B.Webb
H . J .Welch
N.Whiteside
E .L.Wigham 
J .R .WiIdsmith 
P.L.WilIiams
O.E.Williamson 
S .Wood (e d . )
J ,Woodward 
J.Zeitlin
Industrial Democracy 
(Longmans, Green, 1897).
The History of Trades Unionism 
(Longmans, Green, 1920).
An account of the first 
decade of th e National Institute of 
Industrial Psychology (P i tma n 
& S o n s , 1932).
Industrial Psychology in Practice 
(Pitman & Sons, 1932).
"Industrial Welfare and Labour 
Regulation in Britain at the Time of the 
First World War", I . R . S . H . , 
vol.xxv (1980), p p . 307-331.
The Power to Manage 
(M a c M i l l a n , 1973).
Managerial Theories
o f the firm (Martin Robertson, 1973).
T he Emergence of the Theory
o f the Firm: from Adam Smith to Alfred
Marshall (MacMillam, 1979).
Markets and Hierarchies 
(Collier MacMillan, 1980).
The Degradation of Work:
Skill, Deskilling, and the Labour Process 
(Hutchinson, 1982).
Industrial Organisation: Behaviour 
and Control (O.U.P., 1970).
"The Labour Strategies of 
British Engineering Employers,
1890-1922" in Gospel & Littler (1983)
502
Chapter 2 .
D .H .Aldcrof t
G .Alderman
P.S.Bagwell
M.R.Bonavia
K.J.N.Browne
P .J.Cain
A . D .Chandler
E.J.O'B. Croker
G.W.Crompton
its Organisation 
of T.H. ( 1965 ) ,
"The Efficiency and Enterprise of British 
Railways, 1870-1914", Explorations 
in Entrepreneurial H i s tory ( 196 8a) , 
v o l .5, pp.158-174.
"Railways and Economie Growth: A Review 
Article", J 1 . of T . H . , 2nd ser., vol.l 
( 1972 ) , pp. 238-249 .
"The Decontrol of British Shipping and 
Railways after the First World War",
J 1 . of T.H. (1961), v o l . 5, p p . 117-143. 
Studies in British Transport
H istory, 1870-1970 (Newton Abbot: David &
C h a r l e s , 1974).
The Railway I nterest 
(Leicster U.P., 1979).
"The Railway Companies and the Growth of 
Trades Unionism in the Late Nineteenth 
and Early Twentieth Century", H .J .
(1971), vol.14, p p . 129-152.
The Railwaymen: a history of the N.U.R. 
(Allen & Unwin, 1963).
"The Railway Interest: 
and its Influence", 
no.2, pp.65-86.
The Railway Clearing House in the British 
E conomy, 1842-1922 (Allen & Urwin, 19 68). 
T he Four Great R ailways 
(David & Charles, 1980).
The Organisation of British 
Railways (Shepperton: Allen, 1971).
R ailway Policy between the Wars 
(M.U.P., 1981).
The Browne and other
Systems of Railway Discipline (Railway 
Gazette, 1923).
"The British Railway Rates Problem, 
1894-1913", B u s . H i s t . , vol.xx 
( 1978 ) , pp. 87-99 .
"Railway Combination and Govermment",
E con.H.R., vol.xxv (1972), p p . 623-41. 
"Traders versus Railways: the Genesis of 
the Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 
1894", J 1 . of T . H . , 2nd ser., 
n o . 2 (1973), p p . 65-84.
"The Railroads: Pioneers in
Modern Corporate M a n a g e m e n t " , Bus.H.R.
(1965), vol . 30, p p . 16-40.
Retrospective Lessons on Railway Strikes, 
United Kingdom (Kent: Marshall, Hamilton, 
1898).
"'Efficiency and Economical Working'?
The Performance of the Railway Companies, 
1923-33", B u s . H i s t . , vol.xxvii 
( 1985) , pp. 222-237 .
503
H.Ellis 
G . Findlay
T . R .Gourvish
P.S.Gupta
G . R .Hawke
G.R.Hawke 
& M.C.Reed
R.J . Irving
S.T.James 
P .W.Kingsford
D.R.Lamb 
L , M , S ,
J.L.MacLean
J.Mavor
British Railw ay H i s t o r y , V o l s . I & II 
(Allen & Unwin, 1954 & 1959).
The Working M a n a g e m e n t
of a n English Railway (Whittaker & Co. 
1889 ) .
"Captain Mark Huish: A Pioneer in the 
Development of Railway Management",
Bus . H i s t . , (19 70), vol.12, 
p p . 46-84.
Mark Huish and the
L.N.W.R. a study of management 
U . P . , 1972) .
Business Elite: the Chief 
of the Railway Industry, 
Bus.H.R., vol.lxvi
(Leicster 
"A British 
Executives 
1850-1922"
( 1973 ) , pp. 289-316 .
"The Performance of British Railway 
Management after 1860: the Railways of 
Watkins and Forbes", B u s .H i s t ., vol.xx, 
(1978), p p . 186-200.
Railways and the British Economy, 
1830-1914 (MacMillan, 1980).
"Railway Trades Unionism in Great 
Britain, c . 1880-1900", Econ.H.R.
(1966), 2nd ser., vol.19, p p . 124-153. 
Railways and Economic Growth in
E ngland and Wales, 1840-1870 (Oxford:
C l a r e n d o n , 1970).
"Railway Capital and the United 
Kingdom in the 19th Century", Econ.H.R. 
(1969), v o l . 22, p p . 269-86.
"British Railway Investment and 
Innovation, 1900-1914", B u s . H i s t . , 
vol.xiii (1971), p p . 39-64.
"The Profitability and Performance of 
British Railways, 1870-1914", Econ.H.R. 
(1978), v o l . 31, p p . 46-66.
The Railwayman, his work by day and 
night (Nelson & Sons, 1928).
"Labour Relations on the Railways, 
1835-1875", Jl.of T . H . , vol.l,
(1953-54), p p . 65-81.
Victorian Railwaymen: the Emergence 
and Growth of Railway Labour, 1830-1870 
(Frank Cass, 1970).
Modern Railway Management 
(1941) .
The London, Midland, Scottish Centenary 
(The T i m e s , 19 38).
The British Railway System: 
a Description of the Work Performed in 
the Principal Departments 
(M c C o r q u o d a l e , 1883).
The Scottish Railway Strikes,
1891: a history and criticism (Edinburgh 
W.Brown, 1891 ) .
504
p.O'Brien The New Econom ic History
of the Railways (MacMillan, 1977).
H.Parris G overnment and the Railways
in 19th Century Britain (Routledge, 
Keegan, Paul, 1965).
H.Poll ins Britain's Railways: An
Industrial History (David &
C h a r l e s , 19 71).
E.A.Pratt British Railways and the Great
W a r , V o l s . I & II (Selwyn & Blount,
1921).
M.C.Reed Investment in Railways in
B ritain, 1820-1844: a study in the 
development of the capital market 
(C.U.P., 1975).
Railways in the Victorian Economy: 
studies in finance and economic growth 
(Newton Abbott: David & Charles, 1969) 
Sir J.C. Stamp Industrial and Railway
Amalgamation (London General 
P r e s s , 19 28).
505
Chapter 3 .
C .E .Brackenbury
W.T.K.
Braunholtz
C.Carpenter
D.Chandler
D.Chandler 
& A.Lacey
P.Chantier 
D.A.Chatterton
H.A.Clegg
Croydon Gas 
Company
A.E.P.Duffy
S .Everard 
G.Evetts
M.Falkus
British Progress
in Gas Works ' Plant and Machinery 
(A.Constable & Co., 1905).
Modern Methods of Saving Labour 
in Gasworks (P.S.King & Son, 1901).
The Institution of Gas 
E ngineers: The First Hundred Years, 
1863-1963 (Institution of Gas 
Engineers, 1963).
Industriai Copartnership 
(McCorquodale, 1927).
The Gas Industry: from
light to heat (Leighton Buzzard:
Arrow, 1946 ) .
Outline of the History of Lighting 
b y Gas (Chancery Lane Printing Works, 
1936).
The Rise of the Gas Industry 
in Britain (British Gas Council,
1949).
The British Gas Industry:
An Economic Study (M.U.P., 1949).
"State Control of the Public 
Utilities in the Nineteenth Century: the 
London Gas Industry", B u s . H i s t ., vol.xiv 
( 1972 ) , pp. 166-178 .
General Union: a study
o f the National Union of General and
Municipal Workers 
B l a ckwell, 1954).
(Oxford: Basil
A Hundred Years of Public 
Service, 1847-1947 (private 
publication, 1947).
"New Unionism in Britain, 1889-1890: 
a reappraisal", E c o n . H . R . , 2nd ser., 
xiv (1961-62).
A History of the Gas Light
and Coke Company (Ernest Benn, 19 49).
T he Administration and
Finance of Gas Undertakings (Benn Bros,
1922).
Gas Legislation (Walter King, 1935).
"The British Gas Industry before 1850", 
E con.H.R. (1967), 2nd ser., vol . 20, 
p p . 494-518.
"The Development of Municipal Trading 
in the Nineteenth C e n t u r y " , B u s .H i s t ., 
vol.xix, (1977), p p . 134-161.
"The Early Development of the British Gas 
Industry, 1790-1815", Econ.H.R.
(1982), 2nd ser., vol.35, p p . 217-234.
506
Gas Light and 
Coke Company
G .Gibbon 
& R .W . B e l 1
J .A , Hassan
E .Hobsbawm
C.Hunt
Industrial 
Freedom League
J,Mel ling
The History of the G.L.C.C. JL
F .A.Popplewell
G.Radice & 
L.Radice
J.Reeson
1812-1912 (Waterlow Bros &
L a y t o n , 1912).
History of the London County 
Council, 1889-1939 (MacMillan, 19 39), 
esp. c h . 26.
"The Gas Market and the Coal Industry 
in the Lothians in the 19th Century", 
Industrial A r c h a e l o g y , xii (1977), 
pp.49-73.
"British Gas Workers, 1873-1914" 
in Labouring Men (Weidenfield 
& N i c o l s o n , 1964).
History of the Introduction
o f Gas Lighting (Walter King, 1907).
Report of the Proceedings 
at the Annual Meeting (190 3-7). 
"Industrial Strife and Business 
Welfare Philosophy: the Case of the 
South Metropolitan Gas Company from the 
1880s to the War", B us . H i s t . , 
vol.xxi (1979), p p . 163-179.
"The Gas Industry" in S.Webb 
& A.Freeman Seasonal Trades (L.S.E.: 
Studies in Economics & Political 
Scie n c e , 1912).
Will T h o rne: Constructive Militant 
(Allen & Urwin, 1974).
Acts Relating to the Supply
of Gas and Water by Companies and Local
Authorities (Butterworth & Co.,
1902).
The General Acts relating to the
South Metropolitan 
Gas Company 
R .Roberts
C.Singer e t . a l . 
W.Thorne 
T . I .Williams 
T.Williamson
supply of gas and w a t e r .... 
(Westminister: Butt & Co., 1874).
S.M.G.C. Almanack ( 190 9 ) .
"Businessmen, Politics, and Municipal 
Socialism" in J.Turner (ed.) Businessmen 
and Politics (Heinemann, 1984).
A History of T e c h n o l o g y ,
Vol.IV (Oxford: Clarendon, 1954-1978).
My Life's Battles 
(George Neunes, 1925).
A History of the British 
Gas Industry (C.U.P., 1981).
"Trades Unionism and Negotiating 
Machinery in the Gas Industry" in
F.E.Gannet & B.F.Catherwood Industrial 
Labour Relations in Great Britain 
(New York: no publisher stated, 1939).
507
Chapter 4 . 
D.Aldcrof t
D.A l d c r o f t &
N. Buxton (eds)
D.H.Aldcroft & 
H.W.Richardson
K . J .W.Alexander 
& C.L.Jenkins
C . R .Andrews
P .W .S .Andrews 
& E . Brunner
T.S.Ashton 
W.Bain & Co. Ltd
A.W . Baldwin 
J . S .Boswell
H.Brearley 
British Iron & 
Steel Federation 
T .H.Burnham 
& G.O . Hoskins
D.Burns
N.K.Buxton
R .H.C a m p b e l 1
The Development of British Indus try 
and Foreign Competition, 1875-1914 
(Allen & Unwin, 1968).
B ritish Industry Between the 
Wars (Scholar Press, 1979).
1870-1914The British Economy, 
(MacMillan, 1981).
Fairfieldst a study of industrial change
(Allen Lane, 
The Story of
1970). 
the Wortl' ;y Ironworks
(L e n t o n : R.Milward & Sons, 1952)
The Eagle Ironworks (Mills &
B o o n , 1965).
Capital Development in Steel: A Study 
of United Steels Companies (Oxford:
B.Blackwell, 1951).
Iron and Steel in the Industrial 
Revolution (M.U.P.: Longmans &
Co., 1924).
Lochrin's One Hundred
Years: the Story of William Bain and Co. 
Ltd of Coatbridge (Edinburgh:
McFarlane & Erskine, 1959).
My Father: the True Story 
(G.Allen & Unwin, 1956).
Business Policies in
the Making: Three Steel Companies
Compared (G.Allen & Unwin, 1983).
"Hope, Inefficiency or Public Duty? The 
United Steel Companies and West 
Cumberland, 1918-39", B u s . H i s t . , vol.22 
(1980), p p . 35-50.
Steel-Makers (Longmans, 19 33).
The B.I.S.F. (private publication, 1963).
Iron and Steel in Britain,
1870-1930 (Allen & Unwin, 1943).
lel
1940 ) .
"Efficiency and Organisation in 
Scotland's Iron and Steel Industry during 
the Interwar Period", Econ.H.R.
(1976), v o l . 29, p p . 107-124.
Carron Company (Edinburgh:
Oliver & Boyd, 1961).
T he Economic History of St< 
Making, 1867-1939 (C.U.P.,
508
Carlton Greig 
& Co. Ltd.
J.C.Carr & 
W.Tapi in
J.L.Carvel
D.Charman
R.A.Church
Consett Iron 
Company
M .J .Daunton
E .J.Davies
Dowlais Iron 
Company
G.D.Elliot
C.Erickson
K.Feiling
Firth & Brown 
Tools Ltd
H.J.Fyrth & 
H.J.Collins
J .L.Garvin
Carlton and Greig and Co. Ltd. 
and the Wolverhampton Group of companies 
a study in the abuse of privilege 
(private publication: 1955).
History of the British Steel 
Industry (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962).
T he Coltness Iron Company 
(Coltness Iron Company, 1948). 
Glengarnock: a Scottish Open
Hearth Steelworks: the Works, the People
(Aalst-Waalre: De Archaeologische Per 
N e d e r l a n d , 1981).
"Family and Failure: Archibald Kenrick & 
Sons Ltd, 1900-1950 in B.Supple (ed.) 
E ssays in Business History (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1977 ) .
Kenricks in Hardware, A
Family Business, 1791-1966 (Newton
Abbott: David & Charles, 1969).
Leaves from Consett Iron 
Company Letter Books, 1887-1893 
(Newcastle: Doig Bros., 1962).
"The Dowlais Iron Company in
the Iron Industry, 1800-1850", Welsh
H . R . , vol.vi (1972), pp.16-48.
T he Blaenavon Story
(Newport: Torfaen Borough Council, 1975)
Iron in the Making 
(Glamorgan Co. Council, 1960).
Leaves from Consett Iron Company 
Letter Books, 1887-1893 (Newcastle:
Doig B r o s ., 1962).
Ironmaking at Appleby-Frodingham 
Works of the United Steel Companies Ltd 
(Iron & Steel Institute, 1944).
Steel and Hosiery, 1850-1950 
(C.U.P., 1959).
The Life of Neville Chamberlain 
(London: MacMillan, 1947).
100 Years of Steel
(Sheffield: T.Firth & J.Brown, 1937).
The Foundry Workers: a trade
union history (Manchester: Amalgamated
History of Foundry Workers, 1959).
The Life of Joseph Chambe r l a i n ,
Vol.l (MacMillan, 1932).
509
H .Gintz
G.K.N. Ltd
C.A.Hamps tead
F .H .Hatch
Iron and Steel 
Employers Trades 
Association
J .S.Jeans
W.Jenkins
D.Judd
B.S.Keeling &
A.E.G.Wright
R.Lloyd-Jones 
& M.J.Lewis
H.Lumsden
Marshall, Sons 
& Co.
D.M.McCloskey
J.D.McKechnie
W.E.Minchinton
Ministry of 
Munitions
R.H.Mottram 
& C.Coote
"Effects of Technological Change on 
Labour in Sections of the Iron and Steel 
Industries of Great Britain, the United 
States, and Germany, 1900-1939"
(London Ph.D. 1954).
An Outline History of this
Group of C o m p a n i e s   (private
pubication, 1925).
Cleveland Iron and
Steel I background and 19th Century 
history (Redcar: B.S.C., 1979).
The Iron and Steel Industry 
o f the U.K. under War Conditions 
(private publication, 1919).
Agreement with regard
to holidays (private publication, 1938) 
C onciliation and Arbitration in 
Labour Disputes (Crosby Lockwood 
& Son, 1894?) .
The Iron Trade of Great Britain 
(Methuen & Co., 1906).
Consett Iron Company (Newcastle- 
upon-Tyne: Mawson, 1893).
Radical Joe: A Life of Joseph 
Chamberlain (Hamish Hamilton, 1977).
The Development of the Modern 
British Steel Industry (Longmans, 196 4)
"Industrial Structure and Firm Growth: 
the Sheffield Iron and Steel Industry, 
1880-1901", Bus.Hist. (1983), 
vol.25, pp.260-263.
History of the Hammermen 
of Glasgow (Paisley, 1912).
Britannia Iron Works
(Bedford 
Economic
Press, 1886) 
Maturity and
(Camb. MassEntrepreneurial Decline 
Harvard U.P., 1973).
The McKechnie Story 
(Newman Neame, 1965).
The British Tinplate Industry 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1957).
History of the Ministry 
of M u n itions, Vol.V (H.M.S.O., 1919).
Through Five Generations: the History 
of the Butterly Company (Faber 
& Faber, 1950 ) .
510
A.Muir
J.M.Norris 
J .A .Owen
P .L.Payne 
R .Peddie
S .Pol lard
J .Por ter
A.Pugh 
A.Raistrick
H.W.Richardson
H.W.Richardson 
& J.M.Bass
L.T.C.Rolt
R . S .Sayers 
F .Scopes
M.Seth-Smith
B.S.Skinner
Stanton Iron 
Works Company
75 Years: A Record of Progress:
Smith's Stamping Works (Coventry) Ltd; 
Smith-Clayton Forge Ltd (Lincoln) 
(Tonbridge Printers Ltd., 1958).
"The Struggle for Carron", S c o t t .H . R . , 
vol.xxxvii (1958), pp.l37ff.
The History of the Durham Iron 
Works, 1759-1970 (Newport:
Starling Press, 1977).
The McKechnie Story 
(private publication, 1966).
C olvilles and the Scottish
S teel Industry (Oxford: Clarendon).
T he United Steels Companies,
1918-1968 (Manchester: C.Nicholls 
& C o . , 1969 ) .
Three Centuries of Sheffield 
Steel : the Story of a Family Business 
(a history of Marsh Brothers) (Sheffield 
J.W.Northend Ltd, 1954).
"The Iron Trade" in C.Wrigley 
The Growth of Industrial Relations 
(Sussex: Harvester, 1982).
Men of S t e e l 
(I.S.T.C., 1951).
The Coalbrookdale Ironwork: a
short history (Telford: Ironbridge Gorge
Trust Museum, 1975).
Dynasty of Iron Founders: the 
Darbys of CoaIbrookdale 
(Longmans Green, 1953).
E conomic Recovery in
B ritain, 1932-39 (Weidenfield &
Nicolson, 1967).
"The Profitability of the Consett 
Iron Company before 1914", B u s . H i s t . , 
vol.vii, (1965), p p . 71-96.
Waterloo Ironworks: A History 
o f Taskers of Andover, 1809-1968 
(Newton Abbott: David & Charles, 1969). 
The Bank of England, 1871-1944 
(C.U.P., 1976).
The Development of Crosby 
Works (Portsmouth: Eyre &
Spottiswood, 1968).
Two Hundred Years of
Richard Johnson & Nephew (Manchester, 
private publication, 1973).
The Iron Mills of Cramond 
(Univ. of Edinburgh, 1965).
The Iron Dale (Nottingham:
private publication, 1959), by V.Lewis.
511
T.Alec Steel
E .Taylor 
J.G.Timmins
S.Toi1iday
B.H.Tripp
United Steel 
Companies
G.R.Walshaw & 
C.A.J.Behrendt
K.Warren 
W.G.Willis
G.M.Young
Pioneers for a Century, 1852-1952: 
a history of the growth and achievement 
of S.Osborn & Co. Ltd, Clyde St Works, 
Sheffield (Sheffield: private 
publication, 1952).
The better temper: a commemorative 
history of the Midland Iron and Steel 
Board (I. S . T . C . , 1976 ) .
"Concentration and Integration 
in the Sheffield Crucible Steel 
Industry", B u s .H i s t ., v o l . 24 
( 1982 ) , p p . 61-78.
"Industry, Finance, and the State: 
an analysis of the British steel industry 
in the Inter-War years" (Camb.
Ph.D., 1979).
The Joint Iron Industrial
Council, 1945-1966 (G.Allen & Unwin,
1966) .
Wokington Iron and Steel 
Company (Wokington, private 
publication, 1956).
The History of Appleby- 
Frodingham: An Outline (Scunthorpe, 
private publication, 1950).
The British Sheet Steel Industry
since 1840 ( Bell, 
South Durham Iron
1970) 
and Steel
Company Ltd (Portsmouth: Eyre & 
Spottiswood, 1969).
Stanley Baldwin (Hart-Davis, 1952)
512
Chapter 5
H .Bolitho
J .M.Cohen 
R.Cohen
J. & J.Colman
B .Didsbury
J . Goodman
Imperial Chemicals 
Industries
W.P.Jolly 
S .Koss 
Sir W.Lever
P .Mathias
A.Mond 
A . E .Musson
Alfred Mond, First Lord 
Melchett (London: Martin Seeker, 1933). 
T he Life of Ludwig Mond (Methuen, 19 55). 
"The Soap Industry" in P.L.Cook Effects 
o f Mergers: Six Studies (Allen &
U n w i n , 19 58).
The First Fifty Years of the
Carrow Works Councils, 1918-68 (Norwich:
Colmans & Co., 1968).
"Cheshire Saltworkers" in R.Samuel 
(ed.) Miners, Quarrymen, and Saltworkers 
(Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977).
The Mond Legacy (Weidenfield 
& Nicolson, 1982).
I.e.I. Ltd and its Founding 
Companies: the History of Nobe 1 's
Explosives Co. Ltd. and Nobel Industries 
L td, 1871-1926 (I.C.I., 1938).
I.C.I.: A Short Account of the 
Activities of the Company (I.C.I., 1929). 
Lord Leverhulme 
(Constable, 1976).
Sir John Brunner: Radical 
Plutocrat, 1842-1919 (C.U.P., 1970).
C opartnership and Efficiency 
(Port Sunlight: Lever Bros, 19 
Copartnership in the Chemical
1 2).
Industries
(Port Sunlight, Lever Bros, 19 
Copartnership: Laying the Thre 
Ghosts: Unemployment, Sickness
15).
e
, and Death
(Port Sunlight, Lever Bros, 19 
The Six-Hour Day and other 
Industrial Questions 
(Allen & Unwin, 1918). 
"Manufacturers and Retailing i 
the Food Trades: the Struggle 
Margerine" in B.Supple Essays
2 2 ) .
n
over
in British
Business History (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1977 ) .
Industry and Politics 
(MacMillan, 1927).
Enterprise in Soap and
Chemicals: Joseph Crosfields and Sons
Ltd, 1815-1965 (M.U.P., 1965).
513
Prices of 
Bromborough
W .J .Reader
B.N.Reckitt 
E.Walls
A .Watson
A.Waugh
C.Wilson
A Branch History of Prices 
C andle Company, Battersea, & Brom Pool 
Works, nr. Birkenhead (Waterlow 
& Sons, 1891) .
The History of Prices
o f Bromborough, 1854-1954 (Bromborough: 
private publication, 1954).
B irds Eye : the Early Years 
(Birds Eye Foods Ltd, 1953).
I .C .I .: A H i s t o r y ,
Vols.I & II ( O.U.P., 1970).
Fifty Years of U n i l e v e r , 1930-1980 
(Heinemann, 1980).
S.P.P.: a story of distribution 
(B.T.Batsford, 1969).
The History of Reckitt
and Sons Ltd (A.Brown & Sons, 19 51).
Progressive Copartnership
(Nisbet & Sons, 1921).
Price's Village: a study of a 
V ictorian industry and social experiment 
(Brom Pool : private publication, 1966 ). 
The Lipton Story 
(C a s s e l , 19 51).
The History of U n i l e v e r ,
Vols.I & II (Cassell, 1954).
514
Chapter 6 .
A.Barnard
J .Baxter 
J .B .Brown
J.Courage & Co
I .Donachie
D .Fahey
T .R .Gourvish 
& R.G.Wilson
D.A.Hamer
B.Harrison
K.H.Hawkins 
& C.L.Pass
D.Knox
P.Lynch &
J.E.Vaizey
Mann, Crossman, 
& Paul in Ltd
P.Mathias
Truman, Hanbury, 
Buxton & Co.
J.Turner
The Noted Breweries of
Great Britain and Ireland, V o 1s .I- IV
(Sir J.Causton & Sons, 1889-91).
"The Organisation of the Brewing 
Industry" (London Ph.D., 1945).
"The Pig or the Stye: Drink and 
Poverty in Late Victorian England",
I . R.S.H., vol.xviii (1973), p p . 380-395. 
The Development and Growth 
of the Company's Brewery 
(private publication, 1933).
"Sources of Capital and Capitalisation 
in the Scottish Brewing Industry about 
1750-1830", E con.H.R. (1977), 
v o l . 30, p p . 269-383.
"The Politics of Drink: Pressure Groups 
and the British Liberal Party, 
1883-1908", S o c .S c i e n c e , vol . 54
(1979), p p . 76-85.
"Temperance and the Liberal Party,- Lord 
Peel's Report 1899", Journal of Brit. 
Studies v o l . 10 (1971), p p . 134-148.
"Profitability in the Brewing Industry, 
1885-1914", B u s . H i s t . (1985), v o l . 27, 
p p . 146-165.
The Politics of Electoral 
P ressure (Harvester Press, 1977).
Drink and the Victorians 
(Faber & Faber, 1971).
The Brewing Industry 
(Heinneman, 1979).
"The Development of the London Brewing 
Industry" (Oxford B.Litt., 1956).
Guinesses ' Brewery in the
Irish Economy, 1759-1876 ( C.U.P., 1960).
Albion Brewery, 1808-1958: the 
story of Mann, Crossman, & Paul in Ltd 
(Harley Publishing Co., 1959), by 
H .J o n e s .
The Brewing Industry in England, 
1700-1830 (M.U.P., 1958).
Trumans: the Brewers 
(Newman Neame, 1966).
"State Purchase of the Liquor Trade 
in the First World War", H.J. (1980), 
v o l . 23, p p . 589-615.
515
J.Vaizey "The Brewing Industry" in P.L.Cook
The E f f e cts of Mergers: Six Case Studies 
(Allen & Unwin, 1958).
The Brewing Industry, 1886-1952 
(Pitman, 19 60 ) .
Whitbread & Co. W hitbread's Brewery
(private publication, 1947), by B.Hill.
516
Chapter 7.
Alexandra
Docks
B .W . E .A1ford
A.G.AlI en
P ,W . S .Andrews 
& E.Brunner
M .Bache
P .S .BagwelI
R.Balgarnie
P .Banbury
L .H.Barber 
T.C.Barker
The Alexandra (Newport and 
S .Wales) Docks and Railway Company 
(Newport: A.W.Dawson, 1903).
"Penny Cigarettes, Oligopoly, 
Entrepreneurship in the U.K. Tobacco 
Industry in the Late 19th Century" in
B.Supple (ed.) Essays in Business 
History (Oxford : Clarendon, 1977 ).
W .D. & H.O.Wills and the Development
of the U.K. Tobacco Industry, 1786-1965
(Methuen, 1973 ) .
"Strategy and Structure in the U.K. 
Tobacco Industry" in L.Hannah Management 
Strategy and Busi n e s s Development 
(MacMillan, 1976 ) .
John Heathcot and his 
Heritage (C.Johnson, 1958).
The Life of Lord Nuffield:
A Study in Enterprise and Benevolence 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1955).
Salter: the History of a
Family Firm, 1760-1960
(West.Brom.: private publication, 1960) 
"Transport" in C.Wrigley The 
Growth of Industrial Relations (Sussex: 
Harvester, 1982).
Sir Titus Salt, Baronet:
H is Life and Lessons (Settle: Brenton 
Publishing, 1970, 1st edn. 1877). 
Shipbuilders of the Thames 
and Medway (Newton Abbott: David 
& C h a r l e s , 1971).
Clarks of Street, 1825-1950 
(Street, private publication, 1950). 
"Business Implications of Technical 
Developments in the Glass Industry, 
1945-65: a Case Study" in B.Supple (ed.) 
Essays in British Business History 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1977).
"A Family Firm becomes a Public 
Company: Changes at Pilkingtons Brothers 
Ltd in the Inter-War Years" in L.Hannah 
Management Strategy and Business 
Development: An Historical and 
Comparative Study (MacMillan, 1976).
T he Glassmakers: the rise of an 
international company, 1826-1976 
(Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1977). 
Pilkington Brothers and the Glass 
Industry (G.Allen & Unwin, 1960).
517
T.C.Barker & 
R .M .Robbins
H .Barty-King
J .Benson
J.Benson & 
R.G.Neville
E .L.Best
Bleachers
Association
A.Booth & Co.
R.N.Boyd 
R.Boyson
A.Briggs
J .G .Broodbank 
W .A.Brown
B r y a n ,
Donkin & Co. 
A.L.C.Bullock
H.F.Bulman
R.G.Burnett
A History of L o n d on Transport:
P a s senger travel and the d e v e lopment of 
the m e t r o p o l is, Vols.I & II (G.Allen 
& Unwin, 1963 & 1974).
Girdle Round the Earth :
the study of Cable and Wireless..
1929-1979 (Heinemann, 1979).
B r i t i sh Coalminers in the
19th Century : A Social History
(Dublin: Gill & MacMillan, 1980).
Studies in the Yorkshire Coal 
Industry (M.U.P. 1976).
C auses of Absence for Men 
and Women in four Cotton Mills 
(Washington: U.S. Women's Bureau, 1929). 
Lost Time and Labour Turnover in 
Cotton Mills (Washington, U.S.Women's 
B u r e a u , 19 26).
Concerning the Bleaching Industry 
(Manchester: private publication, 1926), 
by Sir A.J.Sykes.
A Kindred Spirit : a history 
o f gin and the house of Booth 
(Newman Neame, 19 59).
Coal Pits and Pitmen 
(Whittaker, 1892).
The Ashworth Cotton Enterprise: 
the Rise and Fall of a Family Firm, 
1818-80 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1970 ) .
Social Thought and Social 
Action: a study of the work of Seebohm 
Rowntree, 1871-1954 (Longmans,
1961) .
History of the Port 
of L o n d o n , V o l s . I & II (Daniel 
O'Connor Press, 1921).
The Silken Glow of Macclesfield: 
the jubilee history of the Macclesfield 
Silk Manufacturing Society Ltd 
(Macclesfield, private 
publication, 1938).
Some notes on the history
of a firm (private publication, 1912).
T he Life and Times of
E rnest B e v i n , V o ls.I & II
(Heinemann, 1960 & 1967).
Coal Mining and the Coal 
M iner (Methuen & Co., 1920).
Colliery Working and Management 
(1896 ) .
Through the Mill: Life of 
Joseph Rank (Epworth Press, 1945).
518
J .Butt (e d . )
N .K.Buxton
T.J.Byres
E.Cadbury
P .S.Cadbury
Cadbury
Brothers
R . H .Campbel1
J.L.Carvel
A.D.Chandler 
S .D .Chapman
R.Church
Robert Owen : Prince of 
C otton Spinners (Newton Abbott:
David Charles, 1971).
The Economic Development of
the British Coal Industry (Newton
Abbott : Batsford, 1979 ).
"The Scottish Shipbuilding Industry 
between the Wars: a Comparative Study", 
B u s .H is t . (1968), v o l . 10,
p p . 101-120.
"Entrepreunership in the Scottish 
History Industries, 1870-1900" in 
P.L.Payne Essays in Scottish Business 
History (Frank Cass & Co., 1967).
E xperiences in Industrial Organisation 
(L o n g m a n s , 1912).
B irmingham - 5 0 Years On
(Bournville Village Trust, 1952).
A Century of Progress 
(Bournville: Cadbury Bros, 1933). 
Industrial Record, 1919-39 
(Bournville: Cadbury Brothers, 1945). 
"Costs and Contracts: Lessons 
from Clyde Shipbuilding between the Wars" 
in A.Slaven & D.H.Aldercroft (eds.) 
Business, Banking, and Urban History 
(Edinburgh: John Donald, 1982).
O ne Hundred Years in Timber :
the History of the City Saw Mills,
1849-1949 (Glasgow: Brownlee & Co.,
1951) .
Management Thought in 
B ritain (MacMillan, 1976).
The Cotton Industry
in the Industrial Revolution
(MacMillan, 1971).
The Early Factory Masters (Oxford: 
C l a r e n d o n , 19 84).
"Financial Restraints on the Growth of 
Firms in the Cotton Industry", Econ.H.R.
(1979), vol.32, p p . 50-69.
100 Years in Coal : the history of 
the Alloa Coal Company 
(private publication, 1944).
Herbert Austin; the British 
Motor Car Industry (Europa, 1979). 
"Innovation, Monopoly and the Supply of 
Vehicle Components in Britain,
1880-1930"; the Growth of Joseph Lucas 
Ltd", B u s . H i s t . , vol.20 (1978), 
p p . 2 46-4 9.
"Labour Supply and Innovation, 1800-1860 : 
the Boot and Shoe Industry",
B u s .H i s t ., vol.xii (1970), 
p p . 25-45.
519
R.A.Church 
& M.Miller
H .A.Clegg 
R. Coad
Coates Bros & Co
D .C .Coleman
T.A.B.Corley
M.J.Daunton
Sir M.E.Denny
W.Denny & Bros
H.W.Dickinson
J.Dickenson 
& Co. Ltd.
M.Dillon
D.Dougan
J.Dummelow
R.W.Dunn
"Messrs Gotch & Sons and the Rise of the 
Kettering Footwear Industry", B u s . Hist., 
vol.viii (1966), p p . 140-9.
"The Big Three: Competition, Management, 
and Marketing in the British Motor 
Industry, 1922-1939" in B.Supple (ed.) 
E ssays in B ritish Business History 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1977).
Labour Relations in London 
Transport (Oxford : B.Blackwell 
Ltd, 1950).
Lainq: the Biography of Sir 
John W.Laing, 1878-1978 (Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1979).
75 Years
(Coates Bros, 1952).
"Courtaulds and the Beginning of 
Rayon" in B.Supple (ed.) Essays in 
British B u s ine s s History (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1977).
A History of C o u r t a u l d s ,
Vols.I & II (Oxford : Clarendon Press,
1969).
Quaker Enterprise in
Biscuits: Huntley and Palmers of Reading, 
1822-1972 (Cape, 1966).
"Miners' Houses: South Wales and 
the Great Northern Coalfield, 1880-1914",
I.R.S.H., vol.xxv (1980), 
pp.143-175.
"Down the Pit: Work in the Great Northern 
and South Wales Coalfields, 1870-1914", 
Econ.H.R. (1981), 2nd ser, vol.35, 
pp.578-597.
The Shipbuilding Industry:
Rapid and Substantial Improvement : the 
Shipyard Labour Situation (Lloyds List 
and Shipping Gazette 1937).
Denny, Dumbarton, 1844-1950 
(Edinburgh : McLagan & Gumming, 1950 ). 
Matthew Boulton 
(C.U.P., 1937).
The Firm of Dickenson
and Company Ltd (Chiswick Press, 1896).
Some Account of the Works 
of the Palmers Shipbuilding Shipbuilding 
and Iron Company Ltd (Newcastle-upon- 
Tyne : W.E.Frankin, 1900).
The History of North Eastern 
Shipbuilding (G.Allen & Unwin, 1968).
1899-1949: Metropolitan- 
Vickers Electrical Company Limited 
(Manchester: private publication, 1949). 
Labor and Automobiles 
(Modern Books, 1929).
520
K .D u r 1 and
H . I.Dutton 
& J .E .King
English Calico 
Ltd
D.Eyles
R.S.Fitton &
A.P.Wadsworth
S .J.Fitzgerald 
R.Floud
J .Foreman-Peck
A.G.Gardiner 
V.A.C.Gattrel1
R .S .Geddes
C.Gill 
F .J.Glover
H .A.Goddard
W.Gore Allen 
Sir A.Grant
L.H.Green
Among the Fife Miners 
(Swan Sonneschein, 1904).
"The limits of paternalism: the 
cotton tyrants of North Lancashire, 
1836-54", S o c .H is t ., vol.7, 
no.l ( 1982 ) , pp. 59-74 .
"Ten P e r Cent and No Surrender":
The P r e s t o n St r ike, 1853-54 
(C.U.P. , 1981 ) .
E nglish Sewing Cotton Company 
Ltd (National Trade Press, 1958). 
Royal D o u l t o n , 1815-1965 
(Hutchinson & Co., 1965).
The S t r u t ts and the
Arkwrights, 1759-1830: A Study of the
Early Factory System 
Coals and Colliers
(M.U.P., 1958)
(T.W o o l m e r , 
The British
1881). 
Machine Tool
Indus try (C.U.P., 1976).
"Diversification and the Growth 
of the Firm: the Rover Company to 1914", 
B u s . H i s t . , vol.xxv, no.2 
( 1983 ) , pp. 179-192 .
L ife of Georoe Cadbury (Cassell, 1923). 
"Labour, Power, and the Size of Firms in 
the Lancashire Cotton Industry in the
Second Quarter 
E c o n . H . R . , vol
of
30,
the 19th Century", 
pp . 9 5-139.
Burlington Blue-Grey: A History 
of the Slate Quarries (Kirkly-in-Furness
1975 ) .
Linen
1925).
private publication. 
The Rise of the Irish
Industry (Oxford: Clarendon,
"Government Contracting, Competition 
and Growth in the Heavy Woollen 
Industry", E c o n . H . R . , 2nd ser., 
vol.xvi, (1963-4), p p . 478-498.
"Profitsharing and the Amenities
of the Nuffield Factories" in F.E.Gannet
& B.F.Catherwood Industrial and
Labour Relations in Great Britain
(New York: publisher not stated, 1939).
John Heathcot and his Heritage
(C.Johnson, 1958).
Steel and Ships : the
History of John Browns (Michael
J o s e p h , 1950).
"Labour Problems in the British 
Flour Milling Industry: An Experiment in 
the Ordering of Industrial Relations" in
F.E.Gannet & B.F.Catherwood Industrial 
and Labour Relations in Great Britain 
(New York: publisher not stated, 1939).
521
E.O.Greening
G.A.Greenwood
L.F .Haber
L.Hannah
N.G.Harte &
K .G .Ponting
A.B.Hill
G.C.Hirst 
E .Hobsbawm 
E.Hodder 
A .Holroyd
A .Howe
J.R.Hume & 
M.S.Moss
J.B.Jef frys
A.John
G .Jones
R.Jones & 
0 . Marriot
P.Joyce
A Pioneer Copar t n e r s h i p , being
the History of the Leicster Cooperative 
Boot and Shoe Manufacturing Society Ltd 
(Leicster; private publication, 1923). 
Taylor of B a t l e y : A Story 
o f 102 Years (Max Parish, 1957).
The C h e m ical Industry (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1971).
Electricity before Nationalisation 
(MacMillan, 1979).
Textile History and Economic 
History (M.U.P., 1973).
A n Investigation into the 
Sicknes s Experience of London Transport 
Workers (Industrial Health Research 
Board, no . 79, 1937).
Sickness amongst Operatives 
in the Lancashire Cotton Mills 
(Industrial Health Research Board, 
n o . 59, 1930).
History of C. & J.Hirst 
& Sons Ltd (Huddersfield: private 
publication, 1942).
"New Unions on the Waterside" 
in Labouring Men (Weidenfield & 
Nicolson, 1976).
The Life of Samuel Morley 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1958; 1st edn., 
Haber, 1887 ) .
Saltaire and its Founder 
(Saltaire; private publication, 1871). 
The Lay of Saltaire (Bradford: 
private publication, 1871).
The Cotton Masters, 1830-1860 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), 
esp. p p . 178-192,273-309.
Beardmore: the History of
the Scottish Giant (Heinemann, 1979).
T he Story of the Engineers 
(Lawrence & Wishart, 1946).
By the Sweat of their Brow: women 
w orkers at Victorian coalmines (Croom 
H e l m , 1980).
"Multinational Chocolate: Cadbury 
Overseas, 1918-39", B u s . H i s t . , 
vol . 26, (1984), p p . 59-99.
Anatomy of a Merger: A
History of G.E.C., A.E.I., and English 
Electric (Jon Cape, 1970).
"The Factory Politics of Lancashire in 
the late 19th Century", H . J . , vol.xviii
(1975) , pp. 525-53 .
Work, S o c i e t y , and Politics 
(Arrowsmith, 1980).
522
c .D .M .Ketelbey
M.W.Kirby
B.C.P.Lascelles 
& S .S .B u l lock
C .H .Lee
W .Lewchuck
Linen Thread 
Company
I .Lloyd
R.LIoyd-Jones 
& A.A.Le Roux
D.G.Lockhart
Sir C.Macara
J .W.McConnel 
N.McKendr ick 
J ,Melling
Tullis Ru s s e l l: The History 
of R .Tullis & Co. and T . R u s sell & Co. 
L td., 1809-1959 (Fife: MacKinch, 1967). 
The British Coal Industry,
1870-1946: a p o l i t ical and economic 
history (MacMillan, 1977).
"The Control of Competition in the 
British Coalmining Industry in the 
Thirties", E c o n . H .R., 2nd ser., 
xxvi, ( 1973 ) , pp. 273-284 .
"Government Intervention in Industrial 
Organisation: Coal Mining in the 1930s", 
B u s .H i s t ., v o l . 15 (1973), p p . 160-173.
"The Lancashire Cotton Industry in 
the Inter-War Years: a study in 
Organisational Change", B u s . H i s t . , vol.16
(1974), p p . 145-159.
Dock Labour and D e c a s u a l isation 
(P.S.King & Sons, 1924).
A Cotton E nterprise, 1795-1840: 
a history of McConnel and Kennedy, fine 
cotton spinners ( M.U.P., 1972).
"Fordism and British Motor Car 
Employers, 1896-1932" in H.F.Gospel &
C.R.Littler Managerial 
Strategies and
Industrial Relations (Heinemann, 1983).
The Faithful Fibre (Glasgow: 
private publication, 1956).
Rolls R o y c e : the Years of 
Endeavour (MacMillan, 1978).
"Marshall and the Birth and 
Death of Firms: the Growth and Size 
Distribution of Firms in the Early 19th 
Century Cotton I n d u s t r y " , B u s . H i s t . , 
vol. 24 ( 1982 ) , pp. 140-156 .
"The Linen Industry and the 
Advancing of Towns and Villages in 
Ireland, 1700-1750", Textile History
(1977), p p . 183-5.
R e c o llections(Cassell & Co., 1922)
Social and Industrial Reform: Some 
International Aspects (Manchester:
Sherrat & Hughes, 1919).
A Century of Fine Cotton 
Spinning (Manchester:
G.Faulkner & Sons, 1913).
"Joseph Wedgwood and Factory 
Discipline", H . J . , vol.iv (1961), 
p p . 30-45.
"Employers, Industrial Housing,
and the Evolution of Company Welfare
Policies in Britain's Heavy Industry:
West Scotland, 1870-1920", I.R.S.H., 
vol.xxvi (1981), p p . 255-301.
523
S.Miall
Ministry of 
Munitions
C.More
Morgan Crucible 
Company Ltd
R. H.Mottram 
& C.R.Coote
A.Muir
H.Nockolds
E.R.Pafford & 
J.H.P.Pafford
R.B.Perks
J . R .Parkinson 
E.L.Pearson
D.E.Pitfield
A. Plummer & 
R.E.Early
S .Pollard
"Non-Commissioned Officers: British 
employers and their supervisory workers, 
1880-1920", S o c . H i s t . , vol.v, n o . 2
(1980), p p . 183-221.
A History of the British
Chemical Industry (Ernest Benn, 1931).
History of the Ministry 
o f M u n i t i o n s , Vol.V (H.M.S.O., 1919). 
"Armaments and Profits: the Case of 
Fairfield", B u s .H i s t ., 
vol.xxiv (1982), p p . 175-186.
B a ttersea Works, 1856-1956 
(R . B e n n e t , 1956).
History of th-c 
Company through Five 
(Faber & Faber, 1950
mVio Pi f ct
Butterley
Generations
The __
(Fife:
I L a j. V D U / »
Fife Coal Company Ltd 
: L e v e n , 1953?).
Lucas: the First One Hundred Y e a r s , 
V o l s . I & II (Newton Abbot: David & 
C h a r l e s , 1976).
S.Pollard &
J.Salt (e d s .)
Ford, Ayrton & Company
Ltd, S i 1k-Spinners (Wilts.: Pasold
Research Fund Ltd, 1974).
"Real P r o f i t s h a r i n g : William Thomson 
& Sons of Huddersfield, 1886-1925",
Bu s .H i s t ., vol.xxiv (1982), pp . 156-174. 
The Econom ics of Shipbuilding 
in the United Kingdom (C.U.P., 19 60). 
O rganisation and Management 
in the Flour Milling Industry 
(Pitman & Son, 1925).
"Regional Economic Policy in 
the Long-Run: Innovation and Location in 
the Iron and Steel Industry", B u s .H i s t ., 
vol.16 (1974), p p . 160-174.
The Blanket Makers, 1669-1969:
A History of Charles Early and Marriot 
(Witney) Ltd (Routledge, Keegan,
Paul, 1969).
"The Decline of Shipbuilding on the 
Thames", E c o n . H . R . , 2nd ser., vol.iii, 
(1950-51), p p . 72-89.
"The Economic History of British 
Shipbuilding, 1870-1914" (London 
P h . D . , 1951) .
"The Factory Village in the Industrial 
Revolution", E . H . R . , vol.79,
(1964 ) , p p . 513-531.
Robert Owen, prophet of the 
poor (MacMillan: 1971).
524
s . Pollard & 
R .Turner
Powell Duffryn 
Steam Coal Co.
C.Pratt & 
C.Turner
J.M.Price
A.W.Purdue
F.C.Pyman
G.F.Rainnie
W .J .Reader 
J.G.Reynold
J . J .Rhyme
E .R.Richards 
W.G.Rimmer 
A . J .Robertson
J.Robertson
P.L.Robertson
E , S . & A . 
Robinson & Co
E.Roll
"Profitsharing and Autocracy: the 
Case of J. T. & J.Taylor of Batley, 
Woollen Manufacturers, 1892-1956",
Bus.Hist. (1976), vol.18, p p . 4-34.
The Powell Duf fryn Steam Coal 
C o m p a ny Limited, 1864-1914 
(Cardiff: private publication, 1914).
Reduction in Costs...in S h i p b u ilding 
(Sunderland: T.Reed & Co., 1926).
"The Rise of Glasgow in the Tobacco 
Trade, 1707-1775" in P.L.Payne Studies 
in Scottish Business History 
(Frank C a s s , 1967).
"The Liberal and Labour Parties in 
North-Eastern Politics, 1900-14: the 
Struggle for Supremacy", I.R.S.H. (1981) 
vol . 26, pp . 1-24.
Shipbuilding Rationalisation 
(Liverpool: C.Birchall & Sons, 1933).
The Woollen and Worsted 
Industry: An Economic Analysis 
(O.U.P., 1965).
B owater (C.U.P., 1982).
Me taIbox (Heinemann, 1976 ).
T he Great Pate rnalist:
1984).
to the village
T itus S a l t (Croom Helm,
an introductionSal taire :_______________________________________
of Sir Titus S a l t (City of 
B r a d f o r d , 1977).
Some Southern Cotton Workers 
and their Villages (U.S Labour 
B u r e a u , 1930).
Shoemenders: A story of goodwill 
in industry (Allen & Unwin, 1953). 
Marshalls of Leeds, Flax-Spinners 
1788-1886 (C.Ü.P., 1960).
"Clydeside Revisited: a reconsideration 
of the Clyde shipbuilding industry, 
1919-38" in W.H.Chaloner & B.M.Ratcliffe 
(eds) Trade and Transport: Essays in 
e conomic history in honour of T.S.Willan 
(M.U.P., 1977).
Fifty Years Experience in
Paper-milling (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Reed,
1897).
"Shipping and Shipbuilding: the Case 
of William Denny and Brothers",
B u s . H i s t . , vol.xvi (1974), p p . 36-47.
Robinsons of Bristol, 1844-1944 
(Bristol: private publication, 1947).
An Early Experience in Industrial 
O r g a n isation...Boulton and Watt,
1775-1805 (Longmans, 19 30).
525
J .J .Rosenburg 
W.Ross
B .S .Rowntree
J .D .Scott
Scotts of 
Greenock
A .H .Seabrook
Sh ipbu tiding
Employers
Federation
E.M.Sigswor th
A.Slaven
J.Smellie
N.J.Smelser
Sir H.L.Smith 
& V.Nash
Life in a Model Coal-Mining Village 
(Manchester: Oxford Press, 1947). 
C rombies of G r a n d h o lm and Cothal, 
1805-1960 (Aberdeen: private 
publication, 1975).
The Way to Industrial Peace 
and the P r o b lem of Unemployment 
(Fisher Unwin, 1914).
Industrial Unrest: A Way Out 
(Fisher Unwin, 1922).
Siemens Brothers, 1858-1958: An 
Essay in the History of an Industry 
(Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1958). 
V ickers: A History (Weidenfield 
& N i c o l s o n ).
Two Centuries of Shipbuilding by 
the Scotts at Greenock (private 
publication, 1920).
The Management of Public Electricity 
Supply Undertakings (Electrical 
T i m e s , 1913).
Position of Industry in Conference 
w ith Unions (private publication, 1931). 
B lack Dyke Mills: A History 
(Liverpool U.P., 1958).
The Developm ent of the West of Scotland, 
1750-1960 (Routledge, Keegan,
P a u l , 1975).
"Earnings and Productivity in the 
Scottish Coal-Mining Industry during the 
19th Century: the Dixon Enterprises" in 
P.L.Payne Essays in Scottish Business 
History (Frank Cass, 1967).
"A Shipyard in Depression: John Brown of 
Clydebank, 1919-38", B u s . H i s t . , vol.xix,
( 1977 ), p p . 192-217 .
"Strategy and Structure in the 
Shipbuilding Firms on the Clyde" in
A.Slaven & D.H.Aldcroft B u s i n e s s ,
Banking, and Urban History (Edinburgh:
Jon Donald, 1982).
Shipbuilding and Repairing in Dublin:
A Record of Work Carried out by the 
Dublin Dockyard Company, 1901-1923 
(Glasgow: M c C o r q u o d a l e , 1935).
Social Change in the Industrial 
Revolution: an application of theory to
the Lancashire cotton industry, 1770-1840
(Routledge, Keegan, Paul, 1959).
The Story of the Dockers' Strike 
(T.Fisher & Unwin, 1889).
526
Stephens of 
Linthouse
G .B .Sutton
J.Tann
B .H .Tripp
G .Turnbull 
R .E.Tyson
G.Unwin (e d .) 
R. W a l 1er
Wall Paper 
Manufacturers Ltd
R.H.Walters
C . H .Ward- 
Jackson
R. E.Waterhouse
A.D.Webb
E.Welbourne
F.A.Wells
R.C.Whiting
A.G.Whyte
A Record of 200 Hundred
Years Shipbuilding, 1750-1950 (private
publication, 1951).
A Shipbuilding History, 1750-1932; 
a record of the business founded c.1750 
b y Alex Stephen at Burghead (London & 
Cheltenham: E.J.Burrow, 1932).
"Shoemakers of Somerset: A history of
C. & J. Clark, 1833-1903" (Nottingham 
Ph.D., 1959).
Industrial Archaeology: Gloucstershire 
Woollen Mills (Newton Abbott: David 
& C h a r l e s , 1967 ) .
Renold Chains: A History of the Company 
and the Rise of the Precision Chain 
Industry, 1879-1955 (Allen &
Unwin, 1956 ) .
A History of the Calico Printing Industry 
(Altrincham: J.Sherrat & Sons, 1951).
"The Sun Mill Company Limited,- A study 
in democratic investment, 1858-1959" 
(Manchester M.A., 1959).
Samuel Oldknow and the Arkwrights 
(M.U.P., 1924).
The Dukeries transformed, the social and 
political development of a 20th Century 
coalfield (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985).
W.P.M.: The pattern of a great 
organisation (Manchester: private 
publication, 1949).
"The Economic History of the South 
Wales Coal Industry, 1840-1914" (Oxford
D . P h i l . , 1976 ) .
A History of Courtaulds (Curwen 
P r e s s , 19 41).
A Hundred Years of Engineering 
Craftsmanship, 1857-1957: a history of 
Tangyes Ltd (Birmingham: private 
publication, 1957).
"The Building Trade" in S.Webb 
& A.Freeman Seasonal Trades 
(London School of Economics, 1912).
The Miners ' Unions of Northumberland 
and Durham (C.U.P., 1923).
The British Hosiery Trade 
(Allen & Unwin, 1935).
Hollins and Vlyella: A Study in Business 
History (Newton Abbot;
David & Charles, 1968).
"The Working Class in the 'New 
Industry' Towns between the Wars; the 
Case of Oxford" (D.Phil. Oxford 1977). 
Forty Years of Electrical 
P rogress; the Story of G.E.C.
(Ernest Benn, 1930).
527
w.G.Willis South Durham Steel and
Iron C ompany Ltd (Portsmouth: Eyre 
& Spottiswood, 1969).
W.Woodruff The Rise o f the British Rubber
Industry during the I9th Century 
(Liverpool U.P., 1972).
E.C.Yarrow Alfred Yarrow (E.Arnold, 1923).
J.Zeitlin "The Labour Strategies of British
Engineering Employers, 1890-1922" in
H.F.Gospel & C.R.Littler Managerial 
Strategies and Industrial Relations 
(Heinemann, 1983).
528
Chapter 8 . 
G.Alderman
W . H.G.Armytage 
& E.C.Mack
M.E.Askwith
E .W .Brabrook
E.Bristow
K .D.Brown
C.C.Carpenter
R .Church
R.Douglas
B .Hoi ton
G.J.Holyoake
R.R.Hyde
Industrial 
Copartnership 
Association 
Industrial Union 
of Employers and 
Employed
B.Jones
P.d 'a .Jones
"The National Free Labour Association: a 
Case Study of Organised Strike-Breaking 
in the Late 19th Century and the Early 
20th Century", I.R.S.H. (1976), vol.xxi, 
p p . 309-336.
Thomas Hughes: the Life of
the Author of Tom Brown's Schooldays
(Ernest Benn, 1952).
Profitsharing: an Aid 
to Trade Revival (London: Duncann 
S c o t t , 1926).
Provident Societies and
Industrial Welfare (Blackie & Son,
Unrest"
in Anti-Labour
1898).
"Profitsharing and Labour
in K.D.Brown (ed.) Essays___________________
History (MacMillan, 1974).
Essays in Anti-Labour 
History (MacMillan, 1974).
Copartnership in Industry 
(Copartnership Publishers Ltd, 1912). 
Industrial Partnership 
(London: M c C orquadale, 1927). 
"Profit-Sharing and Labour Relations 
in the Nineteenth Century", I.R.S.H. 
vol.xvi (1971), p p . 2-16.
"The National Democratic Party
and the British Workers League", H . J . ,
vol . XV, (1972), p p . 533-552.
British Syndicalism, 1900-1914 
(Pluto Press, 1976).
The History of Cooperation 
(Fisher Unwin, 1906).
The Jubilee History of the Leeds 
Industrial Cooperative Society from 
1847-1897 (Manchester: Cooperative 
Printing Society Ltd, 1897).
The Boy in Industry and 
Leisure (Social Service Library, 1921). 
The Camp Book....the Duke of York's 
experiments (Ernest Benn, 1930).
Profitsharing in Practice: A
Brief Outline of the Profitsharing Scheme
of Ford Ayrton & Co. Ltd. (I.C.A., 1949).
T h e Industrial Union of Employers 
and Employed (no publisher 
s t a t e d , 1894).
Cooperative Prod u c t i o n , Vols.I & II 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894).
The Christian Socialist Revival 
(New Jersey: Princeton U.P., 1968).
529
Labour
Copartnership
Association
A.D.Murray (ed . )
M.M.Niven
S . Pol lard 
& R.Turner
J .Rammage
Report on London Copartnership 
Congress (L.C.A., 1920).
John Ludlow: the Autobiography
o f a Christian Socialist (Cass, 19 81).
Personnel Management, 1913-63: 
the Genesis of Personnel Management 
and the Development of the Institute 
(Weston-super-Mare: Lawrence Bros, 1967
"Profitsharing and Autocracy: the 
Case of J . , T . , & J.Taylor of Batley, 
Woollen Manufacturers, 1892-1966",
B u s .H i s t ., vol.xviii, (1976), p p . 4-34.
and Copartnership in 
in F.E.Gannet & 
Industrial and Labour
"Profitsharing 
Great Britain"
B.F.Catherwood ______________
Relations in Great Britain ( New 
1939 )
C.E.Raven
D.F.Schloss 
N. Soldon
E .Sidney
G . Stoddart-Kennedy
York: no publisher stated,
C hristian Socialism, 1848-1854 
(MacMillan, 1920).
Methods of Industrial Renumeration 
(Williams & Norgate, 1898).
"Laissez-faire as Dogma: the Liberty 
and Property Defence League" in K.D.Brown 
(ed.) Essays in Anti-Labour History 
(MacMillan, 1974 ) .
The Industrial Society, 1918-1968 
(I.W.S., 1968).
Dog-Collar Democracy: the
Industrial Christian Fellowship, 1919-39
(MacMillan, 1982)
530
Chapter 9.
W .Abbott
P .Abrams
G .Alderman 
S .Armi tage 
P.S.Bagwell
R .Bean
S.H.Beer 
W.Beveridge 
S .Blank
R . A .Brady 
E.Bristow
K.D.Brown 
J .Brown
L.P.Carpenter
S .D .Chapman 
R .Charles
P.F.Clarke
its Organisation 
of T.H.,
in the Port of 
I . R . S . H . ,
Education for Industry and 
Commerce in England 
(O.U.P., 1933).
"The Failure of Social Reform, 1918-20", 
Past and P r e s e n t , n o . 24,
(1963), p p . 43-64.
The Railway Interest (Leicster U.P.,
1979 ) .
The Politics of Decontrol 
(Ernest Benn, 1968).
"The Railway Interest:
and its Influence", Jl__
vol . 7 (1965), p p . 65-86.
"Employers ' Associations
Liverpool, 1890-1914", __________
vol.xxi (1976), pp . 358-382.
"The Liverpool Dock Strike", I . R . S . H . , 
vol.xviii (1973), pp.51-68.
Modern British Politics (Faber &
F a b e r , 1 9 6 5 ) .
Power and Influence (Hodder &
Stoughton, 1953).
Industry and Government in Britain: 
the Federation of British Industries in 
politics, 1945-1965 (F a r n b o r o u g h : Saxon 
H o u s e , 19 7 3).
Business as a System of Power 
(Columbia U.P., 1943).
"The Liberty and Property Defence League 
and Individualism", H . J . , vol.xviii,
(1975), p p . 761-789.
Labour and Unemployment, 1900-14 
(New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1971). 
Essays in Anti-Labour History (MacMillan, 
1974 ).  ^ ^
" 'Social Control ' and the Modernisation 
of Social Policy, 1890-1929" in P.Thane 
The Origins of British Social Policy 
(Croom Helm, 1978).
"Corporatism in Britain, 1930-45",
J l . of Contemporary H y , vol.xi,
(1976), p p . 3-25.
A History of Working Class Housing 
(Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1971).
The Development of Industrial 
Relations in Britain, 1911-1939 
(Hutchinson, 1973).
"The end of laissez-faire and 
the politics of cotton", H . J . , 
vol.XV, (1972), p p . 493-512.
Lancashire and the New Liberalism 
(C.U.P., 1971).
L iberals and Social Democrats 
(C.U.P., 1978).
531
J.L .Cohen
D .Col I is
R.W.Ferguson
A.Deacon
H.V.Emy 
D.Fraser
I .G.Gibbon
B .B.Gilbert
W. P .Grant 
& P.C.Marsh
W.L.Guttsman
J.Harris
J.R.Hay
"The Progressive Movement in England", 
T . R .H.S., vol.24, (1974), pp . 159-181. 
"Liberals, Labour and the Franchise",
E . H .R., vol.92, (1977), p p . 582-590.
Insurance against u nemployment with 
special reference to British and American 
conditions (P.S.King & Son, 1921). 
Insurance by Industry Examined 
(P.S.King & Son, 1923).
Social Insurance Unified
(P.S.King & Son, 1924). 
"The Introduction of Old 
in Great Britain", H . J . , 
( 1965 ) , pp. 246-259 .
Day Continuation Schools
Age
vol
at
Pens ions 
v i i i ,
Work (no publisher stated, 1935).
Education in the Factory: an Account 
o f educational schemes and facilities at 
Cadbury Brothers Ltd (Bournville 
Publishing Dept, 1924).
Concession and Coercion: the Politics 
o f Unemployment Insurance in the 1920s" 
in A .Briggs & J.Saville Essays in Labour 
H i s t o r y , Vol.Ill (Croom Helm, 1977), 
p p . 9-3 5.
L ibera ls, Radicals, and Social 
Politics, 1892-1914 (C.U.P., 197 3).
The Evolution of the Welfare 
S ta te (MacMillan, 1973 ).
Unemployment Insurance: A study in 
schemes of assisted insurance
(P.S.King & Son, 
The Evolution of
1911). 
National
Insurance: origins of the welfare state 
(Joseph, 1966).
British Social Policy, 1919-1939 
(J o s e p h , 19 70).
1977 )
Welfare 
1942" in 
British
The Confederation of British 
Industry (Hodder & Stoughton,
The British Political Elite 
(McGibbon & Kee, 1963).
"Did British Workers Want the 
State? G.D.H.Cole's Survey of
J.Winter The Working Class in__________
History (C.U.P., 1983).
Unemployment and Politics: a study in 
E nglish social policy, 1886-1914 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1972).
William Beveridge; a biography 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1977).
T he Development of the British Welfare 
S tate, 1880-1975 (Edward Arnold,
1978), esp. p p . 32-52.
532
A. J .Heeson
R.F.Holland
A . R . &
F.B.Ilersic
Industrial 
League 
Indus tria I 
League and 
Council
Industria I 
Reconstruction 
Council 
P.B.Johnson
R.Kimber &
J.J.Richardson
C.E.Lindblom
R.Lowe
C .Macara
A.Marwick
"Employers' Attitudes to Social Policy 
and the Concept of Social Control,
1900-1920" in P.Thane The Origins of 
British Social P o l i c y (London: Croom 
Helm, 1978).
The Origins of the Liberal Welfare 
Reforms, 1906-1914 (MacMillan, 1975). 
"Employers and social policy in Britain: 
the evolution of welfare legislation, 
1905-14", Soc.Hist. (1977), 
v o l .2, pp. 435-455 .
"Social Policy making in Britain during 
the second world war" in W.J.Mommsen 
The Emergence of the Welfare State 
in Britain and Germany, 1850-1950 
(Croom Helm, 1981).
"The Northern Coal-Owners and the 
Opposition to the Coal Mines Act of 
1842", I . R . S . H . , vol.XXV
(1980), p p . 236-271.
"The Federation of British Industries and 
the International Economy, 1929-39", 
Ec o n . H . R . , 2nd ser., v o l . 34, 
p p . 287-300.
Parliament of Commerce: the story of
the Association of British Chambers of 
Commerce, c.1860-1960 (Commerce 
& Newman Neame, 1960).
The Industrial League (3) (1921) .
Whitley Councils: What they 
do and what they are doing (19 20 ) , 
by J.H.Whitley.
Reconstruction Handbook 
(1918).
Land Fit for Heroes (Chicago:
Chicago U.P., 1968).
Pressure-groups in Britain: 
a reader (Dent, 19 74).
Politics and Markets
(New York: Basic Books, 1977).
"The Failure of Consensus in Britain: 
the National Industrial Conference,
1919-1921", H . J . , v o l . 21,
(1978), p p . 649-675.
"Welfare Legislation and the Unions 
during and after the First World War",
H . J . , vol. X X V  (1982), p p . 437-441. 
Recollections (Cassell, 1977).
Social and Industrial Reform 
(Manchester: Sherrat & Hughes, 1918).
"The Labour Party and the Welfare 
State in Britain, 1900-1939", A m . H . R . , 
vol.73(1) (1967), p p . 380-403.
533
J.Melling
(ed.)
K .Middlemas
R.Milliband
Ministry 
of Munitions
W.J.Mommsen
D .C .Moore
M.Olsen 
H.M.PelIing 
N.Poulantzas 
P .L.Robertson
Sir H.P. 
Robinson
R.J.Scally
D.F.Schloss 
G.R.Searle
B .Semmel 
J.B.Seymour
T.Smith 
R . K .Snyder 
F.H.Stead
"Employers, Industrial Housing, and the 
Evolution of Company Welfare Policies in 
Britain's Heavy Industry: West Scotland, 
1870-1920", I .R.S.H., vol.xxvi,
(1981), p p . 255-301.
Housing, Social Policy, and the 
S tate (Croom Helm, 1980 ).
Politics in Industrial Society 
(A . D e u t s c h , 1979).
The State in Capitalist 
Society (Quartet Books, 1983).
H istory of Ministry of
M u n i t i o n s , Vol.V (H.M.S.O., 1919).
T he Emergence of the Welfare State in 
Great Britain and Germany 
(Croom Helm 1981).
The Politics of Deference: a study 
of the mid-19th Century political system 
(Harvard U.P., 1976).
The Logic of Collective Action 
(Camb. Mass.: Harvard Press, 1968). 
Popular Politics and Society in 
Late Victorian Britain (MacMillan, 19 68) 
"The Problem of the Capitalist State", 
New Left Review (1969), n o . 58, pp.67-78. 
"Technical Education in the British 
Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering 
Industries, 1863-1914", E c o n .H .R ., 
(1974), v o l . 27, p p . 222-235.
The Employers Liability Assurance 
Corporation Limited, 1880-1930 (private 
publication, 1930).
The Origins of the Lloyd George 
Coalition: the politics of social 
imperialism, 1900-1918 (Princeton 
U.P., 1975).
Insurance against Unemployment 
(P.S.King & Sons, 1909).
The Quest for National Efficiency 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1971).
"The Edwardian Liberal Party and 
Business", E . H . R . , vol.98, (1983),
p p . 28-60.
Imperialism and Social Reform 
(Allen & Unwin, 1960).
The British Employment Exchange 
(P.S.King & Son, 1928).
The Whitley Council Scheme 
(P.S.King & Son, 1932).
The Politics of the Corporate 
Economy (Oxford: M.Robertson, 1979).
T he Tariff Problem in British Politics,
1917-1923 (Stanford U.P., 1944).
How Old Age Pensions Came 
to Be (Methuen, 1909).
534
M .Swenarton
R.H.Tawney 
P.Thane
J.H.Treble
J.A.Turner 
N.Whiteside
C.Wrigley
A.H.Yarmie
"An 'Insurance against Revolution': 
Ideological Objectives of the Provision 
and Design of Public Housing in Britain 
after the First World World War",
B . I . H . R . , vol.liv (1981), p p . 86-134.
Homes Fit for Heroes: the Politics and
Architecture of Early State Housing in 
Britain (Heinemann, 1981).
"The Abolition of Economic Controls,
1918-21", E c o n . H . R . , 2nd ser., vol.xiii 
(1943), p p . 1-30.
Foundations of the Welfare 
S tate (Longman, 1982).
The Origins of British Social Policy 
(Croom Helm, 1978).
"The Attitudes of Friendly Societies 
towards the Movement in Great Britain for 
State Pensions, 1878-1908", I . R . S . H . , 
vol.XV (1970), p p . 266-299.
"The British Commonwealth Union and 
the General Election of 1918, E.H.R.
(1978 ) , pp. 528-551 .
"Industrial Labour and Welfare 
Legislation after the First World War: A 
Reply" (to R.Lowe: cf. above), H . J . , 
vol. X X V  (1982), p p . 443-6.
"Welfare Insurance and Casual Labour: a 
Study of Administrative Intervention in 
Industrial Employment, 1906-26",
E c o n . H . R . , (1979), vol.32, 
p p . 507-532.
"Welfare Legislation and the Unions 
during the First World War", H . J . , 
vol.xxiii (1980), p p . 857-874.
David Lloyd George and
the British Labour Movement (Sussex:
Harvester Press, 1976).
A History of British Industrial Relations 
1875-1914 (Sussex: Harvester 
P r e s s , 1982 ) .
"Employers ' Organisations in 
Mid-Victorian England", I . R . S . H . , 
vol. X X V ,  (1980), p p . 209-235.
535
Addendum to B i b l i o g r a p h y .
Chapter I & General :
L.Hannah Inventing Retirement: the development
o f occupational pensions in Britain 
(C.U.P., 1986)
L.Johnman "The Largest Manufacturing Companies of
1935", Bus. H i s t . (1986), vol.xxviii, 
no . 2, pp.226-245
J.Melling "British Employers and the Development
of Industrial Welfare, c.1880-1920: an 
Industrial and Regional Comparison" 
(Glasgow Ph.D., 1980).
Chapter 2:
R.J.Irving The North Eastern Railway Company,
1870-1914: an economic history (Leicster 
U.P., 1976).
Chapter 4:
P.D.Stubley "The Churches in the Iron and Steel
Industry in M i ddlesborough, 1890-1914" 
(Durham M.A., 1979).
Chapter 9:
R.P.T.Davenport Dudley Docker: the life and
-Hines times of a trade warrior (C.U.P., 1986).
